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ABSTRACT 
The thesis aims to build on what is known about large and internationalized welfare 
firms, and to make a contribution to the debate about social policy and globalization, 
through an empirical and exploratory study of large and internationalized firms within 
the UK market in long term care for older people. The thesis utilizes two levels of 
analysis: a micro level analysis based on case studies of the three largest private 
providers of long term care in the UK; and a meso level analysis of the relationships 
between these firms and three other actors: the state and its agencies, staff and unions, 
and older people themselves. The findings of the thesis contradict deterministic claims 
concerning the loss of power by the state. The state is found to be the most powerful 
actor in the sector in ten-ns of its ability to regulate the sector and influence its overall 
structure. In contrast, the relative weakness of unions and older people's organizations 
leads them to attempt to exert influence on private providers through the medium of 
the state. State policies, however, are likely to facilitate greater concentration and 
internationalization within the sector, an outcome which is in the long tenn interests of 
those firms which are already large and internationalized. The parallel processes of 
concentration and internationalization in the sector have significant implications for the 
delivery of care. 
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INTRODUCTION 
During the period of study during which this thesis was researched and written, the 
term 'globalization' has moved from relative obscurity to over-used buzzword. 
Fortunately, it has also become a serious topic of academic study in a wide variety of 
different disciplines, each of which has sought to investigate different aspects of the 
phenomenon and the implications of it for the particular concerns of that discipline. 
However, as Ruigrok & van Tulder (1995: 5) point out, there often seems to be few 
cross references between different debates and disciplines. Despite this, assumptions 
have sometimes been transported into one discipline from another without being 
sufficiently subjected to critical appraisal. This has often led to 'sweeping conclusions' 
based on acceptance of the claims of others. According to Ruigrok and van Tulder 
(ibid), 'members of the academic community sometimes forgot to put these claims to 
the same rigorous tests as they demanded from scholars from their own disciplines and 
debates'. 
As will be discussed further in Chapter One, this charge of accepting assumptions at 
face value is one that can easily be made of some Social Policy accounts of 
globalization. In particular, such accounts have reflected a widespread view that 
changes in the world economy have placed severe restrictions on the social policies 
that can be pursued by governments. Assumptions about the nature of the 
contemporary world economy drawn, often uncritically, from Political Economy and 
associated disciplines have thus been used to present often simplistic and deterministic 
claims about the consequences for welfare provision and the social and economic 
policies which affect it. There is a rich tradition of analysing the welfare state from the 
perspective of Political Economy (O'Connor, 1973; Gough, 1979; Offe, 1984; Esping- 
Anderson, 1990). Yet much of the recent work on globalization within Social Policy 
has concentrated on the alleged effects upon welfare states, without taking sufficient 
account of debates within Political Economy which demonstrate the contested status of 
the idea. 
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This thesis takes an interdisciplinary approach from the start, integrating the Social 
Policy literature with that of Political Economy and associated disciplines. In doing so, 
it follows calls for interdisciplinarity from a number of academics in a cluster of 
disciplines concerned with globalization, including Social Policy, International 
Relations, International Political Economy and International Business (Deacon, 1997; 
Sally, 1996; Ruigrok & van Tulder, 1995; Dunning, 1993; Stopford & Strange, 1991). 
Most Social Policy debates on globalization have usually been focused at a 'macro' 
level of analysis, that is, they attempt to assess the impact of changes in the world 
market generally on the social policies and refon-ns pursued by national governments. 
However, authors within the field of International Business have tended to focus on a 
'micro' level analysis of international firms (Dunning, 1993), whilst some authors in 
International Political Economy have pioneered the study of bargaining relations 
between such firms and national governments (Stopford & Strange, 1991) or other 
actors (Ruigrok & van Tulder, 1995), what Ruigrok & van Tulder characterize as a 
4meso' level of analysis. 
This thesis aims to make a contribution to the study of globalization and social policy 
by incorporating some of these innovations from other disciplines. It focuses upon 
developments within one particular area of welfare, where private provision has 
become the norm in the UK - long term care for older people. It does this by 
combining two levels of analysis not often utilised within Social Policy. These are, 
firstly, a 'micro' level analysis based on case studies of the three largest firms operating 
within the UK long term care market, and secondly, a 'meso' level analysis of the 
relationships between such firms and three other key actors: the state and its agencies, 
the fin-ns' staff and unions, and older people themselves. 
The thesis has two principal aims. Firstly, it aims to build on what is known about 
large and internationalized welfare fin-ns through an empirical and exploratory study of 
such firms within the UK market in long ten-n care for older people. As well as having 
relevance for the globalization debate, this will have relevance for those involved in 
social work and health practice, who may deal daily with such fin-ns but have little 
appreciation of the organizational and economic factors behind the delivery of care. So 
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that the results of the thesis should have the maximum relevance for the recipients of 
the service studied, there is an emphasis throughout on issues of quality. Secondly, the 
thesis aims to make a contribution to the debate within Social Policy concerning the 
perceived loss of power by the state and other domestic actors resulting from 
globalization. 
, Chapter One reviews the literature on globalization within Social Policy in the context 
of the Political Economy literature which has influenced it. Chapter One also reviews 
some approaches to the 'level of analysis problem', and its significance for the debate 
about globalization within Social Policy. This chapter also notes that the state may not 
be withdrawing from economic and social life, but rather changing the form of its 
intervention. 
Chapter Two discusses issues relevant to the private provision and 
internationalization of welfare services. It notes that internationalization in services 
generally has increased in recent years, in line with growing internationalization in the 
wider world economy, and that the privatization of provision has increased the scope 
for internationalization in welfare services. This has been accompanied by a process of 
concentration in many sectors, including long term care. However, the increase in 
private provision of such services has led to a renewed emphasis on their regulation 
and on issues of quality. The chapter also discusses issues relevant to the internal 
functioning of large private providers, particularly those which may have a bearing on 
the quality of care, including processes of merger and acquisition. 
Chapter Three outlines the research design of the thesis and discusses methodological 
issues. How the micro and meso levels of analysis were operationalized is explained in 
this chapter. Chapter Four discusses the results of the micro level analysis of the case 
study firms. Chapters Five, Six and Seven discuss the results of the meso level analyses 
of the relationships between these firms and the three other actors: state agencies, staff 
and unions, and older people respectively. The concluding chapter, Chapter Eight, 
discusses the implications of the research for both long term care in the UK, and for 
the debate about globalization. 
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CHAPTER ONE: GLOBALIZATION, DETERMINISM AND 
LEVELS OF ANALYSIS 
INTRODUCTION 
As indicated in the Introduction to this thesis, the idea of globalization has been 
adopted for study in a range of disciplines. In Social Policy, globalization has quickly 
become the new paradigm within which changes to welfare states are explained. 'The 
emergence of a competitive global economy which has diminished national autonomy 
and community identity' (BASW & University of Central Lancashire, 1999), is 
increasingly taken to be the causal force which is reshaping welfare. 
In the first section of this chapter the debates which have surrounded globalization in 
the discipline of Social Policy are examined in the light of debates within Political 
Economy. In particular, deterministic claims concerning the loss of power by the state 
and other domestic actors are assessed. The section argues that such deterministic 
accounts of globalization are over-simplistic and open to challenge on a number of 
counts. Pursuing a theme which will be fundamental to the remainder of the thesis, it is 
argued that, despite significant changes to the world economy, the state retains its 
power. However, it will be argued that theform of state intervention may be changing, 
and that state intervention today may often take the form of regulation rather than 
direct provision. 'Globalisation' is thus regarded not as fully realized end point, but as 
a process which is actively shaped by a number of agents, including the state. 
In the second section, the chapter moves on to a discussion of the 'level of analysis 
problem'. It is pointed out that most Social Policy accounts of globalization have been 
pitched at the national, or macro, level of analysis. In contrast, this thesis combines 
findings from analyses pitched at two other levels: the micro (firm) level, and a meso 
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level concerned with interaction between core firms and other key actors. This 
discussion of the 'level of analysis' problem is resumed in Chapter Three. 
GLOBALIZATION, POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIAL POLICY 
In Political Economy (and International Political Economy in particular) it has been the 
massive growth of trade, foreign direct investment (FDI) and financial flows which 
have caught the attention of commentators in relation to globalization. Trade has been 
growing faster than output throughout the post-war period (Foreman-Peck, 1995: 
288), but it was the realization that FDI had begun to grow at an even faster rate than 
trade in the 1980s which initiated the globalization debate. The primary vehicles for 
FDI are the Transnational Corporations (TNCs). The world's 37,000 TNCs directly 
employ about 73 million people, 20% of all employment in the industrialized countries. 
Their impact on indirect employment is just as huge, bringing the total number of 
workers dependent on TNCs to at least 40% of total employment in the industrialized 
countries (Ruigrok & van Tulder, 1995: 155). The role'of TNCs is highly significant in 
both trade and FDI. Some 80% of US trade in 1992 was conducted by TNCs, which is 
not atypical for developed countries. For total US trade as much as a third was 
estimated to be intra-TNC trade, i. e. conducted within the boundaries of the company, 
involving transfers across borders between different parts of the same organization. As 
far as finance is concerned, even 'globalization sceptics' like Hirst & Thompson (1996) 
have accepted that there is a strong trend toward globalization. The most innovative 
changes here have come through the development of complex financial instruments 
such as derivatives. Technology has been a facilitator, as the exchange of shares and 
other financial instruments are increasingly recorded only on computer files, without 
the exchange of paper certificates. It is the volume, speed and price sensitivity of such 
exchanges which have dazzled commentators. 
There are varying responses to these changes in the Social Policy literature. These 
can broadly be split into three types of response. Firstly, there are those accounts 
which argue that globalization is pushing all states in broadly the same direction, i. e. 
welfare retrenchment and the dominance of neo-liberal policies. Mishra (1999) is the 
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best example of this view, and his work will be discussed further below. Secondly, 
there are those accounts which argue that globalization is not the cause of 
contemporary changes in welfare states. This view has been advanced by Paul Pierson 
(1998), who argues that there are three endogenous causes of the current pressures 
being experienced by advanced welfare states which have nothing to do with 
globalization. These are firstly, the expansion of the service sector, which is less 
productive and therefore leads to slower overall growth; secondly, 'the maturation of 
governmental commitments', particularly pensions and health; and thirdly, population 
ageing. Despite these pressures, Pierson argues, the strength of support for welfare 
states in most countries makes their dismantling highly unlikely. The third type of 
response to globalization in the Social Policy literature are those accounts which argue 
that globalization is having an effect, but that this varies between different types of 
welfare state, which retain a degree of autonomy in terms of how they respond to 
external constraints. Esping-Anderson (1996a & b) is the best example of this view; his 
work will be discussed further below, especially in the second section of this chapter in 
relation to the level of analysis problem. 
This thesis is primarily concerned with the first of these views, which will be referred 
to as the 'determu'ustic' view of globalization. This view, which also has many 
adherents within the wider political economy literature, encompasses the belief that 
globalization has stripped away the powers of the nation state (as well as of other 
domestic actors such as trades unions), leaving citizens vulnerable to the ravages of the 
world market. Ohmae even characterises the nation state as an 'artefact of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries'(1995: 129). Soediomoto, of the United Nations 
University of Tokyo, articulates well the widespread perception that today's global 
market is beyond human control by likening it to the natural behaviour of the weather, 
rather than seeing it as a pattern of human relations: 
In the process of interdependence, we have all become vulnerable. Our 
societies are permeable to decisions taken elsewhere in the world. The 
dynamics of interdependence might better be understood if we think of the 
globe not in ten-ns of a map of nations but as a meteorological map, where 
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weather systems swirl independently of any national boundaries ahd low and 
high fronts create new climatic conditions far ahead of them. 
(quoted in Campanella, 1995: 18, emphasis in original) 
Internationalization is most often seen as 'an exogenous development to which 
domestic actors must respond rather than the result of conscious policy 
choice. '(Garrett, 1996: 83) In this view, even though policy liberalization invariably 
attends increases in trade and capital mobility, reductions in the relative prices of 
technology and transportation are seen as causally prior to changes in policy (ibid). 
Even if substantial state intervention is thought desirable it is not possible without 
paying high costs in terms of competitiveness (See Keohane & Milner, 1996). A 
consensus has thus emerged that, in order to attract investment, states must pursue an 
economic policy based on low taxation, restrained public borrowing and spending, low 
and stable inflation rates and a low wage, flexible labour market. The consequences for 
welfare involve both budget restraint and privatization. 
This dominant, deterministic, thesis has become a new paradigm which accepts the 
inevitability of welfare retrenchment, what Held et al (1999: 3 1) call 'political 
fatalism'. Mishra (1999: 6) sums up this view very well: 
Put simply, by providing capital with an 'exit' option, globalization has 
strengthened the bargaining power of capital very considerably against 
government as well as labour... Thus money and investment capital can vote 
with their feet if they do not like government policies... Indeed globalization 
virtually sounds the death-knell of the classical social democratic strategy of 
full employment, high levels of public expenditure and progressive taxation. 
Mishra (1999) advances seven propositions which encapsulate the 'logic' of 
globalization as he sees it. These are: 
1) Globalization undermines the ability of national governments to pursue the 
objectives of full employment and economic growth through reflationary policies. 
'Keynesianism in one country' ceases to be a viable option. 
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2) Globalization results in an increasing inequality in wages and working conditions 
through greater labour market flexibility, a differentiated 'Post-Fordist' work-force 
and decentralized collective bargaining. Global competition and mobility of capital 
result in 'social dumping' and a downward shift in wages and working conditions. 
3) Globalization exerts a downward pressure on systems of social protection and 
social expenditure by prioritizing the reduction of deficits and debt and the 
lowering of taxation as key objectives of state policy. 
4) Globalization weakens the ideological underpinnings of social protection, especially 
that of a national minimum, by undermining national solidarity and legitimating 
inequality of rewards. 
5) Globalization weakens the basis of social partnership and tripartism by shifting the 
balance of power away from labour and the state and towards capital. 
6) Globalization constrains the policy options of nations by virtually excluding left-of- 
centre approaches. In this sense it spells the 'end of ideology' as far as welfare 
state policies are concerned. 
7) The logic of globalization comes into conflict with the 'logic' of the national 
community and democratic politics. Social policy emerges as a major issue of 
contention between global capitalism and the democratic nation state. 
With some qualifications, Mishra argues that there is a trend towards the realization of 
this logic, thus undermining existing welfare provision. 
Whilst Mishra (1999) at least acknowledges the role of neo-liberal ideology in 
promoting contemporary globalization, George (1998: 34) claims that: 'It is a good 
example of structural forces overriding ideological influences. ' George (1998: 30) 
offers the globalization thesis as 'the central explanatory notion' in approaching 
welfare developments in advanced industrial societies today. According to him, there 
are three main effects of globalization on welfare developments. First, the cheaper 
labour costs of South East Asian Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) is enabling 
them to increase their share of world trade at the expense of the West. Second, these 
lower labour costs are encouraging firms to transfer some of their production to 
developing countries, putting pressure on advanced industrial countries to lower their 
own labour costs in order to compete. Third, globalization has resulted in the mobility 
of capital, but not of labour, making it easier for multinational companies to frustrate 
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the taxation policies and other demands Of national governments. This gives capital the 
upper hand and undermines the forces which have traditionally defended state welfare. 
The result is that 'governments are no longer total masters in their own countries and 
welfare developments are, to some extent, at the mercy of globalizing 
influences. "(1998: 31) According to George (1998: 34)ý it is only within these new 
hostile conditions that national factors influencing welfare can be understood. 
A more sophisticated view argues that states can at least actively shape policy in the 
area of education and labour market efficiency, and thus increase national 
competiveness (see Jordan, 1998, and Holden, 1999, for critiques of such policies). 
According to Reich (1991), it is the workers within countries who now must compete 
with each other, since competitiveness no longer depends on the success of nationally 
owned corporations (which have outgrown their national bases) but on value added by 
workers within states. Equipping workers with the skills with which to compete in the 
global marketplace is seen as the main task of national governments. It is only through 
education, and the application of new technology which such education allows for, that 
the value added by routine workers in both the shrinking manufacturing sector and the 
service sector can be enhanced. This is a view shared by Tony Blair, who has pledged 
to 'accept globalization and work with it'. According to Blair, the 'driving force of 
economic change today is globalization' which has created a world order 'where 
capital and technology are mobile ... (and) people are our key resource' 
(Speech to the 
Keidenran, Tokyo, 5.1.96, quoted in Froud et al, 1996: 13 3). 
This is ultimately the view of Esping-Anderson (1996a: 4). Whilst his work at least 
emphasizes the Mering types of welfare state adaptation, he nevertheless starts from 
the proposition that, 'integration in the world today almost automatically implies open 
economies', further noting that, 'openness is said to sharply restrict nations' capacity 
to autonomously design their own political economy. ' His argument is illustrated in 
relation to the two very Merent welfare states of Australia and Sweden (See also 
Stephens, 1996 and Castles, 1996). Australia could pursue a model of welfare based 
on job security, full employment and high wages only as long as it adhered to 
protectionist measures - the price it paid was lagging growth. Sweden could balance 
full employment with its famously generous welfare state only so long as governments 
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could control domestic credit and investments, and as long as the 'labour market 
partners' could guarantee wage moderation consensually. Following liberalization in 
the early 1980s, Sweden suffered heavy capital leakage abroad. At the same time, its 
tradition of centralized national social pacts eroded. Enhanced openness in both 
Australia and Sweden has thus compelled governments of both left and right to cut 
back social expenditure (Hirst & Thompson, 1999: 167, offer a different interpretation 
of the Swedish crisis). Yet policies based on liberalization tend to produce greater 
inequalities, and in democracies this compels governments to rely on persuasion or 
compensatory social guarantees to gain the consent of their populations. Esping- 
Anderson's conclusion (1996b: 256) is that a strategy based on education and training 
can be the basis of a 'positive-sum solution' which avoids the 'trade-off between jobs 
and equality'. 'Lifelong learning' and 'social investment' strategies can eliminate the 
surplus of unskilled workers and ensure that inferior low-paid jobs do not become life 
cycle traps but merely stop gaps or first entryjobs. 
Whilst Esping-Anderson emphasizes the differences between welfare states, he shares 
with the deterministic thesis the assumption that exogenous developments in the world 
market have placed constraints on states which push them in a particular direction. Yet 
such assumptions have been questioned for a variety of reasons. First, the extent of 
globalization may be exaggerated in such accounts. In Political Economy, there has 
been much debate about the extent of FDI and its significance, with 'sceptics' such as 
Hirst & Thompson (1996 & 1999) and Ruigrok & van Tulder (1995) pointing out that 
the overwhelming majority of TNCs continue to be nationally based rather than 
genuinely 'footloose'. So, although around 40 of the world's largest 100 firms 
generate at least half of their sales abroad, this is mainly through exports: less than 20 
maintain at least half of their production facilities abroad. The executive boards of the 
top firms are overwhelmingly national in their composition. Many firms appear to have 
internationalized their finances when measured in terms of the number of foreign stock 
exchanges on which they have fisted shares, yet when this is measured in terms of the 
percentage of the firms' total shares it is minimal (Ruigrok & van Tulder, 1995: 156). 
Where firms have operations in more than one country, but a clear national base, it is 
therefore more accurate to call these 'internationalized' rather than 'globalized' firms, 
or 4 multinational" corporations (MNCs) rather than 'transnational, corporations 
(TNCs). 
Nevertheless, it is clear that there is a growing trend towards the internationalization 
of investment. Ruigrok & van Tulder (1995: 149) themselves quote figures which 
show that between 1983 and 1988, FDI rose by more than 20% annually, four times 
faster than international trade. Hirst & Thompson (1996: 5 1) also note that during the 
1980s, FDI overtook trade as 'the dominant factor driving the world economy'. As 
Held et al (1999: 282) point out, the pre-eminence of MNCs in world output, trade, 
investment and technology transfer is unprecedented. Even where MNCs have a clear 
national base, their interest is in global profitability and competition above all. 
So although the extent of economic globalization may be exaggerated, the evidence 
suggests there is in fact a trend towards greater integration. The comprehensive work 
undertaken by Held et al (1999: 427) concludes that when viewed in historical ten-ns, 
contemporary patterns of globalization across a range of 'domains' are unprecedented, 
not just in quantitative terms but also qualitatively in terms of their organizational 
forms. Whereas sceptics such as Hirst & Thompson (1996 and 1999) argue that 
contemporary patterns of internationalization are essentially no different to the pre- 
1914 period of the Gold Standard, Held et al (1999: 425) point out that the pre-1914 
period was characterized primarily by divided imperial systems. Contemporary 
globalization, on the other hand, is characterized by global flows and networks 
between independent nation states, 'overlaid by multilateral, regional and global 
systems of regulation and governance'. Growing integration therefore means that 
globalization is best seen as aprocess, rather than a fully realized end point (Held et al, 
1999: 27; Perraton et al, 1997). This process, however, is not pre-determined or 
teleological, but is reflexive and contested: 'globalization today reflects the varied and 
self-conscious political or economic projects of national elites and transnational social 
forces pursuing often conflicting visions of world order' (Held et al, 1999: 430). 
However, despite the terminology of 'globalization', many authors have pointed out 
that the majority of FDI flows have come from and gone to other industrialized 
countries (Ruigrok & van Tulder, 1995; Hirst & Thompson, 1996 & 1999). Moreover, 
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most of this investment is also regionally based. So the world economy is actually 
bound together by threads of investment between the three dominant economies of the 
USA, Europe (of which Germany is the core) and Japan - what Ohmae (1990: 6) calls 
the 'Interlinked Economy' of the 'Triad'. Each of the three major powers of the Triad 
is dominant in the poorer economies which are geographically closest to it. Thus, the 
USA dominates in Latin America, the EU dominates in central and Eastern Europe, as 
well as Africa, and Japan dominates in the Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) of 
East Asia. These regions may centre around formal trading blocs such as the EU and 
NAFTA, or may be more informal, as in Japan's dominance of the East Asian 
economies (Ruigrok & van Tulder, 1995: 198). Held et al (1999: 270), however, argue 
that high levels of transregional flows mean that contemporary globalization and 
regionalization are mutually reinforcing. Hirst & Thompson (1996: 63) point out that 
there is more 'cross-fertilization' between regions in terms of FDI than in terms of 
trade, a fact which mirrors the general growth in importance of FDI. 
The fact that the majority of FDI flows go to other industrialized countries casts 
doubt on the claim that unemployment in the industrialized countries is a result of 
TNCs seeking cheaper labour in less developed countries. The availability of low 
wages is only one of the reasons motivating TNCs to invest abroad. They may also 
seek developed infrastructure or more skilled labour. Alternatively, foreign investment 
may be the extension of an export strategy designed to penetrate overseas markets. 
This may require the firm to become an 'insider' in order to get past trade barriers or 
overcome the uncertainty of exchange rate movements (Ruigrok & van Tulder, 1995: 
179). Most importantly, however, the firm will be seeking investment opportunities 
that are not open to it at home. As Chapter Two indicates, overseas provision of some 
services has to take the form of FDI rather than trade, since they are consumed at the 
time of production. In so far as any area of the 'Third World' has benefited 
substantially from the increase in FDI flows, it is China, to which all areas of the Triad 
have exported large amounts of capital. Meanwhile, a few East Asian NICs. such as 
South Korea, are becoming significant as a source of FDI. As Hirst & Thompson 
(1996: 69) put it, global inequalities 'are dramatic, remain stubborn to change and 
indeed have grown since the 1970s. ' (see also Hoogvelt, 1997) 
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The evidence therefore suggests that there is a significant trend towards greater 
internationalization in the world economy, although this falls short of the claims of 
some globalization theorists. However, this need not lead us to the conclusion that the 
state has become powerless. In fact, the state itself has been a powerful agent of 
change. This is an argument advanced most forcefully by Weiss (1997,1998). She 
argues (1998: 204) that, 'states may at times be facilitators (even perhaps perpetrators) 
rather than mere victims of so-called "globalization". ' She presents evidence that states 
such as Japan, Singapore, Korea and Taiwan are increasingly acting as 'catalysts' for 
the internationalization strategies of corporate actors. This involves offering incentives 
to finance overseas investment, to promote technology alliances between national and 
foreign firms, and to encourage regional relocation of production networks. For 
example, the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) has for a 
number of years sought to manage trade imbalances with the United States by assisting 
companies to localize production offshore. In countries such as Vietnam, Cambodia 
and Laos, 'MITI has been centrally involved in the selection and planning of model 
cities as free-trade zones which will serve as incubators for the transition to a market 
economy' (1998: 205). Thus internationalization is, 'a key strategy of the Japanese 
bureaucracy, implemented through agencies such as MITI' (1998: 204). 
Neo-liberal states such as Britain can also be seen to have acted to facilitate 
globalization. Dominelli & Hoogvelt (1996: 48) argue that in Britain the central 
government has played a crucial role in 'transmitting the global market discipline 
throughout the economy'. This has been possible because even today the state has 
direct control over 40% of GDP. Thus privatization has seen huge transfers of money 
from the public sector to the private sector in the form of subsidies and tax cuts to 
business, and has created an infrastructure for the private sector to trade with through 
various fonns of contracting out. 
Weiss (1998: 190) points out that, 'globalists tend to exaggerate state powers in the 
past to in order to claim feebleness in the present'. Furthermore, there is a wide 
variety of state responses to current economic conditions; at least two nation states, 
Germany and Japan, have pursued extensive Keynesian policies of the type that are 
regarded as 'impossible' in countries such as Britain (1998: 191). The most important 
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point, however, is that rather than withdrawing, states may be changing the form of 
their intervention. Weiss (1998: 196) refers to this as state 'adaptivity'. State capacity 
may appear to have been weakened by the loss of effectiveness of particular macro- 
economic policy instruments. However, strong states will adapt to use whichever tools 
permit them to pursue their strategic goals. States such as Japan have pursued their 
goals through industrial policy, which by its very nature must be creative and adaptive. 
In contrast, the willingness and capacity of states to play such a role, 'are not widely 
institutionalized outside East Asia in contemporary capitalism, and are more and more 
ideologically constrained in the European setting' (1998: -201, emphasis in the 
original). However, Weiss (1998: 195) argues 'that nation states will matter more 
rather than less and, by implication, that this will advance rather than retard 
development of the world economy. ' 
Similarly, Held et al. (1999: 431) argue that, 'different historical forms of 
globalization may be associated with quite different state forms'. Contemporary 
globalization may even, therefore, dramatically expand the scope for state initiatives 
(Held et al, 1999: 437). According to Held et al (1999: 440) states in advanced 
capitalist societies (SIACS), 
are undergoing a profound transformation as their powers, roles and fimctions 
are rearticulated, reconstituted and re-embedded at the intersection of 
globalizing and regionalizing networks and systems. The metaphors of the loss, 
diminution or erosion of state power can misrepresent this reconfiguration or 
transfon-nation... For while globalization is engendering a reconfiguration of 
state-market relations in the economic domain, SIACS and multilateral 
agencies are deeply implicated in that very process. 
According to Taylor-Gooby (1997: 186), 'government is becoming more rather than 
less significant', although the increased use of the private sector in welfare shifts the 
emphasis of state intervention to regulation rather than provision. The issue of 
regulation will be pursued in some depth in the next chapter. 
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Furthermore, the distribution of power between states is profoundly unequal. 
Keohane & Milner (1996) point out that it is the world's most powerful states, and the 
international institutions which they control, which have helped to shape changes in 
internationalization. They provide ample evidence of how during the 1980s intense 
political pressure was exerted by the advanced capitalist countries on developing 
countries to open their economies: international financial institutions such as the IMF 
and World Bank intensified their emphasis on conditionality (primarily through 
'structural adjustment programs'); the GATT codes of the Tokyo round moved away 
from unconditional 'most-favoured-nation' treatment towards demands for reciprocity 
from developing countries; and the USA pressed hard for liberalization of foreign 
investment regulations, and for the protection of intellectual property. As Keohane & 
Milner (1996: 24) put it: 'As always in the world economy, power mattered. ' 
Where powerful states do come under pressure from changes in the world market, 
they may respond through supranational institutions like the EU or intergovernmental 
agreements like the Basel Accords of 1988 which set international standards for global 
finance (Hirst & Thompson, 1996: 134. See also Coleman & Porter, 1994). As Held et 
al (1999: 430) point out: 'Globalization is far from being simply "out of control" and 
is, on the contrary, the object of new forms of multilateral regulation and multilayered 
governance. ' Deacon (1997) has argued for the possibility of supranational social 
policy in the form of regulation, redistribution and provision at a global level. This 
could include a 'Tobin Tax' on short term capital flows, which could reduce the level 
of global speculation and provide revenue for development purposes (see ul Haq et al, 
1996). Furthermore, Deacon shows that international organizations such as the IMF 
and the World Bank are not monolithic, but contain within them potentially more 
progressive as well as neo-liberal wings. Even Mishra (1999; 1998) has suggested the 
feasibility of setting up a system of global social standards. These could be linked to 
the economic standards achieved by Merent nations, and thereby 'help overcome the 
vexed problem of developed societies demanding a level of social protection and 
labour standards from less developed societies, which appears arbitrary and which the 
latter can ill afford to provide. '(1998: 487-488) 
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Just as states may cooperate at the international level to regulate the world market 
and economic competition between themselves, so citizens also may organize 
internationally to form social movements which transcend borders (Waterman, 1998; 
Held et al, 1999: 37 1). According to 'The Economist' (11.12.99), 'citizens' groups are 
increasingly powerful at the corporate, national and international level'. The web site 
of one group (Global Solidarity, http: //www. utexas. edu/ftp/student/subtex/. web/ 
Groups/crossborder/gstrategy. html) claims that workers' organizations are: 
formulating new strategies and tactics to coordinate activities, share resources 
and establish common bonds in order to bargain more effectively with the 
multinational corporations. The same advanced communications technologies 
that allow multinational corporations to globalize their operations also create 
the potential for increased international cooperation amongst labor 
organizations. 
Beck (1999), despite a fairly crude view of globalization, argues that: 'The age of 
globality should bring... a new beginning, through the growth of transnational states 
such as the European Union, the development of international law, the rise of trade 
unions and consumer groups that cut across national boundaries... '. The protesters 
who disrupted the meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle in 
December 1999 represented a diverse, and often incoherent, alliance of different 
interests. They nevertheless succeeded in creating a public debate about the future 
direction of the world's most powerful governments' policies towards the world 
economy. 
In order to assess the claim that welfare spending inhibits the competitiveness of 
nations, Haller, Gough & Therborn (1991) carried out a comparative study of five 
advanced capitalist countries (the USA, the UK, Germany, France and Sweden). In his 
section on the UK, Gough found that neglect of the public sector may actually harm 
economic competitiveness (Pfaller, Gough & Therborn, 1991: 149). This is because 
neglect of investment in human capital may lead to skills shortages, and therefore wage 
inflation, despite high levels of unemployment; and because the rundown of physical 
infrastructure (e. g. public transport in SE England) is not conducive to business. The 
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study found that there has been a general trend towards cont ii aining public expenditure 
in the five countries, except where it is associated with an 'investment function' (ibid: 
274). This is consistent with some aspects of the new thinking on welfare discussed 
above. Yet Haller et al (1991: 280) show that economic changes diminished the 
effectiveness of the old welfare state arrangements even without any budget cuts, 
through unemployment in France, Germany and Britain, and growing low wage 
employment in the USA. Concern about economic competitiveness prevented 
'remedial action'. but changes in welfare may be seen as the result of the economic 
slowdown which began in the 1970s as much as of globalization (see also Paul Pierson, 
1998, discussed above). Preoccupation with the tax burden imposed by welfare 
spending arose first in a period of slow economic growth, and preceded the current 
debate on globalization (see O'Connor, 1973; Bacon & Eltis, 1976). 
Thus, we must also take account of the powerful legitimating role that ideas like 
globalization may play (BumhatA 1997; Weiss, 1998: 193). As Moran & Wood (1996: 
140) put it: 'Constructing external constraints... allows particular national elites to 
present their policy preferences as the more or less unavoidable consequence of forces 
over which nationally organized institutions can have little or no control. ' 
LEVELS OF ANALYSIS 
We have seen that deterministic accounts of globalization and its relationship to social 
policy are open to many criticisms. However, as indicated above, there are also some 
more sophisticated accounts which recognise national specificities and the mediating 
effects of Merent levels of policy-making in determining how states adapt to external 
pressures. Wilding, for example, emphasises the importance of domestic politics (1997: 
422), although he concludes that national social policies 'will be much more globally 
and regionally influenced and patterned than in the past. '(ibid: 426) Comparative 
approaches have been particularly good at recognising the importance of national 
institutions: 
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One of the most powerful conclusions in comparative research is that 
political and institutional mechanisms of interest representation and 
political consensus building matter tremendously in ten-ns of managing 
welfare, employment and growth objectives. 
(Esping Anderson, 1996a; 6) 
Thus, whilst post-war Western welfare states addressed similar objectives, they 
differed in terms of how they pursued these. Similarly, as these same welfare states 
seek to adapt to the changing conditions associated with globalization, they do so very 
differently (see also Weiss, 1998,1997; Keohane & Milner, 1996: 14; Held et al, 1999: 
13; Hirst & Thompson, 1999: 163-190). As Esping-Anderson (1996b; 258) points out: 
'Each of these welfare state responses combines benefits and costs in a way which is 
hardly Pareto optimal. ' 
Thus in acknowledging the specificity of national history and culture we may 
conclude that the influence of globalization has to work its way through several 
'layers' of national institutions and practices, leading to different results in different 
countries. Yet this still assumes a one way flow from the world market 'downwards' 
through the different levels (each having its own mediating effect), finally ending at the 
delivery of actual welfare services 'on the ground'. The chain of causation is not seen 
as being able to work in the opposite direction. One way of attempting to deal with this 
problem is to utilise the concept of 'structuration'. Structuration has been theorised 
and popularised by Giddens (1981; 1984), and involves a 'two-way' conception of 
agency and structure where each impacts on the other. As Held et al (1999: 27) put it: 
'globalization is akin to a process of "structuration" in so far as it is a product of both 
the individual actions of, and the cumulative interactions between, countless agencies 
and institutions across the globe'. Utilised in this context, structuration could 
acknowledge the potential for national institutions and practices to modify the working 
of the world economy, i. e. for the chain of causation to work 'upwards' as well as 
, downwards'. A good example of this is the way in which decisions taken by some 
governments on financial liberalization (Thatcher's being the obvious example) 
encouraged others to do the same to remain competitive. Thus decisions taken by 
conscious agents produce a new structure (in this case an open world financial 
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market), which is difficult to reverse - actors are constrained by past decisions (Cerny. 
1990 & 1996). 
This acknowledgement of different levels of policy making and activity is related to 
the 'level of analysis problem'. This was identified in the discipline of International 
Relations (IR) by Singer (196 1). He argued that in IR, as in any science, 'the observer 
may choose to focus upon the parts or upon the whole, upon the components or upon 
the system' (1961: 77). This means we may 'choose between the flowers or the 
garden, the rocks or the quarry, the trees or the forest, the houses or the 
neighborhood, the cars or the traffic jam, the delinquents or the gang' and so on (ibid). 
The complexity and significance of these level of analysis decisions are indicated by the., 
long-standing controversies between, for example, social psychology and sociology or 
micro- and macro -economics. According to Singer, in IF, authors had: 
roamed up and down the ladder of organizational complexity with remarkable 
abandon, focusing upon the total system, international organizations, regions, 
coalitions, extra-national associations, nations, domestic pressure groups, social 
classes, elites, and individuals as the needs of the moment required. And though 
most of us have tended to settle upon the nation as our most comfortable 
resting place, we have retained our propensity for vertical drift, failing to 
appreciate the value of a stable point of focus. (1961: 78) 
We may switch between levels of analysis, but must explicitly recognise that this is 
what we are doing. 
In IR, the two most commonly used levels of analysis were the international system, 
usually conceived as a system of nation states, and the level of the individual nation 
states themselves. Both of these levels have their own strengths and weaknesses. Thus, 
the systemic (international) level of analysis allows for comprehensive study of 
, international relations in the whole' (1961: 80), although it tends to 'lead the observer 
into a position which exaggerates the impact of the system upon the national actors 
and, conversely, discounts the impact of the actors on the system. ' (ibid) It also 
requires the postulation of 'a high degree of unifon-nity in the foreign policy 
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operational codes of our national actors'. This is a similar criticism to that which has 
been made above of the more deterministic accounts of globalization in Social Policy. 
The national state level of analysis, on the other hand, allows for differentiation among 
the actors in the system, but may lead to an exaggeration of the differences between 
them. 
The comparative approach often favoured in Social Policy has usually been pitched at 
the national level. This involves comparing the social policies of countries (and often 
types of social policy 'regime' - see Esping-Anderson, 1990) and changes in them to 
detect common trends and differences (Esping-Anderson, 1996a&b). This work has 
done much to advance our understanding of broad shifts within social policy and the 
impact upon them of existing national institutions and practices. However, there may 
sometimes be only a conceptual link between globalization and the observed changes, 
which could perhaps be explained at least in part with reference to some other 
paradigm, such as the influence of ideology (a particularly important factor following 
the collapse of the Soviet Union). As discussed above, determinism may be avoided at 
this level by approaches which recognise the mediating role of national institutions and 
practices, the existence of influences other than globalization on welfare state change, 
and the ability of states themselves to influence the globalization process. Yet little 
work has been done on globalization and social policy which is pitched at other levels 
of analysis. Deacon (1997) is one exception to this, having argued for a shift to 'global 
social policy' analysis through a focus on supranational and transnational institutions. 
The level of analysis problem has been addressed in relation to accounts of NHS 
reform in Britain by Mohan (1996). He notes that such accounts have been pitched at 
three levels: the macro, the meso and the micro. In Mohan's categorisation, 'macro- 
level' accounts see welfare states as converging on a common set of solutions, as in the 
grip of forces beyond their control, and/or as grappling with common dilemmas which 
leave them with very little scope for manoeuvre, just as the crude version of the 
globalization thesis does. However, such accounts concentrate on trends which are 
contextual influences, and must be, 'complemented, at a lower level of generality, by 
discussion of the ways in which these trends are mediated. '(ibid: 682) For Mohan, 
4meso-level' accounts are pitched at the level of national state policies which may arise 
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from the distinctive character of governments' ideological predispositions and political 
strategies. However, the strategies pursued by these governments 'have had effects on 
the character of discourse in the welfare state, and on the construction of a 
constituency with a vested interest in the reforms (e. g. those with private healthcare; 
GP fundholders, and their patients; owners of health-related businesses). '(ibid: 686) 
'Micro-level' accounts thus focus on the processes operating either internally within 
the NHS or within British society. The way these issues are worked out varies between 
different sectors of the welfare state, but they nevertheless 'are structured by and, in 
their turn, recursively structure the operation of state policies. '(ibid: 691) So, for 
example, the parameters within which welfare pluralism operated were set by the state, 
but the welfare system was becoming more plural partly because of the involvement of 
multi-national healthcare and ancillary-service corporations, attracted to Britain by the 
liberal operating environment (see Mohan, 1991). 
According to Mohan, all of these three levels of analysis offer important insights into 
the nature of change in the NHS, but none of them is alone sufficient. He thus 
concludes that a degree of 'eclecticism' is required if a comprehensive account of the 
NHS reforms is to be constructed. 
Ruigrok & van Tulder (1995) tackle the level of analysis problem in relation to 
accounts of industrial restructuring in the world economy. They begin their book with 
an evaluation of post-Fordist debates at four levels of analysis. The 'meta-level' is 
analysed by the 'neo-Schumpeterian' schooL which is concerned with the concept of 
'long waves' of technological innovation. This school is technologically determinist 
and underestimates the role of governments in affecting change. The 'macro-level' (in 
this account, that which is concerned with state policy) is analysed by the regulationist 
school and the Amsterdam school, which is concerned with issues such as the new 
ýpolitical hegemony' of neo-liberalism. However, macro analyses are too general and 
fail to analyse developments in the production process (crucial to a 'post-Fordist' 
paradigm). 'Micro' analyses of post-Fordism have concentrated on perceived 
improvements for workers in the labour process at the firm level, taking Japanese 
models as exemplars. However, they'have overlooked the more negative aspects of 
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changes in management, and have ignored the potential side effects of these changes 
on third parties such as subcontractors. 
For Ruigrok & van Tulder (1995), 'meso-level' analyses are those which have 
concentrated on the developments of networks of cooperating fin-ns, as an alternative 
to the existing model of markets vs. heirarchies. So whereas previously fin-ns may have 
chosen to 'make' inputs within a large firm hierarchy rather than 'buy' them in the 
market (generally to cut down on transaction costs), they can now choose to 
'cooperate' through a network. Ruigrok and Van Tulder (1995) conclude that a meso 
level of analysis is the most appropriate for studying industrial restructuring. However, 
they argue that post-Fordist writers have failed to analyse relations within the network, 
and possible shifts in the balance of power within it. Furthen-nore, they have not 
analysed the working conditions within these firms or acknowledged the importance of 
institutional and political forces (1995: 32). Ruigrok and Van Tulder (1995) thus 
suggest their own conceptual framework, based around a meso-level analysis of 
'industrial complexes'. An industrial complex (1995: 7) is a bargaining arena made up 
of six actors: 
1) the corefirm , which is 'the spider in the 
industrial web'; 
2) its supplyingfirms , which may or may not 
be owned by the core finn; 
3) its dealers and distributors, which may also be owned by the core firm; 
4) its workers, who may or may not be represented by a union; 
5) itsfinanciers , which may consist of 
banks or pension funds, e. g.; 
6) its local, regional and national (and even supranational) home and host 
governments. 
Each core firm will have a series of bargaining relationships with each of the other 
actors in its industrial complex (see Appendix One). 
Ruigrok & van Tulder (1995) therefore provide a framework for the meso level 
analysis of the relationships between internationalized fin-ns and a range of other actors 
(including the state) which is distinct from those approaches based on macro level 
analyses of the interaction of nation states with the world market in general. TIýs is an 
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important and innovative approach which, when modified and applied to social policy, 
allows for a detailed analysis of the way relevant actors inter-relate in the delivery of a 
particular service. Resting as it does upon the concept of a 'core' firm at the heart of 
an 'industrial complex', such an approach is particularly suited to an area of welfare 
where provision is undertaken by private companies. Private provision of welfare in the 
UK has advanced furthest in long term care, as is discussed in the next chapter. Hence, 
the three largest private providers of long term care were chosen as the focus of this 
study. Using an adapted version of Ruigrok & van Tulder's model, the relationship of 
these firms with other key actors could be analysed. These other key actors were the 
state and its agencies, staff and unions, and older people and their organizations. How 
Ruigrok & van Tulder's model was adapted for this thesis is discussed in detail in 
Chapter Three. 
Here, however, it can be noted that this meso level of analysis is centred on the 
relationships between organizations, or more correctly between collective actors with 
varying degrees of organizational capacity. Agency is conceived of primarily at the 
level of the organizations themselves, rather than at the level of entire classes, or of 
individuals, for example. The strength of such an approach, as already argued, is the 
scope it affords for a detailed analysis of relationships between key organizational 
actors within a particular sector, including the state. As with other levels of analysis, 
however, its strength is also its weakness, in that it entails a 'trade-off with other 
levels of analysis. It therefore precludes consideration of interactions at other levels, 
whether these be the inter action of the nation state with the world market in general 
(as in the macro level of analysis), or the interaction of individuals within 
organizations. This weakness is remedied to some extent in this thesis through the 
inclusion of micro level case studies of the chosen fin-ns, involving analysis of their 
internal organization and strategies. The importance of these issues of organization and 
strategy as they apply to internationalized welfare fm-ns, and the relationship between 
them and the issue of the external regulation of private welfare providers, are 
discussed in the next chapter. 
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CONCLUSION 
This chapter has argued that deterministic accounts of globalization and its relationship 
to social policy are over-simplistic and open to challenge on a number of counts. 
Following from this assessment, some preliminary conclusions can be reached. Firstly, 
globalization is best regarded as a process, rather than a fully realised end point or an 
objective force. Secondly, this process may be seen as being shaped by a number of 
active agents, including both nation states and multinational corporations. Thirdly, 
globalization may not necessarily be leading to a reduction of state intervention in 
economic and social affairs in advanced capitalist societies, but to changing forms of 
state intervention, often involving greater regulation rather than direct provision. The 
issue of regulation will be pursued finiher in the next chapter. 
This chapter has also discussed the 'level of analysis problem', pointing out that most 
Social Policy accounts of globalization have been pitched at the national, or macro, 
level of analysis. This thesis aims to make a contribution to the globalization debate 
within Social Policy by focusing upon the area of welfare delivery in the UK where 
private provision has gone finihest, that of long ten-n care for older people. In focusing 
on private providers of a welfare service, the thesis will be able to combine findings 
from two levels of analysis not often utilised in Social Policy. Thus, a micro level 
analysis of the three largest private providers of long term care in the UK is conducted 
as the basis for the subsequent meso level analysis of the relationships between these 
firms and other key actors. This approach allows for an exploratory and empirical 
enquiry into a welfare service which is experiencing a process of internationalization, 
as well as making a contribution to the debate concerning the perceived loss of power 
and autonomy by the state (and other domestic actors). Issues relating to research 
design and methodology are discussed in Chapter Three. Issues relevant to the private 
provision, and growing internationalization, of welfare services are discussed in the 
next chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION AND 
REGULATION OF PRIVATELY PROVIDED WELFARE 
SERVICES 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses issues relating to the private provision, internationalization and 
regulation of welfare services, focusing particularly on the long term care market in the 
UK. In doing so it sets out the key themes which inform the research questions 
detailed in Chapter Three, and which are therefore central to the remainder of the 
thesis. The first section begins with a discussion of the growing internationalization of 
services generally, before moving on to discuss issues specific to the 
internationalization of welfare services. The second section deals with issues relevant 
to both the internal and external regulation of large private welfare providers. This 
section develops in some depth the observation made in Chapter One, that the fon-n of 
state intervention may be shifting away from direct provision towards regulation. 
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION AND CONSOLIDATION OF PRIVATELY 
PROVIDED WELFARE SERVICES 
THE GROWTH OF TRADE AND FDI IN SERVICES 
Most writing on multinational corporations has been concerned with manufacturing 
industry (Enderwick, 1989a). This is not surprising, since the majority of the world's 
largest fin-ns are manufacturing based. However, changes in the structure of the 
advanced capitalist economies have brought about a profound shift away from 
manufacturing and towards services. The reasons for this shift are the focus of much 
debate, and cannot be fully discussed here (see Daniels, 1993: 13-23; and Allen & 
Massey, 1988; Gough, 1979). Nevertheless, the extent of the shift is evidenced by the 
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fact that services now account for 78 % of employment in the British economy ('The 
Economist': 1999). 
Whilst not all countries have experienced this shift to the same extent as Britain, the 
growing importance of services in the world economy has been reflected in the trade 
figures, which show that 20% of world trade is now in services (Hoekman & Primo 
Braga, 1997: 285). The USA is by far the biggest exporter of services, with $233.6 
billion worth in 1998,18.1% of the world total ('The Economist', 8.5.99). Britain 
comes second with $99.5 billion worth, or 7.7% of the total. This is an important 
indicator of the reliance of the British economy on services, since it ranks only fifth in 
the league table of goods exporters, with a 5.1 % share. Both Britain and the USA run 
large service-trade surpluses, but even larger goods-trade deficits. The growing 
importance of services is also reflected in the FDI figures, which show that FDI has 
been growing fastest in services (Stopford & Strange, 1991: 87, Hirst & Thompson, 
1996). The Invest in Britain Bureau (IBB, 1998) confin-ns the growing importance to 
Britain of inward services FDI. It notes how in the past the service sector has been 
4considered less capable of delivering a product across national boundaries' (1998: 
20). Today, however, advances in communications technology and the growing use of 
outsourcing has changed this. 
The distinction between trade and FDI is less clear cut in services than in 
manufacturing. This is because cross-border sales of services often have to take the 
form of FDI, since many services require physical proximity to the consumer, because 
they are consumed as they are produced (Hoekman & Primo Braga, 1997: 286). So, 
for example, where a doctor travels overseas to carry out an operation, this may be 
regarded as trade. But where a healthcare company wishes to deliver its services 
abroad on a more regular basis, it must invest in setting up or running its own hospital. 
The company could grant a licence to a third party to deliver the service, but this may 
result in loss of control over the knowledge contained in such delivery, the quality, the 
price, or all of these things (Daniels, 1994: 89). Evidence from the USA, therefore, 
suggests that service firms prefer overseas production to exporting from their 
home 
base. Over 80% of total foreign sales by US service industries were derived from 
overseas affiliates. The same trend was apparent for sales of services by foreign 
firms 
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in the US (Daniels, 1994: 89). The subtleties of the difference between trade and FDI 
in services have been occupying the WTO, during and since negotiations over the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) (Hoekman & Primo Braga, 1997: 
302; see Chapter Five). 
Yet Dunning (1993: 256) notes that: 'Compared with the large volume of 
publications on the global strategy of goods producing companies, there has been very 
little research done on the strategy of service MNEs. ' Stopford & Strange (1991) 
argue that in large part the growth of services FDI has been caused by demand derived 
from earlier investors. Thus, just as many component suppliers to the automobile 
industry expanded abroad to provide worldwide supply to their large customers, so 
many service firms, such as banks, accountants and advertising agencies, have done the 
same. The growth of tourism has spurred equivalent developments in the hotel and 
leisure-related sectors. A key influence on the decision of the US firm Hospital 
Corporation of America to invest in Southampton was the presence in the area of other 
multinationals with large company-paid private health insurance schemes (Mohan, 
1991: 857). Both Erramilli & Rao (1990) and Enderwick (1989a), however, have 
pointed out that service firms may be 'market seeking' as well as 'client following'. 
Many examples, including most hospital services, retailing and news agencies, do not 
fit the 'client following' pattern. (Enderwick, 1989a: 33). 
Enderwick (1989a) shows that there are a number of important differences between 
manufacturing and service N4NCs, in terms of both structure and strategy. Such 
differences are important because they, 'could raise unexpected issues for a policy 
framework heavily orientated to extractive and manufacturing multinationals' (1989a: 
31). Enderwick (I 989a: 3 0) argues that, 'the relatively recent take-off in service-sector 
FDI implies that these firms may not have yet reached the multinational maturity 
characteristic of many manufacturing enterprises. ' Service sector MNCs tend to be 
smaller than their manufacturing counterparts and display greater product 
specialisation. Whilst economies of scale in purchasing may be important, they are less 
so in production, since consumption of services must often take place at the same time 
as production, so that concentration of production in one place and dependence on 
mass distribution is not viable. According to Enderwick (I 989a: 32): 'The 
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comparatively late take-off and considerable cross-investment in services suggests that 
acquisition may be a preferred form of entry for many firms. ' Analysis of inward 
investment in the USA confirms this. A strategy of acquisition allows rapid entry into a 
market and 'the achievement of a critical mass which may be considerable in industries 
characterised by multiple outlets'. 
As Daniels (1993: 3) points out, however, services are diverse and consequently 
difficult to classify. Firms delivering health or social care, for example, are very 
different to financial services firms or IT firms. One way of dealing with this problem 
of heterogeneity is to carry out industry-specific studies (Enderwick, 1989a). In his 
table of illustrations of 'OLI advantages' (ownership, location and internalization 
advantages) relevant to multinationals in particular industries, for medical services 
Dunning (1993,276) mentions experience with advanced / specialised medicine, 
modem management practices and supportive role of government under ownership 
(competitive) advantages; the fact that consumers have to travel to the place of 
production under location advantages; and quality control under internalization 
advantages (coordinating the advantages of an 'hierarchical' rather than market route 
of exchanging intermediate services). The issue of quality control is discussed later in 
this chapter, but it is worth noting here the potential importance of branding and 
corporate identity to service firms in which quality is a key consideration (see also 
Enderwick, 1989a: 24). Lower costs as a result of economies of scale may give 
multinational service fim-is the resources to provide quality and consistency, which can 
be branded, thus helping them to retain or extend their competitive advantage 
(Daniels, 1993: 45-60). 
The characteristics of both home and host countries are important in influencing the 
investment decisions of MNCs. For example, Dunning (1993) found that language and 
culture scored high among factors identified by service fin-ns as affecting location. 
However, 'non-tariff barriers', especially the regulatory environment of host countries, 
are also a major factor influencing the way in which markets are serviced by foreign- 
owned firms (Stopford & Strange, 1991; Dunning, 1993; Enderwick, 1989b). Stopford 
& Strange (1991) argue that regulatory barriers have been an especially important 
obstacle to the full development of internationally traded services. Dunning (1993: 
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260) is of the opinion that, in general, governments have adopted more controls on 
trade and investment in services than in goods. However, these tend to vary 
considerably between countries, and are more common in developing countries. In 
economically advanced countries, government decisions about investments are less 
likely to be ad hoc, and more likely to be bound by rules and international agreements. 
States in advanced economies, therefore, will usually have conunitted themselves to 
accept foreign investment unless it contravenes particular rules. But as Daniels points 
out (1993: 67), trade in services is heavily influenced by government regulations 
intended to enforce standards in particular industries. 
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PRIVATELY PROVIDED WELFARE 
SERVICES 
The internationalization of services has combined with government policies of 
privatization over the last two decades to produce a new phenomenon whereby 
'public' services are being increasingly provided by internationalized firms. One of the 
key reasons for the relative shift in industrialized economies away from manufacturing 
and towards services was the expansion of the welfare state in the post-World War 
Two period. This is indicated by the large growth of employment in social services 
(broadly defined) during this period (Daniels, 1993: 9). This itself relates to the growth 
of public expenditure. As Gough (1979: 78) puts it, the twentieth century, and the 
post-war period in particular, saw 'public expenditure rising as a share of GDP, and 
social expenditure rising as a share of public expenditure'. Privatization therefore 
promotes internationalization because: 'With rare exceptions, government-owned 
service organizations do not compete globally. '(Porter, 1990: 247) In the context of 
the current process of globalization, privatized services thus move from a protected 
existence into an internationally competitive market. International companies now run 
public services in a range of different countries and continents where privatization has 
taken place, providing services from water and electricity to catering and cleaning. For 
example, the school meals in Bromley, the water in Newcastle and the refuse collection 
in Bristol, were all run in 1996 by subsidiaries of Lyonnaise des Eaux, which also ran 
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the water and sewage of Buenos Aires and was the biggest road builder in the Czech 
Republic (PSPRU, 1996: 1). 
Privatization, or more usually contracting out, of welfare services has gone finihest in 
the USA, where private healthcare has long been more entrenched than in most of 
Europe. In Britain, there have been significant changes in the delivery of health care, 
although the ideological preferences of Conservative governments since 1979 did not 
lead to outright privatization. However, the scope for the development of private care 
has increased considerably. By 1989, spending on private acute health care already 
amounted to over E700 million per annum, with another estimated El billion spent on 
private nursing homes and residential care, and around 30% of the NHS budget paid to 
suppliers of goods and services (Mohan, 1991: 853). As Mohan (ibid) points out, these 
sums support various activities which cross the boundary between the service sector 
and manufacturing, and which employ people in a wide range of occupations. Yet even 
before the NHS was set up, there was little commercialism in British healthcare - 
private health services were provided largely on a voluntary subscription or charitable 
basis. For thirty years after the creation of the NHS the private sector remained small, 
although there were 'occasional hospital takeovers by US corporations' (Mohan, 
1991: 854). 
This situation began to change in 1976, when the Labour government attempted to 
separate private practice from the NHS (Papadakis & Taylor-Gooby, 1987: 43; 
Mohan, 1991: 854). There was concern at this time that private healthcare was not 
abolished altogether, for this would mean losing revenue from rich overseas patients 
attracted to Britain by its specialised medical expertise. At the same time, the 
government's National Enterprise Board established United Medical Enterprises 
(UME) through a merger between two smaller companies. This was to operate as a 
hospital developer and supplier, primarily in the Middle East, exploiting Britain's 
competitive advantage in health care provision and management derived from the 
experience of the DHSS (Mohan, 1991: 854; Griffith & Rayner, 1985: 41). At that 
time, UME was not permitted to enter the British market, leaving instead US based 
multi-nationals as those best placed to invest in new hospitals there. These corporations 
had access to capital which the non-profit sector in Britain did not, allowing them to 
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finance hospital acquisition and construction. Mohan (1991) traces the introduction of 
commercial provision in ancillary services to this period also, since Conservative 
interest in this after 1979 dated from a desire to loosen the grip of trade unions in the 
public sector, which had grown during the 1970s (see also Papadakis & Taylor-Gooby, 
1987: 49). In contrast, the pharmaceutical companies which supply the NIFIS have 
always been in private hands, and have grown to be huge international Players (Held et 
al, 1999: 266; Moran & Wood, 1996: 135; Wood Mackenzie, 1999 & 2000). 
As with other public services, therefore, private provision in health has been 
accompanied by internationalization. Mohan (1991: 855) argues that the main source 
of opportunities for internationalized companies in the health sector has been 'state 
policies regarding the regulation and provision of welfare', which have provided a 
greater space for the operation of the commercial sector in Britain than in Europe. In 
addition, state policies elsewhere have 'forced multinational organizations to seek new 
investment opportunities' (Mohan, 1991: 855), such as in the US where federal 
restrictions on healthcare expenditures were one reason behind decisions to invest in 
various European states in the 1980s. 
Enderwick (1989a: 21) argues that the consolidation of corporate hospital chains in 
the US market facilitated, 'the application of modem management methods, the 
achievement of huge purchasing economies and the development of arrangements with 
commercial insurance companies which have yielded financial and policy-formulation 
strengths'. This then provided a basis for overseas expansion. By 1988, commercial 
hospitals in the UK accounted for 55% of all beds in independent hospitals, compared 
with 29% in 1979, whilst 22% of all independent hospital beds were US owned 
(Mohan, 1991: 857). The strategy of US corporations in the UK at this time was based 
on expansion through acquisition of existing businesses as much as on new-build 
(Griffith & Rayner, 1985: 33 & 44) -a trend which is being repeated within the long- 
term care market today. 
In the mid- I 970s, independent health care in Britain was fragmented, based on small 
organizations and run on a largely charitable basis. The largest British organization, 
(the Company I affiliated) Nuffield Hospitals, with thirty facilities, was a non-profit 
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body, with prices held low and any surpluses invested in new hospitals. Foreign-owned 
hospitals have typically been large and have concentrated on high technology medicine 
and surgery, where domestic firms have been reluctant to compete due to the scale of 
investment involved and its attendant risk. 
However, 'non-profit' organizations enjoyed some advantages, as explained by Oliver 
Rowell, Nuffield's General Manager at that time: 
[Nuffield] generates a surplus every year but one major difference... [from] a 
commercial company like American Medical International, Hospital 
Corporation of America and United Medical Enterprises, etc. is that they have 
to make a profit to satisfy shareholders and bankers, [but Nuffield] makes a 
surplus that is totally recycled into itself and used totally to expand and 
improve its service to private patients. (cited in Griffith & Rayner, 1985: 34) 
Furthermore, 'non-profit' organizations do not have to pay corporation tax (Griffith & 
Rayner, 1985: 15). 
However, commercial companies have the advantage of being able to borrow in order 
to fund expansion. Mohan (1991: 857) claims that British financial institutions were 
initially reluctant to back private health care because of political uncertainties, whereas 
US corporations, with access to Wall Street, had enormous financial advantages. US 
multinationals consolidated their position finiher by a marketing strategy aimed at the 
luxury end of the market. Furthermore, they developed a strategy whereby the largest 
proportion of fees was charged for 'ancillary' services, rather than beds, allowing them 
to remain profitable even when occupancy rates were low (Griffith & Rayner, 1985: 
38). The success of these American firms reflects the longer tradition of privately 
provided health care in the USA, and indeed Michael Porter's table (1990: 255) 
estimating patterns of competitive advantage in service industries for different 
countries shows the USA in a leading position in healthcare services. However, 
multinationals remain vulnerable to market conditions, and foreign subsidiaries are 
vulnerable when the fortunes of the parent company change. For example, during 1989 
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American Medical International had to sell off its UK operations, and Hospital 
Corporation of America's hospitals were acquired by Company I (Mohan, 1991: 859). 
The problems experienced by American multinationals were exacerbated by the 
British recession of the early 1990s. Their partial withdrawal from the British market 
opened the way for the entry of European conglomerates (May & Brunsdon, 1999: 
286; Mohan, 1991: 859). The French Generale des Eaux, for example, acquired a small 
British hospital chain in 1990. According to a spokesman from the company, the initial 
acquisition reflected the fact that the UK market for private healthcare had become 
'uniquely liberal' in Europe ('Daily Telegraph', quoted in Mohan, 1991: 859). By 1996 
Generale des Eaux's other UK operations included water companies, refuse collection 
services, waste to energy plants, housing management, financial administration, road 
and bridge building, car parks, cable television, mobile phones and was bidding for a 
railway franchise (PSPRU, 1996: 3). 
Some of the American multinationals have also diversified into other areas. American 
Medical International, for example, moved into private psychiatry, a head injuries 
treatment centre, and the treatment of drug addiction, partly in response to the reduced 
profitability of the acute hospital sector (Mohan, 1991: 857). By the beginning of the 
1990s, multinationals were also seeking greater collaboration with the NHS, for 
example through partnerships in jointly financed capital projects. Collaboration with 
other kinds of multinationals has also been positively encouraged by the introduction of 
the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), which has been adopted by the New Labour 
government after its introduction by the Conservatives. Tarmac, for example, the UK's 
largest civil engineering and building contractor, has been closely involved with the 
Private Finance Initiative, building the first PFI hospital and the first PFI prison. 
Tarmac has operations or offices in thirty countries, with 25% of its 24,000 employees 
based overseas (http: //www. tarmac. co. uk). As with other kinds of public services, 
multinational activity in health care ancillary services has often taken the fon-n of 
acquisitions of domestic firms, notably in laundry, catering and contract cleaning 
(PSPRU, 1996). 
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Mohan (1991: 864) points out that considered from the standpoint of market share 
and geographical coverage, the impact of multinationals in health care may appear to 
be limited, and in some ways this is true of the long term care sector considered below. 
However, the qualitative impact on the way services are delivered is of much greater 
importance, since multinationals are leaders in terms of innovation, whether in terms of 
marketing methods and budgeting techniques, as in the hospital sector, or in terms of 
new methods of work organization, as in ancillary services. Held et al (1999: ch. 5) 
make a very similar point in relation to MNCs generally in the world economy. Mohan 
(1991: 863) argues that multinationals may lead experiments with changes to the 
labour process due to their scale and management expertise. This may lead to a 
deskilling and devaluation of such work comparable to similar developments in 
manufacturing. Furthermore, the process of concentration which the multinationals 
have led has raised the possibility that some operators may achieve a de facto 
monopoly in certain areas. Both these issues - of concentration, and of labour process 
and control - will be discussed later in this chapter, and are key concerns of the thesis. 
Given privatization policies across the world, and the increasing globalization of 
economic activity, the involvement of such internationalized firms is likely to attain 
greater significance in the future, with more people dependent on them for both work 
and welfare services. The most fundamental shift towards private provision in the UK 
in recent years has come in the area of long-term care (May & Brunsdon, 1999: 287). 
This is the focus of this thesis, and will be discussed next. 
THE UK MARKET IN LONG TERM CARE 
Demand for the private provision of residential and nursing care for the elderly in the 
UK has two main determinants: demographic trends and the actions of the state. The 
state influences demand for long ten-n care because local authorities (and until recently 
the DSS) pay for the largest single share of it. The extent of private provision is also 
affected by the extent of public supply. As Laing & Buisson (hereafter L&B) put it: 'It 
is those areas where the marginal cost of choosing private over public treatment is low 
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and where there is a significant public sector supply constraint that private sector 
demand and supply has flourished most. ' (1997: A 140) 
Both purchasing by public agencies and the constraint of public sector supply are the 
direct result of policies introduced by Conservative governments, although, as 
Bradshaw (1988) points out, the effects of these were not always intentional. Until the 
1980s, delivery of care was divided up between the NHS and local authorities in a way 
which is reflected today in the regulatory regime: the NHS provided nursing care; local 
authorities provided residential and home care services. Such provision was largely 
free at the point of use, since local authorities rarely used their discretionary powers to 
levy charges. The growing awareness of the problems of institutionalization (Ebrahim 
et A 1993: 199) and the move towards community care from the 1960s onwards led 
to the closure of many NHS and local authority institutions. According to Harrington 
and PoRock (1998: 1806) when this trend extended to older people in the 1980s it led 
to 'reinstitutionalisation in the private sector'. 
Private sector provision of long term care in Britain increased rapidly when the 
Conservative government used an amendment to the Social Security Act to allow 
residents entering private sector homes to claim board and lodging to pay homes for 
their care. Residents being cared for in the public sector could not use this provision, 
so local authorities encouraged residents to opt for the private sector, which allowed 
the release of income through the closure and sale of public facilities (Harrington & 
Pollock, 1998: 1806). However, according to Bradshaw (1988: 177): 'The growth of 
social security funding for private care arose largely because its availability was made 
more explicit in the 1980 reforms of supplementary benefit', rather than because the 
government desired it. Other factors combined with this to produce a huge growth in 
social security spending on long term care: demographic factors, the closure of state 
institutions, financial pressure on local social services departments, and the emergence 
of 'a new entrepreneurial class who make their living in private residential care' 
(Bradshaw, 1988: 176). Although most of those entering into the private provision of 
long-term care were small businesses, some of the American multinationals discussed 
above began to turn their attention towards the market (Griffith & Rayner, 1985: 47). 
As the social security budget spiralled, concern was expressed about costs, as well as 
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that expenditure was being skewed towards nursing and residential care rather than 
community based services. 
The goverm-nent's response was the NHS and Community Care Act (1990), which 
was implemented on I April 1993, and which made local authorities responsible for 
purchasing care packages from providers. Local authorities received an annual 
increment of funds from the Government known as the Special Transitional Grant 
(STG), which included a transfer element intended to replace the amount which would 
otherwise have been spent by the Department of Social Security on new residents in 
residential care and nursing homes. A condition was attached to the STG stipulating 
the proportion of the grant which must be spent on independent sector services. In 
order to fulfill this the authority had to demonstrate that overall community care 
spending on the independent care sector had increased by an amount equivalent to at 
least 85% of the transfer element of the grant each year (Edwards & Kenny, 1997: 11). 
Through this means, LAs were compelled to expand public subsidy for private sector 
care. This condition has since been relaxed and finally replaced with the Labour 
government's 'Best Value' system. The independent sector accounted for nearly 69% 
of the residential and nursing home budget in 1996/7, compared with 63% in 1995/6 
and 54% in 1994/5 (Edwards & Kenny, 1997: 12). In November 1998, an estimated 
II1 000 or 29% of independent sector care home residents were self-payers (L&B, 
1999-2000: 211). 
L&B (1997: A144) predict that underlying demand for care services win continue to 
expand over the coming years, as the proportion of older people in the population 
grows. This is because rates of disability and dependence escalate rapidly with 
increasing age. Demand for care services is also affected by the numbers of people 
prepared to provide informal care for family members. An estimated 1,400,000 
currently devote 20 hours or more to such care. If all the informal care provided for 
elderly and disabled people were valued at E7.00 Per hour (based on local authority 
pay rates) the cost would have been E42 billion per year at April 1996, dwarfing the 
El 1.6 billion spent on formal long term care for the elderly (L&B, 1997: A144). 
37 
In 1999 there were approximately 13,000 residential homes for older people, 11,600 
of which were in the independent sector. There were approximately 4,600 independent 
nursing homes, catering mainly for older people (DoH, 1999b, regulatory impact 
statement, 2.6 & 5.2). The independent sector provided 88% of all residential and 
nursing care home places in 1998, compared to 82% in 1994 (DoH, 1998a). However., 
1999 showed the third annual decrease in capacity across the sector, and the sixth year 
in succession in which capacity growth fell short of what would be expected from 
demographic pressure (L&B, 1999-2000: 163). Nevertheless, private sector capacity 
continued to expand at the expense of public sector capacity. Dual registered places in 
the independent sector increased from 8% in 1994 to 18% in 1998 (DoH, 1998a). The 
increase resulted from the re-registration of many nursing homes as dual registered 
homes, which in turn is a reflection of budgetary pressures on local authorities, many 
of which adopted a policy of placing people wherever possible in (less expensive) 
residential care rather than in nursing care (L&B, 1997: A 147). 
According to L&B (1997: A149): 'The 1980s era of rapid expansion in private care 
capacity, fuelled by open ended income support funding, has clearly come to an end 
with the transfer of state funding to cash limited local authority budgets in April 1993. ' 
Despite consistently falling occupancy rates since 1993 (Laing, 1999), in 1997 L&B 
(1997: A149) thought there was still scope for an expansion of private sector 
provision, given continuing demographic pressure, the decline of public sector 
provision, and the lack of hostility towards the market on the part of the New Labour 
government. However, occupancy rates continued to fall. In March 1999 these stood 
at 85.7% for private nursing homes and 87.1% for private residential homes (L&B, 
1999-2000: 182). The main reason for this has been the failure of local authority 
funding to keep pace with demographic pressure. 
Wistow et al (1996: 90) note that in the early 1990s attitudes of local authorities 
towards the private sector, 'reflected a relatively crude , 
knee jerk reaction against 
what was often seen as inappropriate commercialization of social care. ' However, their 
research shows that very few private providers of residential care were motivated 
primarily by profit maximization. Nevertheless, this research was geared towards 
residential care where the vast majority of providers are small owners. As Wistow et 
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al (1996: 111) make clear, the homes with most noticeable market awareness and 
commercial orientation tended to be private sector, relatively large, part of a multi- 
home organization, of intermediate age, and purchased rather than inherited. Most 
homes began operating during the early and mid- I 980s, 'presumably partly fuelled by 
the availability of social security funding. '(1 996: 183) 
Corporate penetration is greater in nursing than in residential care. Corporate 
providers concentrate on nursing care partly because homes are typically larger than in 
residential care. They therefore afford some economies of scale (L&B, 1999-2000: 
176), despite the observation by Enderwick (1989a), discussed earlier in this chapter, 
that service firms make less use of economies of scale in production (as opposed to 
purchasing). Between 1988, when L&B started maintaining records, and 1997, major 
providers more than doubled their share of the for-profit care home market (L&B, 
1997: A186). L&B's definition of 'major provider' includes all organizations with 
three or more homes. Yet there has clearly been a process of consolidation within the 
corporate care home sector (L&B, 1997: A 186). For the first time in 1996 the number 
of for-profit major providers fell slightly. More significantly, the number of UK stock 
market quoted companies fell sharply as a result of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) 
during 1996 and 1997 (ibid). During calendar year 1998, the for-profit major 
providers' share of the entire for-profit care home sector rose by 3% to 29.7%, which, 
according to L&B (1999-2000: 176), represented 'a quickening of the pace of 
corporatisation'. At the end of 1998, there were 288 for-profit major providers 
(CCMN, March 1999). However, the ten largest operators owned or leased 13.8% of 
total UK for-profit capacity, whilst the three largest owned or leased 7.9% (L&B, 
1999-2000: 176). 
Walker & Golding (1997) saw the largest firms involved in M&A activity in the 
sector as having, 'the appearance of chess grandmasters operating an intricate 
offensive, or defensive, strategy prior to striking at the heart of their opponents. ' US 
operators had entered the UK market as a result of their perception that there were 
better opportunities abroad than at home, 'since to a large extent UK dynamics are 
simply following the pattern already seen in the US' (ibid). The extent to which 
concentration in the UK market has been accompanied by internationalization is one of 
39 
the key research questions tackled by this thesis, which are discussed in the next 
chapter. 
This process of concentration in the industry appears to be reinforced by the problems 
experienced by the smaller homes in the current tight financial climate. Andrews & 
Phillips (1998: 10) found that in Devon, where their study was focused, smaller homes 
were experiencing the most severe financial problems. In 1994, for example, 70% of 
the homes operating at or below their margins of profitability were registered for 
fifteen beds or fewer. Many proprietors were disillusioned with working in the 
residential sector, and over one third of home owners stated they would sell their 
business if it were possible. Smaller homes are not necessarily owned by small 
companies, but on the whole this is the case, partly because large companies have 
engaged in some new build in order to take advantage of economies of scale. 
According to Bartlett & Burnip (1999: 10), in the process of improving quality in care 
homes, 'the loss of good smaller homes along the way seems inevitable'. As Andrews 
& Phillips (1998: 10) point out: 'Ironically, it is the smaller homes, being less 
"institutional",, which sit best with the philosophy of care in the community. ' 
In addition to the pressures upon existing small providers, financial barriers to entry 
have risen for small providers, as average home sizes have increased, and as lending 
institutions have operated stricter lending policies in contrast to the expansion period 
of the 1980s (L&B, 1999-2000: 178). Investment in the private care sector involves 
highly capital-intensive investment in property, but sale and leaseback offers a 
mechanism whereby care home operation can be separated from property investment. 
Corporate providers have, therefore, increasingly made use of sale and leaseback as a 
way of funding expansion. This has brought a number of Real Estate Investment Trusts 
(REITs), including many US based ones such as Omega Worldwide (CCMN, April 
1998), into the market. However, the increasing recourse to sale and leaseback has 
prompted much debate within the industry following the financial difficulties 
experienced by some companies. These have included Tamaris, as well as Advantage 
Care and Grampian Care, both of which went into receivership in 1999 (CCMN, 
October 1999). 
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THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL REGULATION OF PRIVATE WELFARE 
PROVIDERS 
MANAGERIALISM AND THE WELFARE STATE 
As we saw in the previous section, there has been a significant shift towards the private 
provision of some welfare services in recent years. Yet despite this, many such services 
have remained 'in house'. However, even these services have been affected by the 
'logic' of the private sector. The health service 'internal market' has seen hospitals 
become semi-independent trusts, which are supposed to follow the efficiency 
maximising logic of private firms within a (internal) competitive market. Even where 
quasi-markets have not been introduced, public agencies of all kinds have been 
required to account for their efficiency through a range of measurable perfonnance 
criteria. Many commentators have noticed how this has tended to shift power away 
from professionals and towards a new elite of managers (Clarke et al, 1994). 
Under the paradigm of the 'New Public Management' (NPM), this managerialism has 
been linked by some to globalization, and other PhD work is proceeding on this 
particular topic (See Barnes, K., 1997). NPM is usually linked to globalization via the 
concept of Cemy's 'competition state'. Cerny (1990) sees a new emphasis on 
economic competition between states as emerging from growing transnational. 
'interpenetration', which undermines state welfare provision and the Keynesian 
demand management that supported it. NPM is therefore seen by some as an aspect of 
this competition, as states try to maximise efficiency within those services which 
remain in public hands (Hood, 1995). 
Cousins (1988: 222) has also argued that in the NHS, even where in-house tenders 
won contracts for ancillary services, 'although labour is still not conducted 
for a profit, 
the labour process is organized as if it were'. Dominelli & Hoogvelt (1996: 56) make a 
smular point when they argue that the reorganization of social work training around 
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core competences (usually in the form of NVQs) 'is in keeping with the strategies 
which have been developed by multinational firms'. Competences make tasks 4more 
amenable to quality control and quality assurance mechanisms', something discussed 
later in this section. According to Dominelli (1997: 20), competences are Taylorist in 
approach and 'provide a means through which employers can control both the labour 
process and their employees by reining in independent thought processes and 
deliberations. ' 
Dominelli (1997: 15) argues that globalization has promoted, 'the penetration of 
market discipline into welfare provisions in order to release capital for accumulation 
and investment in various sectors of the economy, primarily by individual private 
entrepreneurs and financial corporations who operate on a world-wide scale'. 
According to her (1991: 15): 
This has led to the emergence of the global market principle at the heart of the 
welfare state, the spread of the conditions necessary for flexible accumulation 
within it, the introduction of just-in-time production techniques into public 
sector activities, and the internationalisation of the national welfare state by the 
incorporation of non-national and multinational firms as key providers of 
services. As a result, global competition sets the parameters within which the 
quasi-market of the welfare state is compelled to operate. 
According to Dominelli (1997: 15), The Financial Management Initiative (FMI) of 
1982 laid the foundations for drawing the welfare state into the marketplace and 
'transforming caring relations into exchange relations'. It did this by introducing 
business management techniques into welfare provisions, particularly health and 
education. FMI was succeeded by the Next Steps Initiative (NSI) in 1988. In services 
for older people, the basic tenets of NSI were explicated through the Griffiths Report 
(1988), 'which demanded that business methods be properly introduced into social 
work to improve the productivity of its practitioners and increase customer choice' 
(Dominelli, 1997: 16). According to Dominefli, the FMI, NSI and PFI between them 
laid the groundwork for managerialist control of the public sector workforce, and the 
challenging of professional autonomy. 
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THE EXTERNAL REGULATION OF PRIVATE FIRMS 
The imposition of managerialism, and the adoption of assessment by measurable 
performance criteria, in the welfare state has led to a culture change in public services. 
This has reacted back onto the private sector through a new concern with measurable 
quality indicators by commissioning agencies, and increased regulation. Private 
providers are thus tied into a field of 'dispersed' state power (Clarke, 2000: 212). 
Hence, some of the methods for the external regulation of private providers identified 
by Dominelli (1997: 18) include contract specification, the setting of measurable 
performance targets, specifying and costing input and output measures and establishing 
monitoring and reporting mechanisms. According to Dominelli (1997: 18), it is for this 
reason that Total Quality Management (TQM) and British Standards (BS) 'have found 
their way into social work practice and its lexicon'. The British Standard BS 5750 was 
originally written with manufacturing industry in mind, but in 1987 it acquired an 
international equivalent, ISO9000, and in 1991 an additional part to the standard, 
ISO9002, was introduced for services (BSI, 1994; Pollitt, 1996: 104). The essential 
idea behind BS 5750 / ISO 9002 is that the processes by which goods or services are 
produced and delivered should be very clearly specified. The standards lay heavy 
emphasis on documentation, and require subscribing organizations to identify 'control 
documents' such as manuals. 
In theory such mechanisms aim to assure the purchaser that the provider has the 
mechanisms in place to guarantee the delivery of quality products. However, they have 
been criticised for making no allowance for the fact that service organizations are 
Oferent from organizations producing physical goods, and may require different 
techniques to take account of them (Dominelli, 1997: 18; PoUitt, 1996: 105). 
Furthermore, the user of the service is not involved in the specification of the services 
provided, and is thus constructed as a passive recipient of what others think is best for 
them. General issues of quality measurement in health related services will be discussed 
in the next sub-section, and the internal forms of organization used by large and 
internationalized firms to facilitate quality and other goals in the sub-section following 
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that. Here we discuss issues relating to the external regulation of finns, particularly 
those providing long term care. 
Le Grand & Robinson (1984; see also Le Grand et al 1992) identify three possible 
forms of state economic and social activity: provision, tax/subsidy and regulation. It 
has already been seen that the shift away from direct state provision has involved an 
increase in state subsidy to private providers. However, in an advanced capitalist 
economy a shift to private provision is also likely to lead to the state increasing its 
regulatory role, since the threat to standards of care posed by inadequately regulated 
profit-seeking would be generally unacceptable. As Papadakis & Taylor-Gooby (1987: 
56) argue, privatization paradoxically necessitates 'even more intervention in order to 
issue standardised guidelines'. All of the privatized utilities in Britain are currently 
regulated by an agency specially set up for that purpose (see Bishop et al, 1995). In 
residential and nursing care, the expansion of private provision in the 1980s 
encouraged a trend towards 'an insistence on higher standards through the regulatory 
system' (Day & Klein, 1987). However, this regulatory system was divided between 
individual health authorities which had responsibility for the regulation of private 
hospitals and nursing homes, and individual local authorities which had responsibility 
for the regulation of residential homes. 
This drive towards greater regulation can be seen in a number of countries, where it 
has been reinforced by scandals and by the perception of low standards among private 
providers. Dartington & Denham (1991: 78) note that arguments for privatization of 
continuing care in the UK claimed that this would improve standards of care whilst 
reducing the financial burden on the NHS. It was implied that privatization would 
mean de-institutionalization and better care and efficiency, especially since the public 
sector applies standards to the private sector which it would not often apply to itself 
However, American experiences in the 1980s have involved scandals in private nursing 
homes, half of which provided their care in fife-threatening situations in at least one 
aspect (ibid). The perception of low standards, and fraudulent behaviour (Inman & 
Sone, 1997), among American firms has raised concern in Britain since, as discussed 
above, US firms have been entering the British market. In Australia, stories of 
mistreatment and neglect in private nursing homes in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
led 
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eventually to a new regulatory system being introduced in 1987 (Braithwaite et al, 
1993: 2). The imposition of I-dgher standards through state regulation may have played 
an important role in increasing the appeal of private care in Britain (Papadakis & 
Taylor-Gooby, 1987: 64). 
Mintzberg (1991: 390) sees regulation as only one possible tool for the control of 
organizations by outside interests. At best, according to Mintzberg, regulation sets 
minimum and usually crude standards of acceptable behaviour. When it works 'it does 
not make any firm socially responsible so much as stop some from being grossly 
irresponsible. '(1991: 395) Furthermore, because it is inflexible, regulation tends to be 
applied slowly and conservatively, usually lagging behind public sentiment. It often 
does not work because of difficulties in enforcement. The regulators may have limited 
resources and information compared to the industries they are supposed to regulate. 
Yet Mintzberg quotes Theodore Levitt's argument (Levitt, 1968) that business has 
fought every piece of proposed regulatory or social legislation throughout this century, 
from the Child Labor Acts on up. However, there are, according to Mintzberg, 
obvious places for regulation, especially where the industry creates tangible 
'externalities' such as pollution. Likewise, regulation may have a place where 
competition encourages the unscrupulous to pull all firms down to a base level of 
behaviour. 
In the literature on corporate strategy, however, Pfeffer (1991: 383) identifies 
regulation as one of a number of options open to managers of corporations, who, he 
argues, are seeking to reduce uncertainty and interdependence. Uncertainty arises from 
the unpredictable actions of competitors, as well as from noncompetitive 
interdependence with suppliers, creditors, government agencies, and customers. 
According to Pfeffer, regulation most frequently benefits the regulated industry, since 
regulation reduces competition and uncertainty and may allow prices to rise. In 
contrast to Levitt (1968), Pfeffer (1991: 387) argues that regulation has frequently 
been sought by the regulated industry. However, firms have no assurance that 
regulatory authority will not be used against their interests, and it is very hard to repeal 
once enacted. 
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One approach suggests that regulation is created for the public benefit, but is 
subsequently 'captured' by the firms subject to regulation. Braithwaite et al (1993: 52) 
found that capture was not a particularly useful concept for understanding nursing 
home regulation. However, they saw a need for 'constant reinvigoration' of the 
regulatory program to guard against Marver Bernstein's (1955) notion that regulatory 
agencies go through a 'life cycle', that sees public interest progressively subordinated 
to the interests of the regulated industry. Braithwaite et al (1993: 52) found evidence 
that, over time, inspectors who gave tougher ratings were more likely to leave the job 
than those that gave easier ratings. Those who left complained of lack of departmental 
support to take tough action against recalcitrant nursing homes. How the regulatory 
authorities are organized is also a key issue. According to Dartington & Denham 
(1991: 78), many of the problems associated with poor standards of care in US homes 
in the 1980s arose because 'the responsibility for financing the parameters of care and 
proving quality, while preventing and punishing fraud and abuse, were fragmented 
between agencies at all levels. ' In the UK, regulation is currently divided between a 
multiplicity of local and health authorities, an issue discussed in some depth in Chapter 
Five. 
However, where MNCs are involved, they may make use of 'regulatory arbitrage' 
(taking advantage of differences in national regulations) (Sally, 1996: 68). 
Furthermore, it is argued that MNCs tend to have greater expertise, intelligence of 
non-market environments, access to political elites, and skills in the exercise of 
influence and negotiation, compared to smaller national fin-ns without international 
production networks (Sally, ibid). Thus, as Ruigrok & van Tulder (1995) and Stopford 
& Strange (1991) emphasise, MNCs are likely to engage in bargaining over regulation 
and other issues with state (and other) actors. 
D 
REGULATION AND QUALITY 
We have discussed above the issues relating to the external regulation of private finns. 
This has involved a concern with measurable criteria. This section discusses the types 
of criteria which may be used in measuring quality. 
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Attempts to set quality standards for care home residents have made a distinction 
between structure, process and outcome (see Donabedian, 1966). Braithwaite et al 
(1993: 9) give some useful examples of these which illustrate the differences between 
them. Structural standards are concerned with inputs. Examples are a requirement that 
certain numbers of square metres of space be available per resident, that buildings have 
sprinkler systems and that a registered nurse be on duty at all times. Process standards 
are defined in terms of the good professional or organizational practices thought 
necessary to deliver quality care. Examples are requirements for the regular 
repositioning of residents to prevent bed sores, or accounting standards which specify 
procedures for the management of residents' finances. Outcome standards are 
concerned with the outcomes that are considered desirable for residents. These were 
usually defined in medical terms, but today outcomes also include concepts such as 
'quality of fife'. As already indicated, systems such as ISO 9002 are concerned with 
process. 
Haywood (1991) argues that the NFIS has been preoccupied with structure and 
process considerations at the expense of outcomes, reflecting a service-led approach. 
In contrast, the development of appropriate indicators for the measurement -of 
outcomes requires a concentration on patients' preferences and rights. Discussing a 
Health Services Management Centre exercise for registration and inspection officers, 
which requires them to judge services against the standards they would apply to 
themselves, Haywood (1991: 20) notes: 'The outcome remains challenging for most 
registration officers since comparisons of existing practice (NHS and private) with 
things that are valued for themselves produce a significant deficit. ' 
Twining (199 1), however, notes that the more successful we are in raising standards 
of care, the more difficult it becomes to demonstrate that what we are doing is 
effective. Once we have taken care of basic bodily needs, the measurement of 
standards becomes more problematic. Thus today, according to Twining (1991: 47), 
the 'ultimate aim of nearly all care for older people is quality rather than quantity of 
life. ' Any definition of quality of life must include the subjective element of the degree 
of satisfaction or dissatisfaction felt by individuals about various aspects of their 
lives. 
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'Thus it can only ever be this perception, and the factors influencing this, Which we can 
hope to measure. '(Twm*ig, 1997: 49) These factors are: physical environment; physical 
health; social interaction; mental health; and personal and past history. Social 
interaction is particularly important since studies of older people in hospital have 
shown that the greatest causes of dissatisfaction tend to be with interpersonal rather 
than physical aspects of the environment. Personality and past history, being rooted in 
the past, may not seem to be amenable to change, but have a significant impact on how 
individuals adjust to different settings. 
The Burgner Report (1996: 3 8,4.3.7) on regulation of the social services argued that 
input measures cannot be replaced as the central basis for statutory regulation, but that 
they should increasingly be used in conjunction with outcomes. This reflects the 
current American system, where the emphasis is on moving towards an outcome 
orientation, but with the regulatory process mandating both structures and processes 
seen as necessary to achieve these outcomes. However, it is different to the Australian 
system, where since the federal government took over most of the responsibility for the 
regulation of nursing homes in 1987, the emphasis has been much more radically 
outcome oriented (Braithwaite et al, 1993). The Australian philosophy is based on the 
conviction that outcomes are what counts, but that 'there are few, if any, well 
established truths about which inputs consistently result in improved outcomes' 
(Braithwaite et aL 1993: 10). It is argued, therefore, that input regulation runs the risk 
that regulators will set in concrete requirements that make residents worse off. 
According to Braithwaite (1993), in the US, where the expansion of private provision 
of long term care took place far earlier than in the UK, input regulation encouraged the 
development of a 'disciplinary' culture within nursing homes. The structure of the US 
nursing home industry in the immediate post-war period was very similar to that of the 
UK in ten-ns of being composed of mainly small providers running small homes 
(Braithwaite, 1993: 19). During the 1970s, however, tough regulatory measures 
concentrating on structural input standards were introduced. The effect of these was to 
lead to the development of large chains running large homes which could meet the 
standards but still be profitable by utilising economies of scale. Provision by large 
chains running large homes, where 'management control became increasingly remote 
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from actual care giving' (Braithwaite, 1993: 21), led to disciplinary practices towards 
residents, such as high levels of restraint. Input regulation therefore led to 'ritualism', 
i. e., 'going along with institutionalized means for achieving regulatory goals while not 
attaining the goals themselves' (Braithwaite, 1993: 11). According to Braithwaite 
(1993: 20): 'Nursing homes owned by some of the largest chains became dispiriting 
places - regimented, standardized, institutionalized, relying heavily on restraint to 
maintain order, and devoid of a warm, homelike atmosphere. ' 
There are some arguments in favour of input regulation, however. One is that when 
business people are making major capital investments, they like certainty (Braithwaite 
et al, 1993: 10). For example, they like to be able to ask regulators how they should 
build a new wing to meet their requirements, and they don't like being told that it does 
not result in adequate outcomes once it has been built. Input measures also provide 
clear guidance to managers who may not be well trained. There are some areas in 
which there is little dispute about the need for clear guidance, such as fire prevention. 
It is also argued that inputs, such as the number of beds per room, can be easily 
counted, and therefore enforced. 
Objective outcome indicators, like the number of pressure sores, may also be easy to 
count, and in the US has provided a strong basis for comparisons between homes, 
particularly over the incidence of physical restraint. In contrast, Twining (1991: 65) 
points out that there are several dimensions to sub ective outcomes such as quality of j 
fife, and these are difficult to measure. He does however, suggest ways in which this 
might be done. It is worth doing because, as Dartington and Denham (1991: 69) argue: 
'Home is what you own - psychologically if not literally. ' Thus, psychological 
ownership is especially important for those who are increasingly in need of physical 
support and for whom the therapeutic task is to maintain their sense of identity and 
worth as people. They should be able to make as many decisions for themselves as 
possible, and be consulted in decisions made for them. Braithwaite et al (1993: 13) 
similarly argue that 'the key to delivering an outcome orientation is a resident centred 
process'. Whilst recognising the problems presented by high dependency 
levels, 
Braithwaite et al (1993: 14) argue that: 'It is simply not true, as some of the critics 
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have suggested, that a resident centred process cannot work well where levels of 
disability are high. ' 
It has been seen, therefore, that quality systems may make use of structure, process 
or outcome measurements, or a combination of these. Increasingly there is a 
recognition that structure and process indicators should not dominate over outcome 
measures when monitoring quality. However, when discussing the issue of quality, it is 
necessary to consider not only the arrangements for external regulation of providers, 
but what kind of internal systems might be used by such providers. 
THE INTERNAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONALIZED FIRMS 
We have discussed so far in this section how the advent of managerialism in welfare 
services, together with public concern about standards, has encouraged a new 
emphasis on the regulation of private providers and demonstrable quality measures. 
Yet little detailed work has been done on how private providers of welfare (as opposed 
to manufacturing MNCs) actually organize themselves. 
Mintzberg (1979) identifies five main types of corporate organization: the simple 
structure, the machine bureaucracy, the professional bureaucracy, the divisionalized 
form, and the adhocracy. Each of these has a 'prime coordinating mechanism'. In a 
professional bureaucracy, for example, coordination is through standardization of 
skills, and training and indoctrination. This results from the specialized knowledge of 
professionals, leaving them relatively autonomous in the work process once they have 
graduated through the relevant training (1979: 349). A health care firm might therefore 
be assumed to operate in this way. However, this would be mitigated in firms 
providing care for older people, which tend to rely to a fairly large extent on relatively 
low-skilled, low-paid workers (see Chapter Six). A firm employing low-skilled 
workers is more likely to resemble a machine bureaucracy, which concentrates on 
standardizing the work process in classic Taylorist fashion. Furthermore, according to 
Mintzberg (1979: 380), multinational firms tend to be organized as divisionalized 
forms. This is because successful operation in diverse markets requires the firm to be 
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divided into a set of quasi-autonomous entities held together by a central 
administrative structure or headquarters. Thus, the vast majority of the Fortune 500 
are organized in this way. 
Divisionalized forms rely on standardization of (financial and profit-oriented) outputs 
as their prime coordinating mechanism. This is because the divisionalized form 
enhances the power of middle line managers, who control the day to day running of 
each division, but who must be held to account by headquarters. Quantitative 
performance control systems are thus a key design parameter of this type of 
organization. According to Mintzberg (1979: 424), this reliance on performance 
criteria is both its chief source of economic efficiency and the basis for one of its most 
serious social consequences: 
The Divisionalized Form requires that headquarters control the divisions 
primarily by quantitative performance criteria, and that typically means financial 
ones - profit, sales growth, return on investment, and the like. The problem is 
that these performance measures become virtual obsessions, driving out goals 
that cannot be measured - product quality, pride in work, customers well 
served, an environment protected or beautified. In effect, the economic goals 
drive out the social ones... As a result, the control system of the Divisionalized 
Form drives it to act, at best, socially unresponsively, at worst, socially 
irresponsibly. 
Although there is evidence that some MNCs have turned towards more flexible forms 
of organization, and that there is a diversity of these, (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1998 and 
1987; Held et al, 1999: 268), Coates et al (1993: 7) and Stopford & Strange (1991: 
150) confirm that MNCs measure the worth of any particular investment by the rate of 
return on that investment. 
The implications of this for welfare organizations, where quality of service is all 
important, are profound. According to Grfffith & Rayner (1985: 38), the American 
healthcare corporations operating in Britain in the early 1980s were managed 
according to company guidelines set at head office, but with some 
latitude allowed. 
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This meant that managers had some discretion, but that their personal progress within 
the organization depended on financial results. Gene Burleson, the chief executive 
officer of American Medical International, said that: 'Progress against budget is 
reviewed daily, weekly and monthly by the hospital director working with his 
department managers. Deviations from budget are dealt with by agreeing plans for 
corrective action. However, all managers within AMI are aware they are responsible 
for meeting their budgets and that failure to do so may result in ... de-selection. '(cited 
in Griffith & Rayner, 1985: 38; emphasis in original) According to David Bromberg, a 
spokesperson for American hospital corporations in 1983, 'As a service becomes 
unprofitable, there is greater danger that quality may be sacrificed' (Cited in Griffith & 
Rayner, 1985: 51). 
Mintzberg (1979) argues that the divisionalized fon-n encourages firms to grow ever 
larger as managers seek to expand their power and profitability. Paradoxically, this also 
encourages the concentration of power outside the firm, as unions and goverm-nent 
agencies seek to match that of the corporation. Yet according to Mintzberg (1979: 
288): 'The greater the external control of the organization, the more centralized and 
formalized its structure. ' This is because the two most effective means to control an 
organization from the outside are (I)to hold its most powerful decision makers 
responsible for its actions, and (2)to impose clearly defined standards on it. 'The first 
centralizes the structure; the second formalizes it. '(ibid: 289) There thus appears to be 
a symbiotic relationship between state and firm, the actions of each encouraging a 
concentration and formalization of the power of the other. 
In firms providing welfare, the imposition of standards through the regulatory system 
is likely to result in a formalization of the firm's structure through its adoption of 
internal quality assurance (QA) systems, which will operate simultaneously with 
financial criteria. As already discussed, quality systems such as ISO 9002 are based on 
controlling the labour process, in the manner of Mintzberg's 'machine bureaucracy'. In 
a competitive market, the firm is likely to seek to standardize the quality of 
its 
4product' in any case, in order to be able to sell it. This relates to the issue of branding. 
The chief officer of the American healthcare firm Humana Corporation, for example, 
once declared that the wanted to provide a product as uniform as a McDonald's 
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hamburger (Griffith & Rayner, 1985: 37). Large firms thus have incentives to impose 
internal quality systems, and the capacity to do so through their fon-nalized structures. 
It may also be the case that large and internationalized firms are able to deliver higher 
quality care as a result of economies of scale, access to more resources or a wider 
knowledge base. Dunning & McQueen (1981: 203) argue that economies of scale, 
managerial and organizational expertise, a high level of training and the provision of 
detailed instruction manuals are amongst the factors which give a competitive edge to 
multinationals involved in the hotel industry, which has a number of things in common 
with long term care, although in other ways it is very different (for a discussion of the 
'hotel approach' to long term care, see Bland, 1999). 
Overlapping with these issues of fonnal organization is that of 'culture' within the 
finn. This wifl be discussed next. 
COMPANY'CULTURE'AND MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
'Culture' within a firm may seem like an intangible notion, but it is important to the 
functioning of the firm, and may have been nurtured over many years. Johnson & 
Scholes (1993; 60) argue that: 'It is clear in examining decision processes that 
experience carries an important influence. Managers draw heavily on frames of 
reference which are built up over time and which are especially important at a 
collective organisational level. ' Johnson & Scholes (1993: 162) see the core of an 
organization's culture as residing in its 'paradigm', which is composed of values, 
beliefs and assumptions. Values may be easy to identify in an organization, as they are 
often written down as statements about the organization's mission, objectives or 
strategies. However, they tend to be vague, such as 'service to the community'. Beliefs 
are more specific, and are also issues which people in the organization can 'surface' 
and talk about, such as a belief that professional staff should not have their professional 
actions appraised by managers. Assumptions are seen as the 'real' core of an 
organization's culture: 'They are the aspects of organizational life which are taken for 
granted and which people find difficult to identify and explain. ' (Johnson & Scholes, 
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1993: 162, emphasis in original. ) Culture is related to organizational structure because 
the latter preserves the core beliefs of the organization. Furthermore: 'The way in 
which responsibility and authority are distributed within the organizational structure is 
also an important part of the culture' (ibid: 167). 
This issue of culture is relevant to the long-term care industry because, as with health 
care ancillary services and many other privatized services (PSPRU, 1996), a process of 
expansion through mergers and acquisitions (M&As) has been particularly marked in 
the UK Community Care market (see above). According to Johnson and Scholes 
(1993: 234) a compelling reason to develop by acquisition is the speed with which it 
allows the company to enter new product market areas. Johnson and Scholes (ibid) 
also point out that international developments are often pursued through acquisition 
(or joint development) in order to gain market knowledge quickly. Additionally, there 
may be reasons of cost efficiency which make acquisition desirable, perhaps arising 
from the fact that an established company may already be a long way down the 
6experience curve', and may have achieved efficiencies which would be difficult to 
match quickly by internal development. According to Johnson and Scholes (ibid), in 
public services cost efficiency is usually the stated reason for merging units and/or 
rationalizing provision. Consolidation can bring benefits from economies of scale 
involving cuts in administration costs and savings from additional buying power of 
consumable items and utility costs. Although M&As often lead to staff cuts, 
consolidation may also assist retention of staff and increase potential for bringing on 
board skilled middle managers and professionals. In the long ten-n care market, a 
particular reason for acquisition is the expense of new-build. 
However, Johnson & Scholes (1993: 234) point out that: 'The overriding problem 
with acquisition lies in the ability to integrate the new company 
into the activities of the 
old. This often centres around difficulties of cultural fit. ' The problem of cultural 
fit 
has been well illustrated in the recent spate of mergers in the world economy more 
generally. In 1998 there were $2.4 trillion worth of mergers worldwide, a 
50% 
increase on 1997, itself a record year ('The Economist', 9.1.99). A quarter of these 
involved cross-border mergers. 1999 saw a huge increase in M&A activity 
between 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
firms (Wood Mackenzie, 1999 & 2000). Much of 
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the inward investment in the UK in particular has taken the form of M&As. Foreign 
spending on acquisitions in the UK rose by 36% in 1997, while the US saw a fall of 
16% (IBB, 1998: 8). In absolute terms, the amount spent in the US by foreign 
investors was only 13% higher than that in the UK, despite the much larger size of the 
US economy. 
Yet most studies have shown that two of every three deals has not worked. 
According to 'The Economist' (9.1.99): 'The only winners are the shareholders of the 
acquired firm, who sell their company for more than it is really worth. ' However, as 
'The Economist' (9.1.99) puts it, 'People never fit together as easily as flow charts. ' 
This applies to top management as much as to other staff - the drug merger of Glaxo, 
Wellcome and SmithKline Beecham collapsed 'when neither boss was prepared to play 
second fiddle'. According to 'The Economist' (9.1.99), two things make culture 
clashes harder to manage today; one is the growing importance of intangible assets (i. e. 
skilled staff who can 'walk out of the door' and important relationships with customers 
and suppliers built up over time), the other is the rise in cross-border mergers. For 
example, the link between Sweden's Pharmacia and America's Upjohn in 1995 was 
supposed to be driven by cost-cutting and matching drug portfolios, but time was 
wasted on 'American' practices like banning alcohol at lunch. In addition, Pharmacia 
had not integrated an earlier Italian acquisition. The new company started with 'power 
bases' at Stockholm, Milan and Michigan, but after a failed attempt to make everybody 
report to a new office near London, the firm moved to New Jersey and appointed a 
new boss. 
According to 'The Economist' (9.1.99), there are three 'ominous signs' about the 
recent merger boom. First, fin-ns may be better at negotiating the deal than at 
integrating their acquisitions, especially in America. The services conglomerate 
Cendant, for example, ended up with two bosses and two different accounting centres: 
neither side really knew what the other was doing. This problem of integration has 
been confirmed by a Bank for International Settlements (BIS) study (BIS, 1999), 
which showed that bank profitability had fallen in twelve countries despite a wave of 
consolidation. The BIS found that acquirers had 'systematically' underestimated 
organizational problems. Second, many deals are rushed - Cendant did twelve big 
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deals in four years. Third, mergers have often become a strategy in their own right. For 
example, most American bank deals have been done in the name of cost-cutting, yet 
research has shown that merged banks had generally cut costs more slowly than those 
that had not merged. Mergers may therefore distract managers' attention from tackling 
the real problems. As well as the problem of wrecking 'carefully nurtured corporate 
cultures'('The Economist', 9.1.99), there are problems such as linking distribution 
systems or settling legal disputes. In particular, many mergers have found it difficult to 
mesh information technology together. For example, Aetna, an insurer, bought US 
Healthcare, a health maintenance organization, partly for its computer systems, which 
could sift out the 'best' doctors. However, the two firms had big problems combining 
their 'back offices'. 
It is clear, therefore, that M& As may be problematic. A study of the large firms that 
are developing in the long term care sector, where M&A activity has been 
widespread, must therefore investigate the impact of M& As on such firms' internal 
organization and culture. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has discussed a number of important issues. It has surveyed the growing 
internationalization of services, and the way in which the internationalization of welfare 
and other public services has been facilitated by privatization. Although little is known 
about internationalized welfare firms, it was noted that there may be a number of 
important dffferences between manufacturing and service MNCs, in terms of both 
structure and strategy. Like other large firms, service firms are likely to make use of 
economies of scale. These may primarily be in purchasing, rather than production 
(provision), since consumption of services must generally take place at the same time 
as production, making the concentration of production in one place and 
dependence on 
mass distribution impossible. However, providers of long term care 
have made use of 
some economies of scale in production, through the use of 
large, purpose-built, homes. 
Furthermore, Mohan's analysis of the expansion of internationalized fin-ns in the UK 
hospital market in the 1980s (1991) indicates that they may have had a qualitative 
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impact on the way services are provided, through their innovative role in work 
organization for example; whilst Dunning & McQueen's analysis of the hotel industry 
(198 1) indicates that multinationals may also have competitive advantages arising from 
managerial and organizational expertise, and training and instruction manuals. Whilst 
services are diverse, and consequently difficult to classify, strategies of 
internationalization may be either 'client following' or 'market seeking'. 
In long term care, the introduction of the 'mixed economy of care' has allowed 
significant penetration of delivery by large private companies. The long term care 
market has been experiencing a process of M&A, reflecting trends in the world 
economy more generally. Entry to a foreign market may take the form of mergers or 
acquisitions because they allow the firm to gain market knowledge quickly. This is 
confirmed by Mohan's research (1991) which showed that US hospital corporations 
often entered the UK market via these means. However, M&A can be a disruptive 
process, since the new firm is faced with the problem of integrating previously 
independent companies into a single coherent entity. Such problems often revolve 
around the issue of 'cultural fit', i. e. the difficulty of cohering companies with 
sometimes very different practices based on their own specific set of values, beliefs and 
assumptions. 
This chapter also discussed the growing concern with state regulation in long term 
care resulting from increasing private provision. It was argued that growing 
managerialism within the welfare state, influenced to a large extent by practices in the 
private sector, has reacted back onto private providers. As more provision has been 
transferred to the private sector, there has been a growing concern with the need to 
find external forms of control. This is consistent with the observation made in Chapter 
L) that rather than the state losing power it may be changing the form of its 
intervention, in this case from direct provision to subsidy and regulation. However, it 
was noted that the monitoring of quality is not a straightforward process; the type of 
quality criteria utilized may have an impact on the outcomes for residents, depending 
on how the regulatory system interacts with providers, the nature of those providers, 
and the overall structure of the market. Braithwaite (1993), 
for example, has shown 
that in the US after the 1970s the introduction of tough structural input standards 
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encouraged the development of large companies which met the standards by 
developing large homes which could take advantage of economies of scale. These 
organizations ultimately engaged in 'ritualism', i. e., 'going along with institutionalized 
means for achieving regulatory goals while not attaining the goals themselves' 
(Braithwaite, 1993: 11). 
Also relevant to this issue of regulation were issues relating to the internal 
organization of large and internationalized firms. Based on Mintzberg's typology 
(1979), three types of organization were identified as potentially being relevant to large 
private providers of long term care. These were: firstly, the 'professional bureaucracy' 
in which coordination takes place through the standardization of skills and training and 
indoctrination; secondly, the 'machine bureaucracy' in which coordination takes place 
through standardizing the work process in classic 'Taylorist' fashion; and thirdly, the 
'divisionalized form' which is relevant to MNCs and results from their need to control 
their quasi-autonomous national divisions from a central headquarters. The 
divisionalized form relies on the standardization of financial outputs, or profitability 
criteria. This emphasis on profitability criteria was identified as a potential source of 
concern where fin-ns are providing welfare services. However, the incentive for fin-ns 
to ensure minimum standards of care through their own internal quality assurance 
mechanisms was also acknowledged. These incentives relate to the need for the firm to 
compete on quality as well as price if market share is to be gained, and this relates in 
turn to the issue of 'branding'. The firm must also meet the requirements of external 
regulators, and doing so is an important part of maintaining its brand image. As 
Mintzberg (1979: 289) notes, the attempt to control. the firm through external 
regulation tends to encourage even greater centralization and formalization of the 
firms' internal structure. There is, therefore, potentially a 'symbiotic' relationship 
between state and firm, with the actions of each encouraging a concentration and 
formalization of the power of the other. 
This chapter has identified a number of issues and concepts which are important for 
studying the development of internationalized welfare firms, and have particular 
relevance to the UK market in long term care. The next chapter sets out the research 
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design and methodology used in the thesis. In doing so, it builds on the discussion so 
far undertaken in chapters one and two. 
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH DESIGN AND 
METHODOLOGY 
INTRODUCTION 
The discussion in Chapter One highlighted the 'level-of-analysis problem', noting that 
much of the Social Policy literature has been centred on the macro-level, in the sense 
of being concerned with the effect of the world market on national policy making. 
Chapter Two discussed the emergence of internationalized welfare firms, concentrating 
on the long-term care market, where private provision has gone finihest in the UK. 
Chapter Two noted that little work has been done on these kinds of fin-ns, and 
surveyed what is already known about them and some of the issues that are relevant to 
their conti i growth. Mulng 
This thesis has two complementary aims. Firstly, it aims to build on what is known 
about large and internationalized welfare firms through an empirical and exploratory 
study of large and internationalized firms within the UK market for long term care. 
This first airn is pursued at two levels of analysis, both of which have been somewhat 
neglected in the Social Policy literature on globalization. Research questions are 
discussed below, drawn from the discussion in Chapter Two, which are best 
approached at a micro level of analysis centring on company case studies. The results 
of this micro level of analysis are then used as the basis for an adapted version of 
Ruigrok & van Tulder's meso level of analysis, centring on the relationships between 
these firms and other key actors. Throughout the thesis there is an emphasis on issues 
of quality and quality assurance (QA). The rationale for this is that regulation in this 
sector is centrally concerned with the quality of care delivered (see Chapter Two), and 
because there is little relevance to a study of this sector that is not centrally concerned 
with outcomes for the users of the service. 
This meso level of analysis also allows the second airn of the thesis to be pursued. 
This is to make a contribution to the debate within Social Policy (and other disciplines) 
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concerning the deterministic claims relating to globalization discussed in Chapter One. 
Thus the relationships between internationalized providers of care and other key actors 
could be analysed in the light of claims about the loss of power by nationally based 
actors, and the state in particular. Whilst the findings from such an analysis would not 
necessarily apply to all sectors of the economy, or even the whole of the service sector, 
the extent to which they are consistent with or contradictory to deterministic claims 
about the relative power of different actors has relevance for the overall debate about 
globalization. This would particularly be the case if the findings showed that the state 
and/or other actors had substantial power or influence over the case study firms, since 
it would contradict the argument that such actors are always weak in their dealings 
with internationalized firms. 
As the basis of the study, the three largest private providers of long-term care in the 
UK were chosen as case studies. 'Largest' was defined in ten-ns of the number of beds 
provided in the UK, rather than the number of homes owned or managed, since some 
companies would have larger homes than others. Numbers of beds, as well as homes 
owned or managed, for each of these firms (at 21 June 1999) are given in the table 
below. 
COMPANY HOMES BEDS 
Company 1 221 161,390 
Company 2 146 89354 
Company 3 95 59972 
Table 3.1: Number of Homes and Beds 
(Source: CCMN, June 1999) 
Restrictions on time, the size of a PhD thesis, and resources meant that the research 
was focused upon the UK market. The international perspective is therefore dealt with 
by reference within the research questions to the form and extent of 
internationalization of both the fin-ns and the non-firm actors, and the impact of this on 
their behaviour and relationships with each other within the UK market. As will be 
seen in Chapter Four, the results of the research revealed that all three 
firms were 
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internationalized in some form to some extent. Elsewhere in the thesis, reference is 
therefore made to 'large and internationalized' firms. Whilst this represents some 
degree of conflation of the simply large on the one hand with the internationalized on 
the other, given that all three firms were internationalized in some way this was 
unavoidable. However, it does confirm that there is in fact a tendency towards 
internationalization among such firms, and provides the basis for the meso level 
analysis of their relationships with other actors . 
The following sections discuss in turn the design of the micro-level analysis; the 
design of the meso-level analysis; and finally the methodological questions and 
problems which related to both of these. 
THE MICRO-LEVEL ANALYSIS 
Chapter Two showed that, like manufacturing firms, service firms are becoming 
increasingly internationalized, but that, unlike manufacturing firms, little work has been 
done on the nature of such firms and the strategies they adopt (Dunning, 1993; 
Daniels, 1993; Enderwick, 1989a). Work done on the expansion of internationalized 
firms in the UK hospital market in the 1980s (particularly Mohan, 1991), indicates that 
they may have a qualitative impact on the way services are provided, through their 
innovative role in work organization for example; whilst analysis of the hotel industry 
(Dunning & McQueen, 1981) indicates that multinationals may have competitive 
advantages arising from economies of scale, managerial and organizational expertise, 
and tra' ' and instruction manuals. Chapter Two also discussed the new concern InIng 
with quality and regulation that has accompanied the growth in private provision of 
welfare services, and the relevance of this to firms' internal modes of organization in 
ten-ns of both quality control and financial control. However, it was observed that the 
largest firms in the long term care market have grown through a process of merger and 
acquisition (M&A), which often presents problems of integration and 'cultural fit'. The 
evidence and issues surveyed in Chapter Two can therefore be used to generate a 
detailed set of research questions concerned with the behaviour and functioning of the 
case study firms. The research questions are as follows: 
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1) What is the corporate history of each firm (with reference to the M&A process)? 
2) What goals and strategies do they have? 
3) What is the form and extent of internationalization of each finn? 
4) How has being part of a large and internationalized organization affected their 
operation? 
5) How are they organized (with particular reference to quality assurance systems)? 
6) How has the process of acquisition and concentration affected (5) above? 
7) What impact do issues of profit and cost have on quality? 
8) What are the differences & similarities between the firms? 
Case study is a method often used in Business Studies. Here, it is seen as particularly 
useful in, 'relatively less-known areas, where there is little experience and theory 
available to serve as a guide... ' (Ghauri et al, 1995: 87). According to Ghauri et al 
(ibid): 'The main focus is on seeking insight rather than testing: instead of testing 
existing hypotheses we seek insight through the features and characteristics of the 
object being studied. ' Case studies are often of an 'explanatory, exploratory or 
descriptive nature' (ibid: 88; see also Mmund, 1997: 107). According to Yin (1994: 
13) a case study is an empirical inquiry that, 'investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-fife context'. This thesis has an important exploratory element since, as 
already noted, little is known about large firms in this sector. The choice of the three 
largest private providers allowed for comparison between large firms, as in research 
question eight. 
As is usual with case studies (Ghauri et al, 1995: 89), two main sources were 
available with which to answer the micro-level research questions. These were, firstly, 
the personnel, especially at management level, of the firms themselves; and secondly, 
various documents and publications. As with the meso-level analysis discussed below, 
interviewees were chosen' by purposive or 'judgmental' sampling. This form of 
sampling is often used in case-study research (Saunders et al, 1997: 145), since it 
enables the selection of key people who will best be able to answer particular research 
questions. Problems of access made it particularly important to consider carefully 
which key people to approach. The more members of an organization approached 
(and 
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the more of employees' time therefore taken up), and the more sensitive the 
information sought, the more likely were conditions to be attached. The primary 
condition was likely to be a guarantee of anonymity (of the firrr4 not just the 
individual). This was important since obtaining information from interviews which 
could not be related explicitly to the firm would hinder the cross-referencing with other 
fon-ns; of infon-nation which was vital in order to substantiate interview data and build 
up an overall picture of that firm. 
The Heads of Quality Assurance (QA) of the three firms, as opposed to personnel 
who might have had a better knowledge of the firms' strategies, were chosen as 
interviewees for two main reasons. Firstly, this was in keeping with the focus of the 
study on quality issues. Furthermore, the Heads of QA, as opposed to lower level 
quality managers, would have an overall view of the functioning of the firm and the 
impact of organizational issues. Secondly, the details of strategy, especially where they 
involved questions of finance, were likely to be more sensitive than issues of quality. 
This was largely because a firm's strategy is at the heart of its attempt to gain 
competitive advantage over its rivals and has a direct bearing on profitability. It was 
therefore considered that little infon-nation would be provided on strategy which went 
far beyond what was available from other sources, without conditions of anonymity 
being attached. The reluctance to divulge infon-nation relating to strategy and finance 
was confirmed in interview with Margaret Grant, who had responsibility for quality at 
Company 3 but who was also on the firm's board of directors, when a hostile response 
was given to a question which she misunderstood to be about the firm's financing 
strategy (the question was actually concerned with local authority funding). 
Whilst issues of quality may also be sensitive, they are likely to be less so than those 
of strategy. This is particularly the case where they are concerned with overall quality 
regimes rather than the evaluation of outcomes, unless the firm considers itself to have 
a particularly high quality of service. In relation to this latter point, there is always the 
danger that firms' representatives will use the interview in a way which is intended to 
serve public relations purposes, and this must be recognised when analysing the 
resulting data. 
64 
Furthen-nore, documentary information relating to the broad outline of strategy was 
likely to be fairly easily available. Firms are required by law to explain their overall 
strategy (including mergers and acquisitions) to shareholders and others interested in 
their activities through their annual reports (Vause, 1997). These Reports can often be 
obtained simply by making a request to the firm in question, although there is no 
guarantee that they will be sent to non-shareholders. They do, however, need to be 
read critically since although they must be factual and meet certain accounting and 
other standards, firms will use these as an opportunity to promote themselves in the 
best possible light (Vause, 1997: 223; Ghauri et al, 1995: 56). However, according to 
Vause (1997: 222), 'It is reasonable to expect the annual report to provide sufficient 
information about a company"s strategy and the success of its implementation to date. ' 
In the event, not every annual report for every company for every relevant year could 
be obtained (See Appendix Four). However, the thesis did not rely on annual reports 
alone for documentary evidence relating to the firms, but also used the trade press 
which provides a continuing commentary on issues of strategy and merger and 
acquisition. Further sources of documentary evidence included company press releases 
and internet sites, and business databases available on the internet (a rapidly growing 
source of company information - see Vause, 1997: 213). 
Therefore, whilst interviews provided the primary source of information relating to 
questions four to seven, documentary sources were the main sources of information for 
questions one to three, although sources are cross-referenced throughout. The key 
people interviewed were Bob Jones, Head of Quality Assurance at Company 1 Care 
Services; Jane Bartlett, Quality Assurance Manager at Company 2; and Margaret 
Grant, Professional Services Manager at Company 3. Two of these, Jones and Bartlett, 
allowed some time for their QA manuals to be looked at, and Jones provided a copy of 
Company Vs Quality Review Manual, which corroborated what they had said in 
interview about QA. The opportunity also arose through a personal contact to be 
shown around a home in the Hastings area belonging to Company I and to interview 
its manager. W'hilst this did not fit into the research design, the opportunity was taken 
up in order to provide background for the study. The interview guide for company 
QA 
managers is reproduced in Appendix Three, whilst general issues relating to interview 
research are discussed in a later section of this chapter. 
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The nature of the research questions for the micro-level of analysis meant that issues 
were touched on which related to actors which Ruigrok & van Tulder (1995) 
conceptualise as external to the firm, notably finance and supply (see Appendix One). 
These issues are not analysed in this thesis with reference to external actors, i. e. at the 
meso level of analysis. The criteria for choosing the non-firm actors for the meso level 
of analysis are discussed in the next section. 
THE MESO-LEVEL ANALYSIS 
In order to be an effective tool for analysis in the long-term care market, Ruigrok & 
van Tulder's model needed some modification. As utilised by Ruigrok & van Tulder 
(1995: 68), the concept of the 'bargaining arena' is concerned with power relations 
between core firms and other actors. This question of power is clearly important to the 
globalization debate, and therefore also has great significance for this thesis. This is 
discussed further below. However, the thesis also attempts to provide a more in-depth 
qualitative analysis of the processes at work in, and the outcomes of, the relationships 
between the firms and the other actors. As with the micro-level analysis discussed 
above, there was thus also an exploratory aspect to the meso level of analysis. So, 
although the idea of private firms operating within a 'complex' of relationships with 
other actors was retained, this was conceived of in a somewhat different way to 
Ruigrok & van Tulder. 
To begin with, Ruigrok & van Tulder's model required some modification in terms of 
the choice of actors to be included. The thesis' emphasis on quality provided a basis 
for choosing the non-firm actors which were included in the study. The globalization 
debate has been concerned principally with two actors: states and firms. For this 
reason, and because of the crucial role of state agencies in the long-term care sector as 
both regulators of quality and purchasers of services, the state was retained as a key 
actor. The workers who do the actual caring remained relevant, since no organization 
can function without them and the conditions of work and the morale of staff are a key 
influence on the quality of care. Whilst Stopford & Strange (1991: 227) claim that 
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their evidence calls into question the concept of class, as Radice (1998) points out, 
Ruigrok & van Tulder (1995) provide the basis for including labour in analyses 
concerned with globalization. Finally residents themselves and older people's 
organizations more generally were included, although this provided some 
methodological problems which are discussed below. 
Other actors which Ruigrok & van Tulder do include in their model are not included 
in this study. Distributors are not relevant to this study given the nature of the 
'product' (service) being provided. Suppliers and financiers are relevant to the overall 
functioning of these firms, but have no direct bearing on the quality and delivery of 
care which the thesis is concerned with. However, as indicated above, issues of finance 
and supply did arise in the micro-level analysis to which Chapter Four is devoted. 
The analysis of the relationships between the case-study firms and each of the other 
actors was divided into three aspects, the first two of which relate to large and 
internationalized firms within the long-term care sector generally, and the third of 
which relates specifically to the case-study firms. Each of these aspects can be 
discussed with reference to a set of research questions. 
The first aspect concerns the attitudes, perceptions and goals which inform and 
motivate each of the non-firm actors considered. In the meso level of analysis, actors 
or agents are conceived of as organizations, rather than as individuals or classes for 
example. It is through this focus on organizations, and organizational capability, that 
we are able to undertake a 'meso' level analysis of relationships between key actors. 
As acknowledged in Chapter One, however, the weakness of this approach is that, like 
every other level of analysis, by focusing on that particular level we must leave aside 
other levels if we are to have 'a stable point of focus' (Singer, 1961: 78; see Chapter 
One). Thus in gaining something we lose something else, since on the one hand 
organizations must operate within a wider economic and social environment, whilst on 
the other they are composed of individuals. 
The starting point for the analysis is the goals of the organization being considered. 
These goals define what it is the organization is trying to achieve; in a sense they define 
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the very raison detre of the organization. However, the way in which these goals are 
pursued, and the way they are formed and interpreted, will be affected by the attitudes 
and perceptions of individuals who undertake key roles within the organization. This 
thesis makes use of interviews with key people within the organizations considered as a 
major source of data. Given the organizational focus of the thesis, this raised both 
conceptual and practical problems. 
Where key people are interviewed primarily as representatives of organizations, 
rather than simply as individuals in their own right, a problem is encountered in 
4 separating' the individual from the organization. For example, how do we know that 
the information yielded by the respondent does not simply reflect their own worldview, 
rather than that of the organization? There are several answers to this. One is that, to a 
certain extent, individuals in key positions are the organization in so far as they have 
executive power within it. However, large organizations are rarely run by a single 
person and, as acknowledged below, respondents were not always the first choice of 
the researcher. However, to a certain extent individuals are also socialized by their 
organizations, and it is their job to represent those organizations. Hence the 
importance of understanding the nature of the organization itself, explored in this thesis 
in the second aspect of the analysis (discussed below), which is concerned with the 
form and extent of the organization. Thus whilst the first aspect of attitudes, 
perceptions and goals is discussed first here, it should be remembered that these are 
not static. As well as helping to shape, they are also partly shaped by the form and 
extent of the organization, and are open to change over time. Finally, in both the 
interview itself and in analysing the data, ) care was taken to consider the role of the 
individual within the organization, and any evidence of conflict or differences of view 
within it. 
Attitudes and perceptions which are relevant to this thesis include attitudes towards 
private provision generally and awareness of the size and internationalization of the 
leading firnis in the sector, which help to condition the actions of the non-firm actors 
towards large private providers generally. It also includes perceptions of and attitudes 
towards quality and regulatory issues, which this thesis is particularly concerned with. 
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The research questions which were addressed for each set of non-firm actors in 
relation to this first aspect are as follows: 
1) What are their overall goals or aims? 
2) What is their assessment of the overall shift towards private provision in the sector? 
3) How aware are they of the size and internationalization of the leading firms in the 
sector? 
What are their perceptions of and attitudes towards large and internationalized 
firms? 
5) What are their perceptions of and attitudes towards quality and regulatory issues? 
The second aspect is a 'structural' one in the sense that it is concerned with the form 
and extent of organization of each of the non-firm actors in the long term care sector. 
These are the general conditions which affect the 'balance of power' between the firms 
and each of the other actors (although it is not assumed that these relationships are 
necessarily ones of conflict). At any given moment in time, the existing form and extent 
of organization of each of the non-firm actors constrains and sets limits to the possible 
strategies they may follow in pursuit of their goals. This includes their ability to 
influence the behaviour of the case study (and other) firms. It also includes decisions to 
attempt to change the form and / or extent of their organization. This is the element of 
ýstructuration' in this analysis. As Giddens (1984: xxi) points out, this reflects Marx's 
famous statement that: 'Men [sic] make history, but not in circumstances of their own 
choosing'. 
In general, the greater the extent of their organization, the more powerful they will 
be. For example, a union with more members is, ceteris parebus, more powerful than 
one with fewer members. However, theform of their organization may also affect their 
capacity to act and the precise way in which they pursue their goals. The same is true 
for the extent of their internationalization, which Ruigrok & van Tulder (1995) 
identify as a key factor affecting the bargaining position of other actors in relation to 
internationalized firms. They argue that in general the more internationalized other 
actors are, the more bargaining power they will have vis a vis the firn-L However, in 
practice this depends on the nature of the actor's international organization. A union, 
to extend the example, may belong to an international federation, but this may not be 
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an effective instrument for action (Ruigrok & van Tulder, 1995: 85). This underlines 
the importance here of the qualitative analysis of the form of organization, as well as 
the extent of that organization. 
The research questions which were addressed for each set of non-firm actors in 
relation to this second aspect are as follows: 
1) What is the form and extent of their organization? 
2) What is the form and extent of their internationalization? 
3) How do they pursue their goals, given the answers to (1) and (2) above? 
The third mpect, which follows from the first two, is firm specific, in that it is 
concerned with the particular set of relationships between each of the firms discussed 
in Chapter Four and the other actors. The first and second aspects thus provide the 
essential context for an examination of the actual relationships between the case study 
firms and the other actors, including incidents of direct bargaining. This is perhaps the 
most exploratory aspect of the meso level of analysis, as it sets out to discover 'what 
actually happens' in these relationships. The research questions which were addressed 
for each set of non-firm actors in relation to this third aspect are as follows: 
1) What experience do they have of relationships with specific firms? 
2) How are these different to each other? 
3) What distinguishes these from similar relationships, e. g. with smaller firms? 
Relevant to this third aspect were also the attitudes of each of the three firms to the 
various non-firm actors, and their experiences of relating to these actors. The research 
questions which were therefore addressed for each of the firms in relation to this third 
aspect are as follows: 
1) What are their attitudes towards and perceptions of each of the non-firm actors? 
2) What experiences do they have of relating to each of the non-firm actors? 
The data for the meso-level analysis was derived from three main sources. First, 
interviews were conducted with key people from each of the non-firm actors. These 
are discussed immediately below. Second, the interviews with the QA managers from 
each of the three case-study firms, in addition to focusing on the questions relating to 
the micro-level analysis, also covered questions relating to each of the three non-firm 
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actors from the point of view of the firms themselves. Thus, information could be 
gathered on the firms" experiences of, and attitudes and policies towards, state 
regulatory and purchasing agencies; trade unions and staff related matters; and 
residents' committees (see below for the significance of these). The results of this were 
then cross-referenced with those obtained from the inter-views with the non-firm 
actors. Third, as with the micro-level analysis, relevant documents were analysed. 
These included government acts and reports and the trade press, all of which 
performed an important function in Chapter Five in setting out the framework of 
analysis relevant to government policy and strategy in relation to the goals, and the 
form and extent of organization, of state agencies, as discussed below. The 
publications of unions and older people's organizations also yielded important 
information relating to Chapters Six and Seven respectively. 
As with the interviewees from the firms, the key people to be interviewed from the 
non-firm actors were chosen by purposive or 'judgmental' sampling. The logic of this 
was imposed by the meso level model described above. Thus, the key organizations 
which represented each of the three non-firm actors were identified, and then key 
people from each of these were approached for interview. The criteria for the selection 
of these key people was that they should be the people with overall responsibility for 
the long-term care sector within that organization. However, at the initial interview 
with each of the organizations approached, the respondent was asked if there was 
anyone else whom it would be appropriate to talk to. A judgement was then made 
about whether that person would indeed yield the information required. This practice 
therefore offered a means of both checking if the initial respondent was an appropriate 
interviewee and of identifying others. It did, however, mean that more people were 
interviewed from some organizations than from others; this often resulted from factors 
such as the way in which that particular organization was structured and the resulting 
distribution of roles within it. 
Problems were encountered in carrying out this process which related equally to all 
three of the actors. Some organizations which were approached were unable to 
provide an appropriate interviewee. Others took so long in responding that, after a 
number of reminders, a decision had to be taken to abandon the attempt at interview. 
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Some individuals within organizations delegated the task to another person within that 
organization; it was not, therefore, always possible to interview the person considered 
to be most appropriate. A list of people interviewed for the thesis, including the 
positions of those who did not respond, is given in Appendix Two. 
Problems specific to each of the non-firm actors were also encountered in 
operationalizing the meso level model. The concept of the bargaining arena used by 
Ruigrok & van Tulder (1995) is based principally on organizations, since those actors 
who are unable to organize at all by definition have little bargaining power. As 
discussed above, the focus on organizations, and the importance of the actors' form 
and extent of organization, were retained in this thesis. However, choosing appropriate 
organizations was not always a straightforward process. Where it was difficult, this did 
not ultimately undermine the emphasis on organizations, since the nature of the 
difficulty encountered tended to illustrate the relative strengths or weaknesses of that 
actor, in terms of the form of its organization and its overall capacity to organize. This 
will be discussed in relation to each of the non-firm actors. 
A problem arose immediately upon applying the research design to state agencies, 
since these were organized at a local level and were divided between Health and Local 
Authorities. This is in itself a key issue which will be discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter Five. The problem for the methodology employed revolved around the choice 
of key people to be interviewed, since there were potentially a great many of these 
given the multiplicity of local state agencies - too many in fact for in-depth interviews 
with each one. Nationally based officials would not have any direct experience of 
dealing with the case-study firms, whilst a survey of locally based ones would not yield 
the depth of information which was sought. Through cross-referencing directories of 
major providers (L&B, 1998; Parry, 1998), those authorities with high numbers of 
homes belonging to the case-study firms were identified. The numbers of these were 
relatively low, but securing interviews with key people from these proved difficult due 
to constraints on their time arising from the pressure of work. The solution adopted 
was to analyse the overall, national issues relating to both the goals and the form and 
extent of organization of state agencies with reference to key documents, such as 
government acts and reports. These documents reflect the role of the national 
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government in setting the parwneters of 'for-profit' participation in the delivery of 
services, and in shaping the agencies which regulate it. This was then supplemented by 
interviews with key state actors in one particular locality, which could then act as an 
exemplar in ten-ns of illustrating actual practice and experience in relating to the case- 
study firms. 
The use of one locality as an 'exemplar' does not suggest, however, that the chosen 
locality was 'representative' of the 'average' locality. This would provide problems in 
any case, since a sample of one would be too small to attempt such generalization. The 
chosen locality, Albion, is distinct in two important ways. Firstly, the two Health 
Authorities in Albion, East Albion and West Albioný both had higher than average 
numbers of homes owned by the case study firms. The area was chosen for this very 
reason (as well as for the willingness of key people in the area to be interviewed). At 
the time of interview, West Albion had eight homes belonging to Company 1, two 
belonging to Company 2, and one which had recently been acquired by Company 3. 
East Albion had three homes belonging to Company 1, two belonging to Company 2, 
and five belonging to Company 3. Thus, both Albion Health Authorities had higher 
numbers of homes consistent with a good spread of homes belonging to all three firms 
than any other health authority. They were chosen on the basis of health rather than 
local authorities since the case study firms have much higher numbers of nursing homes 
than residential homes. Secondly, Albion was distinct in terms of its relatively high 
numbers of self-pay clients, which may explain why it also had high numbers of private 
homes. This raised particular issues in relation to purchasing for Albion County 
Council, as will be discussed in Chapter Five. These two factors mean that the data 
collected in relation to Albion cannot be over-generalized fron-L Rather, Albion's 
greater experience of dealing with the case study firms is used to illustrate in an 
exploratory way the issues which may arise in the relationship between state agencies 
and the firms. This data is then discussed in Chapter Five in the context of the general 
and nationally relevant issues identified from the document analysis. 
The key people interviewed from state agencies were therefore the Heads of the 
Registration and Inspection Units in East and West Albion Health Authorities - Maria 
Smitharn and Dianne Fenn respectively; and key people responsible for commissioning 
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on behalf of Albion County Council - Adam Warden, the Local Services Manager, and 
Gordon Saydon, Strategic Commissioning Manager. These key people reflect the 
current division of labour between Health and Local Authorities: the regulators came 
from the Health Authorities because the case study firms have many more nursing 
homes than residential homes, whilst the purchasers were chosen from the Local 
Authority as this could be expected to carry out more purchasing from private nursing 
homes than Health Authorities. This also provided an opportunity to examine the 
relationships between key people from different state agencies - not just regulators and 
purchasers, but Health Authorities and Local Authorities. These interviews were then 
cross-referenced with those conducted with the firms' QA managers, for the 'firm 
specific' aspect of the analysis. 
The only person interviewed for Chapter Five with a nationally based position was 
Julia Owen, Senior Project Manager for the Americas at the Invest In Britain Bureau. 
She was interviewed primarily in relation to the terms of entry of foreign firms, which 
in this study relates primarily to the American-owned Company 2. This was relevant to 
the research question on the form and extent of internationalization of the non-firm 
actors. 
Another problem relating to state agencies concerned differences in regulatory 
structures and practices between the different parts of the United Kingdom. Although 
the thesis is concerned with the UK as a whole in terms of the operation of the case 
study companies, the analysis of their relationships with state agencies was confined to 
the operation of the English system and its proposed reforms. This was necessary to 
avoid over-complexity. 
The key unions in the long-term care sector were identified through a series of 
telephone calls to those unions which were likely to organize in this sector, and 
through the process described above of checking for other key people at the initial 
interviews. The main interviews for Chapter Six were therefore with the following 
people: Steve Morton, UNISON Director of Policy and Research; Peter Stephens, 
UNISON National Officer for Healthcare; Kevin Fenton, a Research Officer employed 
by UNISON in the Public Services Privatization Research Unit; Mike Gresham, 
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National Secretary of the Public Services Section of the GMB; Laura Pole, a Research 
Officer working with Mike Gresham at the GMB; and Louise Saber, Independent 
Sector Advisor to the RCN. A brief telephone interview was also conducted with Tom 
Douras, the Trade Group Secretary at the TGWU for this sector, during which it was 
established that the TWGU's presence in private care homes was virtually non-existent 
and that the union had little interest in it. It did not prove possible to secure an 
interview with Roger Kline, National Secretary for the NHS at MSF, but it was 
established in discussions with administrative staff that MSF's presence in this sector 
was also virtually non-existent. The higher number of interviews with UNISON staff 
reflects both UNISON's internal structure (in terms of specialization of roles) and the 
attention UNISON had paid to the sector, and to large fin-ns in particular, through 
research and campaigning activities. Gresham and Pole of the GMI3 were interviewed 
together on a three-way basis. Questions put to the firms' QA managers for the 'firm 
specific' aspect of the analysis included those related to their experiences of labour 
market conditions in the sector, as well as unionization per se. 
Operationalizing the meso level model for the residents themselves was particularly 
problematic. Many (although by no means all) users in residential and nursing homes 
require high levels of support, mentally and emotionally, as well as physically. A 
relative increase in those aged 85 or over has increased 'dependency' levels still further 
(RCN, 1996: 3). Finding mechanisms for the effective participation of such people in 
their own care is a genuine challenge. In terms of the parameters of this study, a 
paradoxical situation was encountered whereby one of the actors had little or no 
autonomous organizations of its own. Unlike staff, for example, where there may be 
little union organization but the potential to join or form one, the reasons for this arise 
from the needs of the constituency itself for support from others. 
Given the lack of autonomous organizations of care home residents, there were two 
foci around which the analysis of the relationship between the case study firms and 
older people themselves was centred. The first focus was organizations which claim to 
represent or campaign on behalf of older people. These may be concerned specifically 
with the delivery of long-term care, or may be concerned with the interests of older 
people generally. They usually are not directly controlled by older people themselves, 
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but have charitable status. It was hoped to interview a representative from the 
campaigning organization of older people, the National Pensioners' Convention, but 
despite repeated attempts to arrange an interview this did not prove possible. Key 
people from four organizations were therefore interviewed for this chapter. Two of 
these organizations, Help the Aged and Age Concern, are widely recognised as the 
largest and most influential organizations concerned with the interests of older people 
generally. The key people interviewed here were Tessa Garton, Head of Planning and 
Development who managed the policy unit at Help the Aged; Ian Davis, Business 
Advisor at Help the Aged; and Evelyn Edwards, Director of Information and Policy at 
Age Concern. The other two organizations, Counsel and Care and the Relatives 
Association (which has since changed its name to the Residents and Relatives 
Association), are concerned specifically with long-term care. The key people 
interviewed here were Les Martin, Deputy General Manager at Counsel and Care; and 
Alison Alexander, Advice Coordinator at the Relatives' Association. 
The other focus around which analysis was centred were the ways in which older 
people resident in homes run by the case-study firms may have been encouraged to 
express their opinions through meetings at the home level, usually facilitated by care 
home staff. Linked to this was the role of relatives, who may be involved in decisions 
affecting residents, and who therefore sometimes attend such meetings. This 
information was gained through the interviews with the firms' QA managers. 
Methodological questions which related to both the micro and meso levels of analysis 
are discussed in the next section. 
METHODOLOGICAL QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 
The use of qualitative methods such as serni-structured interviews has led to much 
debate about whether quantitative or qualitative methods are more scientific. 
Qualitative methods have been criticised as being 'unscientific' because they are not 
quantified, whilst quantitative methods have been accused of sometimes aggregating 
rich phenomena into artificial and meaningless numbers. As Held et al (1999: 11) point 
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out, in the globalization debate statistical evidence of global trends has often been, 
'taken by itself to confirm, qualify or reject the globalization thesis, even though such a 
methodology can generate considerable difficulties... Any convincing account of 
globalization must weigh the significance of relevant qualitative evidence and 
interpretative issues. ' However, different research methods and techniques are 
appropriate to different research problems (Kvale, 1996: 66; Ghauri et al, 1995: 83). 
This thesis took a primarily qualitative approach, utilising both semi-structured 
interviews and documentary analysis, since such an approach allows for a richer 
analysis of issues such as organizational form, and the processes of interaction between 
different actors. Where quantifiable data has been relevant, this could often be obtained 
during the course of a largely qualitative interview. For example, the best source of 
information relating to the level of union membership in the long-ten-n care sector was 
the unions themselves, hence the appropriateness even here of utilising interviews. 
Semi-structured interviews are particularly suited to yielding qualitative data since 
they aim to obtain information which can answer specific research questions, but allow 
for in-depth probing on particular points. The interviewer must be flexible enough to 
allow the respondent a high degree of freedom in how they answer the questions and in 
what order!, and to allow the interview to proceed in a way that permits the flow of a 
(normal' conversation, whilst at the same time ensuring that the interview yields the 
information required, usually within a prescribed amount of time. This requires a great 
deal of skill on the part of the interviewer (Ghauri et al, 1995: 65); Kvale (1996: 105) 
has gone so far as to suggest that the interview researcher is a 'craftsman' rather than 
simply a 'scientist'. These skills must be applied not just during the interview, but also 
beforehand, when the interviewer has to, 'create a situation where the respondent 
wiflingly offers time' (Ghauri et al, 1995: 67, emphasis in the original). This can 
involve expending a great deal of time and effort on sending letters and making 
telephone cafls. The advantage of semi-structured interviews is that they permit for a 
more accurate and clearer picture of the respondent's position or behaviour 
(Ghauri et 
al, 1995: 65), allowing for checking, clarification and elaboration. However, they may 
be difficult to interpret and analyse, and as with other methods, involve issues of 
reliability and validity. They may also 
involve issues of confidentiality which sometimes 
require the respondents to remain anonymous when the results are reported. 
it is 
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important for ethical reasons that this be discussed with the respondent prior to the 
interview and that her/his wishes be accorded with. In this thesis, all the names of 
individuals have been changed except for those from older people's organizations, 
whilst the names of organizations have not been changed except that of the health and 
local authority area. 
Documents may be an effective source of both quantitative and qualitative 
information. They are often used in historical studies, but may also relate to relatively 
recent events. Bryman (1989: 189) offers a four way typology of documentary 
methods of analysis, encompassing studies which are quantitative/recent, 
qualitative/recent, quantitative/historical and qualitative/historical. By this typology, 
the use of documents in this study is primarily qualitative/recent. However, the thesis' 
findings are historical in the sense that events in the long term care sector are changing 
continually and rapidly, and the results of the study must be considered in this context. 
Furthermore, documents were sometimes the source of quantitative data, but problems 
were encountered here in relation to the comparison of data across organizations, in 
terms of being able to compare like with like (Bryman, 1989: 198). 
This problem of comparability is best illustrated in relation to the concept of 
'-internationalization'. The research questions for both the micro and meso levels of 
analysis address the 'form and extent of internationalization' of the various actors. 
Ruigrok & van Tulder (1995: 154) use five measures of internationalization of 
companies, based on the percentage for each company of assets, sales, employment 
and shares listed abroad, and the composition of top management by nationality. Not 
all of this information was available from annual reports or the trade press for each 
firm considered in this thesis. There were other measures that could have been utilised 
for long term care firms. For example, the three largest firms in the UK market were 
chosen for this thesis on the basis of the number of beds operated in the UK. A similar 
measure could have been used for internationalization, such as the number of beds 
operated outside the firm's home country, or the number of different countries within 
which each firm had operations. However, simple comparison on this kind of basis 
would ignore the fact that there may be different types of internationalization, based on 
differences of strategy or subtle differences in the type of services provided by the 
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parent company. Even in manufacturing, as Held et al (1999: 237) point out, 'global 
production and distribution systems do not depend solely on ownership or control but 
rather may simply involve cross-border production networks between firms'. This is 
one reason why Held et al (1999) include qualitative studies of specific industrial 
sectors, as well as quantitative measures of FDI flows, in order to build up a true 
picture of contemporary patterns of global production. 
In this study, therefore, quantitative infon-nation was gathered where it was available, 
but equal attention was paid to the question of the form of internationalization. This 
provided results that are closer to the traditional case study qualitative 'portrait' of the 
organization, rather than results that are strictly comparable on a quantitative basis. 
The same is true for the non-firm actors, in that information on membership of 
international organizations (derived from interviews as wen as documents) does not 
provide insight on how effective such organizations are, as discussed above in relation 
to the meso level research questions. 
The results of any kind of research are open to challenges based on questions of 
reliability and validity. Yin (1994: 36) defines reliability in relation to case studies as 
follows: 'The objective is to be sure that, if a later investigator followed exactly the 
same procedures as described by an earlier investigator and conducted the same case 
study all over again, the later investigator should arrive at the same findings and 
conclusions. ' One prerequisite for allowing such repetition is, of course, to document 
the procedures followed in the original study, and this is done throughout this chapter 
for both the micro and meso-levels of analysis (see also Kvale, 1996: 209). The 
circumstances under which evidence was collected should also be recorded (Yin, 1994: 
99), for example the date and place of an interview (these details are given in Appendix 
Two). Kvale (1996: 88) defines reliability as 'how consistent the results are'. This 
consistency can be achieved in interviews by avoiding 'leading questions', and 
in 
transcription by clearly stating the 'rules' that were used and sticking to then-ý as 
discussed below (ibid: 23 5). Kvale (1996: 88) defines validity as, 'whether an interview 
study investigates what is intended to be investigated'. According to Kvale 
(ibid: 236), 
validity in interview research should be addressed throughout aH stages of the research, 
rather than simply through, 'inspection at the end of the production 
line'. This can be 
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done, for example, through the checking process during the interview, as discussed 
below. 
The first step is to ensure that the interview guide or schedule is derived in a 
consistent way from the research questions. Ghauri et al (1995: 66) recommend that 
the interview questions be compared several times with the research questions, both to 
test the consistency between the two and to see whether the questions are thorough 
and correct enough to elicit the desired information. In this study, the differences 
between non-firm actors at the meso level, and differing degrees of prior knowledge 
about different actors, sometimes led to the specific questions used for one set of 
actors being different from those of another. For example, in relation to the research 
question regarding the form of its organization, interviewees from a union might be 
asked: 'How does UNISON organize in the long term care sectorT. However, this 
information was already known for health authority registration and inspection units 
because it is given by law, so instead they would be asked questions about how they 
interpreted their functions in practice, or in what circumstances they brought particular 
enforcement measures into operation. The purposive nature of the sampling also meant 
that sometimes different questions might be asked of different people in the same 
organization who performed different tasks. Examples of interview guides used in this 
thesis are provided in Appendix Three. 
However, as discussed above, the flexibility required within the actual interview 
situation if the fuU strengths of semi-structured interviews are to be utilised also 
needed to be taken into account. Respondents, for example, may yield information 
which is sought without being directly asked that question. The flow of the 
conversation may lead questions to be asked in a different order to that given in the 
guide. Respondents may even yield important and relevant information which had not 
previously been considered by the researcher which needs to be followed up. The 
interview guide is therefore precisely that: a guide. The interview transcript may 
therefore differ significantly from what might be expected from the interview guide, in 
terms of the order of questions or even the precise questions asked and answered. It is 
here that the skil-I or 'craftsmanship' of the interviewer comes into play in ensuring 
that the original goals of the research are pursued. This is also a fundamental reason 
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why interviews should be triangulated with other sources of data (as discussed at the 
end of this chapter). 
According to Kvale (1996: 144), 'the quality of the original interview is decisive for 
the quality of the later analysis. ' Kvale offers six 'quality criteria' for an interview: the 
extent of spontaneous, rich, specific, and relevant answers from the interviewee; the 
shorter the interviewer's questions and the longer the subject's answers, the better; the 
degree to which the interviewer follows up and clarifies the meanings of the relevant 
aspects of the answers; the ideal interview is to a large extent interpreted throughout 
the interview; the interviewer attempts to verify his or her interpretations of the 
subject's answers in the course of the interview; the interview is 'self-communicating' - 
it is a story contained in itself that hardly requires much extra descriptions and 
explanations. Although such ideals may often be difficult to reach, they can serve as 
effective guidelines. These were guidelines which the research for this thesis attempted 
to utilise. 
As is common practice, the interviews for this study were tape-recorded in order to 
allow for in-depth analysis at a later date. This meant that the first task to be 
accomplished before analysis could take place was transcription. This is not a 
straightforward task, since in rendering the spoken word into text a process of 
'translation' involving a number of critical decisions has to be undertaken (Kvale, 
1996: 163). Thus, all interviews within the study must be transcribed according to the 
same 4rules', especially if more than one person is involved in transcribing or if the 
transcriber is not the person who conducted the interviews. In this study, some of the 
interviews were transcribed by the interviewer, and some by another person. The rules 
of transcription were that the interviews should be transcribed word for word without 
any attempt to correct grammar, but with 'ums' and 'ers' left out. However, Kvale's 
(ibid) observation that the interview tape-recording remains the primary data was taken 
seriously: whenever there was doubt about a section of the transcript that was not 
transcribed by the interviewer (and author), the tape was listened to again in order to 
arrive at the greatest possible accuracy. 
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Ghauri et al (1995: 7 1) advise that even where an interview is recorded, notes should 
also be taken. This not only ensures that crucial points are recorded twice, but 
demonstrates interest and keeps the interviewer alert, rather than allowing the tape to 
do the 'listening'. This turned out to be particularly good advice when the interview 
with Louise Saber of the RCN demonstrated one of the pitfalls of in-depth interviews: 
it was discovered after the interview had finished that the tape had not recorded. The 
responses could therefore be reconstructed from notes immediately after the interview. 
Kvale (1996: 132) points out that the social context of an interview, in terms of the 
4emotional tone' or 'mood' of the interview and the nature of the surroundings, may 
also be relevant to its interpretation. These things should be stated when reporting the 
results of interviews, as well as the actual words spoken. The vast majority of the 
interviews conducted for this thesis were in office environments and involved a helpful 
and friendly manner from the respondents. The reader should assume that this was the 
case when reading the results of the interviews, except where something different is 
explicitly stated. 
A- 
As Ghauri et al (1995: 96) point out: 'To analyse data we have to code them so that 
they can be broken down, conceptualized, put together and presented in an 
understandable manner. ' In qualitative studies, 'coding requires extra care, and a 
balance between creativity, rigour and persistence has to be achieved. '(ibid) Kvale 
(1996: 189) suggests a number of possible 'steps of analysis'. These include the 
condensation and interpretation of meaning during the interview referred to above, and 
the interpretation of the transcribed interview. The latter involves three parts: 
ýstructuring% i. e. transcription itself; 'clarification', i. e. the elimination of superfluous 
material and distinguishing between the essential and the non-essential; and 'analysis 
proper% i. e. developing the meanings of the interviews. Kvale (ibid) suggests five main 
approaches to this analysis of meaning: condensation; categorisation; narrative; 
interpretation; and ad hoc. The interviews conducted for this thesis were analysed by 
coding the sections of each interview according to their relevance to the research 
questions. This was followed by an analysis of meaning which comes closest to what 
Kvale refers to as 'narrative', in the sense that the material was presented as a coherent 
4story'. This was appropriate because the research questions served as an explicit guide 
to ordering the materiaL and because the data collected was relatively straightforward 
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rather than requi i the, 'deeper and more or less speculative interpretation of the Wing 
text'. required in what Kvale (1996: 193) refers to as 'meaning interpretation'. 
Nevertheless, in analysing the data care was taken to consider the incentive of the 
respondents to exaggerate or otherwise distort information. 
Documentary sources of evidence can also be assessed on the basis of reliability and 
validity. For example, reliability may be questioned where an incomplete set of 
documents are collected. This problem can be mitigated by stating clearly which 
documents were obtained, and this information is given in Appendix Four for company 
annual reports and other unpublished documents. Other documents, such as published 
government reports, are given in the bibliography in the normal way. As discussed in 
relation to the micro level analysis, the set of company annual reports collected for this 
study was not entirely complete. However, annual reports were obtained for all three 
case study firms for 1997, the crucial year for M&As in the long term care sector. 
Furthermore, data on strategy and corporate history could also be obtained from the 
trade press, to which there was unhindered access. 
Problems of validity in documentary sources may relate to the question of how 
different documents measure a particular concept, and whether like is being compared 
with like. This was discussed above in relation to the concept of 'internationalization', 
where the solution adopted was to take a more qualitative approach. Saunders et al 
(1997: 173) point out that an assessment of the reliability and validity of documentary 
evidence will involve a recognition of the original purposes of the document. 
Documents cannot be taken at 'face value'; as already discussed in relation to annual 
reports, they may reflect the bias of the author and this bias has to be explicitly 
recognised. Documents, however, have a number of advantages. Since they are 'non- 
reactive' (that is, they are not the product of investigations in which individuals are 
aware of being studied), the possible biases which are often thought to 
derive from 
interviews are removed (Bryman, 1989: 197). Documents can also provide access to 
information in cases where the relevant individual may be fairly inaccessible, such as 
senior executives (ibid), as also discussed in relation to the micro 
level of analysis. 
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An important way of enhancing the validity and the reliability of a study is through 
triangulation. i. e. the combination of methodologies in the study of the same 
phenomenon (Ghauri et al, 1995: 93; Yin, 1994: 90). Yin (1994: 92) identifies two 
conditions relating to triangulation, 'convergence' and 'non-convergence' of different 
sources of evidence. Convergence is, 'when you have really triangulated' (ibid), i. e., 
when different sources of evidence converge on the same facts. Non-convergence is 
when the study has multiple sources of evidence which nevertheless address different 
facts. The present thesis incorporates both of these; sometimes either documentary or 
interview material was the principal source of data for particular research questions, 
but wherever possible the two sources were cross-referenced. As discussed above, 
interview material from different respondents was also cross-referenced (especially 
that of the firms' QA managers with that of other actors) as a further means of 
verification. 
The next chapter discusses the results of the micro-level case studies, whilst Chapters 
Five, Six and Seven discuss the results of the meso-level analysis. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: FIRM LEVEL CASE STUDIES 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the micro level analysis of the three case study companies, 
organized around the research questions detailed in Chapter Three. The case studies of 
each of the three companies are broken down into three sections. Section One: 
Corporate History and Strategy discusses Research Questions I ('What is the 
corporate history of each firm, with reference to the M&A process? ') and 2 ('What 
goals and strategies do they have? '). Section Two: -Internationalization 
discusses 
Research Questions 3 ('What is the form and extent of internationalization of each 
firin? ') and 4 ('How has being part of a large and internationalized organization 
affected their operation? '). Conceptually, we should draw a distinction between sheer 
size on the one hand, and internationalization on the other. In practice, however, as 
was indicated in Chapter Three and as shown by these case studies, it is extremely 
difficult to draw a distinction between these two characteristics because all of the firms 
were internationalized in some form. This may itself be seen as an indicator of the 
intensity of the globalization process. These large and internationalized organizations 
stand in stark contrast to the majority of the industry, which, as Chapter Two 
discussed, currently remains characterised by small businesses. Section Three: Quality 
Assurance and Organization discusses Research Questions 5 ('How are the firms 
organized, with particular reference to QA systems? ), 6 (How has the process of 
acquisition and concentration affected this? ') and 7 ('What impact do issues of profit 
and cost have on quality? '). Most of the data for this section is drawn from the 
interviews with the firms' QA managers. Considering the respondents' roles within 
their respective organizations, there is a danger in semi-structured interviews of this 
kind that answers relating to question 7 in particular will tend towards the banal or will 
be misleading. Nevertheless, it is possible that some light may be shed on 
how these 
organizations manage the apparent tension between cost and quality, and this will 
be 
shown to have been the case for at least some of the answers. The chapter as a whole 
ends with a section which discusses Research Question 8 
('What are the differences 
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and sirnilarities between the finns? '), and offers some conclusions with reference to the 
issues of strategy and internal organization raised in Chapter Two. 
As indicated in Chapter Three, there is some discussion in this chapter of issues 
relating to finance and supply (i. e. economies in the purchasing of supplies by the 
fin-ns). These are discussed here purely in terms of their relevance for the internal 
functioning of the firms, not in terms of the firms' relationships with external actors 
(i. e. financiers and suppliers). The impact upon Company 2's American parent 
company, Company 2 (USA), of policies pursued by its home state is also dealt with 
here in relation to Research Question 4. since this is clearly important to the 
functioning of the firm and is important for assessing the effects of internationalization. 
However, the relationship of Company 2 (USA) with the US state is not dealt with in 
this thesis at the meso level of analysis, since the thesis is focused upon actors within 
the UK market. 
COMPANYI 
1: CORPORATE HISTORY & STRATEGY 
Company I is the UK's largest private healthcare company. Its status as a provident 
society means that technically it is non-profit making. It is included here as a 'private' 
company on the basis that it can reasonably be regarded as behaving in the market as 
any for-profit firm would: it is not a charity, rather it must compete with other 
providers for business, must do this in a cost-effective way, and has attempted to 
expand and gain market share throughout its existence (Maynard & Williams, 1984: 
107). The doubling of Company I's advertising budget between 1979 and 1981 has 
been taken as evidence that the organization had adopted, 'a more expansionary, 
marketing-oriented strategy' (Griffith & Rayner, 1985: 15). The increasing arrival of 
for-profit organizations into the British healthcare market after 1979 had intensified 
competition (Papadakis & Taylor-Gooby, 1987: 68), compelling Company I to adopt 
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the strategic thinking of its for-profit competitors. Like other long term care providers, 
Company I has borrowed substantial sums in order to fimd the expansion of its care 
home operations (CCMN, February 2000). However, it may be the case that features 
of Company I's organization associated with its provident status may influence the 
nature of its strategy and its capacity to achieve its goals, and this will be discussed 
further in this section. 
Company I was formed in 1947, and had at that time 38,000 individual subscribers to 
its private medical insurance (Annual Review, 1997: 6). It expanded thereafter 
primarily on the basis of mergers with other provident societies (Papadakis & Taylor- 
Gooby, 1987: 57). Its core business has always been health insurance, in which it is the 
market leader. Expansion in the number of subscribers increased gradually until the 
early 1970s, when it dropped briefly before expanding rapidly (ibid). Despite this, 
however, Company I (along with the other provident associations) suffered losses for 
the first time in 1981 (Maynard & Williams, 1984: 107). The problems experienced by 
provident associations, and Company I in particular, related in part to the rise in the 
cost of servicmg subscriptions. This has meant that although total subscriptions have 
risen, the surplus generated from the gap between subscription income and benefits 
paid out has fallen (Griffith & Rayner, 1985: 22). 
From the late 1980s competition in health insurance increased as banks, building 
societies and insurance companies entered the market. By 1996, Company I's share of 
the market had fallen to 46% (L & Bý 1996). Whilst one major healthcare provident 
society decided to demutualize to raise the capital necessary to compete, the above 
factors have influenced Company I's move into areas of healthcare other than 
insurance, as well as their expansion abroad (discussed below). The threat to its core 
business of health insurance made it crucial for Company I to seek out other, 
potentially more profitable, areas of provision. Company I had provided medical 
centres and nursing and pathology services since the late 1950's 
(May & Brunsdon, 
1999: 286), and formed the independent Nuffield Nursing Home Trust (later Nuffield 
Hospitals) in 1957 (Grfffith & Rayner, 1985: 34). The organization also now provides 
private hospitals, screening services (Papadakis 
& Taylor-Gooby, 1987: 68), and most 
recently long-term care services. The move 
into private hospitals in 1978, on an 
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explicitly 'for-profit, basis, also reflected Company I's strategy of presenting itself as a i- 
fully fledged Company I 'health service' (Griffith & Rayner, 1985: 40). 
Company I initially entered the long-term care market in 1985 when it developed a 
home for the frail elderly in Milton Keynes (Grfffith & Rayner, 1985: 47). It briefly 
exited the market in December 1994 by selling its 10 nursing homes to Country House 
for L27m. However, Company I re-entered the market in May 1996 by buying back 
the Country House Group, which by then had 30 nursing homes, from the brewery 
group Greenalls (Community Care Market News, May 1996). Shortly prior to this, 
Company I also launched a long term care funding product, and a nursing home 
network information service. By the end of 1997, Company I had 2 10 care homes, as 
well as 74 homecare branches (Annual Review, 1997: 9). As indicated in Chapter 
Three, it is now the largest provider of long term care in the UK., with 221 homes and 
16ý 390 beds (CCNW, June 1999). 
In August 1997, Company I purchased the Goldsborough chain (AR, 1997: 41). 
Goldsborough Healthcare plc had come to the market in March 1994 (CCMN, April 
1994), but in June 1996 Company 3 had made a hostile takeover bid for the company, 
which was successfully resisted by Goldsborough's board. In May 1997, 
Goldsborough put up about 40% of its care home portfolio for sale (CCMN, May 
1997), and at the beginning of the following month agreed a deal for the purchase of 
the company as a whole by Company I (CCMN, June 1997). This included an 
unconditional offer from Company 1 for the 9% of Goldsborough's shares which were 
held by Company 3 (CCMN, August/September 1997). In addition to its care homes, 
Goldsborough also owned the second largest independent home care business in the 
UK and six acute hospitals (ibid; Company I Annual Review, 1997: 8). 
Company I had also acquired 14 nursing homes from Community Hospitals Group 
plc in June 1997 (AR, 1997: 41; CCMN, August/September 1997). Company I 
described all the new homes as being at the top end of the market in terms of quality. 
Edward Lea, Company I's finance director, declared that Company I's 'goal is to 
build a high quality network of nursing homes' and 'to provide an integrated range of 
services for this market' (CCMN, June 1997). The new homes, most of which were in 
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the Midlands, would he said, provide 'an excellent geographic fit with Company I Is 
existing network mainly in the south East'. 
However, it was the purchase of the Care First Group, formerly the TC Group, which 
led Company I to become the largest private provider of long term care in the UK. 
The TC Group was itself formed from the merger of Takare and Court Cavendish. In 
December 1993 Takare was the largest long term care company in the UK with 5370 
beds (CCMN, April 1994). Court Cavendish came to the market in July 1993, and 
subsequently pursued a successful acquisition strategy which included the acquisition 
of Greenacre (CCMN, April 1994). Court Cavendish saw that 'speculative new build is 
not the only approach and better risk/reward ratios can be achieved through 
acquisitions during periods when land and building costs are rising and new beds take 
more than 9-12 months to fifl. '(ibid) In September 1996 Takare plc and Court 
Cavendish Group plc merged to form the TC Group (TC/Care First AF, 1996). Takare 
were apparently of the view that the Court Cavendish management 'had a lot to offer 
them', and would bring on board new ideas on marketing, advertising, training and 
human resource management as well as giving assistance with product development, 
acquisition policies and better price differentiation (CCMN, August/September 1996). 
At the time of the merger TC Group comprised 125 care homes with 11,742 beds and 
over 13,000 employees, making it by far the largest group in the sector at the time 
(CCMN, August/September 1996). However, group figures for the year ended 31 
December 1996 were generally poor (CCMN, April 1997). The title of the group was 
later changed to the Care First Group, and new management information systems were 
implemented. Computer systems were introduced into all facilities throughout 1997 
and linked to the group's head office through an ISDN network. Ron Reid, the 
company's finance director, told CCMN (April 1997): 'this capability will no doubt 
assist with the administration and finance functions, reduce operational costs and also 
provide databases for future service development, customer relationships and new 
market initiatives. ' Keith Bradshaw, chairman, expected 'significant cost saving 
opportunities' in expanded group purchasing programs for food and other 
consurnables, as well as 'prospects for rationalisation of some homes with sub-optimal 
occupancy rates which might even mean closure of some of the beds' (CCMN, April 
89 
1997). Elm was to be cut from central overheads in 1997, and so-called- delayering 
was to take place in the original Takare Group through review of the original regional 
management structure. At this time the management of the merged group was also 
determined to convert a number of the homes into individual facilities catering for 
specialist client groups such as people with learning disabilities, the younger physically 
disabled and those with neurological disorders. This would involve the development of 
'protocols and procedures' to meet the needs of these different groups (CCMN, April 
1997). 
However, in August 1997, Care First's chief executive, Dr Chai Patel, resigned. 
According to Patel, the company had already embarked on a strategy which would put 
right its problems, but there were still 'too many chiefs' (CCMN, August/September 
1997). In Patel's view, chairman Keith Bradshaw 'was proving more and more 
reluctant to let go of the reins of "his" company in the near term' (ibid). Interim figures 
for the half year ended 30 June 1997 demonstrated the extent of the company's 
problems, exacerbated by the decision to build until that year new homes, despite the 
unsustainability of historic occupancy levels and revenue fee levels (CCMN, October 
1997). Payroll systems had not functioned properly and finance and control fimctions 
had not been able to provide monthly management accounts to the board of directors 
for much of the time. Observers concluded with hindsight that the executive directors 
had found it difficult to puff together as a team, and that some senior executives were 
very unhappy with the leadership and style of management of Bradshaw (ibid). 
Against this background, Company I approached Care First in November 1997. 
Approaches also came from a consortium led by Dr Chai Patel, and another led by US 
venture capital group, Warburg Pincus, with 'involvement' from Merrill Lynch 
(CCMN, November 1997). Company I's bid was initially rejected by Care First 
(http: //www. ukbusinesspark. co. uk/ 13.11.97), but it eventually acquired the firm on 31 
December 1997 (AR, 1997: 41). The purchase of Care First made Company I the 
largest care home operator in the country with approximately 3.3% of all independent 
sector supply of nursing and residential homes (CCMN, November 1997). The chief 
executive of Company I said at that time that he was confident that Company I 'has 
the management skills, resources and brand strength to develop fully the Care First 
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business, without which the group would never have contemplated making such a full 
offer for the company. '(ibid) 
According to CCMN (November 1997), the original Takare portfolio made up almost 
two thirds of the homes, and some of these - 150 bed homes without en suite facilities 
and certain decorative attractions - would in due course require 'considerable 
reconfiguration'. Company I would thus need to make significant capital investment, 
and operating bed numbers would inevitably fall, i. e. some homes would be closed. 
CCMN (November 1997) was of the view that Company I intended, 'to use its mutual 
status to give itself sufficient breathing space to lessen the pressure to seek a short 
term fix on all the issues. ' Company I's 1997 Annual Review confirms its ability to 
make use of internal surpluses, 'to invest in taking a long term view' (1997: 7), 
although it also took out new debt to finance its acquisition programme (AR, 1997: 3). 
It seems, therefore, that Company I's mutual status has given it significant advantages 
in being able to make the necessary capital investment and plan for the long term 
without pressure from shareholders for short-term returns. According to Jacobs, 
Company I would 'never be forced by analysts and institutional shareholders to make 
any decision for short-term expediency reasons. '(CCMN, November 1997) A similar 
view was given in interview to the author of this thesis by Head of Quality Assurance, 
Bob Jones: 
We're not a profit organization, there's no shareholders to pay out and nobody 
can buy or sell [Company 1], other than the main board. So we're not subject 
to hostile takeover bids or any of that rubbish which we [Goldsborough] 
suffered from in the past when we were on the stock exchange. A very nice 
position to be in. So that financial stability is a very good base [which]... we 
draw upon. 
When Company I made the strategic decision in the past to invest in hospitals, it 
sought to put itself in a position where it could best afford to pay a premium price to 
buy into the sector (CCMN, December 1997/January 1998). In building up its care 
home portfolio, it also sought to put itself in a position where it could outbid all the 
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competition. With the purchase of Care First, CCMN (December 1997/January 1998) 
described Company I as: 
clearly determined to build up a broad based healthcare group in care homes, 
domiciliary care, occupational health and clinical acute services. Since its 
reserves well exceed those required under solvency ratios for its UK and 
overseas PMI (private medical insurance) business, it clearly has the resources 
to develop major parallel business interests in the healthcare sector. 
This is confirmed by its Annual Report, and by its Annual Review (1997: 6), which 
stated that the year had seen, 'the acceleration of a strategy to create a fully rounded 
health care organisation, unique in being the leader in both the funding and provision of 
quality care to all sectors of the community'. Company I's acquisition of Care First 
was supported by the fact that it had access to cheap funding and would seek to 
improve occupancy and/or harden weekly fee rates for self pay clients, 'by simply 
running up the "[Company 1] flag" outside the homes' (CCNiN, December 
1997/January 1998). This suggests that branding is an important part of Company I's 
strategy. 
In early 1999 Company I also acquired Primrose Care, a home care company which 
had 26 branches and 14 satellite offices, and in which Company I had previously had a 
minority interest (CCN4N, February 1999). Company I was also aiming to expand its 
care home operations through transfers of local authority run homes (Tompany I 
Today', 6.11.98; see Chapters Five and Six). 
Bob Jones gave some clues as to why Company I was expanding out of the insurance 
market, although he stressed that such decisions were not within his domain. However, 
he did suggest that: 'insurance was all your eggs in one basket, the insurance market is 
a lot tighter now than it was ten years ago. So it's appropriate to not have all your 
eggs in one basket, and because Company I already had hospitals on board, it makes 
sense to move into other bits of healthcare. ' As a healthcare company which had been 
built initially on the basis of private insurance and then of private hospitals, the role of 
the NHS in British healthcare provision must clearly have a profound impact on 
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Company I's strategy. Successive British governments have comn-dtted themselves to 
maintaining the principles of health provision which is free at the point of use, with 
significant changes only at the margins of this (of which the private provision of long 
term care is probably the most profound). This means that the scope for Company I to 
extend both its provision of private insurance and hospital treatment is limited by the 
near monopoly exerted by the NHS. Long term care provision, where private provision 
is now dominant, but where funding is available for this from the state, is a logical site 
for Company I's expansion. According to Walker and Golding (1997), Company I's 
expansion into long term care was also an attempt to control rising costs through 
vertical integration, i. e. treating insured clients in its own facilities. Nevertheless, the 
need for investment discussed above, meant that its new acquisitions would not 
immediately be profitable. Its Annual Review for 1997 stated: '... we are confident that 
our acquisitions will be earnings enhancing in future years. '(1 997: 6- emphasis added) 
Company 1, then, is diversifying away from being insurance based into various forms 
of healthcare provision. As will be seen in the next section, this involves a strategy of 
significant overseas investment. In the long term care sector it has involved building 
rapidly through acquisition of existing companies, and then seeking to promote them 
through their re-branding under the Company I 'label'. The significance of these 
acquisitions is demonstrated by the fact that in 1997 the total number of people 
employed by Company I in the UK expanded from 12,000 to over 30,000 (Annual 
Review, 1997: 6). Of these, 21,000 were employed in care homes (Tompany I 
Today", 6.11.98). 
2: INTERNATIONALIZATION 
Since nidd-1998, Company I as a whole has been split into five business units, all of 
which report to the main board. These are insurance, care homes, 
hospitals, Company 
I's Spanish subsidiary, and new businesses. Company I has operations in seven 
countries other than the UK (Annual Review, 1997: 3). The 
foreign operations other 
than the Spanish subsidiary come within 'new businesses', and include dental, travel 
and overseas insurance interests in Ireland, Thailand, 
Hong Kong and Saudi Arabia 
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(Health Care Market News, July 1998). Company I Ireland was set up in -early 1997 
after the opening of the Irish market to competition, and became 'the first alternative 
to the State controlled monopoly in that country' (Annual Review, 1997: 17). The 
Hong Kong business was described as welcoming, 'the opportunities brought by the 
change to being part of China'. In Thailand, Company 1 had acquired a stake in the 
country's leading health insurer, which had continued to grow, although it had been 
affected by the downturn of Thailand's economy in 1997 (Annual Review, 1997: 9). 
Company I Middle East was due to be launched in 1998, offering health insurance 
'-both to local nationals and to the country's growing expatriate workforce'. Company 
I claims to insure four million people from 115 different nationalities who five in 
around 190 countries (Company I web site). The majority of these are British, living at 
home or abroad, but Company I claims that one million of its members live outside the 
UK. The organization claimed to provide, 'local knowledge on a global 
scale'(Company I web site). 
Its Annual Review (1997: 8) indicated that in 1997 the organization had met its, 
'ambitious target for international development', and had become, 'a more 
comprehensive international health care business'. The Review (1997: 17) stated 
Company Vs, 'objective of opening for business in at least one new country a year. ' 
Company I International, within which foreign operations were then organized, was 
the organization's 'fastest growing business, with a 23% increase in members and two 
new overseas ventures in 1997' (described above). Its organization in Spain insured 
around 750,000 people, owned two hospitals and a network of primary care clinics 
(Annual Review, 1997: 17). The 1997 Annual Review described the Spanish 
organization as having 'established itself as one of the leading suppliers of sports 
related medicine, providing the official sports injury climic for Barcelona 
Football Club 
within the club's Nou Camp Stadium, as well as supplying services 
for many more of 
Spain's leading football and sports clubs' (ibid). Bob Jones indicated in interview that 
the Spanish organization was likely to expand into the care home market. 
Company I Care Homes in the UK forins one of the five business units mentioned 
above, and uses some of Company I Is central services, 
but according to Bob Jones 
was 4a relatively defined, relatively autonomous part of 
[Company 1], as are the other 
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bits. ' Jones jokingly labelled Company I as a whole 'Big' Company 1. Apparently it 
had 'been a surprise to Big [Company I] that when we joined them [Company I] Care 
Services had more staff than the whole of Company I had before. So that's been a 
nasty shock for them, there's more of us than there is of them. ' Overall financial 
targets for Company I Care Homes are set by 'Big' Company 1. However, according 
to Jones: 'The Managing Director of Care Services is on the main board of [Company 
1]. So the main board agree, and he's part of it. So... its not somebody up there doing 
something to us, we're actually part of that overall process, as are the other four MDs 
that make up the five business units. ' 
In Jones's view, Company I Care Homes had benefited considerably from access to 
Big Company I's systems and resources. Corporate communications was offered as a 
good example: 
In the past whenever there was any press involvement, in my corporate past 
[Goldsborough] I used to have to make it up and give it to the Chief Exec. to 
rewrite and we'd bang it out. Now... a whole department does that for us, its 
wonderful. [A Company I] journalist rings up 'The Independent', gets in there 
positively before they do it negatively. So there are very positive things we 
draw from there. 
Similarly, Jones mentioned a medical directorate at 'Big' Company I run by 'a very 
senior consultant' who was 'wheeled out in front of the media' when necessary and 
who had 'assisted us with one or two fairly difficult medical issues', one of which 
had 
been the subject of a court order. A supplementary interview with Colin French, 
manager of a Company I home in Hastings, suggested that Company I's British staff 
had also gained from training exchanges with the organization's foreign staff. 
Jones saw Company 19s mutual status and its brand name, both discussed above, as 
bringing particular advantages. According to Jones, Company I's mutual status gave 
it 
an 'incredibly stable financial base... No profits go anywhere. 
Everything's ploughed 
back into the business. There are a few people on a very nice salary but there's no 
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shareholders to pay out. Unlike most large organizations. ' Of the Compahy I brand 
Jones said, 'the ability to trade under the [Company I] name' was 'very good for 
recruitment and initial impressions seem to be good for occupancy. ' 
However, Jones noted that: 'There are down sides. We have a very good tight 
control on our IT [information technology] systems and the IT department... appearto 
have not cracked the problem of making bureaucracy work for you, as opposed to 
suffering from bureaucracy'. This stemmed partly from the fact that Company I 'still 
are of the mindset of being insurance driven and don't really understand our bit of the' 
company. Jones thought it may also stem from Company I being more bureaucratic 
and less well managed in the past. This was being corrected under the new chief 
executive, who had 'turned it round into a much more business orientated and business 
focused organization'. However, 'There are bits of [Company 1] we recognise, and 
[Company 1] IS [Information Service] is one of them, that haven't yet got there, as 
part of the new process, the new structure. ' There were thus clearly some problems 
relating to the bureaucracy which may exist within large organizations. 
However, whilst size presents problems as well as benefits in organizational ten-ns, in 
economic terms it seems to offer mostly benefits. This is mainly as a result of 
economies of scale, as confirmed in interview with Bob Jones. An example of this was 
given relating to incontinence products. According to Jones, Company I's main 
supplier, 'will offer us 5% without any negotiation just because we're bigger. Bang! 
We've just saved 5% on incontinence products, one of our major expenditures. ' This 
means that large organizations such as Company I are in a much stronger position 
economically than smaller organizations, even though their quality of care is not 
necessarily better. According to Jones, when compared to smaller organizations large 
organizations have 'the potential to be better. And I think it is more likely to be 
monitorable on a more equipment level. But there will always be one man bands that 
do exceptionally well, and all credit to them. And when they're for sale we'll 
buy 
them. ' 
Being part of a large and internationalized organization has therefore provided 
both 
benefits and challenges for Company I Care Homes. Benefits have been gained 
from 
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increased resources and purchasing power, and from the advantages of branding. 
Company I's willingness and ability to acquire smaller providers is explicit in Jones's 
comments. However, there are clearly some problems associated with bureaucracy and 
with the size of the organization. These are explored more fully in the following 
section. 
3: QUALITY ASSURANCE AND ORGANIZATION 
The information in this section was obtained mainly from the interview with Bob 
Jones, who described his overall remit as 'to create, implement and maintain the quality 
assurance system across my bit of the empire', i. e. Company I Care Homes. However, 
his job also involved a general aspect covering 'anything clinical'. He had working 
under him a team of specialists covering areas such as catering, home servicing, mental 
health and other technical areas, who also form the staff responsible for carrying out 
audits (although the term 'quality review' is preferred to 'audit'). Jones also made 
available a copy of the organization's Quality Review Manual. 
The development of Company I Care Services' quality assurance system is tied 
inextricably to its corporate history. According to Jones, 'none of the corporate pasts 
had an appropriate review methodology, and we couldn't find anything off the shelf 
that would meet our needs. ' 'Off the shelf systems were regarded as having been 
developed for specific purposes which were unsuited to a large care home 
organization. The King's Fund 'Organizational Audit' (now the 'Health Quality 
Service Accreditation Progrannne', see King's Fund / Health Quality Service, 1999), 
for example, was developed for hospitals and was 'still very hospital orientated'. In 
addition, such systems were seen as aimed at 'individual or small numbers of users, 
rather than something with the range of spread that we have'. ISO 9002 was regarded 
as being extremely bureaucratic and involving high levels of paperwork. This was 
illustrated in relation to a coffee table that needed replacing: 
I knew the minute somebody said 'change those tables' then all the ISO 
systems would swing into action. There'd be an approved supplier who'd been 
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audited, you'd have exactly the right paperwork, you'd have the guaranteed 
delivery time, they'd take away the old table. Everything would happen, but 
nothing told them to change the table in the first place. There's nothing that 
picks up that there is a quality problem. 
ISO 9002 was thus being used as a supplement to the core system which was under 
development and which was tailored to the specific needs of Company I Care Homes. 
Ten homes had achieved ISO 9002, but this was not considered a priority. 
The only national standard that was considered to have real worth was Investors In 
People (11P) (see IIP, 1995), which was seen to be 'people centred' and 'about training 
the right people to do the right job at the right time'. At the time of the interview, 
Company I was still in the process of trying to decide whether it should aim at 
achieving IIP on a home by home basis or as a national organization. Goldsborough 
had achieved IIP as a whole organization prior to being acquired by Company 1, but 
was at that time one of only five organizations in the country with more than 5,000 
employees that had done it that way. It was seen as a realistic option for Company I 
Care Services as a whole also to attempt IIP status in this way, although there was 
seen to be a problem regarding 'who we tie in with', since Company I had a national 
spread, whilst the Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) which accredited the 
award were organized on a regional basis. 
The quality system which Company I was developing for itself was based on the idea 
of 'critical success factors' developed by Oakland (1993). Oakland (1993: 415) saw 
critical success factors as crucial for identifying the processes which would lead to an 
organization successfufly meeting its goals. According to Jones, the idea behind this 
was that 'in any procedure, whatever you want to cal-I it, or in any organization, you 
can pufl out the critical success factors, and if you get those bits right, the rest wiH 
fol-low, so you don't have to check absolutely everything. ' This, it was hoped, would 
'reduce the amount of bureaucracy and paperwork involved, but stifl get the same end 
product'. The overall requirements of any quality system were seen as being 'to coflect 
information and then use that information'. The system Company I was developing 
was built around three 'strands'. 
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The first of these was at the time of the interview 'undeveloped', but was based on 
collecting information based on quality indicators such as the number of accidents. it 
was recognised that attempts to reduce the number of accidents may lead to 
inappropriate restriction of residents' liberty. So by monitoring the nature of accidents 
it was hoped that a balance could be struck between safety and liberty that would 
'hopefully reduce the accidents without restricting people's mobility'. Incontinence and 
complaints were other examples of 'the sort of things that we might collect and collate 
information on, that we can turn round and use to develop the service'. 
The other two strands of the system which were being developed were concerned 
with audit or 'review'. This involved policies and procedures being set down in a series 
of manuals. According to Jones, these would inevitably be 
a little bit general because of the diversity of stock we have, ranging from a 19 
bedded residential home to a 180 bedded home for frail elderly nursing. Some 
new build, some converted country houses, some 'what on earth is that 
building doing being a care home'... So when you have a diversity of stock it 
becomes difficult to write a set of operational manuals which are specific. 
Nevertheless, it was expected that Company I would be able to produce a set of 
operational manuals which run to a common set of principles. There would be two 
strands of audit. Firstly, 'self audit', which would be guided by eight policy and 
procedure manuals, three of which had been written by the time of the interview. 
Secondly, 'external audit', which would be guided by a Quality Review Manual. 
External audit would be 'external to the care home, but not external to the company'. 
Self audit was based on the principle that it should be possible to 4pull out each policy 
and procedure as a separate entity'. So, for example, there would be a fire manual 
covering everything relating to fire, which itself may be broken down into perhaps 
twenty defined areas. These were developing on the basis of a 'fairly simple checklist, 
where if you are doing everything on the checklist you know the policy has been 
implemented. ' This has two purposes. Firstly it provides 'a record that the senior 
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person in the home has said "yes, we're doing it". ' Secondly, 'it gives senior managers 
in the home the impetus to get the manual off the shelf and read it if they haven't 
already, because they're going to have to sign to say that they've done it, and it will 
give them the opportunity to review whatever procedure that they're looking at at the 
time is actually working in their home. ' The results of such checking would not be 
collated centrally, although operational managers would check it had been done from 
time to time. Rather the purpose of self audit was to 'drive that to make sure it 
happens' and to give the staff 'the motivation to sort their own problems out'. It was 
hoped staff would see self audit in a positive way, 'rather than somebody coming along 
and saying "you're doing this wrong, you're doing that wrong, and you're doing the 
other wrong". ' 
'External audit' was based on the nationally organized team of quality assurance 
managers going into each home on a regular basis, 'I'd like to think annually, but 
there's a bit of a logistics problem, and we haven't fully agreed what the time interval 
will be. ' The quality assurance staff would work through the newly developed Quality 
Review Manual with the home manager. The Quality Review Manual would be 
adapted to tie in with the eight policy and procedure manuals as they were written. The 
Quality Review Manual would also be based on the critical success factors idea, but 
would be 'much more subjective - people walking round the place'. It was at this point 
that it was thought the system would pick up those factors which ISO 9002 did not, 
and would allow action to be taken on these: 
because you've got a couple of experienced people, the home manager / 
matron and one of my quality assurance managers pottering round with a 
framework to look at things and ask specific questions about things, and 
identify things. That's the only methodology to get us to the next process 
which is the action process, and that's what I believe is the real property of 
assurance. Perhaps then the home manager and the quality assurance manager 
will have spent some time looking at the home in some detail but bearing in 
mind the critical success factors, and will then sit down and work out how to 
move forward. If they've found something that they think could be done better 
they have to decide how to put it right. And when we get to that action plan 
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process we'll also be joined by the operations manager... So we're not blue sky 
planning. We're actually planning what we want to change and how we're 
going to do it. So at the end of the process, at the end of that bit of the process, 
we will have a do-able action plan to move forward. 
The corporate history of Company I Care Services has had a big impact on the 
system described above. In part, the system is being developed in the way that it is 
because Company I Care Homes has been built from disparate organizations. As Jones 
put it: 'some of my team and all of the people with whom we work come from 
different bits of the corporate past and inevitably if we chose one of those corporate 
pasts that would give a biased balance to what we did, so we decided to start afresh 
and invent anew. ' Each of the three main previous organizations (Care First, 
Goldsborough and Company I itself, based at that time on the Country House 
portfolio) had its own specific way of doing things, all of which in Jones's view were 
problematic in some way. One of these corporate pasts, 'was run by the Gestapo and 
so had given quality an appallingly bad name, and it was used as a management 
sledgehammer. It was not used as a development tool. ' This was seen as having had a 
particularly negative impact on staff-. 
People went in and picked faults with everything. Left all the staff very 
unmotivated or dernotivated, and it was used as part of the disciplinary process. 
This is not service development. And to my mind, not only is it completely the 
wrong way to run quality, its so detrimental because you have such a selling job 
to do to get people to see quality in a positive fight when they've been subject 
to that sort of regime in the past. 
Another of the three 'corporate pasts' had 'had on the surface really quite a good 
system', but had failed to 'do the job', in Jones's opinion probably because of 'the way 
it was applied'. The third, 'had a lot of value but it didn't have all the strands coming 
together, and neither did it directly relate to policy and procedure manuals. That was 
the bit of development that was waiting from that corporate past. ' 
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The existence of these 'different bits of the corporate past' had also presented some 
difficulties in homogenizing the policies and procedures of the new organization. As 
Jones explained: 
we should be running all our care homes to agreed sets of policies and 
procedures and with that we've come from three different corporate pasts so 
we have... I would say we only have three sets of policies and procedures but 
we probably have about twenty different sets of policies and procedures about, 
and as we speak they are being rewritten to have one set of policy and 
procedure manuals, which every care home will have as the basic both set of 
values and set of operational procedures of how you run a care home. 
The new system did, however, borrow from the previous ones, all of which were seen 
as having 'a level of value in their own right... We've taken the best of them all and put 
them together'. 
Part of the rationale for creating an apparently entirely new system related to the 
'political' problems associated with trying to cohere previously separate organizations. 
As Jones explained: 
You've got to bear in mind that there's three different organizations that have 
come together. Everybody thinks that the bit they came from is better, and that 
to choose one of those would create such a potential political imbalance, and 
all of them were at a stage where they needed some development work 
anyway, so in reality it's easier to start afresh... But to try and... if staff thought 
it was an old one developed then they would... if they didn't come from that 
corporate past - that's the sort of problems you get when you try and put 
different organizations together. So to create it anew, even though some of it 
may well be plagiarized from the past, if you sell it as the new it would appear 
to give a much better flavour of 'this is a new product, a new item we can 
move forward with' rather than 'this is something we've nicked from one part 
of the past'. 
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Two particular problems were identified for Company I's merger process". One was 
the speed of change. Jones estimated that Company I Care Homes had gone from 
having ten care homes to being the largest provider in the country with 225 in about 
eleven or twelve months. Based on the information given in Section 1, this may be a 
slight exaggeration, but the basic point is legitimate. The other problem related to the 
concept of 'culture', which was discussed in Chapter Two, and the diversity of the 
corporate cultures which Company I was attempting to unify. Jones introduced this 
word himself, without prompting from the interviewer: 
Of the three major corporate pasts, they were very very different cultures, so it 
wasn't like taking two fairly similar companies and merging them together. We 
have the command and rule from the centre organization, the fairly laissez faire 
but tightly financed and controlled organization, and the very very democratic 
'let's have a committee to discuss it' organization, bringing them together. So 
very very different cultures. 
The new organization which Company I has developed is split into regions, with each 
region having a regional director. Below the regional directors are operations 
managers who 'run the business'. Regions may have seventy or eighty homes within 
them, and each is split into patches of between ten and thirty homes run by the 
operations managers. As Jones puts it: 'its such a complex empire it needs some level 
of bureaucratic hierarchy to run it. ' Jones was persuaded by the view that: 
the only way to run large organizations was with a bureaucracy even though 
bureaucracy had got itself a bad name, for other reasons, but in terms of 
actually managing a large organization, nobody's ever defined a better way to 
do it. So inevitably we've ended up with perhaps more of a bureaucratic 
structure than any of the pasts had. So there's a bit of that in it. We have to 
have a level of central control because if we didn't we would lose it, because it 
is that big. But I think what we have done is introduced a lot more pragmatism 
into things. 
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Jones expressed the view that had he chosen one of the systems, rather than create a 
new one, 'it would have disenfranchized the other two parts". There were thus 
4elements of rivalry' that existed 'right the way through' the organization. Balancing 
these was therefore seen as important to making the organization effective. This rivalry 
existed at 
every level: the regions, the operations managers, and the homes level. It's a lot 
better now than it was at the beginning, and it's continuing to fade, but bearing 
in mind I had to begin inventing something on day one... if I had gone with a 
corporate past at day one there's no way I could have got some of the parties 
on board that I needed to get on board. 
The only part of the organization in which no rivalry was apparent was at the centre, 
but this seems to have been a product of very careful organizational engineering. Part 
of this related to the failure of Care First to operate effectively prior to its acquisition 
by Company 1. As discussed in Section One above, Care First was itself the result of a 
merger between Takare and Court Cavendish, and had failed to successfully implement 
its strategy partly as a result of internal rivalry at the highest level. According to Jones: 
'They both had very different ideas. In fact one wonders why they ever tried to merge 
in the first place. Its all right for [Company I] to come in because it can take it forward 
and put them together as one, but for two rival organizations to vie for leadership just 
didn't work. ' Staff who previously worked for Care First apparently 'jokingly ten you 
if you pop in the boardroom you can still see the blood stains on the carpet'. Company 
I resolved this situation by appointing a new management team with different 
personnel: 'You can extrapolate the same discussion I had about not picking one of the 
quality assurance models and creating anew. [Company 1] has done virtually the same 
with the management structure - not taking any of the old ones, creating anew, put a 
new guy in. ' Of all of Company I's constituent parts, however, 'Care First probably 
had the most different management style, and the ones who have probably had to move 
furthest into the new culture. ' 
According to Jones, who previously worked for Goldsborough, staff at that company 
were relieved to be purchased by Company 1, having fought off the previous attempt 
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at acquisition by Company I Company I were apparently seen as ýa friendly 
organization who seemed to have the same values as we did'. For other staff, however, 
there was some feeling that Goldsborough was becoming the dominant partner. The 
headquarters of Company I Care Services is situated in the building that was 
previously Goldsborough's headquarters, and the managing director of Company I 
Care Homes was the ex-chief executive of Goldsborough. However, the operational 
director of all the care homes, 'the guy who's actually running the business', was a 
new appointment who 'didn't come from any of the corporate pasts, and that's one 
way to solve it. ' 
Jones's own quality assurance team are highly centralized, 'completely outside 
operations', with Jones himself reporting directly to the managing director. However, 
the action planning discussed above 
is agreed with the home manager and the operations manager so we should 
never get ourselves in the position where things are being proposed to 
operations that they're not happy with, because they're part of the action 
planning process - their audit, their review as much as ours. Inevitably there 
will be times when my team perhaps not concentrating on a particular home 
will begin to find a trend across a few homes where they're not getting things 
moved forward perhaps as much as they see fit. I then have the opportunity to 
go and discuss with the more senior management the issues. 
There may also be occasions when, 'the people on the ground don't have the authority 
to solve the problem, even though they knew what the solution was'. Jones gave an 
example where staff costs in a home were higher than expected, which turned out to be 
because they didn't have any dishwashing machines: 'They were actually bringing staff 
in to wash the dishes by hand. The manager concerned didn't have the authority to go 
out and buy ten dishwashing machines because that was above their budget. 1, 
however, have the authority to go to their boss and say "spend this and we'll save you 
this". ' 
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Despite this, Company I 'still haven't got it right' according to Jones. Effective 
communication was proving difficult across the organization's 221 sites. This was due 
in part to the information technology (IT) systems discussed in Section Two. 
According to Jones: 
IT systems tend to be driven by finance and the three different pasts have three 
different financial systems, so until we get them all on to one system it's 
difficult to put any IT communications on the back of that. So for instance, if I 
want to send an emergency memo out to every care home, that's going first 
class post. We don't have a system to get things out quickly. So we still 
haven't yet got communications resolved. 
In some ways Company I Care Homes was still going through a transition from three 
organizations into one. As Jones explained: 'We're still in the transitional phase of 
bringing it together. There are some things that are running as one and some things 
where we're still using the systems that belong to the past. We still have three pay 
rolls. One run in Leeds, one run in Telford, and one run out of Kingston. ' This was 
attributed to the fact that Company I Care Homes was still a very new organization. 
This process of transition was also evident in the fact that the three main 'corporate 
pasts' continued to belong to provider associations (mainly the Independent Healthcare 
Association and the Registered Nursing Homes Association) as separate entities. 
According to Jones: 
We probably have more than one membership with most of the organizations 
because each of the corporate pasts belonged to something and they've never 
stopped any subscriptions... Most of the organizations are a bit keen to have us 
on board, so even if the subscription only belonged to one of the corporate 
pasts, they're not going to be bothered. 
Jones's account of the difficulties involved in homogenizing the new organization is 
consistent with the reference in one Company I publication ('Company I Today', 
6.11.98) to, 'an intensive period during which the company has worked hard to start 
integrating the businesses which operate within care services into the famous 
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[Company 1] brand. ' As already discussed, branding is an important part of Company 
I's strategy. The Managing Director of Company I Care Homes, Graham Smith, 
stated in the same publication that the Company I 'name now appears outside all of 
the company's care homes and by the end of next year will be operating under 
consistent policies and procedures... homes will have been refurbished to a standard 
consistent with the requirements of the [Company I] brand. ' Smith went on to say 
that: 'The process of integration has at times been difficult. In the last six months we 
have had to close a number of homes with implications for residents, relatives and 
staff. ' The implications of home closures and changes of regime resulting from 
ownership transfers are discussed in Chapter Eight. 
To the extent that companies like Company I are successful in implementing a unified 
quality system, this therefore seems likely in the short term to cause some disruption 
for residents as changes take place. In the long term, however, it is likely to level out, 
and probably raise the standard of care across the organization. However, this also 
raises the issue of diversity and choice since, as also identified above, smaller owners 
may have more economic difficulties, giving firms like Company I an advantage. As 
Jones put it: 
Usually what's special about [small providers] are there are a lot of people 
where the owner is the manager and lives and runs it, and its that. Its like going 
to a real cosy seaside bed and breakfast where you feel real homely, real 
comfortable, versus going into a Trusthouse Forte. You know if you go into a 
Trusthouse Forte you know what standard you're going to get, and I suspect 
we'll be a little bit better than that, but you know what standard you're going 
to get, you know it's always going to work, you know there'll never be a 
problem. Whereas when you go to the B&B you may well find that you get up 
one morning the cooker's broken so you can't have your cooked breakfast, and 
ain't that quaint. Well it might be quaint for a week or two, but not when you 
live there all year... So there's a difference there. 
This issue of the sometimes contradictory relationship between quality, standardization 
and choice will also be returned to in Chapter Eight. 
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The desire to retain some of the features of smaller providers was part of Company 
I's rationale for giving home managers as much autonomy as possible without losing 
the benefits of belonging to a large organization. This meant that the quality of home 
managers themselves was of paramount importance: 
It is the most important thing in our business. In the whole of the business, we 
get the right managers within the homes we're laughing. All sorts of things, 
whether you're talking financial control, occupancy, homely environment, 
quality, training, recruitment, the key - the right manager in the home... And if 
we ever lose sight of that we're done for. 
According to Jones, the separation of his team from operations meant that, 'whatever 
recommendations or issues we come up with we're never driven by the day to day 
hassles of finance', such as problems of occupancy, for example. However, despite the 
ability of large firms to make use of economies of scale (discussed in Section Two 
above), finance did impact upon quality in the form of the cost of improvements: 
Yes, one has to be [concerned with cost] because it's a commercial 
organization in which we live... There's a nw-nber of our care homes where the 
bedrooms have vinyl on the floor. As a nurse I'm not comfortable with that. I 
think we should have carpet on the floor, and slowly but surely over a number 
of years I strongly suspect we will move towards that. At the moment, if I 
snapped my fingers and said I want it all changing tomorrow, the last estimate I 
remember is that it would cost us two million quid. We haven't got an income 
stream that will pay for that two million quid tomorrow, so what's the point in 
me snapping my fingers and saying 'change the carpets"? One has to be 
pragmatic in the initial approach. What I can do is turn people's minds round 
and get them to begin to think that we should be moving towards carpets. So 
every time a floor needs relaying they don't just go automatically and put lining 
down, they put carpet down, and over a period of probably five years, I'll get 
the two million quid spent. So my job, if you like, in my pigeon hole is more of 
a political element and a concern with the politics of the company and changing 
108 
people's mindset. Whereas the team themselves when they're out and about 
doing the reviews at home level are more out identifying much more specific 
issues - the need for dishwashers. 
This meant that a degree of pragmatism was required in effecting change: 'Its 
absolutely pointless us proposing things that can't happen. I can think of one of our 
homes that is built adjoining a derelict industrial site. It would be nice to close it down 
and rebuild it down the road. And you could extrapolate that example across a whole 
load of areas. You've got to be realistic about it. ' Therefore Jones's 'challenge' was 
'to find a different way to do it. See, we've got to be cost conscious. ' 
The supplementary interview with Colin French, manager of a Company I home in 
Hastings, indicated that the need for the organization's centre to be 'cost conscious' 
led to some internal bargaining over resources. The 'considerable reconfiguration' 
which CCNIN (November 1997) saw the need for after the acquisition of Care First 
(discussed in Section One) had led to some homes being closed, whilst others had 
received new investment to bring them up to the Company I standard (the issue of 
home closures resulting from ownership transfers is discussed further in Chapter 
Eight). French's home was a marginal case, but he had been able to make the case to 
headquarters for new investment successfully, and significant improvements had been 
made to the physical layout of the home. 
In Jones's view cost factors did not automatical-ly work against quality: 'If one was a 
naive fool there would inevitably be a contradiction', but one needed to bear in mind 
that 'quality costs, but poor quality costs more'. Jones said he couldn't 'reafly think of 
an incident where the cost of a proposal that I've been involved with has been a factor 
in not doing it, because all the things we propose... nine times out of ten if you 
improve the quality you reduce the costs. ' An example of this related to a home in 
Harrogate: 
They were using veneered tables with paper table cloths and they were trying 
to attract a slightly more affluent client group so we changed to cloth table 
cloths. The outlay in buying those table cloths was significant, but the costs of 
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laundering table cloths are far less than the cost of buying the disposable paper 
ones. So we ended up with a better service and it looked more like an 
upmarket restaurant... whereby increasing the plushness, if you like, the quality 
of the home, you can attract a client who's willing to pay a higher income. So 
whilst you might have increased the costs by a little, you've actually increased 
the profit margin by more than you've increased the costs. Here, you've got to 
be commercial. 
It can be seen, therefore, that Company I Care Homes put little faith in 'off-the-shelf 
systems, like ISO 9002, although Investors In People was seen positively. Instead, the 
organization was developing its own detailed quality assurance system. Nevertheless, 
this was based primarily on procedure manuals, that is, it was concerned primarily with 
process (see Chapter Two), and this was confirmed by the Quality Review Manual 
which Jones made available. However, there was some monitoring of (largely physical 
or medical) outcomes as part of the 'critical success factor' approach. The Quality 
Review Manual also contained a 'resident satisfaction survey', involving a 
questionnaire for residents built around quality of life concepts such as fulfilment, 
privacy, dignity, choice, rights and independence. Company I also organized residents' 
and relatives' meetings, which are discussed in Chapter Seven. 
The practicalities of building one organization from three very different ones has 
clearly had an impact on the shape of Company I's emerging quality system, as well as 
its implementation. Not least among these practicalities has been the need to manage 
the internal 'politics' of the company, in ten-ns of motivating and reconciling the 
perceptions of staff who previously worked for different organizations. The changes 
brought about by ownership transfers also have important implications for residents, 




1: CORPORATE HISTORY & STRATEGY 
Company 2 is today the UK subsidiary of the American based Company 2 (USA). 
Company 2 (USA)'s first acquisition in the UK was Exceler5 in which it first acquired a 
majority shareholding in August 1994, and then bought the remaining shares in 
February 1995 (AR 1996: 19; CCMN, April 1995). In May 1995, Company 2 (USA) 
took a 15% stake in Company 2 through a buy out of part of a Japanese stake in the 
company (CCMN, May 1995). The third major British firm acquired by Company 2 
(USA)was Apta Healthcare, which was purchased in November 1996 (CCMN, 
November 1996). Apta was originally set up in 1984 and was first listed on the London 
Stock Exchange in 1994 through a merger with Realcare plc (ibid). At the time of its 
acquisition by Company 2 (USA)(then trading under the name of Exceler), Apta had 
33 homes and 1294 beds. The merger of Exceler and Apta made Company 2 (USA)the 
fourth largest provider in the industry with 76 facilities and 3417 beds, only just behind 
Company 2, in which Company 2 (USA)had by this time a 29.2% interest. Company 2 
(USA)was willing to pay a premium to access Apta's expertise in mental health, 
behavioural modification and programmes for the young physically disabled (CCMN, 
November 1996). 
Exceler/Company 2 (USA) purchased the remainig shares in Company 2 in January 
1997(AR, 1997: 2; CCMN, December 1996/January 1997), making the combined 
company the second largest in the country. Chet Bradeen, the American managing 
director of Exceler at that time, believed that the enlarged group would benefit 
considerably from the increased resources available from Company 2 (USA), as well as 
economies of scale and 'synergies arising from group-wide application of commercial 
initiatives' (CCMN, ibid). When the chief executive officer at Company 2 (USA) first 
joined the board of Company 2 in May 1995, CCMN (May, 1995) commented that: 
'Provision for care for the elderly in the past has gained from the infusion of business 
and quality assurance expertise from the USA through companies like [Company 3], 
Extendicare and Speciality Care. The arrival, therefore, of [Company 2 (USA)'s chief 
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executive] who had previous links to Hillhaven and, therefore, to [Company 3], has to 
be viewed as positive for the development of the sector. ' Since its fiffl acquisition of 
Company 2, Company 2 (USA) has chosen to trade in the UK under that name. 
Jane Bartlett, Quality Assurance Manager of the 'new' Company 2, and an employee 
of Company 2 prior to its acquisition by Company 2 (USA), described the 
diversification of provision which had taken place with the merger: 
One of the other things that happened with [Company 2] with the merger was 
that previously we'd been very much nursing homes for the frail elderly, and 
that had been the market. We now have residential units, we have EMI units, 
we have young disabled units, learning difficulties, so the amount of clients if 
you like that we have has increased tremendously. 
However, the new combined UK company soon began to experience problems. In 
July 1998, REIT Asset Management (RAM), described by CCMN (July 1998) as a 
'newly formed specialist investor in UK healthcare properties', acquired a total of 29 
nursing homes with 1995 beds from Company 2 on a sale and leaseback basis. This 
method of funding has become quite widespread within the UK long-term care sector 
over the last three years or so as American real estate investment trusts (REITs) have 
entered the market (see Chapter Two). All 29 properties were to be leased back to 
Company 2 on a 20 year lease agreement, yielding the purchaser a rent of E6.5m a year 
with a rent review every five years. However, the terms of this depended very much on 
the strength of Company 2 (USA)'s guarantee as parent company, since, according to 
CCMN (July, 1998), 'in recent periods it has been no secret that [Company 2] has 
struggled to balance its books in its UK operations and has even decided in some 
instances to put some of the homes that it acquired back on the market for resale. ' 
CCMN (October 1998) later stated that: 
'it has been generally understood in the sector that in the last year or so the 
company has struggled very hard to generate sufficient income to meet its 
rental conunitments on the leases of its care home properties. Its lessors, in the 
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main, have insisted on a guarantee from the US holding company in order to 
protect themselves against non-payment. In particular, industry sources suggest 
that the company has had major difficulties in sorting out the former Apta 
Healthcare portfolio partly arising out of the fact that some of the original 
former skilled employees did not stay on with the group when the portfolio was 
purchased'. 
Against this background, the then managing director left the company in October 
1998 (CCNIN, ibid). In the same montk Company 2 (USA)'s shares plunged on the 
New York Stock Exchange to around US$5, only a fraction of the level they were 
some months before, as anxieties increased about the overall leverage of the group 
(CCMN, October 1998). By early 1999, Company 2 (USA) was experiencing severe 
problems (discussed in the next section), and Company 2 had to turn to some of the 
specialist property healthcare fimds for more sale and leaseback money in June of that 
year, both for its own operations, and perhaps to assist Company 2 (USA)(CCMN, 
June 1999). According to CCMN (ibid), 'some of these property companies were not 
necessarily very enthusiastic in taking on more [Company 2] exposure'. 
Company 2's overaH strategy arises from Company 2 (USA)'s strategy of 
international expansion, and the problems Company 2 has experienced cannot fully be 
understood without discussing this. This is done in the following section. 
: INTERNATIONALIZATION 
Company 2 (USA) was founded in the USA in 1989 (AR form 10k, 1998: 39), and 
soon became among the top 15 largest providers in ten-ns of licensed beds and 
revenues in the care sector in the USA (CCMN, December 1996/January 1997). At the 
end of September 1996, Company 2 (USA)operated or managed approximately 18,700 
beds in the USA. It also provided physical, occupational speech and respiratory 
therapy at approximately 850 long term care facilities, as well as pharmacy services for 
more than 41,000 licensed beds in 17 states (ibid). As its annual reports (1998 fon-n 
10k: 10; AF, 1996: 33) make clear, the firm's 'growth strategy has relied heavily on 
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the acquisition of long-tenn and subacute care facilities', both in the US and abroad. 
Its 1998 report (AR form 10k: 10) details the problems this strategy presented in 
relation to its US acquisitions: 
Acquisitions present problems of integrating the acquired operations with 
existing operations, including the loss of key personnel and institutional 
memory of the acquired business, difficulty in integrating corporate, 
accounting, financial reporting and management information systems and strain 
on existing levels of personnel to operate such acquired businesses. 
Such problems are discussed in the next section in relation to its UK acquisitions. 
Company 2 (USA)'s expansion abroad began with the acquisitions in the UK detailed 
in the previous section. The extent of this expansion is Mustrated for the years 1994 - 
96 by Tables 4.1 and 4.2 below: 
Facilities 1996 1995 1994 
Domestic (US) 160 131 115 
Foreign (UK) 75 28 18 
Total 235 159 133 
Table 4.1: Long-term and subacute care facilities (Company 2 (USA)) 
(Source: Company 2 (USA) Annual Report, 1996: 20) 
Licensed Beds 1996 1995 1994 
Domestic (US) 19,321 15,921 13,904 
Foreign (UK) 3,420 19437 840 
Total 229741 179358 149744 
Table 4.2- Long-term and subacute care - licensed beds (Company 2 (USA)) 
(Source: Company 2 (USA) Annual Report, 1996: 20) 
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As detailed in the previous section, Company 2 (USA)took control of Company 2 in 
January 1997, and has traded under that name in the UK ever since. In addition to its 
acquisition of UK care homes, the company also expanded pharmaceutical and medical 
supply operations in the UK. 
Following its entry into the UK market, Company 2 (USA) acquired subsidiaries in 
Spain, Australia and Germany. Company 2 (USA) acquired its majority interest in the 
Spanish Eurosar, S. A., in July 1997. By the end of 1998 Eurosar's nursing home 
operations had increased from eight to ten (AR form 10k, 1998: 15). As of the end of 
1998, its Australian interests consisted of 38% of the equity of publicly held acute care 
provider Alpha Healthcare Limited, acquired in August 1997, which operated nine 
acute care facilities, and a majority interest in five hospitals formerly run by Moran 
Healthcare Group Pty Ltd, acquired in November 1997 (AR form 10k, 1998: 2). 
Company 2 (USA)saw its Australian operations as, 'a base for ftirther expansion in the 
Pacific Rim'(AR 1997: 10), and in 1998 it acquired the medical supplies distributor 
Promedica Pty., Ltd., 'as part of its strategy to develop ancillary services in the 
region'(AF, 1998: 12). In December 1997, Company 2 (USA)acquired a majority 
interest in Heim-Plan Unternehmensgruppe, an operator of nursing homes in Germany 
(AF, 1997: 32), whose facilities numbered 16 by the end of 1998 (AR form 10k, 1998: 
15). This was followed by the acquisition of the German company Procedo/Stocker 
GmbH by Company 2 (USA)'s UK pharmacy business, which allowed it to establish, 
'a solid platform for expanding pharmacy and supply businesses throughout Europe' 
(AF, 1998: 12). According to Jane Bartlett,, at the time of inter-view Company 2 (USA) 
were, 'looking to acquire I think in Belgium and France within the next six to nine 
months. ' Company 2 (USA)'s annual reports confirm the strategy of international 
expansion, stating that: 'Because of the Company's foreign growth strategies, the 
Company does not expect to repatriate funds invested overseas'(AF, 1996: 32; AR 
1997: 34). 
Worldwide, the company had more than doubled its provision by 1997 in comparison 
with a year earlier, with 483 long term and sub-acute care facilities and 47,103 beds 
(AR, 1997: 1). By the end of September 1999 these figures had increased again to 552 
inpatient facilities and 53,600 beds. Of these, 373 facilities and 41,800 beds were 
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located in the US (1999 Third Quarter Results, 7.12.99). As of February 20,1999, the 
company had 80,720 full-time and part-time employees worldwide (AR form I Ok, 
1998: 5). Calculations based on figures given in the annual report (ibid) show that of 
these 70J88 were based in the US and 10,532 were based abroad. The overall growth 
of Company 2 (USA)'s foreign operations is indicated by their percentages of total net 
revenues. These were 2% in 1995,5% in 1996,10% in 1997, and 9% in 1998 (AR 
form l0k 1998: 10; AR, 1997: 34). Foreign operations accounted for 17% of 
consolidated total assets by the end of 1998 (AR form 10k, 1998: 10). By the end of 
1998, Company 2 (USA)operated 186 facilities with more than IIý 700 beds outside 
the US, an increase of 12% over 1997 (AR, 1998: 12). 
The company's annual reports provide important insights into its strategic thinking in 
relation to internationalization. The rationale for international expansion would seem to 
He both in the stated aim of seeking out 'favourable market conditions and regulatory 
environments' abroad (AF, 1996: 11), and in seeking higher profit margins than are 
available in the USA. Company 2 (USA)'s 1997 annual report described the company 
as, 4aggressively exploring new opportunities in the global healthcare market, where 
operating profit margins can be more attractive than those in the United States'(AR, 
1997: 6). When entering a foreign market, there is evidence that some care is taken to 
obtain an understanding of the local market: 
We continue to believe that the international market offers significant 
opportunities for us to export our operational expertise, quality care and 
integrated ancillary services. We believe our approach is prudent and 
appropriate: to look for markets that are open to foreign ownership and 
operation, to partner with established providers and to participate on a 
relatively small basis until we gain a fuller understanding of local market 
conditions. (AR, 1997: 2) 
The basis of Company 2 (USA)'s operations is long term nursing care, but, in a 
similar way to some US hospital providers (see Chapter Two), most of its profits were 
made through selling ancillary services to nursing homes (both its own and those 
owned by others) (AR, 1996: 5). This was because (prior to the introduction of the 
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prospective payment system discussed below) US state compensation for such services 
provided for higher margins than routine nursing care. Long-term and subacute care in 
the USA is provided through its core company, with the ancillary services being 





temporary therapy staffing; 
hospice, radiology and allied services; 
assisted living residences; and 
rehabilitation therapy. 
Different countries are seen by the company as offering different opportunities for its 
ancillary services: 'The pharmaceutical services division has seen significant growth in 
the United Kingdom, for instance, and Spain and Australia offer attractive 
opportunities for rehab services' (AF, 1997: 6). However, Company 2 (USA)'s 
outpatient rehabilitation facilities belonging to its then Canadian subsidiary (Columbia), 
which had been acquired in 1995, were sold during 1998 and the beginning of 1999 
because they did not fit in with Company 2 (USA)'s strategy of selling ancillary 
services to its core long term care business (AR form 10k, 1998: 15). 
However, by the end of 1998 Company 2 (USA) was experiencing Miculties with its 
international operations, as discussed for its UK care homes above, and as its annual 
report for that year indicates (AR, 1998 form 10k: 10): 
Adverse results from [Company 2 (USA)'s] international operations have and 
continue to negatively affect [Company 2 (USA)'s] financial condition and 
results of operations. The success of [Company 2 (USA)'s] operations in and 
expansion into international markets depends on numerous factors, many of 
which are beyond its control. Such factors include, but are not limited to, 
economic conditions and healthcare regulatory systems in the foreign countries 
in which [Company 2 (USA)] operates. In addition, international operations 
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and expansion may increase [Company 2 (USA)'s] exposure to certain risks 
inherent in doing business outside the United States, including slower payment 
cycles, unexpected changes in regulatory requirements, potentially adverse tax 
consequences, currency fluctuations, restrictions on the repatriation of profits 
and assets, compliance with foreign laws and standards and political risks. 
Furthermore: 'certain of the United Kingdom facilities have not acWeved profitability 
targets established upon their acquisition' (AR form 10k, 1998: 22). 
These comments on Company 2 (USA)'s international operations need to be 
considered in the context of problems experienced by the firm in its home market, 
which had already manifested themselves by the time of the publication of its 1998 
annual report. These problems relate to its relationship with US state agencies, and 
have been exacerbated by its apparent over-borrowing. The relationship of Company 2 
(USA)to state funders and regulators (and other domestic actors) in its home state, and 
indeed to those in other countries where it has operations, is a topic which could be 
pursued in depth using the meso-level analysis employed in relation to UK domestic 
actors elsewhere in this thesis. However, for practical reasons of cost, time and size the 
meso level analysis in this thesis is restricted to actors in the UK market. Nevertheless, 
some discussion of Company 2 (USA)'s relationship with state agencies in its home 
state must be carried out here, since this is crucial to an understanding of the firm's 
strategy and the problems it has encountered, which have in turn affected its UK 
operations. 
Company 2 (USA)has experienced significant problems with regulatory authorities in 
the US, and was between January 1995 and July 1997 the sub ect of an investigation 
by the United States Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Inspector 
General (OIG) and the United States Department of Justice. The investigation included 
a review of whether Company 2 (USA)'s rehabilitation therapy subsidiary 'properly 
provided and/or billed for concurrent therapy services and whether it provided 
unnecessary or unordered services to residents of skilled nursing facilities', as well as a 
review of 'whether its long term care subsidiary properly disclosed its relationship 
with the Company's rehabilitation therapy subsidiary and properly sought 
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reimbursement for services provided by that subsidiary'(AF, 1996: 36). The 'negative 
publicity' surrounding the investigation had. ) 'from time to time... slowed the 
Company's success in obtai i additional outside contracts in the rehabilitation InIng 
therapy business', which had 'resulted in higher than required therapist staffing levels', 
and had 'affected the private pay enrolment in certain inpatient facilities' (AR, 1996: 
37). In addition, both individual states and private citizens were pursuing lawsuits 
against the company (some of which related to the actions of subsidiaries prior to their 
acquisition by Company 2 (USA)) relating to abuse, neglect or fraud (AR form 10k, 
1998: 36). The OIG / Justice Department investigation ended with no action being 
taken against Company 2 (USA). However, following calls by President Clinton for an 
enforcement 'crackdown' against nursing home regulatory violations in the summer of 
1998,, the federal government, 'has proposed to terminate several of the Company's 
facilities from the Medicare and Medicaid programs, and has imposed bans on 
admissions and civil monetary penalties against several facilities, on the basis of alleged 
regulatory deficiencies. '(AR form I Ok, 1998: 4) 
Company 2 (USA) has also experienced financial problems which it attributes to a 
large extent to the system of state funding in the US. In the month to February 1999, 
Company 2 (USA) saw its share price fall more than 60% (CCMN, February 1999). 
This was attributed to a fourth quarter loss arising from Medicare payment changes 
and a declining demand for its therapy services. In an echo of the discussion which will 
follow in Chapter Five of this thesis, Company 2 (USA)told Wall Street that 
government reimbursement systems were no longer keeping pace with the cost of care. 
In an effort to save around $150m a year, Company 2 (USA)fired 7490 employees, 
including 6% of inpatient services staff and 36% of rehabilitation workers. 
The background to Company 2 (USA)'s problems fies in changes to the Medicare and 
Medicaid systems of reimbursement. Medicare is the US's health insurance progrwn 
for older people, whilst Medicaid is the government insurance program for the poor. 
The Medicare scheme was introduced in 1965, yet by 1980 it was regarded as being in 
urgent need of reform if bankruptcy was to be avoided. This was because the insurance 
method of meeting health needs required the state to meet costs set by private 
providers,, thus creating an incentive for providers to constantly raise prices. 
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Furthermore, Berkowitz (1991: 154) describes how increasing health costs set in 
motion a discourse whereby employers complained that costs to company insurance 
schemes were damaging their profits, thus affecting their international competitiveness. 
This has led to restrictions on health-related payments by the state, and the increasing 
use of Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) by employers. In this context, the 
US Balanced Budget Act of 1997 mandated the introduction of a new Prospective 
Payment System (PPS) from the end of 1998. This would replace the system by which 
costs were set by providers with one under which the US government would pay 
nursing homes and home healthcare agencies a fixed fee per patient per day based on 
the patient's designated 'acuity level'. 
Company 2 (USA)'s initial response to these changes was that it was, 'uniquely 
positioned today to succeed in this new environment', because of its ability to offer an 
integrated package of diverse health services through its various subsidiaries (AR, 
1997: 20). However, PPS undermined its strategy of seeking profits from the higher 
margins, and higher reimbursement rates, which could be obtained from providing 
ancillary services under the old system (AR 1997: 23), and its 1998 annual report 
stated that, 'the impact of PPS was both more rapid and more significant than we had 
anticipated, creating results for 1998 that are clearly disappointing' (AR, 1998: 9). The 
company claimed that its significant number of 'higher-acuity patients' which resulted 
from Company 2 (USA)'s old strategy actually rendered it more vulnerable to the 
profit squeeze engendered by PPS (AF, 1998: 9). 
Company 2 (USA)'s failure to get adequate take-up for its new package of care 
services from other providers resulted in the cutbacks noted above, plus 
further 
anticipated workforce reductions, restructuring and finiher 'streamlining' of 
operations, and across the board reductions in operating expenses (AR 1998; 
CCMN, 
February 1999). Restructuring activities were due to include the elimination of several 
senior corporate positions and a company wide wage freeze. Wall 
Street analysts 
indicated that what worried them was the company's high operating leverage and 
4 strained financial flexibility' (ibid). This had raised concerns among 
REITs that leased 
properties to Company 2 (USA)and other companies that such companies may not 
be 
able to keep up payments. CCMN (ibid) quoted 
UK industry analysts as suggesting 
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that, 'there is a clear message for those who have provided funding to [Company 2] in 
the UK% i. e. the UK company may also be unable to keep up payments. The situation 
for Company 2 was particularly precarious given that recent loans for Company 2 were 
only secured on the basis of a guarantee from Company 2 (USA). 
Ultimately Company 2 (USA) was forced to announce that it would not make sen-ii- 
annual interest payments due on 31 May 1999, and the group was informed by the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) that its common stock would be suspended from 
trading on 29 June, and that the NYSE would apply to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission to delist that stock. Company 2 (USA)ultimately had to accept a 'chapter 
II plan of reorganization' (Company 2 (USA) press releases, 14.10.99 and 26.10.99), 
the equivalent of receivership in the UK. At the time of writing, Company 2 
(USA)remained in chapter II protection, seeking approval from the bankruptcy court 
for, 'an overall restructuring of [Company 2 (USA)'s] capital structure' (ibid). 
According to Kent Phippen, managing director of Company 2 (USA)'s European 
operations, Company 2 and Company 2 (USA)'s other European operations would not 
be affected by the parent company's problems, but there would be 'some 
reorganization of senior management' within Company 2, following the departure of 
its managing director, Elaine Farrell (CCMN, October 1999). 
The interview with Jane Bartlett took place on 30.10.98, prior to Company 2 
(USA)'s entry into chapter 11 status. Bartlett said that she was 'well aware that 
[Company 2 (USA)] exists'. According to Bartlett, being part of Company 2 (USA) 
had provided benefits for Company 2 in terms of information technology and training 
in particular, which was 'helping us an awful lot... There's certainly been a vast amount 
of money been made available to bring in technology, to help us get things sorted. ' At 
the time of interview, Company 2 were waiting for a new system to come in which 
4will give us intranet access to alot of training materials, some of which we are going 
to get verified and credited to NVQ level and we will be able to do an open 
learning 
NVQ in care. Quite possibly customer care would go on... we can effectively train 
80 
units at one time from a central location. ' The company was 
'currently developing with 
a consultant in the States a core competency manual which will come 
into the units for 
anybody to have and it will be a self-development manual. 
" In addition, OmniCell units 
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- sophisticated computer systems for the automatic dispensing., tracking, bifling and 
reordering of medical supplies which Company 2 (USA)used in the US - had been 
installed in its UK nursing homes (AR 1997: 17). 
Although Bartlett said exchange visits were in their early days, learning between the 
different national groups within the Company 2 (USA)umbrefla seemed to be an 
important feature: 'If you talk to some of the staff in some of the units, they're saying 
"do you think we'll ever get to do exchanges" and "can we do this" and "can we do 
that". I think that'll probably come, but we've got to make sure we've got our act 
totally together first and that we're ready really for 2000,2001... We've almost got 
there now. ' Bartlett herself had been asked 'to have a look at the procedure manuals 
for the rest of Europe and to comment, obviously because of the experience that I've 
had in pulling these together and changing them [see below]. So whether that win take 
off in '99... I'm waiting really for the ball to come back. ' 
One of Company 2's clinical nurse specialists dealing with EMI had been to the 
States for a study tour to look at dementia models there, visiting several different 
facilities. Bartlett said that there had been some surprise at the level of physical 
restraint used in the US (for a discussion of this see Braithwaite, 1993). Her comments 
demonstrate that intra-organizational learning does not necessarily flow only from the 
centre to the divisions: 
And they said come over, have a look at the planning unit, have a look at what 
we're doing. She's sort of got over there and has almost found that they're a 
good five or six years behind us in their methods. And whether it's because of 
the sue culture that they've got over there where you've got to make sure that 
everybody's well looked after because they'll sue you, they're still using a lot 
more restraint and they see restraint as a way of protecting the resident. And 
obviously they're at very little risk because they can't move, whereas that 
would be frowned upon tremendously here because we're still trying to 
encourage as much independence and give them some privacy even within the 
dementia units as much as we can. It was quite a culture shock to her I think, 
and I know that from someone from one of the dementia units in the States 
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that's been over and had a look at one of the model units that Carolyn has set 
up here... Its just something that shocked her to see restraint used and the 
amount of paperwork that they went through and there's disclaimers for 
everything. It was a totally Oferent ball game, so I think that we're still very 
i rent, and hopefully we can learn from each other. 
Such differences may lead nationally based staff to End their own solutions, perhaps 
looking outside the organization: 
I think Carolyn went over hoping to get new ideas from them and has come 
back and has perhaps thought 'well maybe I need to look elsewhere and not to 
the States for the information'., simply because it doesn't fit what we're looking 
for. I mean there"s going to be other places to have a look at, and I know that 
she's making links outside the corporate company, just really to keep up to 
date and to make sure we're looking at the practices and deciding what is our 
best practice, trying to set the standard. 
Whilst initiatives are likely to come from the centre, and therefore reflect American 
business culture, Bartlett claimed there was an awareness of the need to adapt to local 
(i. e. country) needs: 'I think they do recognise cultural differences, and possibly 
because of diversification across the world they perhaps recognise cultural differences 
and are very aware that what is really good here may not work in Germany, what's 
really good here may not work in Spain'. The intranet initiative had come from 
Company 2 (USA): 'they were aware of the technology and what it could do. They 
had a management introduction system where the managers are expected to work 
through certain training courses and they have training videos and the intranet working 
over there, and I think this is an extension'. However, Bartlett said 'I don't know 
whether to say we've Anglicised it or whatever, but there's been a lot of input from us 
saying "well that's great but its a little bit too over the top or a bit too USA for us to 
use over here. " So we've had a lot of say, its not just coming over off the shelf, its 
actually been packaged very much for us. ' 
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Nevertheless, Company 2 (USA)does seem to value standardization. Chet Bradeen, 
the American managing director at Company 2 in 1997, argued that: '[The UK] has a 
lot of variety and therefore gets inconsistency. This is eliminated when you deal with a 
corporation. You get a standard approach -a McDonald's approach - where you know 
standards are high. '(quoted in Inman & Sone. ) 1997: 26) From Bartlett's own account, 
some things did indeed appear to be standardised. All the regional and divisional 
operations staff had been across to attend executive training courses organized by 
Company 2 (USA)at Yale University, 'and that will continue next year so that new 
staff coming online will receive the same management training across the whole 
company-9 
Bartlett thought that the overall effect of Company 2 (USA)'s ownership had been a 
definite advantage for Company 2: 
We are able to use the expertise... of a lot more people, and that's certainly 
made a lot more difference, having that knowledge base to call on. Even with 
Carolyn finding out that we're possibly more advanced it has its positive side. 
It means perhaps that we have to do a bit more of our own research, but it sort 
of gives you the basis to say we're doing this really well, and perhaps we can 
help out there... Information exchange has been great. Networking facilities 
obviously have been superb, because with the States being so well set up and 
also, although we've only just started really looking at Europe and the sister 
companies there, there are companies in Asia[sic] and Australia, so if we start 
getting that together I can see that there'fl just be so much information 
available. And as long we're managing it and not just getting infon-nation for 
information's sake we can aH leam from it. 
it is perhaps unsurprising that Bartlett should present the net effect of Company 2 
(USA)'s ownership as positive, so her comments on this may be regarded with some 
scepticism. There is also some inaccuracy in her statement that 'there are companies in 
Asia', which perhaps casts doubt on her detailed knowledge of Company 2 (USA)'s 
other foreign operations, including the claim (quoted earlier) that Company 2 
(USA)was intending to expand into France and Belgium (of course it is also possible 
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that she had information that was not known outside the company). However, it is 
clear that there was significant learning within the organization between national 
divisions, with most initiatives coming from the parent company in the US. 
,, As, noted above, 
in addition to the care services provided by Company 2, Company 2 
(USA) has also expanded its pharmacy and medical supply wings into the UK. 
According to Bartlett, the medical supply wing is Company 2's major supplier of 
equipment and medical supplies. The phan-nacy wing, however, was not at that time 
large enough to be Company 2's major supplier, with only 17 units in the UK. The 
pharmacy wing was seeking to expand in the UK, but at the time of interview, 
ýwouldn't be able to cope with the geographical spread of the [care] units'. 
,Ac ith Company I, Bartlett saw economies of scale, or 'buying power', as a major ,,, wi 
advantage, stemming in this case from the specialist activities of its medical supply 
wing: 
We've noted reductions in costs since we've had [the medical supply wing] 
coming across, because their buying power is even bigger than one of the 40 / 
50 home companies that we were before the merger and before Company 2 
(USA) put us together. So certainly that helped tremendously. It also helped I 
would think in being able to source things. Because we've got the expertise. 
We"ve got a purchasing and procurement manager working on things and 
keeping up with advances as well. So I think being part of a corporate certainly 
helps there. 
Bartlett also noted the difficulty this produced for small organizations given current 
market conditions: 
a lot of the acquisitions that Exceler made have come about because they 
have 
been very very good homes and when the only manager set them up there was 
a lot more money to be made. With the real term amounts you get paid now 
per resident, it's almost impossible for some of these people to stay 
in business 
because they haven't got those economies of scale, because they haven't got 
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the buying power. And it's the only place really that can make the Oference 
because you can't reduce staff costs and you can't not pay the wages. But if 
you're paying three times as much as we are for food each week and giving 
food to the same standard you find that you go into some homes and you may 
find that there's a sandwich for tea, whereas you look at the menus you'll find 
that there's three meals a day and choices at each. But its the level or the 
standard that you can give I think, that's the difference. 
The evidence given by Bartlett suggests that Company 2 has benefited to a 
considerable degree from Company 2 (USA)'s resources and expertise, although it 
would appear that learning within the organization is a two way process. However, 
Company 2's overall direction is determined by Company 2 (USA), despite the 
existence of some level of autonomy. This means that Company 2 is subject to the 
problems of its parent company as well as the benefits it can offer. At the time of 
writing, Company 2 (USA)remained in chapter 11 status and Company 2 was 
continuing to function 'non-nally'. However, this section demonstrates the risks as well 
as the advantages that may attach to internationalization. 
3: QUALITY ASSURANCE AND ORGANIZATION 
As was the case with Company 1, the data for this section derives primarily from the 
interview with the company's QA manager. Bartlett described her job formally as 'to 
ensure that the policies and procedures within Company 2 are complied with, and that 
those policies and procedures are in compliance with ISO 9002. ' The company was 
'committed to achieving ISO 9002 standard within every home, and each home goes 
for the standard individually'. ISO 9002 was considered useful primarily because it 
provided an administrative framework: 
it gives us the process. It ensures regularity between all our homes so that 
every nurse can walk into any home in the country and be able to understand 
the paperwork, so that if we did need to transfer a nurse because of staff 
shortage... they wouldn't have to spend time relearning the paperwork or 
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getting to know what they were doing on the admin. side. They could then 
spend more time getting to know the residents and ensure the standards of care 
were there. ISO enables us to do that. It ensures that the administrative side is 
certainly done to the same level. Also, it means standards of care and the work 
practices are maintained to a certain level within every unit. I suppose that's 
where ISO stops and some of the other things come back in. 
Nevertheless, ISO 9002 was considered 'mainly a foundation', rather than as 
adequate in itself. The problems which Bartlett saw with it were very similar to those 
identified by Bob Jones of Company 1, in that it dealt only with the most formal 
aspects of quality: 
if in the policy manuals it was written that at three o'clock every afternoon all 
the residents would be wheeled into one lounge and the doors were going to be 
locked and all the staff would go down the pub, the non-compliance would be 
if they found a member of staff in the building, because that's what the policy 
says that we do, so you're showing compliance to policy. There will be very 
few checks to ensure that the policy is the best practice, so its the best practice 
part that comes in and that's why the policies have to be kept updated... it 
won't police the system for you, it will ensure that the standard's maintained to 
the standard you're setting yourself 
Like Company 1, therefore, Company 2 also supplements ISO 9002 with its own 
systems. The main quality manual 'lays out the compliance with the system of ISO', 
but there are also eight procedure manuals, 'which basically tell the general manager 
and the staff the way we expect and the standard of work that we expect within the 
home'. The system is 'policed' by 'internal process reviews' carried out by regional 
managers, 'where we're actually talking to members of staff about them, the way they 
feel about the home, the way they feel about themselves and their colleagues, teams 
that are working. ' This also involved 'a lot of time talking to residents' (see Chapter 
Seven). Company 2 is organized in three divisions (North, Central and South) and 
twelve regions, with four regional managers reporting to each divisional director. 
The 
regional managers' reviews are checked by the divisional 
directors who 'police that 
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system to ensure compliance and also continuity'. Rather than comparing one unit to 
another, this involves monitoring, 
the improvement the unit has made on the previous month's score. It also 
means that we're much more aware if something goes slightly wrong or if the 
home starts to slip or if there're problems, that it's picked up within, usually 
three or four weeks, or something like that, rather than waiting six months for 
the ISO audit, where it may be that the surveillance visit doesn't focus on care 
issues this time, it will look at housekeeping standards or admin. policies. We 
try and take a good cross section with the internal process review. 
Bartlett also carries out alot of 'ad hoc audits where felt necessary'. According to 
her: 
I also am very much involved with the introduction of the learning organization 
into the company. I feel that quality is all encompassing and it affects the staff, 
so I tend to not just stick to the policies and procedures and have this sort of 
top down approach to quality. It's very much getting in amongst people, 
making sure the system's a living system and ensuring that everybody knows 
how to amend the system if something happens, or whatever, to keep 
continuously improving. 
As with Company 1, the process of acquisition by Company 2 (USA)and merging 
with Exceler and Apta had been a somewhat difficult process. As did Jones, Bartlett 
also explained this with reference to the notion of 'culture', without prompting from 
the interviewer: 
three reasonably small companies merged together to fon-n this 150 home unit 
that we now see. It was three totally different cultures coming together. So 
probably for most of 1997 there was a lot of unrest and a lot of upheaval. 
People coming to terms with who, if you like, was going to end up in charge of 
[Company 2] or [Company 2 (USA)] or whatever it was going to be called... I 
think it was mostly people being unaware of what was physically going to 
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happen, and because they felt insecure it obviously affected some -routines. At 
one stage there were three head offices, obviously, with three companies. None 
of the head office staff knew which head office would have been in the back of 
the... who was going to do the admin. or do the accounts or whatever. 
This had important effects on staff relations. The process of merging these 'three 
totally different cultures' involved 'a lot of changes in some of the units because of the 
work practices coming in. ' Apta had had a 'very centralized' business system and 'had 
been used to central office doing everything from ordering the supplies to dictating the 
budget to getting the light bulbs changed and everything else. The way the company's 
set up now is that each general manager is responsible for a cost centre, and they are 
run very differently. ' This change from a centralized system to a more devolved one 
meant that Apta managers, 
went from being matron managers and very much hands on nursing, and in 
some cases were actually called the nursing director. The emphasis was put 
more on them being a business person, so there's been a lot of staff 
development to get the skills necessary to take on that role. And there have 
been a few that have decided that they wanted to stay much more hands on 
nursing. Wherever possible they've been encouraged to take the care manager 
role within the unit, and that's happened in several cases, but some of them felt 
that it was like a demotion, because there was going to be this general 
manager, but you have the problen-L So there were, I suppose, the normal 
trauma of bringing three cultures together and trying to get one that would 
work from the three. 
This is consistent with CCMN's observation (October 1998), quoted 
in Section One, 
that some of the former Apta employees did not stay with the merged company. 
According to Bartlett, the rapid growth in the company, 
meant that the head office team, admin. team, finance teanlý were coping with 
150 units instead of 45,46 units that they had been previously 
looking at, and I 
don't think that maybe that change was managed too well., in that they certainly 
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weren't prepared for the extra work and the lack of knowledge of the 
cofleagues in the unit. You've got an administrator that fiUs in one A4 form 
every week and sends it through to the central office saying 'please buy me two 
packets of toilet rolls' and everything else, and then you've suddenly got an 
administrator who's trying to cope with putting the wages in at unit level, 
running the purchase ledger, invoicing. I don't know that we had the support 
for those people, so the internal customer, being the administrator of the unit or 
the general manager of the unit, was struggling with coming to terms with 
business and finance - whether that was actually there correctly, which again 
caused a bit of unrest. 
The new, more devolved, system of administration had been extended from the old 
Company 2 to cover the new merged company. Exceler prior to the merger had been, 
probably half way between the two. The manager of the home was seen as a 
marketing person and still very much clinically orientated but they [would] sell 
the beds and market the home and be involved with the local community, but 
probably not to the extent that the [Company 2] managers had controlled the 
cost centres, run to a budget and been held accountable for the budget. So they 
were mid-way between the two. Probably [Company 2] and Apta were the 
extremes. 
However, according to Bartlett, the constituent parts were 'now one totally different 
company. I don't think you could say that any of the three companies exist any more. 
And its certainly not that the corporate culture has become the old [company 2] 
corporate culture. We've all been through this huge learning curve and a lot of things 
have changed. ' 
Bartlett herself had been a General Manager of an Company 2 unit at the time of 
acquisition, and had spent the first six months thereafter on secondment, 'really helping 
people come to grips with the bits of paper on the finance side and sort of organizing. ' 
Having subsequently been offered the job of quality assurance manager she had spent 
the first six months in that post, 'looking at taking the best from all the procedural 
130 
manuals and changing the policies and procedures and adapting them to fit-the different 
units. ' Again like Company 1, the process of merger had meant that the new company 
had acquired a mix of assets: 
[Company 2] units had always tended to be purpose built and had been very 
much new-build. There'd been some conversions but quite a lot of the 
conversions where the old houses were left much as was and new wings have 
been built on, so the admin. section would be in the old house and then the 
purpose built unit added on. Some of the assets that have come together have 
been very mixed. Some of them have been local authority units that had been 
purchased by a private individual and then Exceler or Apta had acquired from 
other stock really, rather than building their own. So there's a huge mixture 
now of assets and the way that's come together. 
The diversification of services which took place with the merger has also meant that, 
'the knowledge base that we've needed as a company has obviously expanded and 
we've had to look for specialists within each of the sectors to make sure that, again, 
that nursing issues or care issues are addressed properly, depending on the client base. ' 
Bartlett saw no contradiction between the profit and quality goals of the company: 
Every nurse that works for the health service is there and takes away a salary. 
Even people that are working for some of the voluntary organizations will still 
have a salary at a certain level. So really with the culture that we all five in, I 
can't see a problem with making a profit as long as we are selling first class 
quality care, and that is provided. I can't see a problem with it at all. 
As far as the different demands made by financial criteria and quality criteria were 
concerned, Bartlett argued that: 
The financial performance criteria and the quality assurance criteria are really 
very similar. If we are making a profit for shareholders and our shareholders 
are happy with us, they wifl reinvest with us, which means we can move 
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forward with medical technological advances... I see increased occupancy on a 
local level, meaning that the area is happy with the standard. 
As long as homes are 'filling up' because they have a good standard of care then, 
ýuhirnately the shareholder, wherever they are, is going to get a better return on their 
investment. So I would say that it is definitely quality led. ' Although it is plausible that 
there is a strategic approach based on raising quality, these comments tend to obscure 
the distinct difference between profit targets and quality criteria. 
It can be seen that Company 2 has put ISO 9002 closer to the core of its quality 
systems than has Company 1. However, for Company 2 also, ISO 9002 was not 
adequate by itself, and the quality assurance system it had developed was fairly similar 
to that being developed by Company I Care Homes. Like Company 1, Company 2's 
system was also based on process reviews, although Bartlett emphasised the 
importance of 'talking to residents'. Company 2 also organized residents' and 
relatives' meetings, which are discussed in Chapter Seven. 
Again in common with Company 1, Company 2 had experienced problems in 
homogenizing the different 'cultures' of its acquired firms into one. With Company 2 
this seems to have been as much to do with the administrative and business side of the 
operation as the quality of service side, and appears to have caused considerable 
problems with staff from one of the acquired firms in particular, causing some of them 
to leave. There was no acknowledgement by Bartlett of any tensions relating to the 
relationship between cost and quality, but the financial problems which both it and 
its 




1: CORPORATE HISTORY & STRATEGY 
Company 3 was set up in 1985. Prior to Company 2 (USA)'s acquisition of Company 
2, Company 3 had been the second largest long term care company in the UK, with a 
little under 4,000 beds (CCMN, April 1994). Only 50% of its business was wholly 
reliant on the state sector. This is still the case, and allows it to maintain higher 
occupancy rates than its competitors as it is not so restricted by LA budget restraint, 
although it does mean it is more exposed to the economic cycle. From early on in its 
existence, the US group National Medical Enterprises (NME) had a 42% majority 
shareholding in Company 3. NME also had a minority shareholding in Hillhaven, which 
it subsequently sold to Horizon Healthcare, leaving its Company 3 shareholding as its 
only interest in care homes (CCMN, April 1995). NME was a major acute care 
provider in the USA. In May 1996, NME, which by that time had changed its name, 
sold its 26,, 874,998 shares in Company 3 (CCMN, May 1996). 
Reflecting its strategy of diversification in healthcare delivery, Company 3 acquired 
the entire share capital of Diagnostic Holdings Ltd in April 1995. Diagnostic's 
principal activity was the provision of medical diagnostic services operated out of three 
hospitals in Essex, Suffolk and Sussex (CCMN, April 1995). In November 1995, 
Company 3 acquired the retirement home management company Peveral, in a joint 
venture with Holiday Retirement Corp of the USA 
(http: //www. ukbusinesspark. co. uk/wee3l246. htm). In November 1996, Peverel 
acquired Care UK's retirement housing management operations, reinforcing its 
position as market leader in that area, providing services to 36,000 residents (AR 
1997; CCMN, November 1996). Through Peverel, by May 1997 Company 3's 24-hour 
Careline monitoring service connected 27,000 people to emergency helplines (CCMN, 
August/September 1997). By the end of November 1997, Careline had expanded into 
the non-elderly sectors, bringing total clients to 35,000 (CCMN, Febmary 1998). 
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In June 1996 Company 3 made a hostile bid for Goldsborough Healthcare, which was 
subsequently acquired by Company I (see above). A similar approach had been made 
the year before, and on both occasions Goldsborough's board had rejected the offer 
and requested that their shareholders take no action (CCMN, June 1996). According 
to CCMN (ibid), Goldsborough did not have, 'a sufficient capital base to support 
adequately the growth of a diversified healthcare group'. On the other hand, there 
were good reasons why Company 3 was well placed to take over Goldsborough 
(CCMN, ibid). Company 3 had invested considerably in product development, and had 
developed a capacity to provide for higher dependency clients, including persons with 
challenging behaviour, psychiatric needs, eating disorders, alcohol and drug abuse and 
head injuries. The 'potential synergy' of its care home operations with its Peveral 
business would also boost returns, allowing Company 3 to bring forward investment in 
management information systems and use more 'high tech' products to deliver its 
service. It also, 'knows how to put itself in the frame on long term contracts from local 
authority purchasers' (ibid). However, as detailed above, Goldsborough's board 
successfully resisted Company 3's approaches, and the following year the company 
was purchased by Company 1. 
In June 1997, Company 3 purchased the nursing home and assisted living division of 
PPP Healthcare, PPP Beaumont (AR 1997: 15), including nine premier nursing centres 
and a further two under construction (CCN4N, June 1997). An important part of the 
transaction was that Company 3 would become the primary preferred provider of long 
term nursing care for PPP Healthcare customers as part of a new relationship. It was 
also proposed that PPP Healthcare customers would be able to access Company 3 
nursing homes at preferential rates. PPP Healthcare is the UK market leader in long 
term care insurance, through its subsidiary PPP Lifetime. It was anticipated that the 
relationship would lead to the development of a range of technology and caR-centre 
based services for their joint client markets to provide health information and support 
services. Pat Carter, chief executive of Company 3, commented that the relationship 
met three of the company's main objectives: it strengthened the company's core 
business by raising the element of privately funded residents, in geographicafly 
complementary facflities; it diversified Company 
3's range of UK services in the 
expanding assisted living market, completing the product range 
between sheltered 
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housing and nursing homes; and it gave close links to the leading provider of long term 
care insurance in the UK (ibid). 
Company 3's interim report containing annual figures for the twelve months ending 
31 May 1997 pointed to 'three key messages' which help to illustrate its strategy 
(CCMN, August/September 1997). First, the company was outperforming the care 
homes sector in terms of occupancy (around 3% above the average during the course 
of the year) as well as operating profit per bed and internal rates of return. The higher 
proportion o self pay residents when compared to the rest of the sector was one factor 
helping performance. At this time 25% of Company 3's clients were self-pay - 
following the deals with PPP and the sale of twelve homes to Tamaris, this proportion 
rose to 31.8% (CCMN, February 1998). 
Second, cash flow continued to be increasingly invested in related health and care 
sectors, reflected in the acquisition of Farm Place (which caters for people with alcohol 
and drug problems and eating disorders) and the commencement of construction of 
two medium secure units near Newbury and Milton Keynes. The company's annual 
report (AR, 1997: 11) stated: 'We see the whole area of behavioural medicine as 
having strong development potential with opportunities for finiher expansion. ' 
Third was the statement that it was just as likely to sell. part of its care home portfolio 
rather than acquire more in the market, confirming its strategic plan of diversification. 
Company 3's annual report (1997: 14) stated: 'One of the Group's objectives is to 
increase further the contribution, before interest and tax, from non nursing home 
activities', and announced, 'a substantial reduction in our nursing home expansion 
programme' (ibid: 16). Margaret Grant, member of the board of directors of Company 
3 with overal-I responsibility for quality assurance, commenting on Company 3's 
operations in hospitals and head & brain injury, stated in interview that, 'we believe in 
multi-diversity'. Company 3 had a target aimed at broadening its base to 50% non- 
nursing home activities by year 2000 (CCMN February 1998: 
http: //www. ukbusinesspark. co. uk/wee3l246. htm). 
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At the end of 1997 Company 3 acquired the care home provider Libra Healthcare. In 
March 1998, Peveral, the retirement home management company which Company 3 
jointly owned with Holiday Retirement Corp (HRC) of the USA, purchased O. M. 
Limited for around $8m. (CCMN, March 1998). O. M. Lin-fited had a similar business 
to Peveral, managing 886 developments with 19,500 units. The deal increased the 
number of units managed by Peveral to more than 50,000. Also in March 1998, the US 
company Health Care REIT agreed to become a significant minority investor in 
Atlantic Healthcare Finance, an investment trust set up by Company 3 and HRC. The 
month before, Atlantic Healthcare had announced a series of deals involving the 
purchase of care home properties from Company 3 and Tamaris, which would be 
leased back by Tamaris. It was understood that Company 3 would retain its 49% 
interest in Atlantic Healthcare, but that its partner HRC would only hold a 20% stake, 
with the balance being held by Health Care REIT. Health Care REIT would also 
provide significant input into the management of Atlantic Healthcare (CCMN, March 
1998). 
At the end of May 1998, occupancy in Company 3 care homes was higher than the 
industry average at just over 90%, and the proportion of single rooms with en suite 
facilities had risen to more than 90%, near double the industry average (CCMN, 
August/September 1998). Nursing homes comprised 72% of group turnover and 69% 
of operating profit (previously 80% and 79% respectively), indicating some success 
for Company 3's strategy of diversification away from long term care provision (ibid). 
Local authority 'only' funded residents remained less than one third of 'census' levels, 
and self-pay clients had risen to 35%, reflecting Company 3's strategy of increasing its 
self-pay clients. At this time Company 3 had 16 operational behavioural medicine units 
of which 7 were new openings and 4 were new acquisitions. That portfolio comprised 
618 beds, 293 acute and 325 chronic. Psychiatric beds made up 249 of these beds, 228 
beds were brain injury, and the balance of 145 beds catered for people with learning 
disabilities, alcohol and drug abuse problems and various rehabilitative needs (ibid). 
CCMN (ibid) thought that the key to the rate of growth of the fin-n might be 
development of its Atlantic Healthcare associate through expansion of its property 
portfolio in the UK and other parts of Europe. 
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Company 3's higher proportion of self pay clients and its higher occupancy levels 
meant that it was out-performing its competitors in economic terms. However, it is an 
indication of the situation within the sector that, although Company 3 was regarded as 
'the most commercially viable' of the large fin-ns, CCMN (April 1999) saw it as having 
had to, 'run hard in recent years in order to simply stand still, because the market's 
perception of the value of care homes has fallen dramatically during this period'. 
Despite its relative success, therefore, Company 3 had 'not been successful enough to 
create major gains'. Figures released in February 1999 (CCMN, February 1999) 
showed that the major contributor to earnings was Company 3's long term care 
division, but that even this was experiencing problems. 
In March 1999 the board of Company 3 agreed the sale of the company to 
Canterbury Healthcare. Canterbury was set up by Chai Patel, the founder and former 
chairman of Court Cavendish and former chief executive of Care First (acquired by 
Company I- see above). Canterbury's backers included the US investment bank 
Goldman Sachs and Welsh, Carson, Anderson & Stowe (WCAS), a leading US private 
equity firm set up in 1979. At the time of the acquisition of Company 3, WCAS 
managed a series of nine limited partnership investment funds, including the WCAS 
Funds, that make investments in connection with acquiring and building established 
businesses in the healthcare and information services industries (CCMN, March 1999). 
The board of directors of Canterbury comprised Chai Patel, Edward Siskind (a 
managing director of Goldman Sachs & Co. ), Barry Volpart (a managing director of 
Goldman Sachs International) and Andrew Paul and Lawrence Sorrel (managing 
members of the general partners of the WCAS Funds). Tony Heywood, former finance 
director and executive director of Court Cavendish and Care First respectively, took 
on the role of chief operations officer for the whole group (CCMN, May 1999). Peter 
Churley, previously employed by Company I and Tamaris, was appointed managing 
director for the care homes division. 
In August 1999, the new owners of Company 3 acquired 100% of the home care 
business, marketed under the name Careforce, which was previously owned by 
Company 3 in partnership with businessman Mike Rogers (CCMN, August/September 
1999). The move confirmed that Canterbury would continue Company 3's strategy of 
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diversification, but also showed that care homes would remain central to the 
company's strategy. Patel indicated that Company 3 intended to increase its presence 
in the home care sector, but that home care, as well as rehabilitation and respite 
services, would be expanded through existing care homes. The firm believed that, 'the 
provision of a range of care services from a single location will lead to a more 
integrated solution for people requiring care. '(ibid) 
In February 2000 Company 3 acquired the independent psychiatric hospital operator 
Priory Healthcare, which operated 13 acute psychiatric hospitals and three specialist 
residential schools (CCMN, February 2000). These were to be added to Company 3's 
existing mental health services to form the largest independent sector provider of 
mental health care in the UK, trading under the Priory name. About a third of the 
enlarged group's provision was funded by the NHS, with the rest being privately 
funded. Priory had previously been acquired from its US owners CPC in a management 
buyout in April 1996 (CCMN, October 1999). 
Company 3's overall strategy then, has been to raise the level of self-pay clients in its 
care homes through concentration on the upper end of the market, allowing it to keep 
average care home fees rising ahead of the retail price index (CCMN, April 1999), 
whilst diversifying into specialist operations including psychiatric services, services for 
people with alcohol and drug problems, head injury and medium secure units. 
Alongside this it has developed a national emergency call operation and a substantial 
portfolio of retirement home interests through its partnership in Peveral. It was at April 
1999 (CCMN) the second largest national provider of diagnostic imaging services. 
Through Atlantic Healthcare Finance, it had made substantial investments in property 
which allowed it to profit from the growing popularity of leaseback in the sector. 
Canterbury's strategy subsequent to its acquisition of Company 3 was to be to 
continue to build Company 3's businesses through a combination of internal growth 
and acquisitions. According to CCMN (March 1999) Canterbury believed the calibre 
of Company 3's facilities and management made it a pivotal part of Canterbury's 
strategy for long term growth. 
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2: INTERNATIONALIZATION 
As can be seen from the above corporate history, Company 3 was, like Company 1, a 
British based company. However, unlike Company I it had not yet expanded abroad 
through direct provision. Neither had it grown through acquisitions of large existing 
fin-ns. Rather it had grown predominantly on the basis of two linked forms of 
expansion. On the one hand, it had steadily acquired a number of smaller businesses 
specializing in both long term care and other health related fields. On the other hand, it 
had formed various alliances and joint ventures with other independent firms, many of 
them US companies. These included the initial majority shareholding held in Company 
3 by National Medical Enterprises (NME) of America. NME first entered the British 
healthcare market in 1975, when it acquired many of the hospital assets belonging to 
the British firm United Medical Enterprises (Griffith & Rayner, 1985: 44). Company 3 
was its biggest investment in long term care in the UK, from which it has subsequently 
withdrawn. 
Other than the relationship with NME, Company 3's international partnerships to 
date have primarily involved real estate or retirement housing management. These have 
included its joint venture in Peverel with the US company Holiday Retirement Corp, 
and its partnerships with Holiday Retirement Corp and the US company Health Care 
REIT in Atlantic Healthcare Finance. Company 3 is likely to have benefited from the 
greater expertise of US firms in such ventures. Company 3 was also the 
first UK 
healthcare group to raise funds in the US financial market (AR 1997: 18). 
Furthermore, its most recent owners, Canterbury, were backed by the American 
investors Goldman Sachs and WCAS. It is also possible that Company 3 may decide to 
expand into Europe, either through direct provision of care services and 
/ or through 
its real estate dealings. Canterbury's chief executive, Chai Patel, confirmed to 
CCMN 
(May 1999) that the group was actively considering a number of propositions 
regarding expansion into Europe including, 'a number of potential opportunities 
for the 
group across all its activities in Germany, France and 
Spain'. 
How Company 3's international links have affected its operation 
is difficult to 
pinpoint, not least because the 
interview with Margaret Grant (professional services 
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manager at Company 3 and a member of the board of directors) yielded less 
information than that for the other two fin-ns. Grant was unwilling to have the 
interview tape recorded, although she was happy for notes to be taken during it. She 
provided generally brief and guarded answers to the questions Put to her. The 
interviewer was asked to leave the room twice during the course of the interview 
(which took place at Company 3's offices in Wales), so that Grant could take urgent 
and confidential telephone calls. 
According to Grant, during the period of NME's part-ownership it 'was always 
understood' that Company 3 would eventually 'develop on our own'. Hughes went to 
the US for her induction into the company, and said 'you learn how to work when you 
work for an American company'. Company 3's executives had been to the US to see if 
the American systems could be adapted, but had found that they had a 'different 
system'. According to Grant, some standards in the UK were 'much better' than in the 
US, some were 6not nearly as good'. This tends to confirm the evidence given by Jane 
Bartlett of Company 2, that involvement with a US firm does not necessarily lead to a 
4one way' subordination to American practices, but that cross-national learning is to 
some extent a two-way process. 
Grant thought that Company 3's size gave it a definite advantage over smaller firms 
which were often run by single owner / managers. Company 3, on the other hand, was 
'bigger than any single health authority'. Economies of scale in purchasing supplies 
were seen as 4a definite advantage'. 
3: QUALITY ASSURANCE AND ORGANIZATION 
The information for this section is derived primarily from the interview with Grant. 
Company 3 seemed to be the most sceptical of the three companies of 'off the shelf 
quality systems. ISO 9002 was piloted in three homes, but not taken on board 
due to 
the high levels of paperwork and the fact that it was seen as 'product geared, not 
service geared'. Grant said that Investors In People had also been piloted 
in some 
homes. According to Maria Smitham, Head of the Registration and Inspection Unit in 
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East Albion, all of the PPP homes acquired by Company 3 in Albion had achieved 
Investors In People prior to their acquisition, and other Company 3 homes in the area 
had achieved it subsequent to this, as well as having, 'other kite marks attached to 
them as well'. Grant described the Investors In People 'pilots' as a learning experience, 
which could then be fed into the organization's own quality system. This is consistent 
with the perceptions of Smitharn, who said that the PPP homes had aimed at the 
highest quality section of the market and that Company 3 had continued to market 
them under the PPP brand. However, Smitharn thought any Merences between the 
PPP homes and other Company 3 homes had disappeared as Company 3 had, 'looked 
at the good in each of the homes and they've tried to marry up what is good in each of 
thern. ' 
Company 3's own QA system involved the setting of standards, the monitoring of 
outcomes and the following of operational procedures and schedules which are laid out 
in manuals. The operational procedures related especially to nursing, but also to things 
like kitchens and laundry. The company also had a training system which involved 
every member of staff going through basic induction training (including fire drills, 
safety procedures, etc. ). All ancillary services - laundry, cooking, cleaning, 
maintenance - were done on site and in-house. Each of these departments was subject 
to an audit. There were 12 audits a year altogether in each home, which took place on 
a monthly basis. The home managers carried out the home level audit based on the 
guidelines that were set nationally. 
Each home was subject to a regional manager (responsible for financial targets), a 
regional nurse (responsible for quality and standards), and a regional administrator. 
These regional officers were subject to two national officers -a director of operations 
who is responsible for functional management, and a professional services manager 
(Grant) who was responsible for quality and checked nurses' PIN numbers. These two 
national officers had formal equality, but in practice Grant was 'slightly higher'. The 
regional nurse would visit each home to check the audits. She would talk to the 
ý-patient% and then check the notes to make sure these adequately reflected the 
patient's needs. The notes were of utmost importance since staff sometimes changed, 
although an effort was made to maintain consistency by having a named member of 
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staff who had primary responsibility for each patient. The patient would know who 
that person was. 
The company also had a complaints procedure: 'In a perfect world we wouldn't have 
any complaints but in practice, of course, we do. ' Company 3 had at one time tried to 
introduce quality circles, but Grant said these had quickly become 'grumbling circles, 
and so had been abandoned. Finally there was the '0800 number' or 'the 
whistleblowing number', which was 'one of the company's biggest assets'. This was a 
confidential line for staff, clients and relatives which came 'straight through' to Grant. 




is demonstrated by the corporate history given above, although Company 3 has 
grown through acquisition of pre-existing businesses, unlike Company I and Company 
2 it has not been the result of merger between large pre-existing companies. Rather it 
has built on the basis of alliances which reflect its strategy of diversification, also 
discussed above. According to Grant, about 90% of Company 3's homes were purpose 
built, 'although we have bought in to some extent'. Grant acknowledged few 
difficulties encountered in building up a large organization. She said that Company 3 
had no problems related to bureaucracy, although she did say that it was 'never easy' 
to integrate a pre-existing business once acquired - it took time for the transition to 
take place. She stressed instead that the company were 'clearly the best providers'. 
This claim was based on 'good occupancy levels'; according to Grant the company had 
waiting lists. Grant thought Company 3 had 'proved' that it was better than its 
competitors. This was the result of 'better checking systems' and the fact that 
4everyone works hard, from the top down. I say from the top down, but we also 
believe in empowerment. Of course, everyone says that, but we do mean it. ' Neither 
did Grant acknowledge any tension at all between the quality and profit goals of the 
company stating simply that 'quality always takes precedence'. 
Considering Grant's reluctance to acknowledge any real problems relating to these 
matters, her comments may be regarded as more promotional than enlightening. 
Indeed, the more intangible aspects of semi-structured interviews discussed 
in Chapter 
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Three, such as the emotional tone or mood of the interview, in this case suggested that 
Grant was less open than Jones or Bartlett. The unwillingness for the interview to be 
tape-recorded is some indication of this. However, Grant's comments on occupancy 
are consistent with information given by CCMN quoted above, and her comments on 
the relative lack of problems associated with the growth of the company are consistent 
with Company 3's history of having avoided mergers with other large firms. Despite 
her assertion that 'quality always takes precedence', she indicated that quality and 
financial targets were monitored separately and simultaneously on a regional basis - 
clearly profit considerations were important to the company. The two were presumably 
seen as complementing each other through Company 3's strategy of attempting to 
attract self pay clients who would be willing to pay a premium for higher quality. 
Company 3, then, could be said to be the least enthusiastic of the firms about off-the- 
shelf systems such as ISO 9002. The quality assurance model it has developed would 
seem to be fairly similar to those of Company I and Company 2 in terms of being 
based on the governing of process by operational manuals. However, Grant did 
indicate that outcomes were monitored, although she provided no detail on how this 
was done and did not allow inspection of the firm's QA manuals. The introduction of 
'the whistleblowing number' was an innovative means of feedback to the centre for 
staff, clients and relatives. Company 3 also organized residents' and relatives' 
meetings, which are discussed in Chapter Seven. 
Other than the changes at the top level, detailed in Section One, it is difficult to say 
how the acquisition of Company 3 by Canterbury may have affected the 
firm's internal 
organization, since the interview with Grant took place prior to this. 
According to 
CCMN (April 1999) it was unlikely that the takeover would lead to many changes 
in 
regional management and care home managers, and care 
home staff would be 
'minimally affected'. However, an early move out of Company 3's 
head offices in 
Leicester Square to Surrey seemed likely. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Each of the three firms examined can be seen to have had different corporate histories 
and to have followed different strategies. Company I Care Home's strategy results 
from the decision of the British based Company I to expand (both in Britain and 
overseas) into areas of healthcare other than insurance. Company 2's strategy results 
from the decision of Company 2 (USA) to expand internationally, whilst retaiing long 
term care as its core business. Company 3 has followed a strategy of aiming at the top 
end of the UK long term care market, alongside sustained diversification into other 
health related areas. 
The three firms had different degrees of internationalization in different types of 
activity. Company I has expanded individual insurance abroad (often for British 
nationals) as well as expanding direct provision of services abroad. At the time of 
writing, Britain remained the only country where Company I had significant care home 
provision. Company 2 (USA) has pursued a strategy of extensive acquisition of care 
facilities abroad, and the replication to some extent of the strategy followed within its 
home market, where ancillary services are sold to (its and others') care homes. 
Company 3 had no direct provision abroad, although there was some indication that 
this may change under Canterbury's ownership. However, Company 3 has had 
substantial investment from the US throughout its existence, and has made significant 
international alliances, focused on real estate and retirement housing management. 
These international links, as well as the sheer size which goes with them, have allowed 
all the companies to benefit from increased resources (including information 
technology), expertise and buying power. There is also evidence that Company 3 and 
Company 2 have experienced a degree of 'cultural exchange' with their US partners, 
although Company 2's experience demonstrates that some US practices (such as 
restraint) are not appropriate to the UK. However, there may be drawbacks for these 
fin-ns in ten-ns of a relatively high level of bureaucracy, as identified by Company I's 
Bob Jones. 
Although very different in a number of respects, the international aspects of these 
firms' strategies can all be regarded as 'market seeking' rather than 'client following' 
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(see Chapter Two). This results from their delivery of services direct to the end 
'consumer'. rather than to other businesses (as, for example, financial service firms 
may do). If the intention is to provide services abroad, as in the cases of Company I 
and especially of Company 2 (USA), direct investment must be made. Furthermore, the 
strategy of each of the firms can be seen to have been influenced by their positioning 
in, and the nature of, their home markets. Company I's strategy resulted from a need 
to expand into areas other than insurance, but was influenced by the dominance of the 
NHS in its most 'natural' alternative market of acute medical provision. Expansion has 
thus been into long term care in the UK, and into other countries where opportunities 
exist for private health provision. Company 2 (USA)'s strategy has been influenced 
both by the greater experience arising from the more developed and concentrated long 
term care market in the US, which it is therefore able to export, and from the 
restriction of state funding in that market. There is also some evidence that the 
perception of 'favourable... regulatory environments' abroad (Company 2 (USA)AF, 
1996: 11) may have influenced the firm's strategy (regulation in the UK will be 
discussed in the next chapter). The fact that the UK shares a common language with 
the US would also have added to its attractiveness. Company 3 has responded to the 
NHS' dominance in health services in the UK by expanding into profitable specialist 
markets such as brain injury and drug and alcohol addiction, as well as taking 
advantage of the long term care sector's need for financing through sale and leaseback. 
Through this and its concentration on the higher quality section of the UK long ten'n 
care market, it has actively sought out the most profitable areas of health provision. 
Mohan (1991: 857) argues that the entry of US firms into the British healthcare 
market in the 1980s was facilitated by their ability to borrow on Wall 
Street (see 
Chapter Two). The evidence from this chapter suggests that this advantage may have 
diminished somewhat. The more developed healthcare market in the 
UK has meant 
that British firms are now in principle able to secure finance both in the 
US and in the 
City of London, and sale and leaseback has become a major source of 
finance. As 
indicated above, Company 3 was the first UK healthcare group to raise 
funds in the US 
financial market in 1996 (AR 1997: 18). Furthermore, on entering the 
long term care 
market, Company I would seem to 
have been significantly aided by its mutual status, 
in terms of being able to make strategic moves when 
it was ready without pressure 
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from shareholders. Company 2, on the other hand, which initially gained from the 
ability to raise capital guaranteed by Company 2 (USA), may be significantly affected 
by the financial problems of Company 2 (USA). These have resulted in part from 
Company 2 (USA)'s high level of borrowing in order to fund its expansion plans both 
at home and abroad. Company 2's experience thus illustrates the increased risks, as 
well as the potential advantages, of internationalization. This is underlined by the 
evidence that Company 2 (USA)'s problems have resulted in part from the actions of 
US state agencies, something which neither Company 2 nor the UK state has any 
control over. 
All the fin-ns had similar internally developed quality assurance systems, with varying 
degrees of scepticism about ISO 9002. These were developed for the specific needs of 
each of the three firms, and were therefore likely to be more effective than ISO 9002 
or other 'off the shelf systems. However, as with ISO 9002, these were all primarily 
organized around process considerations, despite some orientation towards outcomes. 
In Mintzberg's terms (1979), fim-is such as Company I and Company 2 (USA) which 
deliver services in more than one country must be organized into some kind of 
divisionalized form or hierarchical structure which regulates its various units on the 
basis of financial output, that is, profitability (see Chapter Two). Company 1, for 
example, was organized into five business units, with financial targets set from the 
centre, whilst Company 2 (USA)'s annual report (form 10k, 1998: 22 - see above) 
indicated that some of its UK facilities had, 'not achieved profitability targets 
established upon their acquisition'. However, the concern with control of the labour 
process noted here bears most resemblance to what Mintzberg (1979: 314) calls the 
'machine bureaucracy', which functions with generally low skilled labour on Taylorist 
principles. This is mitigated by the role of qualified nurses, whose work is also 
regulated to some extent by the standardization of skills, that is, by professionalization. 
The employment of nurses in nursing homes is a regulatory requirement (see Chapter 
Five), and they usually play a supervisory role to care assistants, who predominate. 
Nevertheless, their work is strictly controlled by the firms' QA procedures. 
Furthermore, despite the commitment of the case study firms to training programs, 
care assistants are generally low skilled and low paid (see Chapter Six). In a context 
where managerial control is increasingly replacing professional control 
in public 
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services generally (see Chapter Two), any moves away from such process controls 
within large firms towards greater professionalization are likely to be extremely 
limited. Relationships between the firms and their workers are considered at the meso 
level of analysis in Chapter Six. 
The acquisition processes undergone by Company I Care Homes and Company 2 
would appear to have been quite similar, with similar effects in terms of the difficulties 
of cohering the newly created organizations. The importance of this is indicated by the 
fact that both Jones and Bartlett volunteered this information before being asked for it, 
in response to other questions (concerned, for example, with how their QA systems 
were organized). The idea of 'culture', discussed in Chapter two in relation to M&As, 
was clearly an important way in which both Jones and Bartlett themselves made sense 
of these difficulties; there was no automatic 'cultural fit' between the merged firms. 
The very process of drawing up Company I's QA system had been affected by the 
need to take account of 'political' considerations arising from the merger process, 
whereas changes in work practices appear to have led Company 2 to lose significant 
numbers of staff. This is a valid finding, since the incentive of the fin-ns would be to 
understate such disruption, although Bartlett in particular claimed that these problems 
had been remedied. Company 3 seems to have been less subject to merger problems 
due to its history of gradual acquisition, although Grant did indicate that it was 'never 
easy' to integrate acquired businesses. 
Bob Jones of Company I was most forthcoming in acknowledging some tension 
between cost and quality which had to be managed in a realistic way. There is some 
evidence that this leads to some internal 'bargaining' over resources, particularly 
following merger, which would be expected. However, the firms tended to view 
quality as an important part of their strategies, seeing a reputation for high quality as a 
way of increasing occupancy, and therefore profits. Company 3, in particular, aimed at 
the higher quality end of the market. 
There has thus been substantial internationalization in the UK long term care market. 
This has developed in a parallel process to that of the concentration within the sector: 
the two are in many ways inseparable, both in practical and analytical terms, reflecting 
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the trend towards greater internationalization in the wider world economy. The 
implications of these dual processes of concentration and internationalization for both 
the globalization debate and for long term care in the UK are discussed in the final 
chapter. First, however, the relationship of large and internationalized firms with the 
other actors must be examined. This is done in the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE STATE AND REGULATION 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on state regulation of private care providers. However, the 
chapter also includes some discussion of state purchasers, since these have an 
important influence on the market. The discussion of purchasing is primarily confined 
to the influence of purchasers on quality and on the overall shape of the market. 
Ac 
,,,, discussed in Chapter Three, the data for this chapter was derived from analysis of 
relevant government and other documents, supplemented by interview material from 
those responsible for regulation and purchasing in the locality of Albion, and with 
relevant interview material from the case study finns' QA managers. The interviews 
were conducted subsequent to the publication of the 'Modernising Social Services' 
WUte Paper (DoH, 1998b), but prior to the publication of the Care Standards Bill 
(2000), both of which are discussed below. Albion was chosen for its high number of 
homes belonging to the case study firms, as detailed in Chapter Three, and could thus 
act as an exemplar for the issues discussed in this chapter. 
The chapter, as with Chapters Six and Seven which follow, is organized so as to 
answer the research questions relating to the three aspects of the meso level of analysis 
set out in Chapter Three, and the reader should refer back to these. Therefore, Section 
One ('Attitudes, Perceptions and Goals') deals with the goals of state regulation as set 
out in law and related guidance, as well as the interpretations of these by the 
respondents from Albion. It also discusses their assessment of the shift to private 
provision, and their perceptions of and attitudes towards large and internationalized 
providers. Section Two ('Form and Extent of Organization') analyses the existing 
form and extent of state intervention in the sector, and the ways in which these are 
currently being altered. The section discusses primarily national issues of organization, 
including the continuing debate over consistency and standard setting, supplemented 
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with interview material illustrating how these issues relate to the locality of Albion. 
This section also discusses the international commitments of the British state as they 
affect the long term care sector. Section Three ('Firm Specific Aspects') draws on the 
experiences of the respondents from the local state agencies in Albion to illustrate the 
issues which may arise in direct relations between regulators and firms, as well as on 
the interviews with the firms' QA managers regarding their experiences of the 
regulatory process. 
ATTITUDES, PERCEPTIONS AND GOALS 
]Regulation in the British market for nursing and residential care is the responsibility of 
health authorities, who must register and inspect nursing homes, and of local 
authorities, who must register and inspect residential homes. The distinction between 
these two types of homes is widely regarded as being an artificial one which reflects 
the historical development of the system (Edwards & Kenny, 1997: 9). The Acts which 
governed the responsibilities of the authorities at the time of writing were the 
Registered Homes Act (1984) and the NHS and Community Care Act (1990). 
The provisions of the Acts are reinforced by 'A Better Home Life -A Code of Good 
Practice for Residential and Nursing Home Care, published by the Centre for Policy 
on Ageing (CPA) in 1996. This had the status of guidance for inspectors, but exceeded 
what was generally regarded as the statutory mminnum. This begins by stating that: 
Underlying all the recommendations and requirements set out in this code is a 
conviction that those who live in continuing care should do so with dignity, that 
they should have the respect of those who support them, should live with no 
reduction of their rights as citizens and should be entitled to five as full and 
active a life as their physical and mental condition will allow ..... It 
is the 
interests of residents, individually and collectively, that should assume priority 
over the home, its owners, management and staff. (CPX 1996: 7) 
The basic principles underlying the rights of residents are listed as follows: 
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Respect for Privacy and dignity, 
Maintenance of self-esteem, 
Fostering of independence, 
Choice and control, 
Recognition of diversity and individuality, 




Sustamiig relationships with relatives and friendsý and 
Opportunities for leisure activities. (ibid: 8-11) 
In addition, three further principles are stated as necessary to ensure high standards of 
care: 
i) Necessary care, i. e. care and treatment should be provided only if it will be positively 
beneficial; 
ii) Continuity of care, i. e. residents should not have to move out of the home to receive 
additional care; 
iii) Care which is open to scrutiny, i. e. residents (and their relatives or advocates) 
should be able to complain about the care they receive without fear of being victimised 
or being asked to leave (ibid: II- 12). 
Individuals who are in care should, if they are able, have made their own informed 
decision to be there. 
'A Better Home Life' makes clear that the regular testing of residents' views about 
the quality of the service they receive should be part of the management process (CPA, 
1996: 25). Care plans for individual residents are essential to ensure that each resident 
receives the individual care he or she requires. Residents (and their relatives where 
appropriate) should take a lead in saying how they would like to be looked after (ibid: 
46). With the resident's permission, the care plan may be used by inspectors as one 
means of checking on the quality of care provided in the home. Homeowners and 
managers should welcome suggestions for improving or adding to the fife of the home, 
and there must (residential homes) and should (nursing homes) be a clearly established 
complaints procedure (ibid: 68). However, managers and staff should be particularly 
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alert to the general hesitancy of residents and relatives to complain for fear of 
recrhnimtion. 
'A Better Home Life' advises that inspectors should focus on quality of care and 
quality of fife issues as much as on the fabric of the building (ibid: 126). Time should 
be devoted to asking residents and staff about standards of care provided. Courtesy, 
diplomacy and tact should be used when inspecting individual residents' private rooms. 
The owner or manager must make it possible for inspectors to spend some time in 
private with individual residents. It should normally be possible for inspections to be 
conducted in a way which is seen to be constructive by managers and staff of the 
home. Recognition should be given to innovative and good care practice. Inspectors 
should give time to discuss and review with the owner or manager the objectives of the 
home and how the care of the residents can be enhanced. 
Both Maria Smitham. of East Albion Health Authority and Dianne Fenn of West 
Albion Health Authority explained in interview the goals of their respective registration 
and inspection units in relation to the requirements of the 1984 Act. The two units 
tended to share policies, procedures and forms, so there was a close similarity of goals. 
Smitham said her unit was, 'seeking to achieve hopefully a consistent standard within 
the nursing homes throughout East Albion Health Authority... what we're seeking to 
ensure is that the homes are maintaining what they are required to maintain in terms of 
the requirements not only of the Health Authority but also in terms of the regulations 
which are, if you like, underpin the Act'. Smitham also made the point that the 1984 
Act 'talks about adequacy', but that it was 'up to the Health Authority to define the 
standards of adequacy which is applicable within its own boundaries'. This is done by 
using the national criteria as 'the basic kind of skeletal fon-n that we inspect against and 
into that we have added other bits and pieces in tenus of specific issues that we need to 
look at. Smithain defined her unit's broad goals in the following way: 
our prnne focus is the patient that's in bed in the home... afl our efforts are 
geared to ensuring that that person has a good quality of fife and that they have 
some choice about what is happening to them within the home. 
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The main job of the authority was to ensure that ** minimum standards were met, 
although Fenn said that West Albion was 'always looking to raise quality' as well as 
enforce mffilmurn standards. Both Smitharn and Fenn also pointed out that standards 
were always changing. As Smitham put it, 'The standard of adequacy moves over time 
and is moving upwards. ' This upward shift in standards was 'not always greeted very 
nicely' by homes. 
On the purchasing side, Gordon Saydon, the Strategic Commissioning manager at 
Albion County Council, said that Albion's strategy was driven by the goal of, 
4supporting more older people and supporting more of them in their own environments 
where we can'. This goal had influenced the decision to transfer the vast bulk of the 
authority's own homes to the independent sector, discussed below. Adam Warden, 
Local Services Manager at the authority, emphasised that the strategy was about 
taking on board, 'the government's view generally about prevention and to make sure 
that the kind of services we're going for really do meet the potential that people have 
rather than just their actual situation at the present time. ' This meant not assuming that 
people who go into residential or nursing care would necessarily stay there, but 
recognising that it might instead be a temporary solution. Both Saydon and Warden 
stressed the important of user choice in purchasing care places. 
The rationale for the shift to private provision of long-term care services by 
Conservative governments was discussed in Chapter Two. As noted there, attitudes of 
local authorities towards the private sector in the early 1990s, 'reflected a relatively 
crude, knee jerk reaction against what was often seen as inappropriate 
commercialization of social care' (Wistow et al, 1996: 90). Saydon and Warden 
indicated that such attitudes have generally evolved as local and health authorities have 
realized that private provision is unlikely to be reversed, and that standards of care may 
be high among some private providers. This is reflected in the fact that Albion County 
Council's first major transfer of homes to the independent sector (discussed below 
under 'Firm Specific Aspects') stipulated a 'not-for-profit solution', whereas its second 
such transfer did not. Gordon Saydon accounted for the shift in the following terms: 
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We started at the position where nobody wanted to transfer the -homes and 
members [of the Council] in particular were very proud of local authority 
services... and that was strongly supported by the public consultation. 
Everybody said how good the homes were, how good the staff groups were, 
the quality was good, and they were naturally fearful of change but they were 
fearful that things would take a turn for the worse. The not-for-profit ethos 
was the one that fitted most closely with the public sector ethos, because we 
don't do it for profit, and that was why we went for that solution. I think we've 
moved forward. We're, five and a half coming up six years into community 
care where we've used a lot of private sector providers some of whom are very 
good quality, so there's less suspicion than there was from the people who are 
wanting to have services arranged by us... There is still some resistance, but not 
as much as there was and so I think that's the reasons for this time. The 
members are mostly concerned that we get a good quality solution at a price 
we can afford 
Saydon thought that both voluntary and for-profit providers were 'concerned with 
quality because their reputation is at stake'. This evolution of attitudes is also reflected 
in the views of Smitharn and Fenn, such as Smitham's comment that, 'most of our 
owners within East Albion are pretty good and they do endeavour to meet the 
standards all of the time'. The biggest problems came, according to Smitham, when 
homes complained that changes demanded by the inspectors were 'non-viable 
financially'. 
Saydon and Warden were both aware in general terms of the existence of large and 
internationalized organizations, with Warden for example regularly reading 
'Community Care Market News' (CCMN), but neither had a great deal of knowledge 
of the operation of the case study firms in their area, since in Albion these tended to 
concentrate on self-pay clients, as discussed below. Both Smitham and Fenn were 
aware of the existence of large and internationalized fin-ns, and had substantial 
experience of dealing with the case study firms in their work (as discussed in the 
section on 'Firm Specific Aspects'). In terms of the international links of such 
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companies, Smitharn said she was aware of 'some of them'. Fenn said that she was 
aware of them, and that it had caused some problems: 
Oh yes, it's very ... that is a problem because the names are constantly 
changing. It does cause a lot of confusion because you think well is this a new 
company or you know what does it actually mean, and then you get told 'oh no 
we're not a new company it's just the same as before, we've just been taken 
over by ... but the part ... you know as far as you're concerned we're the 
same. ' Well you know that sets you thinking and you really have to spend a lot 
of time checking out that it really is the same company. 
Smitham did not think large and internationalized firms had any particular significance 
to the way she did her job: 
I think in terms of some of the companies who have links with overseas 
personnel, if I can put it like that, I don't think that they are any more difficult 
to deal with than anybody else, if I'm honest. Some are slightly more difficult, 
but it depends on how they are driven, you know, if they're driven by a 
company who looks at the bottom line all of the time then that actually is 
slightly more difficult, but by the same token most of the larger companies 
understand the issues around quality and they know that if they don't deliver 
quality they're not going to have people coming into their homes. At least I 
hope that's how it works! ..... I mean I think that most 
large operators, and we 
have a few in this area, actually do listen to what you have to say. They may 
not always agree with you, with what you're trying to spell out but they do 
listen and if they understand that it is about improving the situation they will 
endeavour to do something about it. Particularly if you can demonstrate that 
what they're doing is actually having a detrimental affect on the people who five 
in the home and that's how you ... I mean I think that's 
how most reasonable 
people would respond. 
Fenn, howeverý had more reservations: 
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I understand that you must ... or large companies are managed on the fines ... 
on business lines but I think sometimes you need to separate out the business 
that you're running. You can't automatically assume that you run a factory for 
motorbikes in the same way as you run a nursing home, there are differences 
and the basic principles for management, you know, that you get people like 
John Jones going on about, should be the same, but I think you've got to 
acknowledge that there has to be some local differences because you're dealing 
with a local population and people who need care. 
Gordon Saydon, Strategic Commissioning Manager for Albion County Council said 
that, 'in terms of overall awareness of current policies, how to develop strategies, how 
to develop quality assurance programmes, my view is the larger providers are just far 
superior because of the sheer size of their organization. ' These remarks, however, 
were concerned with large independent providers generally, not necessarily for-profit 
or internationalized ones. Saydon also said that where a decision was being taken in 
relation to 'a large contract with an organization', its overall reputation would 
influence the outcome, 'particularly depending on what referees might say about them'. 
The large scale contracting out of homes by Albion had involved all bidders being 
asked, 'to supply a minimum of two referees that we can follow up to check on things 
like quality of services. ' These referees consisted of, 'Other authorities who they are 
doing business with. ' When asked about how awareness that a parent company had 
financial problems might affect a bid, Saydon said that they would 'think very 
carefully', although he did point out that the authority had sometimes made individual 
placements into homes that were run by receivers. 
Warden thought that the 'branding' of private providers was 'quite weak'. Whilst he 
acknowledged the existence of the Company I brand, he questioned whether there 
were any others. However, he did think that where branding occurred it would affect 
user choice: 'It certainly would affect user choice wouldn't it, you know, if users could 
feel confident in a brand. If people are worried about health aspects and that brand is 
associated with good health care it would perhaps be a reflection of user choice. ' 
Warden was aware of 'the American experience' of consolidation and was concerned 
that if this was repeated in the UK it might damage choice: 'the whole point of setting 
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up the market was to create a diversification of supplier and yet it consolidates into, 
like it has in America, several market areas, into a few national players. We will end up 
with less choice for users than we had before. ' This issue is returned to in the 
concluding chapter. 
The experiences of Smitharn, Fenn and Saydon in dealing with the case study 
companies will be discussed in the section on 'Firm-Specific Aspects'. Their 
perceptions of, and attitudes towards, quality and regulatory issues will be discussed in 
the next section in relation to the organizational changes proposed by the White Paper 
'Modernising Social Services' (DoH, 1998b) and the new National Required Standards 
(NRS) for social care. 
FORM AND EXTENT OF ORGANIZATION 
This section begins with a discussion of the 'form and extent of internationalization' of 
the British state in relation to the long term care sector, before moving on to discuss 
the form and extent of domestic state intervention (see research questions in Chapter 
Three). The section begins with a discussion of the terms of entry of foreign care firms 
into the British market, since this will be the first 'contact' that a foreign firm makes 
with British state institutions. In terms of the case study firms, this would most 
obviously affect Company 2/ Company 2 (USA), although Company 3 has also 
received US investment. As discussed in Chapter Two, there are potentially a wide 
range of discriminatory regulations which may affect the entry of foreign service fin-ns 
into a market, although these are more often employed by developing countries than by 
economically advanced ones (Enderwick, 1989b: 220). However, Julia Owen from the 
Invest in Britain Bureau was not aware of any regulatory barriers to entry for foreign 
firms in this market. Neither are there any restrictions imposed by the British state on 
its home firms' operations abroad. 
Like other states, Britain's international economic links are mediated 
by a series of 
supranational institutions, although there is not a coherent international regime 
governing FDI and MNCs (as there is with the WTO 
for trade, for example). The 
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primary mechanisms for governing international investment are bilateral investment 
agreements, of which there were 1,523 in 1998 (Held et al, 1999: 258). The 
Oganization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) attempt to set up 
a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), which would have eliminated virtually 
all controls on FDI, was postponed indefinitely in 1998 following vocal opposition 
from various political and voluntary groups and disagreements between governments 
(for a critique of the MAI see Davis & Bishop, 1998/99). However, membership of the 
OECD continues to require governments to abide by explicit codes and standards 
which involve according 'national treatment' to international investors and enacting 
'transparent,, liberal and stable foreign investment rules' (Held et al. 1999: 258). 
'National treatment' means that there are no regulatory barriers to entry by foreign 
firms, and once here they must be treated in exactly the same way as domestic firms 
are treated (Hoekman & Primo Braga, 1997: 302). 
It is possible that the MAI agenda will be revived within the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) at some future date. The WTO also administers the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which was agreed at the Uruguay Round of 
negotiations (Hoekman & Primo Braga, 1997: 302). This operates on the basis of 
general principals such as national treatment for foreign operators and 'most favoured 
nation' (NlFN) treatment (i. e. all foreign firms must be treated alike), as well as on the 
basis of specific negotiated obligations which countries have to opt into or 'schedule'. 
Analysis shows that most countries in practice only committed themselves to limited 
specific obligations, and 'continue to maintain numerous measures that violate national 
treatment' (Hoekman & Primo Braga, 1997: 302). However, the WTO has continued 
to promote the cause of services liberalization, with potentially far-reaching 
implications for health and social services. The WTO is clear that refonns in health 
services should be, 'whenever possible, market-based' (WTO, 1998: para. 34). One 
paper notes that, 'new fon-ns of private sector involvement have opened breaches 
for 
increased domestic and foreign participation' in health services (ibid: para 9, emphasis 
in original). 
As a member of the European Union, the British government 
is also bound by the 
European Public Procurement Directive (EPPD) (EU, 1992), which seeks to increase 
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cross-border competition between providers of public services within -the single 
market. The EPPD stipulates that governments should not discriminate against foreign 
providers and that no 'non-commercial' considerations should be used when procuring 
public services. The EPPD is discussed ffirther in Chapter Six. 
The British state therefore has significant involvement in international agreements and 
supranational institutions. As is most often the case with such agreements today, these 
tend to commit governments to liberalizing measures rather than imposing 
supranational regulation uponfirms. The EU does, however, affect the regulation of 
firms through directives aimed at protecting working conditions. An example of this is 
the Working Time Directive (EU, 1993), which is discussed in Chapter Six. 
There are therefore significant institutional constraints on the policies of the British 
government. However, the attitude of British governments in the post-war period has 
been an extremely liberal one in relation to FDI generally (Held et al, 1999: 257), and 
insofar as it is privately provided, healthcare has been no exception. As Chapter Two 
showed, foreign (mainly US) healthcare firms have been active in the British market 
since the 1970s. Firms are thus routinely accorded 'national treatment'. The 
supranational agreements discussed above do not, therefore, conflict with the approach 
of British governments, but rather have been voluntarily entered into in accordance 
with their worldview. Indeed, as its name suggests, the purpose of the Invest in Britain 
Bureau is to encourage foreign firms to invest in Britain and to provide assistance for 
them to do so (IBB, 1998), although Julia Owen said that IBB dealt mainly with high- 
tech firms who were seen as bringing particular benefits into the country 
According to Enderwick (I 989b: 219), many arguments made in favour of 
restrictions on trade or investment in services confuse this with the need for some form 
of domestic regulation to safeguard standards: 'What is required is "appropriate 
regulation" to maintain the standard of services offered on the market irrespective of 
where such services are produced. ' This is clearly the approach taken by the British 
government in the long term care market. As indicated above, 'appropriate regulation' 
in this market is fragmented between health authorities and local authorities. The 
respective authorities must ensure that the purposes and aims of establishments are 
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clearly set out and that the standards of care they offer match these aims and objectives 
(CPA, 1996: 123). Each authority has its own registration and inspection unit, which 
comes under the auspices of the authority rather than any national body. There is thus 
currently no real national, let alone international organization, although the national 
government decides on the 'shape' of the regulatory framework, and individual local 
authorities are inspected and audited by the Social Services Inspectorate and the Audit 
Commission. 
The primary legislation relating to care homes is the Registered Homes Act (1984), 
which requires all providers of nursing homes and of residential care homes in the 
private and voluntary sectors to be registered. Residents must not be admitted until a 
certificate of registration is issued. Registration authorities must ensure that all 
prospective managers / owners of homes possess some relevant qualifications or have 
some proven experience of employment within residential care. An owner can apply 
for dual registration as a residential and nursing home, and must satisfy both relevant 
authorities to do so. Once the initial certificate of registration has been issued, owners 
should notify the authority of any intended change of ownership - registrations are not 
automatically transferred to new owners or managers. In extreme circumstances, the 
authority may cancel the registration of a home, in which case the registered person 
may appeal. 
n- 
Residential homes are inspected by the local authority whilst nursing homes are 
inspected by the district health authority. All registered homes and (since 1991) local 
authority homes must be inspected twice a year, although authorities may choose to 
visit more often (CPA, 1996: 125). At least one visit should be unannounced. Where 
an owner or company owns several homes, the authority may make such a visit to 
satisfy itself that the homes' managers are receiving adequate supervision and support. 
Inspections will vary in content, focus and length of time depending on any outstanding 
issues identified on previous inspections. Following initial registration, an inspection 
should be made within the first three months of the home becoming established, or 
when a new manager of a home has been appointed. In the case of dual registration, 
joint inspections may take place, and there has been a growth in the numbers of joint 
inspection units in recent years. The authority should ensure that a report of the 
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inspection is sent to the owner and the manager, drawing attention to any specific 
points of consultation and specifying any variation in the registration requirements. 
Both East and West Albion Health Authorities managed to carry out their two 
statutory inspections a year, plus two medication or pharmacy inspections. Smithwn 
also mentioned nutrition inspections wbich were done once a year. 
Where inspectors come across a problem in a home, the first step is usually to issue a 
recommendation concerning necessary changes, and provide a timescale within which 
such changes must be made. The setting of appropriate timescales require inspectors to 
use their judgement, and are the outcome of negotiation between the inspector and the 
home manager. Both Smitham and Fenn emphasised the need for inspectors to be 
6reasonable' in such negotiations. Where a recommendation is ignored, or the problem 
to be rectified is more serious, requirements are issued. These have the force of law, 
and can result in court action leading ultimately to the closure of the home. Both 
Smitharn and Fenn regarded such action as unusual, with Fenn describing it as 'really 
rather drastic'. 
There was some difference in emphasis between Smitham. and Fenn concerning how 
effective they thought these powers were. Smitham, was clear that she thought they 
were adequate, emphasising the possibility of going for 'urgent closure'. Fenn, 
however, thought the procedures for closure were 'very laborious really'. This was 
because an owner could appeal against an enforcement notice, and 'remain in 
operation until the outcome of the appeal'. The paperwork attached to such action was 
also seen as problematic by Fenn because it was time consuming: 'I know that all units 
around the country are relatively under-resourced, and its fine as long as you're getting 
on with the routine work. Once you come into a problem, such as a potential closure 
or even serving a notice or investigating complaints, then that detracts from your usual 
routine inspections for nursing homes. ' Smitham, however, thought that: 'The Act 
gives you a lot of power if its used correctly... I mean you have sufficient powers to 
ruin somebody's business... that is a lot of power so one needs to use it very wisely in 
my opHUOn. ' This applied to large companies as well as small ones, since if a home was 
closed and the inspectors could 'reflect that back to fitness then you would be talking 
about not allowing the company to continue'. It is obvious that serious action against a 
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home belonging to a large company would also damage its brand image. Smitham 
thought that it was "improbable that it would get to that stage with a large company. ' 
Smitharn had only been involved in one case where a home had closed as a result of 
court action, and this was a small business. 
The fragmentation of regulatory responsibilities between different locally-based 
authorities gives rise to the potential for inconsistency between them in the inspection 
and enforcement of standards. This will be discussed in the next section in relation to 
the experiences of particular firms. The Burgner Report on 'The Regulation and 
Inspection of Social Services' (Burgner, 1996,45; 4.4.19) identified this as a problem, 
stating that: 'There is a strong case for greater central guidance on standards while 
preserving necessary flexibility locally. ' According to the report, the 'great majority' of 
provider groups, whether private sector or charitable, favour a shift towards national 
standard setting (ibid: 40; 4.4.1). There was great concern about a perception of lack 
of even-handedness, resulting from regulation being the responsibility of local 
authorities - who also have responsibility for providing and purchasing services (ibid: 
46; 4.5.1). The report also argued that, 'some of the problems associated with dual 
registration - dual inspection and the accompanying bureaucracy and time wasting - 
could be considerably alleviated if there was more joint working between local 
authorities and health authorities. '(ibid: 67; 4.9.8) 
Fenn acknowledged the problems such fragmentation might cause for large firms with 
homes spread across the country, since 'lots of the requirements of the Act are 
interpreted in different ways throughout the country'. Smitharn on the other hand, 
whilst acknowledging the existence of some variation between authorities, thought that 
this was somewhat exaggerated, and had been '... used by companies, or by private 
individuals, to make a point'. The two Albion inspection units were able to overcome 
the problems of fragmentation to a certain extent by meeting on a regional 
basis with 
other units. These meetings took place on a quarterly basis, and were 
intended to 
prefigure the new regional commissions which would be set up as a result of 
the 
government's Modernising Social Services initiative (discussed 
below). These regional 
meetings allowed units to share information and ideas, although 
Fenn said that it was: 
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very difficult at the moment because we don't know what it's going to look 
like! You know, and we think it's going to be one way, somebody knows it's 
going to be another way and ... but I mean we feel that we have to network at 
least so that we're all informed in the same way, and we share what we have 
now in terms of our inspection forms and the material that we use. 
Contacts with units outside the region took place through the hierarchy of the 
regional groups, which met together nationally, or through direct telephone contact. 
The regional meetings, and the national meetings of regional representatives, did not 
formally consider issues relating to the monitoring of companies' quality of delivery 
across the boundaries of health authorities, but Fenn thought it might be a good idea: 
... there are plenty of moans and groans and it would be good if someone 
would take the initiative to ... you know ... I find it quite irritating sometimes 
when people, they have a lot of bad things to say about a particular group and 
everybody jumps on the bandwagon about it, if you like. But it's not ... I don't 
think you can generalize like that... One of the homes is reasonable, we don't 
have so many problems with it, and the other one isn't... they're local issues 
really, but it would be interesting if ... it would be an interesting piece of 
research for someone to do perhaps, to look at these standards throughout the 
company. 
There was some difference in practice between Fenn and Smitham in tenns of direct 
contact with other units by telephone. According to Smitharn: 
... there are occasions when people 
have said to us, 'well they don't do that up 
in so and so'. So we say 'well fine, I hear what you're saying to me but I win 
need to check this out. ' So then all you do is make a telephone call and say 
you know 'I was told by blah blah blah, what is the situationT And then they 
will tell you exactly what's happened so you've then got a much firmer 
base on 
which to operate, and it also means some consistency of approach 
in terms of 
how people are dealing with things. 
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Fenn, on the other hand, said she would not take this kind of action. 
The New Labour government's initial response to the problems of fragmentation in 
the regulation of long-term care was the 'Modernising Social Services' White Paper 
(DoH, 1998b). This acknowledged three principal problems in the current system: the 
lack of independence arising from local and health authorities combining purchasing, 
providing and regulatory functions; the lack of coherence arising from the split 
between health and social services; and the lack of consistency arising from the large 
number of different authorities across the country imposing varying standards. The 
paper proposed setting up eight regional Commissions for Care Standards in England, 
which would bring regulation of all residential, nursing home and domiciliary care for 
both adults and children under their authority, and which would work to new national 
standards. The management boards of these Commissions would include 
representatives from local authorities and health authorities, plus user and provider 
representatives. The Chairs would be appointed by the Secretary of State (DoH, 
1998b: 4.12). There would be recourse to an Ombudsman for complaints against a 
Commission's exercise of its duties, and rights of appeal against deregistration to a 
Registered Care Tribunal (ibid: 4.14). Although there would be provision for central 
funding to the Commissions, they would be expected to be self-financing through fee 
income paid by regulated providers. Fee levels would be set by central government. 
This is important, since the level of these fees could possibly exacerbate the financial 
squeeze on smaller providers discussed in this section. 
Each Commission would decide how its workforce should best be deployed, for 
example, whether it should use area offices or teams. The workforce would 'consist of 
people with skills and qualifications from both social care and health care, including 
nurses. '(ibid: 4.16) Work would be done, 'on developing more unifon-n methodologies 
for registration, inspection and enforcement, so that there is greater consistency of 
practice than at present. '(ibid: 4.18) Providers would be registered if they met the 
required criteria and standards. 
The White Paper states that: 'Arrangements will be made to ensure that there is no 
unnecessary duplication, for example when several branches of the same organization 
164 
are to be registered', but fails to elaborate upon this. However, it does state -that: 'The 
Government believes that greater use could be made of risk assessment procedures in 
order to ensure that greater attention is paid to providers where risks to users appear 
to be greater. '(ibid: 4.54) This would mean that providers would be assessed in 
relation to various factors, 'including past history, previous concerns or complaints, 
and other matters. ' Other QA mechanisms, such as independent accreditation schemes, 
4could also be taken into account in dete ii the level of attention paid to a rmMMg 
particular provider. ' The internal QA mechanisms used by large firms are not 
mentioned in the White Paper. This has important implications for those firms in ten-ns 
of the way they might relate to the new Commissions, given that their primary QA 
systems were developed internally, with independent schemes such as ISO 9002 
generally being marginal. However, although details are not given in the Paper, it 
clearly leaves room for a more flexible relationship between large providers and 
regulators, especially where the provider has established a good 'track record' in ten-ns 
of its quality of care. Nevertheless, the White Paper makes it clear that all care home 
providers would continue to have a minimum frequency of inspections of two per year. 
The VVhite Paper also acknowledged the difficulties which may arise from the 
adminiistrative distinction between residential and nursing care, and the need for homes 
to register with two authorities (with perhaps different standards and procedures) if a 
resident was to remain in the same home once they required a greater level of care. 
The Paper proposed to tackle this through encouraging the development of homes 
designed to cater for a wide range of needs, which under the new system would need 
only to register with one Commission. Other attempts to reduce the separation 
between health and social services included the discussion document 'Partnership in 
Action' (DoH, 1998c), which outlined provisions for pooled budgets between Health 
Authorities and Social Services Departments, lead commissioning where one authority 
may transfer funds and functions to the other, and more integrated provision. These 
principles have been applied to older people through the Better Goverment for Older 
People initiative, in which 28 local pilots are developing and testing various inter- 
agency strategies (ibid: 11). The government's response to the Royal Commission on 
Long Term Care (RCLTC) (NHS Plan, 2000), discussed below, extended provisions 
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for the joint working, and possible merger, of health and social services for adults still 
further. 
'Modernising Social Services' (DoH, 1998b) also proposed the setting up of a new 
Long-term Care Charter to set out at a national level what users and carers could 
expect from health, housing and social services. A General Social Care Council would 
set practice and ethical standards for staff. Further work was to be undertaken 
concerning the 'confusion and variation' in complaints procedures highlighted by the 
Office of Fair Trading inquiry into care homes (ibid: 4.56. See OFT, 1998). 
The first step in turning the proposals into law was the publication by the government 
of the Care Standards Bill (2000). The most significant change to the original 
proposals included in the Bill was to set up a single National Care Standards 
Commission (NCSC) for England rather than eight regional commissions. This was 
expected to take over responsibility for regulation by April 2002. In Wales the 
regulatory function was to be carried out by a new arm of the National Assembly for 
Wales. The Bill also contained provisions for regulating private and voluntary hospitals 
and clinics, to be carried out by the NCSC through a separate division for healthcare 
regulation. In announcing publication of the Bill, Secretary of State for Health Alan 
Milburn said that, as recommended by the RCLTC, the NCSC would advise the 
government on trends in social care and monitor both the quality and availability of 
provision. The Care Standards Bill would replace the Registered Homes Act (1984), 
which would be repealed in its entirety. This Bill had not been published at the time the 
interviews for this thesis took place, so that the interviewees responded to questions on 
these issues based on the proposals in the White Paper, including that for regional 
commissions to be set up. However, questions concerning regulation did cover the 
possibility of a national regulatory body. 
The original Mite Paper (DoH, 1998b: 4.46) acknowledged the inconsistency which 
may arise from the fragmentation of responsibility between authorities, and from the 
relative lack of guidance offered by the Registered Homes Act (1984) and its 
regulations. This was to be dealt with through reducing the number of authorities 
from 
250 to eight (later a national commission for England, as detailed above), and through 
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the development of national regulatory standards. The tension between national 
prescription and local discretion' would be overcome by the development of, 'a limited 
range of standards to apply at a national level, with a certain degree of flexibility 
allowed more locafly. '(ibid: 4.48) These standards would focus on, 'the key areas that 
most affect the quality of life experienced by service users, as well as physical 
standards. ' They would need 'to have regard to costs and effectiveness when they are 
being developed. ' Overall, standards would be set at three 'levels': 
1) those set fim-fly in legislation, which would be non-negotiable (e. g., that the person 
in charge of a nursing home must be a registered nurse or medical practitioner); 
2) those spelled out at national level (e. g., required procedures for the proper selection 
and vetting of staff); 
3) those allowing for interpretation by the Commissions (e. g., timescales within which 
specific below-standard accommodation must be upgraded). 
The White Paper stated that the standards for all the various services would be 
developed through a consultative process. The first step in this was the commissioning 
of the Centre for Policy on Ageing (CPA) by the Department of Health (DoH) and the 
Welsh Office in February 1998 to advise on proposed national standards for the largest 
group of services - residential and nursing home care for older people. The outcome of 
this was to be the subject of consultation, and would provide a basis for developing 
standards in other areas. The CPA set up a31 -strong advisory panel including 
representatives of regulators and provider associations to draw up the standards, as 
well as conducting a survey of care homes and consulting with a total of 989 
individuals or organizations (CCMN, February 1999). The standards were submitted 
early in 1999, and were published in August of that year under the title, 'Fit for the 
FutureT (DoH, 1999b). They concentrated on input and process measures, but with 
the outcomes expected from these clearly stated in each case, and with the evidence 
that would be required to demonstrate compliance with them often stated as 
'discussion with residents'. 
The physical and staffing standards have been the source of much controversy. The 
physical standards included proposals that all residents should have the choice of a 
single room; that shared rooms in existing homes should account for no more than 
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20% of overall resident places; that single rooms currently in use should be at least 
lOm2 in size; and that new conversions should contain rooms sized 12m2 minimw-n 
with additional space for en suite facilities. The standards set out minimum 
requirements for staff ratios and training levels, including that one third of nursing 
home care staff should be registered nurses. Provider associations such as the National 
Care Homes Association (NCHA) and the Registered Nursing Homes Association 
(RNHA) argued that the proposals had not been properly costed, and would force 
many operators out of business (CCMN, February 1999). Sheila Scott, chief executive 
of the NCHA, which represents smaller owners, resigned from the CPA advisory panel 
in January 1999 over this issue (CCMN, Dec/Jan 1998/99). 
According to CCMN (February 1999), the proposal that no more than 20% of places 
in any given home should be shared would be particularly damaging to some sections 
of the industry. Large numbers of small converted homes, owned primarily by small 
businesses, would be unable to meet these standards. The DoH itself (DoH, 1999, 
regulatory impact statement, 2.8) estimated that 20-23% of independent sector 
residential homes, 12% of nursing homes, and 55% of local authority homes would not 
meet the space and amenity standards, whilst 54-56% of nursing homes would not 
meet the staffing standards. L&B's analysis suggested that even these figures may be 
somewhat optimistic (CCMN, August/September 1999). The fiffl extent of the impact 
would depend on the time scale for their implementation. According to L&B (1999- 
2000: 174), a period of perhaps 10 years would, 'allow non-compliant care homes to 
exit the market gradually with the mmilimurn of disruption. ' According to CCN4N 
(October 1999), 'No other major European country' requires a skiH mix of one third 
registered nurses. 
Whilst the CPA acknowledged arguments from those representing small businesses 
that some residents prefer to share places for reasons of companionship, 
it concluded 
that this is all too often used as an excuse to retain shared accommodation 
for purely 
economic reasons. As well as leading to the closure of many small 
homes, the 
standards are likely to lead to local authorities continuing to withdraw 
from provision, 
since many of their homes would be non-compliant, but subject to regulation 
for the 
first time (L&B, 1999-2000: 174; Jones, 1999: 2). On the other hand, 
CCMN 
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(February 1999) argued that providers of new build and other homes which did meet 
the standard would welcome it, 'in private at least', because of its likely significant 
effect in cutting excess capacity. L&B (1999-2000: 174) thought that the closure of 
small homes would lead to new investment in 'made to measure' facilities, which could 
best be made by larger providers. If the standards do encourage a wave of new build, 
this is likely to result in larger homes which are able to take advantage of economies of 
scale in provision. The implications of this are discussed in the final chapter of this 
thesis. 
According to L&B (1999-2000: 174): 
A possibly unintended effect of the proposed National Required Standards will 
be to favour corporate over independent [small] providers. Corporate 
portfolios are less likely to be out of compliance with the new physical 
standards on Day I of the new system. The new standards Will reinforce the 
competitive advantage of larger homes, where corporate investment is focused. 
Moreover, the new standards as drafted by CPA place a heavy emphasis on 
both procedures and training, which well managed groups will be much better 
placed to comply with than owner managed homes. 
The standards are therefore likely to encourage greater concentration within the 
industry. According to CCMN (July 1999): 'Despite the currently depressed state of 
the sector... there remain opportunities for investors in the nursing and residential 
home sector. These opportunities will be all the greater if the proposed National 
Required Standards do in fact precipitate an industry shake-out. ' CCMN 
(August/September 1999) predicted that closures would accelerate, possibly leading 
to a sudden shortage of supply if the transition period was too short. However, this 
could lead to 'a shift in the balance of power between providers and purchasers, in 
favour of providers', which in turn could push up fee rates. It was unlikely that any 
standards would be introduced before April 2002 (DoH, 1999,2.14). 
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Fenn and Smitharn had differing attitudes to the proposed changes. Fenn was clear 
that both the regional commissions and the national standards would be an 
improvement: 
Well I think it can only be better, ultimately for the patients or residents, what 
ever you like ... because its aim is to improve the fives, the quality of life for 
residents and it can only be better for all potential proprietors really, if they're 
not having to cope with different standards on a national basis and they're not 
having to cope with two organisations, like health authority inspectors and 
social services inspectors, so it's got to be better. 
As far as the regional commissions, were concerned, however, Smitham couldn't 'see 
anything startling in it'. She was most interested in how the changes would affect the 
regulation of private hospitals: 'I mean the rest is like your life, it changes, you know 
your job changes from time to time, the people you report to change from time to time, 
and as long as it's about improving standards as you go along, does it really matter 
who you're working forT Smitham did think, therefore, that the new standards were 
'absolutely' a step forward. 
Whilst this thesis is primarily concerned with regulatory issues as the most direct way 
in which state agencies affect the quality of care, purchasing related issues also have 
some impact on it. Despite- its continuing growth, the corporate sector in the 
community care market is stiff relatively undeveloped when compared to other sectors 
of the economy, and accounts for a minority of overall provision across the country 
(see Chapter Two). However, elderly care markets are highly localized, giving rise to 
the possibility of local monopolies or near-monopolies. Nevertheless, the same pattern 
of fragmentation amongst providers appears in almost every locality, i. e. no one firm 
currently dominates any particular local market. According to L&B (1997: A 189): 
Outside small and isolated communities there is no area in the UK where 
supply side concentration begins to match the concentration of purchasing 
power in the hands of local authorities, which now account for about 75 per 
cent of all new care home placements. 
170 
It is possible, however, that this may change if smaller providers are forced out of the 
market. One factor influencing such concentration of provision is the operation of 
purchasing agencies themselves, and in particular the level of fees paid by local 
authorities. 
Research published by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (Laing, 1998) claims that 
there are frequent disparities between the fees paid by state agencies and the true cost 
of long term care. It is estimated that a total of E80m. a year is spent on bridging the 
gap between care home fees and the amount that state agencies are willing to pay. The 
research, published in June 1998, suggests that at that time around 050 per week for 
nursing home care at 1997/98 cost levels offered a reasonable return to an efficient 
provider of good quality amenities and care. However, this was E40 above the 
Department of Social Security (DSS) rate, and was more than most local authorities 
were prepared to pay. The NHS funded about 15,000 residents - fees paid by them 
were typically more generous than those paid by local authorities, so the issue of 
disparities between fees and actual costs rarely arose in relation to them. Only half the 
95,000 residents receiving DSS preserved rights payments were having their fees 
covered in full. The research also identified hidden disparities where the full fees met 
by local authorities or the DSS were being cross-subsidized from other sources. This 
included voluntary sector homes with access to their own charitable funds, but also 
for-profit homes where self-paying residents were being charged more than publicly 
supported residents for identical accommodation and care. It was calculated that for 
every E5 a week that local authorities were able to save per head, there would be a 
saving for the state of E75m a year -a bill that would pass to individuals, their families 
and other agencies. 
The research also showed that local authority funded residents often received better 
quality accommodation than DSS preserved rights clients (CCMN, June 1998). As 
near-monopoly (monopsony) purchasers of care, local authorities were able to secure 
higher-grade rooms for their clients. A sample survey of 600 care homes found that 
31% of local authority funded residents were occupying a single room with en suite 
bathroon-us, compared with only I I% of preserved rights clients. The report concluded 
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by calling for the transfer of responsibility for preserved rights clients to local authority 
purchasers to end such inequalities, a proposal adopted by the government in its 
response to the RCLTC (NHS Plan, 2000). The report also recommended that local 
authorities should seek more proactively to encourage investment on good quality, 
efficient provision and to drive out low quality providers. The report called on local 
authorities to set differential baseline fee rates according to the type of investment they 
wish to encourage, building on the practice of a small number of local authorities 
which currently pay premiums to care homes which meet defined quality criteria. 
According to William Laing, the figures on local authority fee rates: 
help to explain why the profits record of larger, publicly quoted care home 
companies supplying the state funded market has been disappointing in recent 
years, and why share values have perfon-ned poorly. It also explains why new- 
build nursing home development among corporate, for-profit providers has 
markedly slowed down. There are now few locations in the country where 
expected returns are sufficient to justify commercial investment in good quality, 
new nursing home stock for a clientele dependent entirely on state funding. 
(quoted in CCMN, June 1998) 
CCMN's survey of local authority baseline fee rates (CCMN, June 1999) showed 
that fees would continue to fall behind true costs for the year 1999/2000. Whilst 
increases were broadly in line with those of previous years, they took no account of 
the additional costs faced by providers, such as the National Mmiimum Wage, the 
Working Time Directive and increasing difficulties in the recruitment of qualified 
nurses (see Chapter Six for a fuller discussion of these). However, some relief to wage 
cost pressure would result from the introduction of new employers' National Insurance 
rates in 2001/2002. Whilst generally too low to cover costs, the survey revealed great 
diversity in fee rates in different Parts of the country, reflecting higher costs in areas 
such as the South East. CCMN (ibid) also suggested providers in some areas may be in 
a slightly stronger position in negotiating with purchasers, due to a lower availability of 
beds. At least three local authorities were paying different rates in different parts of 
their respective counties, reflecting the higher costs of providers in some areas. Care 
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home owners had also expressed anger at the November 1998 increases in income 
support rates for care home residents with preserved rights, which were also widely 
regarded as being too low to cover costs. 
On the whole then, state purchasers were able to use their near-monopsony position 
as an effective means of holding down fee rates. WUlst limitations in state funding for 
care places affects all providers, whatever their size, it is likely to further increase the 
tendency for restructuring and consolidation in the sector, ultimately favouring the 
larger, more efficient, providers. 
The overall issue of how long-term care costs should be paid for in the future, given 
demographic trends which are likely to raise the ratio of people in need of such care, 
was reported on by the Royal Comn-dssion on Long Term Care (RCLTC, 1999). The 
main proposal of the report was that personal care should be separated from living and 
housing costs and available, after assessment, according to need and paid for from 
general taxation. The report also proposed the setting up of a National Care 
Commission which would have a wide remit. Although not concerned with day to day 
regulation of care homes, this would have 'a strategic overview of the whole business 
for delivering long-term care for older people', including the taking of 'an overall 
independent view on national quality standards' as well as monitoring resource and 
demographic issues, and keeping 'under review the market in residential care' 
(RCLTC, 1999, Chapter 7). As discussed above, the government decided that insofar 
as such a function was necessary, it would be allocated to the NCSC. 
The Commission received evidence that in the previous 10 to 15 years the 
independent sector had invested between f 10 -fI 2bn into the sector, much of which, 
of course, had been provided by fees paid by the public sector (RCLTC, 1999: 7.6). 
The erosion of profitability in recent years had meant that providers claimed they could 
not achieve an adequate return on their investment. The effect of this was thought to 
be twofold: in the short term many providers may cut standards; in the long term there 
was a danger that the independent sector would not be willing to provide the extra 4;; P 
capacity that would be required by demographic trends (RCLTC, 1999: 7.9) 
The 
proposed National Care Conu-nission should thus have 'as one of its major 
functions, 
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the responsibility to look at the market, including the supply of capital in the long terrn 
and the high quality provision which will be needed as demand grows. '(RCLTC, 1999: 
7.12) 
The government's initial response to the Commission (DoH press release 1999/0117, 
1.3.99), which indicated a less than fidl acceptance of its recommendations, caused 
disappointment among organizations of and for older people, (Dunning, 1999). The 
full response, published at the end of July 2000 (NHS Plan, 2000), rejected the main 
recommendation that personal care as well as nursing care should be free to all. 
Nursing care only, defined as any task undertaken by a qualified nurse, would be free, 
whilst personal care would continue to be subject to means testing. Whilst the 
unconditional state funding of nursing care may alleviate some of the financial 
problems of private providers, it is likely to disproportionately benefit large providers, 
since these tend to provide more nursing than residential care. Ultimately, however, the 
funding problems affecting providers depend as much on the overall level of resources 
made available to state purchasers as they do on the principles of who pays. The 
government did, however, in its response to the Commission commit significant 
amounts of money to ftmding 'intermediate' care, with the aim of increasing the 
independence of older people and reducing their dependence on long term care. To the 
extent that this is successful, it may lead to occupancy in the sector falling still further, 
increasing still more the financial pressure on providers. 
The relationship between quality and purchasing is a complex one, especially given 
the restricted budgets of local authorities. In principle, the purchasing power held by 
local authorities should give them a strong bargaining position to push up the quality of 
care provided. However, since registration and inspection units must remain at arms 
length from the purchasing function, their role is usually confined to providing 
purchasers with information about whether a home has met the minimum registration 
standards. This means purchasers must commit resources of their own to gathering 
information about quality. Unsurprisingly, budget restrictions are often thought to 
produce an emphasis on purchasing low cost care within minimum quality 
requirements, rather than an emphasis on improving the overall quality of care. 
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CCMN (June 1999) found that a minority of local authorities did have some 
mechanism for trying to improve quality. Eleven local authorities were found to have 
schemes for making additional payments for homes meeting quality criteria, or for 
decreasing payments for those that do not. A further 24 local authorities indicated that 
they made additional payments for single rooms and/or en suite facilities, or reductions 
for shared rooms. Other local authorities had set minimum standards for all homes 
wishing to receive placements which were equivalent to the criteria applied for quality 
premiums. Typically such requirements are based on recruitment and selection 
procedures, training, quality assurance and in some cases minimum room sizes. These 
authorities did not make additional payments, but their set fee rates tended to be higher 
than the basic rates paid by local authorities which paid quality premiums. 
Both Adam Warden and Gordon Saydon of Albion County Council emphasised that 
decisions about placements in Albion were based on user (and relative) choice. 
However, where users were reliant on state funding, this obviously meant that choice 
was limited to what the Authority could purchase. In Warden's words: 'the relatives 
would be given information on what's available locally and who is likely to accept our 
fee level'. The authority had only two block contracts - one for homes stiff run by the 
authority itself (most of which were due to be transferred to the independent sector), 
and one for 17 units that had previously been run by the authority but that had already 
been contracted out to an independent non-profit provider. This meant that Albion had 
no block contracts on nursing homes. The predominance of spot contracts was partly a 
result of Albion's relatively low fee levels. According to Warden: 'Our fee levels are 
quite low and we maintain that they are adequate, even so it would be difficult to get 
below that... we would doubt whether the providers would want to move to a block 
contract at our fee levels. ' Some providers had said that 'they subsidize our users with 
privately funding people'. This was confirmed by Saydon, who said that many 
providers 'would like us to pay significantly more than we do'. Saydon said the 
authority was: 
doing a piece of work with representatives of the independent sector to actually 
look at the... try and get to the bottom of what the true costs of residential care 
and nursing home care are, because they consistently claim that we 
don't pay 
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enough. We obviously are responsible for trying to spend public money as 
wisely as we can and making it stretch as far as we can. And its a very simple 
equation, the more we pay for an individual place the less the number of places 
we can manage. 
Warden said Albion was having 'grave dffficulty' in providing enough places with the 
resources available to them. In fact, although neither Warden nor Saydon were able to 
provide detailed figures, they could not think of any contracts at all with the case study 
firms. This was thought to be the result of low fee levels in a generally affluent, home- 
owning area, where larger firms were likely to concentrate on the relatively high 
numbers of self-funding clients. The only exception to this was the bid by Care First 
(prior to its acquisition by Company 1) for the contract ultimately given to the non- 
profit provider, which would have guaranteed funding for residents and capital 
investment under the Private Finance Initiative. This is discussed in the next section. 
Warden himself said that, due to the low fee levels paid by the authority and the high 
numbers of self-funding residents in the county, in contrast to the near-monopsony 
position of some authorities, Albion County Council was, 'not a very big player in the 
market'. It was consequently more Micult for Albion to use its purchasing function as 
a tool for raising quality, although Warden did point out that it would not help a 
provider to "get a reputation for not being used by the local authority'. Warden said 
that Albion was 'reviewing our placements all the time' and that residents were 'visited 
and the quality of service they are getting is measured', although he did not elaborate 
on what this measurement consisted of Other than this, the authority seemed to rely 
on making sure homes met minimwn standards, i. e. that they were registered. Warden 
pointed to, 'the normal systems of complaints and where it gets serious enough 
referrals to statutory investigation sections. ' Warden acknowledged, however, that 'the 
inspection units try and keep at an-ns length, that's the way they're set up... so formal 
fines of contact are really not as strong as you might think in the same area and that's 
the way it runs. ' 
The main formal contact with the local authority registration and inspection unit was 
through an annual summary compiled by it and 'logged information on the last visits 
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from the inspection unit. " Saydon said that the contracts team had a 'protocol 
agreement' with both Local Authority and Health Authority regulators whereby they 
were notified of any homes that had outstanding 'Regulation 20' notices under the 
Registered Homes Act (1984). These could be to do with a variety of things such as 
the fabric of the building, cleanliness or staffing. Any homes with such outstanding 
notices could not go on the authority's list of approved providers. Saydon said the 
authority had been, 'very open with the independent sector about this... we will review 
all the people we are responsible for in the home at the time if a notice is issued and we 
will not make finiher placements there until the position has been addressed. So until 
the quality improves. ' 
The arms-length relationship between Albion County Council as a purchaser and the 
Health Authority registration and inspection units was confirmed by Smitharn, who 
said that the Health Authority inspection unit would simply send the local authority a 
list of homes that had been registered and were thus considered to be 'fit to operate'. 
Smitham continued: 'we can't answer detailed questions to those who hold contracts. 
If the contract manager calls us up and says... you know this home... is this home all 
right to place somebody in, our standard answer is that we have no issues about this 
home, if we don't. ' Local authorities therefore had to draw up their own contracts 
with providers and were responsible for monitoring them. However, Sntitham did say 
that if the local authority 'ask us the right questions we can answer them, but we can't 
volunteer information. ' The 'right questions' might be, for example, 'do they [the 
home] have a quality assurance programmeT or 'do they have Oficulty in recruiting 
staffl'. This general an-ns-length approach was also confirmed by Fenn, who said: 'we 
can't recommend a particular home... sometimes if they [local authority purchasers] 
have concerns about somewhere they will get in touch with us, sometimes if they wish 
to make complaints they come to us although they should in the first instance go back 
to the home and make the complaint. ' The two agencies might also Ease if a particular 
resident was felt to be vulnerable. Overall, however, the inspection units were 
ýsupposed to remain at arms-length and not collude with anybody about what's a good 
home and what's a bad home. ' 
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Thus, whilst the near-monopsony position of some local authorities allowed them to 
hold down fee rates, the evidence from Albion indicates that it is unlikely to be used as 
a means of raising the quality of provision. As discussed above, CCMN (June 1999) 
found that a minority of authorities actively used their position in this way. However, 
the relative absence of such activity by local authorities results from the structural 
separation of the purchasing and regulatory fimctions, and the clear mandate which 
each type of agency must follow. 
It is clear that the problems of fragmentation in the regulation of long-term care are 
being addressed by the current government. The government's response to fimding 
problems in the sector has also been discussed. The evidence from this section is that 
policies in both areas are likely to lead to greater concentration of provision in the 
sector, since large firms with more resources and economies of scale are better placed 
to withstand the associated costs than smaller fin-ns. Given the tendency towards 
internationalization in services discussed in Chapter Two, and the findings of Chapter 
Four concerning the substantial internationalization of large firms in this sector, this 
shift to greater concentration is likely to be accompanied by increasing 
internationalization. The government's commitment to a liberal trade and investment 
policy and its associated international agreements can only reinforce this. 
The officers from Albion interviewed for this thesis had developed a variety of ways 
of fulfilling their functions within the existing institutional and legislative constraints. 
There were some differences between Smitham. and Fenn, both in terms of their 
practice and in ten-ns of their responses to the government's proposed reforms, but on 
the whole their practices were similar and they were broadly in favour of the 
forthcoming changes. Their specific practice in relation to the case study firms is 
discussed next. 
FIRM-SPECIFIC ASPECTS 
Both Srnitham and Fenn had a great deal of experience in dealing with the case study 
firms, and these experiences will be discussed here. However, at the request of 
both 
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Smitham and Fenn, it will not be possible to identify which firm in particular is being 
discussed in every instance. Nevertheless, the discussion is included in this section 
since it relates to direct experience of dealing with the specific firms we are concerned 
with. Where the firms are explicitly identified, we cannot assume that these experiences 
can be generalized for the whole of the firm's provision across the country - these 
experiences concern homes delivering care in Albion only. However, they provide 
useful information in illustrating the types of issues and problems that may arise in the 
relationships between the firms and state agencies. This information also needs to be 
considered in the light of that derived from the interviews with the firnis' QA 
managers. (It should be noted here that, as indicated in Chapter Four, the interview 
with Grant of Company 3 elicited less information than those with Jones and Bartlett. ) 
Finally, Gordon Saydon's experiences with the fon-ner Care First will be discussed. 
The starting point for relations between firms and regulators is the registration 
process. This involves identifying a 'fit person'. According to Fenn, 'with a company 
that's quite difficult because a company has a Board of Directors, etc., etc., a 
Chairman and a Board of Directors, so technically we should check them all out and by 
checking them all out I mean they all have to have a police check. ' In practice the 
process was as follows: 
we would request the name of the Chairman and the Board members and then I 
ask who will be the fit person, we have to have a named fit person. It's not very 
helpful to have the company as a fit person, you know, because if something 
goes wrong then you need ... say there was a serious problem 
then you need to 
contact a fit person, you couldn! t contact 50% of the board and the Chairman, 
you know it's unrealistic so a person is nominated by the person to 
be the fit 
person and we check, and we do the police check and we check the 
CVs and 
references and we also check, we need a bank reference and we need to 
look at 
the financial side, the business side, all of that... that will tell us quite a 
lot 
about the company and then we obviously have a meeting very early on with 
the representatives of the company. In the case of nursing 
homes or hospitals it 
will be the person who is going to be the manager, the person who 
is going to 
be the fit person for the company and you know people like the operational 
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manager or --- whoever we thfik and they think, it's appropriate to discuss the 
plans and policies and procedures with etc. etc. I mean it's quite a long 
process. We need to see all the company's ... within big companies they 
usually have standard kinds of policies and procedures for various things and 
we would ask to see all of those... as well as their business plans and operation 
plans, the whole lot... to see if they're viable to take on another cornnfitment. 
The registration process also involved going through the company's QA manuals, 
although both Smitharn and Fenn made it clear that this did not substitute for 
inspection of the homes concerned. 
Company I's Bob Jones was very much in favour of the regulation process taking 
more notice of firms' internal QA systems: 
There's a number of ways forward with regulation, and one of the things that I 
would like to see... is that if an organization can demonstrate it has an effective 
operating quality assurance system then maybe the regulators will begin to 
accept that or the product of that as their inspection process, as opposed to 
coming along and doing the inspection process themselves. Maybe that's pie in 
the sky. It may be that in the future they will only accept some form of 
accredited quality assurance system, and inunediately you start to think 'oh my 
God, I should have gone down the ISO road'... but I would argue that 
[Company 1] with its size and with the structures we've put in could use the 
[Company 1] system as a standard for care homes and maybe that could 
become an accreditable system. 
Jane Bartlett said she did not, 'think personally that the industry is ready for self 
regulation. I do get out and see a lot of independent units and I would be extremely 
concerned that if it went to self regulation it wouldn't work. ' However, she claimed 
that Company 2's monthly internal process reviews were 'being taken on board by 
health authorities, social services, as being a regular report'. Smitham said that a firm's 
internal procedures might make some difference to her practice, although they clearly 
did not alter the requirement to be inspected by the Unit: 
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Well I think there are issues, aren't there, for me there are some homes I spend 
a lot of time and there are some homes that I donI, and that's because I know 
that there are homes who are not going to present me with problems. It doesn't 
mean I dodt check and it does not mean that I don't test what I'm told, but 
what it does mean is that I am relatively sure in my own mind that there won't 
be a problem. If there is then I spend longer there. 
Smitham. said that in part this confidence that problems would not arise stemmed partly 
from the firrn's internal QA system, but also from confidence, 
in [the] people who operate it and that boils down to local people in local 
situations, doesn't it?... Some people operate their quality assurance systems 
very well, some people don't. And its glaringly obvious when it doesn't 
operate, frankly... I always say if it's not seen it's not done... if I find through 
testing randomly that it's ... what I see on paper 
is not what's happening then I 
go into it in much more depth and I spend more time, so those are the kinds of 
balances and checks one has to put in. And there are some homes that are 
operating very well under one person that dont operate so well under 
another... 
West Albion Health Authority's guidelines on the 'Application for Registration of a 
Private Hospital, Nursing Home or Mental Nursing Home'(1999) (which are the same 
as those for East Albion) make it clear that any change in the ownerstlip of a 
home, or 
any change in 'the management structure of the organization running the 
home', 
requires a new Certificate of Registration to be issued. Fenn said that this could 
be a 
lengthy and costly procedure: 
if it is a new registratior4 and strictly speaking if it's a new company taking 
over, then it should be a new registration which costs money and ... 
if it is a 
new company then they must go through the registration procedure again and 
that takes a year, because we do go through it in exactly the same way. 
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Fenn said that homes did not always tell the Registration Unit when changes of 
ownership took place: 
But I mean they can change ... you know so rapidly and sometimes they don't 
tell. us, we find out from the Financial Times or somebody down the road will 
tell us. 
From Company 2's perspective, Bartlett said that this requirement for re-registration 
could be frustrating: 
In some cases it gets ahnost silly. Just after the merger Elaine Farell, who's 
now the Managing Director, was one of the Divisional Directors and because 
she was going to be the registered person for the company, representative, for 
all these Health Authorities, the fact that she'd been a general manager and 
regional manager for [Company 2] counted for absolutely nothing even in the 
same health authority for the Exceler homes, and she had to go along and have 
fit person interviews with the same person that had given her the fit person 
interview for a home up the road. So some of it is ludicrous. 
The biggest issue for all of the QA managers from the case study firms in relation to 
regulation was the perceived inconsistency between Merent registration and 
inspection units. Company I's Bob Jones thought there were 'huge disparities' 
between the way different authorities interpreted the regulations: 
One of the biggest problems overall with regulation is it's so non-specific that 
they are subjectively interpretable by those who regulate, and now there fies the 
problem. The regulations are written in such woolly language you can make 
them mean whatever you want. 
The perceived pettiness of some inspection officers was identified as a particular 
problem bY Jones: 
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There are a number of occasions when the regulatory arrangements do identify 
and then solve problems that could give clients significant problems. But there 
are also huge areas where the regulators haven't got a hope of picking up a 
problem and don't, and that's with my ex-inspector's hat on. For a company 
like ours, in the nicest possible way the regulation is almost an irrelevance. Its 
sometimes a pain in the butt, its almost irrelevant, because we have every 
intention of doing right. Our raison d'etre is to give a quality service. So whilst 
we're happy to use regulators as a good source of advice, we win always strive 
to aim higher than any regulator would look anyway... So from that point of 
view, regulation and even more stringent regulation doesn't bother me. What 
does bother me is when regulators are petty. And unfortunately there are quite 
a few of those around. Perhaps less than there used to be, but there are still a 
number of regulators around whose pettiness is unbelievable. I'm n-dndful of an 
exchange of letters with a particular registration officer who was getting 
uptight because we wouldn't tell her the make of paint we were putting on 
some tiles in the bathroom. What's it got to do with her? You show me the 
regulations that are bothered about the make of paint! I can't believe this. So 
what use is that in relation to protecting the clients? 
Company 2's Jane Bartlett also thought there was 'huge variation' between the 
requirements of different regulating authorities. Although Company 2 itself was 
organized into regions (see Chapter Four), these cut across different regulatory 
authorities. The internal structure of the company did not, therefore, provide an 
opportunity to match up the firm's regions with the requirements of different 
regulators: 
You could have probably,, if you took the regional manager for Bromley, 
they're probably dealing with at least three or four health authorities and 
probably eight or nine social services. And if you've got all of those with totally 
different audit criteria its very difficult to have a company standard because 
you're adding bits. There's one local authority, I don't know which it is, its one 
of the Albion ones, that insists that we have a laminated sign in every bathroom 
that gives the temperature that the water must be, and we must check with the 
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thermometer. We've got to have a Laminated sign. Now that to me stinks 
because this is meant to be someone's home. If it was my home there's no way 
I'd want a Ian-dnated sign stuck on my wall. So we've had to introduce that as a 
local policy to that particular home because its the only home we have in that 
area that satisfies that health authority, but its certainly not something I'd like 
to see across the rest of the country. 
Bartlett also claimed that authorities sometimes enforced inappropriate standards: 
We've almost gone full circle with them currently because they're looking at 
the assets more than the patterns of the residents. I'll give you a sort of 
example, I don't want to regionalize it for it to cause a slur on the region that 
I'm going to pick, but if you went up into Newcastle, somewhere like that, you 
can go into one of the homes that I'm thinking of that is absolutely great, it's 
friendly, it's cosy, very homely, not very large, and we're having a tremendous 
fight with the health authority because they're saying... that we've got twin 
rooms and we should be giving everybody a single room, and they haven't got 
en suite facilities, and things like that. Now if you actually go and talk to the 
residents there some of them would prefer perhaps to be in a single room, but a 
lot of them like companionship, they come from communities where they've 
probably shared a bed with four or five other brothers and sisters and they do 
not want - Bromley OK, yeah lovely, lets have 
hotel type drapes and furniture 
like this - but if we brought one of those residents 
down here they would hate it 
because it would be like living in a hotel. And I think sometimes Our Own 
perceptions of what we would expect, if we went in now we'd expect a 
bath 
everyday, and we'd expect a reasonable standard of ffirniture, and we'd expect 
so much space, but we're imposing that on people without actually 
listening to 
what they want. And I think in a lot of ways health authorities are 
doing that, 
and maybe they're getting too caught up in the amount or the volume of air 
that we have, or the way things look, rather than getting 
into the actual cause 
and saying 'what is the care likeT, 'how do the staff 
feelT... Residents actually 
don't want what they're trying to force us to do... Sad 
fact. 
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The variation between regulating authorities led Bartlett to be in favour of, 'one 
regulatory board for the whole of the UK': 
Its a procedural nightmare currently, because we're working with different 
social services having different expectations, different standards, different 
formats for audit, health authorities doing the same thing. And we're all after 
the same thing. It's like I say, you've got someone saying about the size of 
rooms, someone else saying whether there's en suite facilities, someone else 
saying that we should have liquid soap and not hard soap. You seem to be 
getting lost in this rigmarole of paper and everything else and we're not really 
focusing on the main issue as I see it. I'd quite like to see one regulatory 
body... 
Grant also thought there was a 'wide variation' in the way regulating authorities 
interpreted standards. She pointed out that Company 3 was 'bigger than any single 
health authority', but did not elaborate on the implications of this. She said 
'conformity' and 'consistency' were the most important things to Company 3, and for 
this reason would have 'no objection' to the setting up of a national regulatory body. 
In trying to compare the case study firms Smitham said that: 'It's very difficult 
because some homes in large companies perform very well whereas others don't... And 
it's tied into where they are located, it's tied into who's managing the home and it's 
tied into the philosophy of that particular home. ' An example of how the nature of 
particular homes within the company would affect the delivery of care, related to the 
purchase of homes in the area belonging to PPP by Company 3 (discussed in Chapter 
Four). According to Smitham, the PPP homes aimed at the highest quality part of the 
market, and therefore offered better care than some others run by Company 3: 
now there is a defined difference between what was [Company 3] homes and 
the PPP homes in terms of the staff and in terms of the environment. Not a lot 
but there was and in terms of the issues and the image of PPP homes and the 
image that they sold to the public, so it was a very ... there's a big contrast 
in 
it, I mean PPP sold themselves as quality homes, you know, able to do anything 
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for anybody, oodles of stafý you know, there at Your command type issue. 
Now that in an area like East Albion is very welcomed by people because you 
have certain pockets of East Albion where people are looking for that, when 
they walk into a home they expect it ... you know it's not about 'thank you 
very much for having me, I'm grateful you're going to keep me secure and give 
me the care that I need'. They are articulate people, they know what they 
want, they understand their health needs and therefore they can articulate those 
and they expect the staff and the service to be there... and most or our 
population base is like that, so it's a bit difficult isn't it. In terms of other 
homes... they're situated in a Oferent part of our catchment area. Now 
although some people are very articulate who go into those homes and they 
can, you know, articulate their needs well, there are other people who can't and 
you see the contrast there... So those are the kind of subtle nuances that you 
get within the homes and I mean that's just one company. 
In West Albion, Fenn said that changes of ownership had sometimes caused 
problems, especially in relation to changes of personnel: 
I can think of one of the large companies where .... I don't think always they 
understand what a nursing home is as opposed to a hotel or a leisure centre or 
somewhere because they have a... it's very important in nursing homes that you 
have continuity of staff and managers and I can think of one where they are 
always changing the manager, the regional managers and the local manager and 
it's a home where we've had a lot of problems... We've had a lot of problems 
between both the general practitioners and the home and I've got, I'll just get 
one sort of case sorted out and the care manager understands the relationship... 
you know how to ensure a good working relationship with staff and with 
GPs, 
when they're whisked off or they leave or somebody else comes in and you go 
through the whole thing again and then you find that the next one, above the 
local manager, has also changed and they haven't got any idea ... and 
it's those 
sort of things that are extremely time consuming and frustrating ... 
And its very 
frustrating to people like the General Practitioners as well because, you know, 
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it is difficult to understand why you have to keep repeating things over and 
over... 
There was one home where Fenn estimated that there had been about ten changes of 
management in the last five years. As a result of her previous experiences with such 
changes, she would take the initiative as soon as she learned that new changes were 
taking place: 
So the minute I hear that this one particular home - which is the love of my fife 
- that the manager's gone, I will take down the details of the new one and I 
will take the initiative because I dodt want anything to go wrong... because of 
this difficulty. So that I can inform them what's been wrong in the past, in case 
they didn't know and the way it should ... what was agreed would happen for 
the future when such and such a situation, and then I satisfy myself that 
everybody knows and that there's no excuse for something to go wrong. It is 
hard work to have to do that! But it's also hard work if we've got lots of 
complaints and, you know, things going wrong. So it's six of one and half a 
dozen of the other really. 
Fenn said that another home belonging to the same organization, but which had not 
had many changes of management, had not caused much Miculty. 
Fenn felt frustrated that effort put into building relationships and improving standards 
could be disrupted by changes in personnel: 
I find that the standards... you know, you do a lot of work to get standards 
raised and then the minute you have somebody new move in they all go down 
again, they don't all go down again but many of them go down... because they 
don't realise, you see if as a manager you change you initially doet know your 
staff and if they're the same staff who were there before and who need to be 
carefully monitored and to ensure that they were performing their jobs in the 
right way and you don't know about all the Miculties that went on in the past, 
then unless you are aware of it when you take up a new post, you know, the 
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staff will go back to their old ways. It's very sad to say, but in a big company 
where they feel they've got no cornmitment to anybody you know, and a lot of 
them think, loh yes this is a very rich company, they're always changing and 
they don't care about their staff , there is absolutely... no conunitment, they're 
not proud to be working for a particular firrn or business. 
Fenn said that in her experience there was in general less comn-dtment among staff 
working for larger firms than small ones: 'I don't feel there's any loyalty among the 
ground staff to their employers. As you know, if the ground staff are unhappy then... 
well that reflects on the care that they give or the job that they do. ' Fenn thought 
managers needed to make sure that staff. - 
gel together, that they can work together, that they're happy together, that they 
have confidence in their employers and then they will .. You will have a happy 
workforce who will not be disgruntled in any way who will be happy in their 
work, and this will ultimately affect the way in which they provide their care, 
instead of moaning to the residents, 'oh you know we haven't got enough staff 
and they're cutting them down again, and do you know my cheque last month 
and it just wasift paid in. ' This is the sort of thing that starts to happen, when 
you get an unhappy workforce. And then the other thing that happens as a 
result of that is that you get staff leaving and then they write horrible letters to 
us complaining about what went on, and sometimes being embroidered you 
know. And we have a duty to investigate all complaints and so we have to go 
shooting off on these ... taking the time out 
from our usual work to go and 
investigate the complaint. And there is one large home that I'm constantly 
having to do this with. 
Smitharn also thought that staffing issues were important. According to her, some 
companies, 'have dif(iculty in retention of staff, whereas Company I did not: 
Other companies have difficulty in retention of staff ... As with contrast to 
another company that I deal with, [Company I], they have very little turnover. 
Now in fact one of the issues around their lack of turnover, I would say, is not 
188 
because people are not ambitious it's because they have a system w hereby they 
recognise development of staff and they actually have a method of rewarding 
staff if you like, and it may not be financial reward but they do recognise and 
reward staff for the development and their contribution to care. So those are 
the kinds of issues that you can pick out in terms of the differences between 
companies. 
Fenn said that how well a company was managed had a big impact on her work: 
And I suppose the thing with large companies is that you never actually get to 
meet the people who are pulling the strings for want of a better word. You can 
meet the regional manager but the regional manager can change after six 
months and there's somebody Merent there... I never feel that I can actually 
talk to somebody who's going to be there for any length of time, who will have 
an influence on what is happening long-term at ground level. 
When dealing with a home belonging to a large firm, Fenn said she would, 'start with 
the local manager, and if I don't get any results I will then ring the regional manager 
and ask for an appointment. ' She said it was rare for managers within the firm above 
the home level to take the initiative in contacting her, unless they were: 
disagreeing with what I'm saying. If they don't like what I'm saying then 
they're on the phone very quickly to me, but I mean its very rare now for... say 
somebody at regional level to actually write to me and say 'Mr So and So's 
now gone and now I'm in post and I would like to come and meet you 
whenever it's convenient. ' Its usually me who does that. 
Sn-ýitham also said that she would normally deal with the home manager, but that 
people further up the firm's hierarchy may get involved where there was a problem or 
a complication. She gave the example of some changes that needed to be made to a 
home"s kitchen which involved digging up the road to lay new power lines. This took 
longer than expected: 
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So, yes, some people at head office did speak to me, I mean they normally 
telephone me and say 'oh, who is this woman, what are you doing, " you know, 
'how dare you ... ' no they dont talk to people like that, they're quite 
reasonable people to deal with as I've said. Well I've found them reasonable to 
deal with, I mean in the same way as anybody would probably try at times to 
get things out of me they would try as well, but that's guaranteed to recognise 
the fact and also to deal with it. 
Company I's Bob Jones said that there would be times when he would attempt to 
move negotiations away from the home level: 
At the end of the day keeping your registration officer happy is one of the 
things that we do because it's easier. But there are times when they're asking 
for unreasonable things that we, I say do battle but I try and avoid getting into 
battle, but I move the discussion out of the home, because the relationship 
between registration and our home is an individual relationship with each 
individual home and nine times out of ten they can sort out their own problems. 
But if it begins to get sticky or tricky then I'll move the discussion away from 
the home and focus it on me. I'll have the negotiation with them so the 
relationship with the home doesn't become soured. 
According to Jones, many inspectors preferred to deal with the company's HQ: 
They're usually more happy about that because most see 'ah, we're getting 
somebody from the centre'. Unfortunately, there seems to be one or two 
registration officers out there who are on a real power trip. If they can 
negotiate with somebody in the centre instead of the home, they'd really rather 
do that, thankyou. 
In an interesting reversal of Smitham's clafi-n (quoted in the previous section) that fmns 
sometimes play inspection units off against each other, Jones claimed that some 
authorities did this with different providers: 
190 
It seems to us that they are more interested in ahnost having a go at a large 
organization, because they then turn that round and they can use that as a 
standard. So if they get a [Company 1] home to do something they can then go 
along to all the other operators and say 'but [Company I] have done that'. So 
its an interesting relationship. I mean I've obviously sounded fairly negative 
about registration officers. There are a number of authorities that are absolutely 
brilliant, we have a very good relationship with, and good working 
relationship, good development. But it seems like the ones who stand out really 
stand out. 
Smitham was very aware of the Merences between large and small finns in terms of 
their 'financial viability', stating that large fin-ns 'can actually get equipment a lot 
quicker because they can spread their risk'. She said that a lot of smaller homes, 'feel 
that in a sense they're being squeezed out of the market'. In terms of how smaller 
providers compared with large ones, however, she said that this, 'depends on the 
person who's at the top of the home'. Smitharn thought that homes owned by large 
firms did not tend to experience the same problems as small owners in the sense of not 
having appropriate equipment, for example: 
They don't have those kind of problems, they have different types of problems 
in terms of financial issues around the environment. The environment in most 
of the large company homes is very glossy, very comfortable ... they have the 
equipment and they usually have a central bulk equipment buying area and 
storage area whereby they can get extra equipment in, very fast, if they need it. 
Whereas the smaller homes don! t have that ... and one wouldn't expect them to 
have it and if they are in fact facing some financial squeezing in terms of their 
financial viability then in effect what happens is they come up against it quite 
hard. 
In Si-nitham's experience, the problems faced by large firms had more to do with 
staffing and management issues: 
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Well they have the same problems as other people have, I mean they have the 
same problems in ten-ns of equipment in terms of getting quality of staff, in 
ten-ns of quantity of staff, in terms of the management of homes .... They have 
all of those issues and those who concentrate more on looking at the quality of 
the care that's being delivered and looking at how their staff are performing 
tend to perform better. So in other words those who concentrate on developing 
staff tend to do a little bit better. 
In contrast to Smitham's perception that large firms had more resources, Fenn 
thought that large fin-ns were under pressure from their own headquarters to reduce 
costs: 
I do find that the large operators are constantly cutting ... and I think that is 
one of the reasons why, maybe some of the managers don't last for long in 
some of these firms. They're getting pressure from their bosses to make better 
use of the resources they've got and they're getting pressure maybe from people 
like me, to maintain their staffing levels, to the staffing levels that have been 
set. 
This pressure to contain costs could affect the time scale over which changes deemed 
necessary by the Inspection Unit could be introduced: 
One company which is generally I think very well run, but the individual 
managers of the homes have their own budget, which is a good idea but they 
have .. they also can't overspend or anything 
but sometimes they have to phase 
in work which is quite urgent because of ... I suppose 
it's good in a sense 
really, but I think that once these budgets have been set there's no slack, and 
there's not contingency sometimes... So then we say well you must have six 
inch restrainers put on all the windows above ground floor level, they might say 
well actually we'll have to put that into next year's budget, we can't do it now. 
That's quite an important thing, actually, to do and should ... I feel sometimes 
that the company should really have some kind of contingency for the managers 
so that they have a little bit laid by to do emergency works like that. 
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In a situation such as this, the level of enforcement action taken by the Unit would 
depend on the urgency of the task to be done. Where something is not clearly covered 
by the law and is not life threatening, the inspectors would point out the problem to the 
home manager and leave the details to them: 'if something's been pointed out and you 
know about it, then you as the proprietor or the... You have to decide whether its a 
risk worth taking or not. ' Where something is a legal requirement or likely to cause 
harm it would be enforced: 
Unless it's a legal requirement and then you know you can force it through, it is 
the ... 
because things like when we've got... flagstones and the patio in the 
middle of summer which are uneven and likely to cause an accident when 
somebody walks outside, ideally they should be repaired or made good or 
whatever. To prevent an accident. 
Whilst Smitham and Fenn had a great deal of experience of dealing with the case 
study firms, as discussed above, Albion County Council had no real experience of 
purchasing from them. Saydon said that his, 'understanding of [Company 1] is that 
their costs are quite high, so we wouldn't normally purchase care there unless there 
was a third party willing and able to pay the difference, the top up. ' From the fin-n's 
side, Jones said that Company I was heavily dependent on the amount of resources 
which local authorities had to spend, but aimed at winning more contracts than its 
competitors, especially small operators, through delivering higher quality care. He saw 
this emphasis on quality as particularly important because, despite low fee levels, 
authorities were increasingly demanding higher quality: 
More and more I anticipate that service requirements will be more clearly 
defined by purchasers, and a number of our purchasers are local authorities. It 
becomes increasingly difficult to both demonstrate that you can meet, and 
meet, those standards for small operators. And to give you a good example, 
I 
have two catering advisors working for me, who are totally on the 
ball when it 
comes to environmental health legislation. There's a whole 
load of new 
legislation around homes that has to have an analysis and critical control point. 
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We sat down and met with our lead environmental authority, I think we saw 
yesterday, and go through our policies and procedures which were the best 
he'd ever seen, and we think we can probably sell those onto small operators. 
That's a typical small example of how we will be driven more and more, you 
have to have specialist advice in order to be able to maintain the business and 
meet the standards that purchasers are beginning to drive. We can afford it 
because we're a big organization, a one man band can't. So I think more and 
more one man bands will go to the wall and people like us will buy them up. 
That's actually the reality of it. 
Jones also thought that because of the increasing dependency of clients, there may be a 
move towards different fee levels for perhaps four or five different categories of 
resident according to their degree of dependency. 
According to Jones, Company I's size enabled it to provide a reasonable level of care 
for local authority fee levels that was not possible even for a mediwn sized fin-n: 
... the private clients, that is the true market. Goldsborough, whom I used to 
work for... had deliberately begun to realign aU its homes to head more for the 
private clients because... the poor ftmding from local authorities meant in some 
areas it was becoming dffficult to give the right quality of care. Now within the 
large organization with economies of scale, it's easier to be able to give an 
acceptable quality of care with local authority funding. I'm sure if the board 
strategically could wave a wand and realign aff our homes and fiH them with 
private clients, they'd probably do it tomorrow because that takes away some 
of the difficulty of inadequate local authority funding. 
Bartlett said that Company 2 was also mostly reliant on local authority funding, which 
she also thought was too low: 
Oh it can be extremely problematic. The local authorities... again this comes 
through that the NHS have complained about bed blocking and acute beds 
being used for the care of somebody that does not need to be in an acute bed, 
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and therefore the NHS are looking to move people into either - short tenn 
nursing care or long term nursing care. Health authorities don't hold the budget 
then, that placement that then goes to social services and social services have a 
pot of money that's only so big and that has caused an awful lot of problems 
and we're well aware that there's, if you like, a resident that wants to come 
into the home, the relatives want them in the home, they're stuck in hospital, 
and there is not the funding there, and they've got to wait until the board sits 
every other month to release the funds for them to come in, and it can be very, 
very upsetting for the relatives and the resident. And there have been cases 
where the resident has died in hospital, not through lack of care, but maybe the 
terminal care could have been given somewhere except in a huge ward, so 
yeah, it does affect it very much. And its seems to get tougher as well. Last 
year by the time we got to February there was almost no movement into the 
homes through social services. Most of them had run out of money and they're 
waiting for April for the new financial year to start. So yeah, it does cause huge 
problems. 
Company 2 (USA)'s annual report for 1997 reveals that its operating margins in the 
UK had been lower than expected as a result of the generalized under occupancy in the 
sector (AR 1997: 27). 
As already noted, it was clear that in Albion the case study firms could concentrate on 
private payers rather than the local authority. However,, prior to its acquisition by 
Company 1, Care First had initially been involved in putting in a tender to run 17 
homes under PFI arrangements, which Albion ultimately contracted out to an 
independent non-profit organization. Saydon, who was the project manager, said Care 
First 'were the only private sector bidder in the running at the time and they were a 
strong bidder', since, 'as far as we were aware from the information they'd supplied 
and what we knew about them, they'd got access to significant resources 
by way of 
people, property, funding... to be able to deliver what we were 
looking for. ' Saydon 
said that the internal management and quality systems of organizations tendering 
for 
this process were an important consideration: 'we want to 
know how an organization 
manages its staff, how it manages its buildings, does 
it sub-contract, if so what are its 
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sort of rules for sub-contracting. Are they signed up to any particular quality assurance 
programmes, are they accredited under any particular scheme, so all of that will be 
looked at. ' This meant looking at the organization's procedure manuals and, spot 
visits to some of their other homes. ' 
Care First, however, 'decided not to pursue their bid with us and withdrew so that 
left us with only not for profit organizations, which wasn't a problem for us because 
we were actually seeking a not-for-profit solution. ' This 'not-for-profit solution' 
would have required a for-profit provider like Care First to set up what Saydon called 
4an arms length not-for-profit subsidiary'. Their incentive to do this may have revolved 
around 'tax advantages' or the selling of support services for profit to the not-for- 
profit subsidiary. It may also have been a way for them to build links with local 
authorities who were in favour of the "not-for-profit ethos'. As indicated above, Albion 
was not applying these not-for-profit criteria to the second tranche of homes that were 
being transferred to independent management. 
With regard to Care First's decision to withdraw from the process, Saydon said they 
had, Lgot past what we call the first invitation to negotiate stage, so we were happy 
with their proposals in principal and it was part way through the second stage when we 
wanted detailed financial bids submitted that they withdrew. ' The reasons Care First 
gave for their withdrawal related to the 'open negotiation' process which Albion used 
to choose the final contractor, whereby all bidders were kept informed of any issues 
and questions relating to the process at each stage: 
They said that they weren't entirely happy with that and would have preferred 
to have run a, sort of a, if not a fully closed certainly a much more closed 
bidding process whereby they'd have submitted and we'd have accepted or not, 
depending upon what we felt about it. We wanted a negotiated procedure 
because what we wanted to achieve was the best outcome for the Council, 
particularly for the older people and the staff concerned and we believed that 
was best achieved through the ability to negotiate throughout the whole 
process with all the bidders. 
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However, Saydon's view, which he emphasised was 'a personal view, was that Care 
First 
were aware of the takeover bid by [Company I] at the time, and putting in a 
bid for a business... to take over a business which in our case was somewhere 
in the region of around about ;E 12 million a year annual turnover, so it was a 
significant size, was taking their energies away from trying to resist the take- 
over. That was my reading of their reasons for withdrawing, but they weren't 
the reasons they gave us. 
Saydon indicated that extensive building and refurbishment being carried out by the 
independent provider as part of the deal involved, 'the need to move people sometimes 
from one part of the building to another, sometimes from one home to another. You 
can't knock down a home and rebuild it with people in situ obviously, so that has to be 
managed very carefully. ' The Authority thus carried out close monitoring of the 
process through monthly meetings with the provider. Had Care First's acquisition by 
Company I taken place shortly after the winning of such a contract by Care First, the 
disruption to residents caused by the renovations would have been amplified by two 
rapid changes in regime, firstly from the local authority to Care First and secondly from 
Care First to Company 1. Such changes can be an unsettling and sometimes fatal 
experience for residents, an issue which is returned to in the concluding chapter. 
None of the case study firms had put in bids to run the second tranche of homes 
which were in the process of being contracted out by Albion, but Company I had since 
become the largest operator of local authority residential care in the UK, through 
partnerships with Staffordshire and Powys councils (CCMN, April 1999). Staffordshire 
leased 20 homes with 830 beds to Company 1, also on a non-profit making basis. A 
spokesman for Staffordshire told CCMN (April 1999) that Company I was selected 
because it offered the best option financially. Staffordshire's decision also involved 
representatives of the council visiting other Company I homes to examine the 
company"s policies and procedures. A significant advantage was gained by Company I 
because it was the preferred provider of UNISON, which represented the majority of 
the 900 staff who transferred. The council decided to transfer the homes to the 
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independent sector in order to give it access to Residential Allowance, also a key 
factor in Albion's transfer. As well as the Powys transfer, which involved 12 homes 
with 327 beds, Company I had contracts with Bedfordshire (Tompany I Today', 
6.11.98), Bromley and three unitary authorities in Berkshire. 
The final way in which fin-ns, may relate to the state is through attempting to change 
policy or practice through the process of lobbying. Jones was clear that Company I 
sometimes did this through provider associations, such as the Independent Healthcare 
Association (IHA) and the Registered Nursing Homes Association (RNHA), as well as 
through other broadly based groups: 
Without a doubt. We are big enough and will lobby independently if we so 
wish, but there may also be times when we feel the need to lobby through a 
third party... Its Oficult to think of something, but there might be times when 
one wouldn't want to come out and say '[Company 1] thinks this', but that 
might actually be our agenda. 
Company 2 was also a member of the IHA and the RNHA. Bartlett described the 
RNHA as, 'independent groups that have fonned to, if you like, lobby together and 
look at forward trends. ' The benefits of this were described as Mows: 
I think it's focused and being able to be kept aware of trends, what other 
companies are doing and also very much giving us a better power to 
influence... the change in Community Care Act obviously meant an awful lot of 
difference in the way that the company was funded. We'd certainly noticed the 
difference. Company 2 prior to the merger had a much larger percentage of 
private pay residents. With the, bringing in the Exceler and the Apta units as 
well, we now have quite a lot of social services fimded residents, and the 
amount in real terms that is given to a home to look after a resident per week 
has gone down tremendously. And obviously that has an effect. So 
its given us 
the ability to join together with other independent healthcare providers and 
lobby the government, and come up with facts and figures and ratios to move 
that forward and hopefully eventually get the better care that we can. 
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Grant said Company 3 was a member of the IHA, which she thought was 'becoming 
more effective' as a lobbying body. She said that Company 3 would like 'to be 
included in the making of the rules'; since low quality would affect the firm's share 
price, it had no motivation to evade the rules. She said she was involved in a 
Department of Health committee, but did not specify which one. She thought the 
government was 'getting better' at listening to private providers, but was 'not quite 
there yet'. The new chief executive of Company 3, Chai Patel, has been an extremely 
influential figure in long-term care, playing a key role in the Continuing Care 
Conference (CCC) for example (see Chapter Seven for a discussion of this). Patel also 
chaired the long-term care working group of the Better Regulation Task Force, an 
independent advisory body set up by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Dr 
David Clark. This published a review of long-term care regulation in 1998 (BRTF, 
1998), which concluded that the current regulatory arrangements failed on each of its 
five principles of transparency, accountability, targeting, consistency and 
proportionality. It made a number of recommendations to government, including that 
the regulation of nursing, residential and domiciliary care should be unified; that a 
national agency with wide-ranging membership should be created to advise the 
Department of Health on care standards; and that locally based inspection units 
independent of local and health authorities should carry out inspections. Although it is 
clear from the discussion above that not all these recommendations were accepted 
by 
the goverm-nent, 'Modernising Social Services' (DoH, 1998b: 4.4) explicitly states that 
the government's plans were designed according to the Task Force's five principles. 
Through his role in the Better Regulation Task Force, Patel was also a member of the 
CPA's advisory panel on the new National Required Standards. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
With the expansion of private provision in long term care in the 1980s, the form of 
state intervention in the sector has shifted from provision to funding and regulation. 
The form of the current regulatory system is clearly fragmented. The division of the 
system into locally based authorities, as well as the split between health and local 
authorities, leads to inconsistencies in the regulatory process and the enforcement of 
standards. However, this system is undergoing a process of reform which will 
centralize, standardize and increase the power of the state. The new National Required 
Standards in particular will raise the standards which private providers will be required 
to meet, whilst the creation of the National Care Standards Commission will introduce 
greater consistency across the country. Contrary to the crude globalization thesis, the 
powers of the state are thus increasing in this sector. In connnon with most private 
providers, all of the three case study fin-ns relied significantly on the state for funding, 
although this was less the case for Company 3. Through its regulatory and funding 
fimctions the state therefore retains decisive power in terms of shaping the overall 
framework within which the firms operate. 
However, contrary to the way the globalization debate often portrays the interests of 
state and fin-ns, as being necessarily antagonistic, the exercise of state power in this case 
does not appear to be against the long term interests of large and internationalized 
providers. Respondents from the case study firms themselves identified the 
inconsistency between regulatory authorities as their biggest problem, and all were 
broadly in favour of the proposed regulatory changes. As Grant put it, 'consistency' 
was what Company 3 thought was most important. Indeed, the firms' very nature as 
large organizations with a geographical spread far larger than that of the current 
regulatory authorities has itself been one of the factors that has 
highlighted the extent 
of unevenness in regulation. In addition, the firms or those close to them may 
have 
exerted some influence on the reforms through their own 
lobbying or opimion-forming 
activities, such as Chai Patel's participation in the Continuing 
Care Conference (see 
Chapter Seven) and the Better Regulation Task Force. 
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The decisive power of the state is most effectively demonstrated by the evidence that 
its policies are likely to alter the very structure of the sector itself Howeverg the 
changes in the structure of the sector which are the likely outcome of the reforrns are 
also in the long term interests of the firms. The high costs which regulatory reform will 
impose on private providers, which are unlikely to be adequately compensated for 
through increased funding levels, will affect all providers. This may have damaging 
consequences even for large firms such as Company 2,, whose American parent 
company is experiencing serious financial difficulties (see Chapter Four). However, the 
economics of the sector mean that it will be the larger firms, which are able to take 
advantage of economies of scale and innovative management systems, and which have 
easier access to extra funds, which will find it easier to survive. 
State policies will undoubtedly lead to a new wave of 'rationalization' within the 
sector. As discussed in Chapter Two, and examined in some detail in Chapter Four, 
there has already been significant consolidation within the sector, especially during 
1996 and 1997. Whether intentional or not, the likely effect of government policy will 
be to facilitate even greater consolidation, especially given the current over-capacity in 
the sector and the difficulty which smaller providers win have in meeting the new 
standards. As Company I's Bob Jones said of good small providers: 'when they're for 
sale we'll buy them' (see Chapter Four). These processes of regulatory reform on the 
one hand, and concentration among providers on the other, seem to confirm the 
observation made in Chapter Two, that there may in fact be a 'symbiotic' relationship 
between state and firm, with the actions of each encouraging a concentration and 
fon-nalization of the power of the other. 
Chapter Four also demonstrated that there was significant internationalization among 
the case study firms. This chapter has indicated that the British regulation process does 
not consider either internationalization or the nationality of firms as a factor 
necessitating special attention. The government's policies in this sector, as in most 
others, is for openness in international trade and investment, and this is consistent with 
its international commitments on such matters. However, given the 'market seeking' 
nature of these firms, and the role which 'favourable market conditions and regulatory 
environments' (Company 2 (USA)AR, 1996: 11) seem to have played 
in Company 2 
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(USA)investing in Britain and other countries (see Chapter Four), the possibility that a 
strengthening of the regulatory framework may act as a disincentive for foreign firms 
to invest here must be considered. This would mean losing the expertise that US firms 
in particular may bring with them (notwithstanding the different and sometimes 
undesirable practices that may be common in the US). The same set of incentives may 
also lead to domestic providers increasing their overseas investments. Yet the evidence 
is that Company 2 welcomed an end to the inconsistencies of the current system as 
much as the other case study firms, and Company 2 is as likely as other large firms to 
gain in the long term from the increased concentration in provision which is likely to 
occur, provided Company 2 (USA)can survive its current financial problems. Given the 
existing internationalization among large providers, therefore, the government's 
commitment to an open trade and investment policy means that increased 
concentration in the sector is also likely to be accompanied by increased 
internationalization. 
However, although the state is largely successful in settings the parameters within 
which private organizations operate, it is clear from the evidence in this chapter that 
there is a constant process of bargaining within those parameters, and one which will 
inevitably continue once the reforms have been implemented. Both the officers of 
Albion County Council and of the Albion Health Authorities appeared to have lost the 
automatic suspicion which characterized relations between state authorities and private 
providers in the initial period of expansion of private provision. However, there was 
some disagreement between Smitham. and Fenn about the Oference large and 
internationalized firms might make to their jobs and to the delivery of care. Whilst tl-ýs 
may reflect a more guarded or 'diplomatic' response on the part of Smithan-ý it is clear 
that it also reflects different experiences, involving different homes from the fin-ns. This 
underlines the importance of not over-generalizing from the Albion data; what this data 
does is rather to illustrate some of the issues which can potentially arise in the relations 
between firms and state agencies. 
Nevertheless, this data can be triangulated with that given in other chapters. For 
example, Fenn indicated particular problems for regulation arising both 
from the 
restrictions imposed on homes where they operated limited budgets within the 
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structure of the firm, and to frequent changes in personnel. Fenn did nof identify the 
firm in either of these cases, but we saw in Chapter Four that Company 2 experienced 
problems in its merger process relating both to the culture change which the 
introduction of devolved budgets involved for some staff, and to the loss of 
experienced staff, partly as a result of these operational changes. Issues relating to the 
disruption which may be caused by the process of M&A will be returned to in the final 
chapter. Despite these particular problems, Smitham's observation that large firms 
were unlikely to meet the same problems as smaller firms in terms of being able to pay 
for improvements which were necessary to raise quality is consistent with the findings 
of Chapter Four. Smitham and Fenn both agreed that staffing issues were particularly 
important for large firms, and this will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Although both Smitharn and Fenn agreed with the necessity for consistent standards, 
Smitham. thought that disparities between authorities were sometimes exaggerated by 
firms. All the firms were keen that regulators should take more notice of their internal 
QA mechanisms. Smitham and Fenn indicated that they already did this to some extent, 
although unsurprisingly, they Mered with the firms about the amount of external 
regulation which remained necessary. As indicated above, 'Modernising Social 
Services' (DoH, 1998b) does acknowledge the need to avoid, 'unnecessary 
duplication, for example when several branches of the same organization are to be 
registered'. Respondents from the firms themselves and both Smitham and Fenn were 
consistent in describing the way the negotiating process between regulators and firms 
would in practice move away from the home and to the firms' headquarters where a 
serious problem arose. Regulators' powers meant that in an extreme case the 
requirement of 'fitness' could be traced back to the ultimate owner, with serious 
consequences for the company as a whole. This situation seems unlikely to occur, and 
in practice once registration has taken place it is the home which is inspected, with 
recourse to the firm's headquarters where necessary. 
Overall then, this chapter has demonstrated that, far from being powerless, the state is 
standardizing and centralizing its regulatory powers. Reforms initiated by the 
government wiH impose costs on all private providers which even large and 
internationalized firms will not be able to evade. However, these firms are best placed 
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to manage such change, and are therefore hikely to benefit in the long term from the 
restructuring of the sector which is likely to occur. State policies, therefore, are 
facilitating increasing concentration and intemationalization in the sector. 
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CHAPTER SIX: STAFF AND UNIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
Staffing issues are particularly important to the quality of long-ten-n care. 'A Better 
Home Life' (CPA, 1996: 71) states that: 'The quality of life which residents experience 
will depend to a great extent on the calibre of the staff caring for then-L A trained and 
experienced staff team, which is well managed and adequately paid, is likely to provide 
high quality care in a responsive and understanding atmosphere. ' However, where staff 
turnover is high, pay is low and training is inadequate, the quality of care is likely to 
suffer. Staffing is also a major economic factor affecting providers: it has been 
estimated that, for a typical 50-bed nursing home, wages account for three quarters of 
total costs (OFT, 1998: 9). 
There are a number of different staff groups who work in care homes. Imber (1977) 
divides residential care staff into three main groups: supervisory staff, who are 
responsible for 'administering drugs, changing dressings, reading to residents, playing 
games with residents, organising social events, and paperwork'; care staff, who are 
responsible for 'washing clothes, washing residents, dressing residents, making beds 
and taking residents to the toilet, sluicing'; and domestic staff, who are responsible for 
4preparing food, cleaning, tidying and washing up'. Davies & Knapp (1981,70) 
suggest a possible fourth category of office and secretarial staff. 'A Better Home Life' 
(CPA, 1996: 71) uses a different four-way categorization: managerial staff; care staff, 
including both nurses and care assistants; administrative and clerical staff; and ancillarY 
staff, including cleaning, laundry and catering staff. 
Current law requires that homes be run with an adequate number of staff who have 
the right balance of skills and experience to meet the needs of residents 
(CPA, 1996: 
72). Before registration, a prospective owner must draw up a staffing schedule to show 
how the staff team meets the residents' requirements. The schedule is subject to 
inspection and approval by the relevant inspection and registration authority, and the 
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onus is on the applicant to show that the right level of staffing with appropriate 
competence and training will be provided. Nursing homes must have a registered 
medical practitioner or first level registered nurse as the person in charge as well as 
employing other qualified nursing staff for nursing duties. The registration authority 
currently determines the staffing levels and skill mix appropriate to the needs of 
residents in each nursing home, and sets it out in a staffing notice before registration. 
As indicated in Chapter Five, the National Required Standards (NRS) stipulate that a 
third of staff in nursing homes should be registered nurses, a requirement likely to raise 
costs considerably. 
This chapter is particularly concerned with what the CPA (1996: 71) defines as 'care 
staff , 
i. e. nurses and care assistants. Not all of these staff will be members of trade 
unions; one purpose of this chapter is to investigate the extent of unionization. The 
principal unions active in this sector in the UK are UNISON, which is primarily a 
public sector union, but which is also the main potential organizer of care and domestic 
staff, as well as nurses, given its general nature and the relatively recent expansion of 
the private sector in what has traditionally been a publicly provided service; the 
General, Municipal and Boilermakers (GMB) union, which is also a general union; and 
the Royal College of Nursing (RCN). The Transport and General Workers' Union 
(TGWU) and MSF (Manufacturing, Science, Finance) also potentially have a presence 
in this sector, although as explained in Chapter Three, telephone calls established at an 
early stage that in practice this was negligible. As also indicated in Chapter Three, 
unlike the interviews with other respondents for this chapter, that with Louise Saber of 
the RCN was not tape recorded, and was therefore reconstructed from memory and 
notes immediately after the interview. 
ATTITUDES. PERCEPTIONS AND GOALS 
The general goal of all unions is to protect and advance the interests of their members, 
usually with regard to pay and conditions of service. The goals of the unions 
considered here which relate specifically to the long-term care sector are inextricably 
linked to their assessment of the overall shift to private provision. This was a 
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particularly important issue for UNISON, which is explicitly a public sector union 
formed from a merger of the Confederation of Health Service Employees (COHSE), 
the National Union of Public Employees (NUPE) and the National and Local 
Government Officers Union (NALGO). Kevin Fenton, a Research Officer at UNISON, 
said it was, 'exceedingly problematic for an avowedly public sector union now to be 
faced with probably a third of its membership in the private sector, if you count water, 
energy production and distribution, and health care and local authority contracting 
out. ' This meant that the first goal of the union was to try to retain as much provision 
as possible within the public sector. In the words of Peter Stephens, UNISON National 
Officer for Healthcare, the union was 'on principle... in favour of directly designed 
care, free at the point of use and funded through general taxation. ' However, the union 
recognised that 'we've moved a hell of a long way away from that and are unlikely to 
get back to it in the foreseeable future'. There was some debate within UNISON about 
whether privatization as such was coming to an end, but nobody expected it to be 
reversed. 
Fenton said that the overaU effect on staff of the shift towards private provision had 
been 'demoralization': 
because most people, particularly join the NHS because they care about the 
institution, they want to do public service, they want to do that, they don't want 
to be faced with having to work in the private sector. That's primarily the 
feedback that we get and there's a lot of hostility... if you ask Joe Soap or the 
average worker in the public sector that's forced to go in there they abhor the 
fact that organizations run for profit. 
The effects of this shift to private provision presented UNISON with some difficult 
problems about how, and whether, to organize in the private sector, which will be 
returned to in the next section. 
One response to the reality of private provision was to campaign for nursing care to 
be free at the point of use, whoever it was provided by. Stephens said this would 
involve, 'a removal of current means testing rationale'. UNISON had presented 
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evidence to the RCLTC to this effect, and were campaigning for the implementation of 
the Commission's recommendations, 'because though not perfect they are, we think, a 
good way forward. ' Stephens said UNISON was also using the 'Partnership in Action' 
proposals (DoH, 1998c; see Chapter Five) to argue for the 'integrated employment' of 
health and social care staff either by the NHS or by local authorities as a way of 
keeping provision within the public sector. Where consideration was given to 
conmriissioning care from private providers, Stephens said that UNISON, 'would want 
a best value model applied to select who those providers should be. ' The union 
preferred voluntary sector providers to private ones, and where provision by the 
private sector could not be prevented, UNISON campaigned for, 'much greater 
regulation of the use of private sector providers both in terms of quality of care they 
provide and in terms of the pay and conditions that they offer to staff... ' Stephens said 
that where a private provider was chosen, 'we want lots of safeguards built in... in 
order to minimize the consequences. ' These safeguards would involve the 
commissioning body applying employment criteria when choosing providers. The 
National Minimum Wage (NMW) was seen as an important way of safeguarding wage 
levels, and this is discussed in the next section. 
The overall attitude of the GMB to private provision was less hostile than 
UNISON's. Nfike Gresham, National Secretary of the Public Services Section of 
GMB, said he thought this was because GMB was a general union with more 
experience of negotiating in the private sector: 'we've always had members in the 
public sector and the private sector and the service sector. We have officers that 
negotiate with companies and with employers at national level, at regional level, at 
plant level, at department level... ' Gresham said that the GMB's, 'ideal position is 
traditional areas of the public sector should remain within the public sector. ' There 
ýwas a view', for example, 'that education should not be for profit'. However, 
Gresham said he thought there was, 'a new realism that there will be, in future, we are 
in a n-dxed economy, there will be a pluralism of service delivery in this sector. ' He said 
that he thought it was 'impossible' to expect all provision in long-term care to be 
public, given the constraints to public sector expenditure, and that, 'we don't subscribe 
to the view that everything that's private is bad. I mean I want Company 2 homes to 
make a profit, it's much easier for us to deal with an employer who's not 
facing 
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bankruptcy and insolvency... ' Gresharn was very aware of the problems -confronting 
home owners, saying that, 'Private care home owners have been squeezed like hell for 
the last four or five years by local authorities. ' All this led GMB to take a 'partnerslýip' 
approach to private providers (see O'Donoghue, 1998), which will be discussed 
below. 
The RCN was also interested in a relationship of 'partnership' with employers. Louise 
Saber, RCN's Independent Sector Advisor, described her particular role as being to 
work with the independent sector in order to increase RCN membership and to 
improve professional practice. She said RCN was 'neutral' on the issue of private 
provision; it did not matter who the employer was. What was important to the RCN 
was 6good practice'. Saber thought that the shift to private provision had probably 
'improved practice overall'. She said that, 'badly paid and treated staff win not deliver 
good care'. It was therefore in the employers' interest to 'treat their staff properly', 
and RCN worked with them on this, particularly advising both members and employers 
on 4comparable pay and conditions' in the NHS. Saber said that the RCN also broadly 
agreed with the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Long Term Care. 
UNISON was particularly aware of the size and internationalization of firms in the 
sector, since the Public Services Privatization Research Unit (PSPRU) which provided 
information to various public sector unions (including the European Public Services 
Union and the Public Service International, discussed in the next section) was based at 
UNISON's office and employed their staff. This was in the process of being wound up, 
partly due to the perception that privatization was coming to an end and partly because 
of organizational changes in public sector unions, but had done much work in 
monitoring and providing 'intelligence material' on multinationals and other large fin-ns 
across a range of privatized public services. Kevin Fenton had special responsibility 
for social care within the PSPRU. Fenton thought that concentration of ownership in 
the sector was, 'going to be the major significant thing if it continues'. He thought that 
the imposition of the minimwn wage would be a major factor in speeding up this 
consolidation: 
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So what I think is going to happen is that the very small ones [private 
providers] are going to go bust, they won't be able to soak up the costs of the 
minimum wage. They'll start collapsing and I think that's what the bigger ones 
will be waiting for because theyll start picking up, therefore, the clientele from 
social services departments and the economies of scale will allow them to soak 
up the minimum wage, and they'll become larger as a result. They'll get a 
greater and greater market share as a result and, I mean it's already gone down 
from 13 to six quoted companies, it wouldn't surprise me if you ended up with, 
say, four or five which is what we've seen in every single market of public 
service that's been contracted out. First of all you get 10 or 12 providers and 
then within a very short space of time you get it reduced down to two or three 
- monopolization ..... I mean the significance of Company 2 (USA)is that in the 
space of two and a half years it became the second largest UK provider. 
The GMB was also very aware of the size and internationalization of the leading 
firms, partly as a result of their links with the American Service Employees 
International Union (SEIU), which they shared with UNISON. However, there were 
some inaccuracies in the detail of what Gresham said, such as in the overstatement of 
the current involvement of multinationals in the UK market in the following quote: 
the big threat is from the multinationals that are coming in. Currently, I mean 
the estimates are that they currently have 20% of the market. I think in five 
years they'll reverse it 80 to 20 possibly their way. Particularly the American 
people who are coming in. I mean we've had a few battles with some of the 
home owners, particularly the Americans who some of our contacts over there 
sent us information about fraud cases amongst certain of the companies that are 
trying to get a foothold in the UK. 
According to Gresham, 'about three years ago the American Chamber of Commerce 
actually published a document advising American multinationals operating in Europe 
how to get round European legislation. ' 
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Saber said the RCN was 'very' aware of the concentration taking place in- the sector, 
partly as result of her role as 'Independent Sector Advisor'. As with the general shift 
to private provision, she said the RCN was 'neutral' on this. She also said that the 
RCN was 'not concerned' with internationalization within the sector. Her statement 
that, 'we only really deal with national organizations', suggests a lack of awareness of 
the internationalization of the leading fin-ns. She was, however, aware that the largest 
organizations had their own internal QA mechanisms, which she regarded as 
'beneficial' and 'effective'. She said that large firms could not make profits, 'unless 
they can demonstrate quality'. 
UNISON's attitude to these large fin-ns was considerably more hostile than the 
RCN's. This almost certainly reflected UNISON's nature as a public service union 
whose primary goal was to halt and reverse the shift to private provision. Fenton said 
that 'one of the primary functions' which the PSPRU provided was, 'to expose or to 
prevent companies winning contracts or to expose what happens when you privatize. ' 
Fenton had very little sympathy for either small or large owners. Of small owners he 
said: 
Because of the reductions in public spending the smaller homes are screaming, 
saying 'we can't afford to run our homes on the money supplied by the state'. I 
mean these people .... They make me 
laugh as employers, they really do. 
These organizations are funded by the tax payer every which way you think, 
they're funded by the local state, they don't pay sick pay, they don't pay 
maternity pay, they don't pay holiday pay or anything like that... they've got 
virtually no extra staff costs and they start screaming. 
Fenton said he suspected, 'that there's quite serious abuse going on in [private] 
residential homes. ' 
Fenton's perception of large, and particularly American, firms was that they were 
essentially corrupt. He interpreted a statement by Company 2 (USA)'s chief executive 
that the British market was 'underdeveloped' as meaning: 
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that the American market is so competitive that the way that they manage and 
operate their homes in the American market they can transpose to the UK 
market and because our health authorities are probably not so rigorous they 
know all the scams, basically, to pull with the health authority or the public 
funding bodies. That's what they probably think, they think that what we've 
learnt in the States we can bring over here - the companies that are already 
over here are national companies, with the exception of [Company 3] who may 
well have learnt a few things off the executives [of its US associate]..... they, 
as I said, operate in a highly competitive market that they'll know the short cuts 
around - or how to cut margins, how to cut costs, how to operate more 
effectively, how to deal with the public bodies... how to deal with suppliers, 
how to deal with patients, how to get high turnover, you know - all those 
things that I'm not intimate with... it was the subtext, I think, of what Turner 
was saying. it seemed to me that what [he] was saying in straightforward 
everyday language is that this is a new market, they're right mugs over here, 
they really don't know how to pull the strokes - we do! 
Fenton thought that such firms knew, 'how to get away with the mhiimal treatment of 
patients': 
Because that seems to be their practice in the States. It's what they do, they go 
out of their way to invite the triple, double billing type of operation. It's 
quantity, get as many in, treat as many as possible but with low grade care but 
dress it up as 'we're caring [Company 2 (USA)] and we look after our patients 
so well', etc., etc., etc. The language that Turner was using at the time, that's 
what it seemed to me it was about - that 'we know how to pull the scams'. 
When he talked about the profit margins could be as great as 8-10% here as 
against the States that seems to me to indicate the other side which is not so 
stringent regulations, not 
accountability. 
so much mspection, not so much public 
This view of Company 2 (USA)was formed partly as a result of information given to 
UNISON by the SEW relating to the investigation of the firm for fraudulent activities 
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discussed in Chapter Four. This information suggested that Company 2 (USA)had 
been fined relatively small amounts by individual states - the implication being that this 
was a risk worth taking in order to obtain revenue by fraudulent means, since it did not 
affect the overall operation of the firm because it did not have to admit to malpractice. 
Fenton thought this was fairly typical of American firms, quoting as evidence the head 
of the FBI who had apparently said that fraud within the US medical system was 
running at $ 100 billion a year (see Inman & Sone, 1997). 
When asked whether the competitive practices of the US might possibly have led 
firms such as Company 2 (USA)to become more efficient providers, Fenton was clear 
that, 'the one thing I'm not saying is that I think these are highly trained, honed, 
efficient organizations that have cut their teeth on a highly competitive market and that 
this is capitalism working at its best. I'm not saying that. ' Fenton also said that he 
would like more information about the kind of internal management systems they used, 
but that he couldn't, 'get inside the organization, it's very difficult to... They're very 
suspicious. ' 
Stephens, however, pointed out that concentration of ownership in the sector could 
potentially benefit the union: 
in the sense of removing one of the obstacles to orgamzm'g the sector. 
Obviously it has negative consequences in the sense that if the firms that are 
created will be stronger so should they decide that they want to resist union 
recognition they'll have more resources to do it. But at the same time you are 
removing one of the main obstacles in organizing the sector which is the 
multiplicity of small employers. On balance we think the concentration would 
actually to some extent be a move forward. There is some evidence that some 
of the leading firms are taking a more positive attitude on union recognition... 
The GMB's approach to such fin-ns was fairly positive. For example, Gresham said 
that, ' we would expect quality to improve because they do have money, they have 
access to money that should be reflected in investment in premises, investment 
in 
trammg, which should improve the quality of the service. " Gresham said GMB had 
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-I -- already concluded 'about 30' national agreements with multinationals operating in 
public services, giving the examples of a French company 'that provides everything 
from trains, water, local goverriment services', and ISS, a Danish multinational 
'increasingly getting involved in home care'. Gresham said that it didn't matter to 
GMB whether the employer was public or private: 'I think the partnership approach 
that we've taken has paid dividends. There are good employers in both the public 
sector and the private sector. ' In long-term care, this 'partnership approach' had 
initially involved working with small owners by providing them with ready-made staff 
handbooks and contracts. This had been followed by the drawing up of hotel-type 
quality benchmarks based on up to five 'stars', in conjunction with the National Care 
Homes Association (NCHA), which was piloted by all the small owners in Brighton 
and Blackpool. This star system was important to the union because it included 
employment issues and health and safety, as well as more usual quality measures such 
as food and room size. Although GMB's emphasis had been on small owners up to 
that point, Gresham said of this latest initiative: 'we're launching this to hit the big 
players. ' 
All the unions were broadly in favour of the changes to regulation proposed by the 
'Modernising Social Services' VAýite Paper (DoH, 1998b), although Gresham said he 
thought the time-scale for introduction was too long. Stephens thought that the 
merging of nursing and social care regulation into one agency was beneficial for 
UNISON since, 'if you're attempting to influence things you've got one agency you're 
trying to influence and not two. ' Stephens was impressed by the way the American 
SEW had been able to, 'influence the awards of Public contracts and the regulation of 
the nursing and care home sector. ' He said the SEW had, 'often used, actually, quality 
concern and quality issues as part of their organizing drives, which is something we've 
not really done'. Saber thought that the existing regulatory arrangements were 'too 
fragmentary' and that national standards were necessary. This is consistent with the 
RCN publication 'Nursing Homes: Nursing Values', which identifies, 'an urgent need 
to... introduce a national audit system [and to] set national regulatory standards and 
protocols' (McClymont et al. 1996: 21). However, Saber said the RCN was concerned 
that the 'nursing component' may not be 'adequately catered for' under the new 
arrangements. Her statement that, 'social workers are not equipped to inspect nursing 
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homes', indicates a concern that nursing issues may be subordinated to those of social 
care. Saber also said the RCN thought that acute nursing should have been 'included' 
in the reforms, something that was subsequently included in the Care Standards Bill 
(2000). 
Both Saber and Stephens thought there was a case for regulation at the fin-n level 
rather than just of homes. Stephens said: 
I think that's a way of getting consistency across all the homes. If you have an 
approach that assesses the whole direction of the company, and you can also 
then introduce wider concerns than simply fabric of the building and quality of 
care that's being delivered. Things like the workforce planning, skills available, 
training and career development, that sort of thing. And there is some evidence 
that the expansion of the sector has reached a point now where there are some 
staff shortages being acknowledged, so if they're going to have any way of 
sustaining development of the sector they need to upskill their workforce and 
make it more attractive to people to stay. Levels of turnover are very very high 
and that can't really contribute to quality of care. 
Saber, however, thought that those firms that could demonstrate good performance 
through their internal systems might legitimately claim a 'lighter touch' from the 
regulators. 
Gresham also said he thought, 'that it is important that at a corporate level they are 
inspected,, not just about the facilities, but about their standards and their ethos and 
their philosophy on care. ' GMB had made submissions to government that any firm 
bidding to provide public services of any kind should have to meet criteria relating to 
four areas: competence and quality; health and safety; equality; and staff employment. 
These would involve the commissioning body in an assessment of the firm as a whole: 
'if a home owner, whether its an individual home owner or a multinational company, 
they've got to demonstrate to the authority that as an organization they've got the 
competence and that individuals within that organization have got the competence. ' 
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Overall, then, the attitude of the RCN and of GMB to private providers, and large 
and internationalized ones in particular, was more 'neutral' and less hostile than that of 
UNISON. It is clear that UNISON's basic hostility to these firms arises primarily from 
its character as a public sector union, and its consequent emphasis on retaining as 
much provision as possible within the public sector. 
FORM AND EXTENT OF ORGANIZATION 
Although each of the unions organized different groups of workers, there was 
considerable overlap in the types of workers who might potentially be members of the 
different unions. UNISON organized the lower part of the hierarchy of worker, from 
cleaners, through care assistants to nurses. GMB organized all workers in the sector 
through its Association of Professional and Executive Staffs (APEX) wing, but had 
launched a bid for the organization of managers (see Edmonds, 1998). The RCN 
organized nurses only, but this included a number who were also small owners or 
managers. Saber described the RCN as 'the voice of nursing'. This put the RCN in 
some degree of competition with UNISON in particular, for organization of lower 
ranking nurses. Stephens said UNISON cooperated well with the RCN on things such 
as the pay review body, but that their interests were 'significantly different' in this 
sector: 
... their interest 
isn't really in collective bargaining in these homes. They don't 
seek, even where they have members, they don't seek to bargain with the 
employer. Their role is to provide professional services to the registered nurses 
and to a limited extent represent them in disciplinary and grievance issues. They 
make no effort to organize, in any sense that we would understand it, the 
homes. 
Saber herself emphasised thatý although the RCN considered itself to be a union, it 
concentrated on, 'professional issues, rather than simply Pay and conditions'. 
Saber 
said that, 'over half of registered nurses nationally are in the RCN', but that 
it was, 
'less well organized in the long-term care sector'. She said that the NHS was the 
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RCN's 'core business", but that it was, 'working to recruit now in the long-term care 
sector'. This often meant attempting to, 'identify and recruit members who may be 
lone nurses in homes'. Stephens said he thought the RCN claimed 20,000 or 30,000 
members in the nursing home sector. This was far more than UNISON, which 
Stephens estimated had, 'less than 2000 members in the whole sector'. This was out of 
an estimated potential membership of, 'something in the region of 100,000 people in 
the healthcare group and probably 300,000 for UNISON as a whole'. Gresham said 
that the GMB's overall membership in the sector was also small: 
In those areas that we have managed to get in and recruit it's 100%, perhaps 
90%, but because in a small home you might only be talking about half a dozen, 
perhaps less than 10 people, yeah? And usually we can sort of mop them all up, 
but I've got to say that for every one home that we've got membership in 
there's plenty that we haven't. 
GMB and UNISON tended to get most of their members in private providers from 
those in homes that had transferred from local authority ownership or management. 
Gresham said that a lot of GMB members had transferred over to the private sector in 
Albion. Membership was also fairly high in some homes owned by voluntary 
organizations; the GMB, for example, had significant membership in the Royal British 
Legion, whilst UNISON had about 100 members in Leonard Cheshire Homes. 
However, during the course of 1999, and subsequent to the interview with Gresham 
and Pole, GMB signed two recognition agreements with private operators, Southern 
Cross Healthcare and the Highfield Group (CCMN, Dec. 1999 / Jan. 2000). Highfield 
operated 75 homes with 3,580 homes, and the agreement covered around 5,000 
employees. This reflected GMB's 'partnership' strategy of concentrating on mutual 
training needs with employers, which is discussed below. A telephone interview with 
Tom Douras of the TGWU confirmed that members of that union tended to be 
in 
voluntary organizations where not employed by public bodies. Douras said the 
TGWU 
tended to organize in large workplaces and organizations, and would not organize staff 
in small workplaces or organizations, 'unless they came to us'. 
Membership of the 
unions within the case study firms will be discussed in the next section, 
but it can be 
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noted here that, consistent with the figures for the sector generally, it was very low 
although the RCN had more individual members. 
The lack of any existing 'tradition' of unionization within the private long-term care 
sector caused problems for UNISON in particular when trying to decide if and how to 
organize within it. Partly this was due to UNISON's nature as a public service union 
which was politically opposed to private provision, as well as being used to bargaining 
with public sector bodies. Both Stephens and Fenton indicated that UNISON would 
not organize within the private medical sector (other than nursing homes) due to 
political reasons. On the other hand, both agreed with Steve Morton, UNISON 
Director of Policy and Research, that in relation to the long-term care sector, '... in 
principle we're strongly committed to organizing workers in whatever the area that 
public services are provided, whoever is the provider. ' Fenton said that sometimes: 
isolated outbreaks of groups of workers in residential or nursing homes come 
to the union saying 'we're having problems with our employer, will you come 
and organize us or will you help usT, and that's occasionally happened. And 
then the regional officer will have to make a decision whether she or he spends 
a lot of time dealing with it. 
The question of whether and how to organize the sector in a more strategic way was 
a serious problem for the union. Morton explained that: 
in practice we find it quite hard to do because our resources are particularly 
tied up in quite large local government branches and our members there face a 
whole range of difficulties and we have to have, well we have a continuing 
argument about the interests of people on the margins or economic outsiders 
as against those who are relatively advantaged. I say that in relative terms but 
by and large unions represent the interests of those on the inside because 
they're in work. And certainly in terms of the balance of our membership, 
proportionately more are in secure employment and so an important continuing 
discussion within the union is how you shift resources from the relatively better 
off sectors and particularly with the... better off branches towards moving 
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organizational resources, particularly the time of organizers, but also financial 
Support to organizing in the much more dffficult to organize fragmented 
workplaces that you get ... I mean it is a problem within the public sector but it 
becomes more acute when you have a range of private companies, many of 
whom are uneasy about the role of unions in any case. 
By 'economic outsiders' Morton meant, 'those who I classify in marginal employment, 
that is in low-pay, in temporary, in casualized work, and many of them I think will be 
in this sector of care for the elderly. ' 
Morton identified two practical problems relating to actually organizing in the sector. 
The first related to 'time and money', whilst the second related to organizational 
issues, and in particular the fact that, 'at the formation of UNISON we had powerful 
sectoral groups formed with an executive council with a high level of negotiating 
autonomy, but community care, care for the elderly... doesn't fit easily within a local 
goverm-nent or a health service fratne which encompasses both. ' On the first of these 
problems, time and money, Fenton said: 'its all about cost-benefit at the end of the day 
isn't it?... how much is it going to cost to organize and how much is the union going to 
gain from it? ' Stephens elaborated on this further: 
we want to organize them, but we have to ... we're a very cash strapped 
resource-low movement, we have to decide what target is going to make the 
most effective number of members in the shortest possible time. Because you'll 
notice I didn't say what's going to generate the most cash for the Union. 
Because if we were looking at it in terms of what generates the most cash for 
the union, we wouldn't organize private contractors at 0. What we would say 
what we need to do is increase our managerial membership where 50% of the 
managers aren't union. But UNISON doesn't say that. We want to organize 
workers that need union representation. Having said that we have to do that in 
a way that's sustainable in terms of resources that we have. It's not a formal 
decision, there is nowhere on paper that it says we are not prioritizing the 
nursing home sector, but in practice we are not prioritizing the nursing home 
sector. 
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Instead of prioritizing workers in the long-term care sector, UNISON had decided to 
prioritize private contractors in ancillary services such as NHS cleaning and catering, 
where Stephens said the union had, 'signed up national recognition agreements with 
seven out of the ten national contractors, the big market players. ' This area therefore 
offered the union the greatest returns for the amount of effort it took. Stephens said: 
We've not abandoned in the longer term organizmig in the nursing home sector 
but I think the key to that will be can the restructuring that we're going 
through in terms of our staff and branches generate enough cash resources to 
fund organizing staff to go out and do organizing in these areas. We're not 
going to be able to do it from our existing structures and resources; we need to 
generate resources that can be thrown into organizing campaigns at the nursing 
home sector. Now we could be criticised for saying that we de-prioritize the 
area that arguably needs us most but on the other hand if that's the area that 
you're not going to be able to organize effectively in the short term you have to 
make a judgement. 
Stephens said that prior experience had brought the union to the position of de- 
prioritizing the long-tenn care sector: 
A a. 
Aner the 80s the whole sector expanded tremendously. That didn't really 
involve any transfers of staff because these were new facilities opening up so 
generally speaking we didn't have any foothold into them. In certain regions 
we made periodic organizing efforts and/or people contacted us from individual 
homes and it's on the basis of that experience that we decided for the time 
being that they're not a priority target, because those regions that tried to 
organize in those sectors experienced that it consumed an incredible amount of 
officer resources because they're not a sector that are activists, get involved in 
organizing much. Our activists are in hospitals and to some extent the 
community services, they will not go out, they wouldn't be allowed to have 
time off from their employer for a start to go out and organize nursing homes, 
with a few individual exceptions... Therefore we actively send in officers, you 
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know, paid staff to try and organize which is quite expensive, - very time 
consuming, and the number of members you get out of it and they generate a 
lot of case work. So taking a very hard approach they're not reafly worth it in 
the short tenn. 
This leads onto Morton's second point about the organizational structure of 
UNISON. Stephens said that this could be a barrier to organizing in the sector: 
we have a problem that our branch secretaries don't necessarily want to go off 
and recruit in this sector because they know that it will generate a lot of 
casework for them and these members don't fit into the entire branch 
structures, they're more difficult to service and represent than members based 
in hospitals and so on and so on. Obviously these are generalizations, there are 
good examples here and there but as a general rule activists either can't or 
won't follow them up, so it has to fall back on paid staff. Now obviously some 
unions, particularly in the United States, have used a paid staff organizing 
approach. There are big institutional obstacles inside UNISON to prevent us 
from doing that on any sort of wide-spread scale, for a couple of reasons. One, 
we have lots of financial problems, so releasing that amount of resources 
wouldn't be easy. Two, the tradition of the way we organize is having regional 
officers attached to secure employers and carry out a casework and organizing 
role in relation to those employers. We've not traditionally had, until relatively 
recently, any people who are appointed as organizers. So if you're a regional 
officer with a geographic patch with one big hospital trust, community services 
trust, a few private contractors in the hospital and 10 nursing homes within 
your areas and some GP practices, 40-50 GP practices, it's obvious what's 
going to consume the vast amount of your time. It'll be the demands of the 
members in the hospital, followed by the community services trust, followed by 
the private contractors, and a very long way down the fist of priorities will be 
doing anything in the sectors where we don't currently have any members. 
OK, so because of the way we've been organized there's been big barriers to 
freeing up any resources to direct at the nursing home sector. 
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The problems of organizing in the long-term care sector had led the union to be much 
more flexible about the organizational forms it used, and to experiment with a number 
of different organizing methods. Stephens said one of these involved, 'taking money 
away from the centre head office of the union to free it up for specific projects'. One 
such project based in London created, 'mobile paid staff who move around from area 
to area and generate projects in areas based on an assessment of what recruitment 
opportunities there are. ' However, Stephens went on to point out that, 'even with all 
that if you free up resources to deal with recruitment and organizing there's still a 
debate about whether the nursing home sector is the right place to deploy those 
resources and our view at the moment is private contractors are a much better bet. ' 
There was also some organizational difficulty where members were recruited in the 
long-term care sector. UNISON's usual way of organizing, in NHS trusts for example, 
was to have employer-based branches. In long-term care, however, even where 
members belonged to a large private company, there were not enough of them to make 
this effective. In Stephens words: 'Because our membership is so weak, the number of 
activists is so low, it's usually not sustainable to have employer-based branches. There 
are one or two exceptions, but as a general rule, what happens is they're attached to 
the nearest NFIS employer branch, on a geographical basis. ' Again, some 
organizational innovations had been attempted: 
There are one or two regions that have developed a geographically based 
multi-employer branch which deals with all employers in one area. In the East 
Midlands there's a branch called Nottingham Healthcare, that has members in 
the community trusts, the GP practices and the nursing homes in Nottingham, 
so it's a multi-employer branch. Having said that it's still... its principal area of 
membership is still the community trust. 
In London a 'London Voluntary and Independent Agency Branch' was set up, but 
although its 'definition of membership' included private care homes, it was in practice 
a voluntary sector branch. Although this worked in London due to the high 
density of 
population, this was not being recommended for other areas, even in the voluntary 
sector. A different structure again was being tried in Wales, where the union was going 
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to have six branches based on lead employers, 'with a sort of sub-branch structure for 
the nursing homes within the main branch but that sub-branch structure's actually 
resourced by a paid member of stafý so what few activists you do have can 
concentrate on recruiting and organizing and the paid member of staff can deal with 
the administration and case work. ' Stephens said that, 'the idea of creating a paid 
member of staff who's a resource for voluntary and nursing home members is one 
that's doing the rounds at the moment and there are ways of doing that, they can be 
funded by branches if you get large branches to Rmd these posts, they don't necessarily 
have to be funded from the central funds of the Union. ' In surn, Stephens said that: 
'the new approach is to say, you know, people should shape their branches based on 
what's workable in their own area. ' 
GMB faced similar organizational problems, especially since its strategy had been to 
target the small home owners. This meant that where there were a few members in a 
home they would be attached to a general branch. However, the aim was to move 
towards geographically organized branches, which mirrored those of the NCHA, the 
national organization of small owners. According to Gresham: 
In Scotland and in Yorkshire we've actually formed carers branches on a 
geographical area... So we have everyone who is within the care sector actually 
in that specific designated branch and it pays benefits quite considerable, 
because they're all talking about the same thing when they go to a branch 
meeting. 
UNISON had begun to think very strategically about how and whether to organize 
within large private providers. At the time of interview, Fenton was in the process of 
moving posts to become UNISON's National Officer 'responsible for bargaining 
relationships with the private sector and developing the union strategy in how to deal 
with the private sector'. This was to focus on making decisions about whether to 
target particular firms for unionization. Fenton described some of the strategic 
considerations which related to this: 
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I've sat with the health group and tried to help them pick one or two of the 
nursing home groups but what's problematic is the scale of the enterprise, 
because you're talking a home, maybe, with 40-50 employees. I mean those 
homes are spread all round the place, all round the country. Now unless you 
are very specific and say we're going to pick that firm because they've got x 
number of contracts and some of our members have transferred across so we're 
going to go and say right we're going to go for that one, and then once you've 
done that send a warning signal to the rest and say 'well OK look we're serious 
about talking with you, we're serious about organizing'. 
Stephens said that some headway had been made on a regional basis with ANS, a 
private firm running 49 homes with 3,350 staff in 1998 (AR, 1998: 1). The South East 
and Eastern regions of UNISON had adopted an approach based on 'consolidation', 
which involved the following: 'take the homes where we had any members at all and 
concentrate on just organizing in them and then approach the employers one by one, 
concentrating on a few leading employers... ' ANS had been chosen because, 'there 
was a particular combination of transfers and we had quite a membership base in ANS, 
so we had a bit of a concerted effort'. This had resulted in about 200 members within 
those regions. UNISON had also had a 'base' of about 100 members in the North 
West in a specialist company, Community and Integrated Care Limited. 
Strategic decisions relating to large providers were profoundly affected by various 
pieces of legislation, in particular the Employment Relations Act (1999), the European 
Acquired Rights Directive (EU, 1977). the National Minimum Wage (NMW), and the 
EU's Working Time Directive (EU, 1993). The Employment Relations Act (1999) 
implements the proposals of the Fairness At Work White Paper (DTI, 1998), and 
provides for union recognition where 50% of the workforce are members or where a 
majority (of at least 40% of the workforce) vote for it in a ballot. Fenton said this 
would provide the basis for trying to organize in large firms. Which 
firms would be 
targeted had not at that th-ne been agreed but would, Fenton said, be either those that 
were easiest to organize in or those that were most sympathetic to union organization. 
Fenton said: 'What I'll be doing is ranking the homes and saying, 
"right, who are we 
going to be approaching for a national recognition deal". Because what we'll 
be doing 
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is going to them and saying, "look, you either sign now or we'll run a campaign and 
we'll enforce it legallyý'. ' Fenton said one argument the union might use to convince 
these firms, 'is the union will help stop their high turnover of staff, because they have a 
phenomenal turnover of staff, because they pay such crap. ' Gresham, however, pointed 
out that there was some ambiguity within the Fairness at Work proposals as to whether 
the bargaining unit would be the company or the individual home. Saber said the RCN 
was also intending to use the Fairness at Work proposals to obtain recognition, but 
that this may prove difficult, since nurses seldom formed the majority of workers in 
nursing homes. 
An important place to start for such organizing, for both UNISON and GMB, was 
the European Acquired Rights Directive (EU, 1977), since most membership of the 
two unions in the private care sector was as a result of transfers from local authorities. 
The TUPE directive protects the conditions of employment of workers who transfer 
from the public to the private sector, including the right to union membership. The 
Acquired Rights Directive is implemented in the UK through the Transfer of 
Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations JUPE, 1981), which ensure 
that workers are entitled to continue working under the same terms and conditions 
(including union representation) agreed with their original employer when a transfer 
takes place to a new one. 
According to Morton, '... once the decision is taken to put the tender out, there is a 
pattern of particular companies moving into monopoly and near monopoly positions, 
and you want to secure agreements with those and get a negotiating relationship with 
them. ' Gresham said that GMB was able to use transfers as a way of recruiting more 
members: 
Where there are members in companies that they're taking over they [GMB's 
regional officials] will be negotiating about the whole transfer question. 
I know 
that they've been able to use that as a recruiting tool, because you know when 
you're being taken over it's always a time of uncertainties and 
insecurities and 
we have been able to make inroads in recruiting there. So the more 
information 
we can provide about the company that's taking over, it puts them in stronger 
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position both with that company and also with potential members to say 'well 
look You know we've got information on what's going to happen. 
Gresham said that GMB had 'a nwnber of little local agreements where there's been 
transfer', as a result of TUPE. 
The NMW, established by the National Minimum Wage Act (1998) and introduced in 
April 1999, was set initially at E3.60 per hour, with exceptions of E3.00 per hour for 
18-21 year olds and E3.20 per hour for workers aged 22 and older receiving trainmig. 
These rates were due to increase by 10 pence for adult workers from October 2000, 
and 20 pence for 18-21 year olds from June 2000 (CCMN, February 2000). It has 
been estimated that less than 10 % of private care home providers had prepared a 
strategy to deal with the likely impact of the NMW (CCMN, February 1999). The 
NMW would add 'millions of pounds' to the cost of care, with the number of business 
failures over the two years subsequent to the NMW's introduction likely to increase as 
a result (ibid). L&B (1999-2000: 171) estimated that the total cost to private and 
voluntary care homes would be over f. 90 million per annun-4 falling most heavily in the 
North of England. The impact of the NMW on the sector would be uneven 
geographically, reflecting local labour markets. Homes in the North of England, East 
Midlands and Wales were likely to be most adversely afiected. L& B's analysis of the 
impact of the NMW (CCMN, June 1999) estimated that the rate of increase required 
to cover the costs ranged from ; E7.09 per week in the Yorkshire and Humberside 
region to 80 pence per week in London. Few local authorities in the areas most 
affected appeared to have made concurrent adjustments to fee levels. The above- 
inflation pay awards granted to NHS nurses in 1999, in response to the widely 
recognised problem of lack of trained nurses, were also Rely to lead to higher wages 
in the private sector. Recruitment difficulties across all providers of nursing care 
(discussed in the next section) had also led to a rise in the use of (more expensive) 
agency staff, and to some providers recruiting from abroad. 
All the unions agreed that the NMW would have a significant effect within the sector, 
and had campaigned for it as a means of improving pay. However, they also thought it 
was set too low. The tactic, therefore, was to use it as a base-line and then attempt to 
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negotiate a mark-up. UNISON's target minimum rate was set at a pound above the 
NMW at E4.60 per hour, whilst GMB's minimum target was E4.00 per hour, which 
they had already succeeded in negotiating in local government and which had risen to 
E4.34. Morton said that UNISON was: 
running courses for our officers on both the new legislation and its organizing 
implications so that we use the law, particularly in sectors like this, and 
whatever emerges in terms of the recognition, the new recognition law, under 
the Fairness at Work, to go into homes and, I mean often its a question of 
getting a foothold, and the Minimum Wage, I think, provides the basis often for 
workers unsure of their rights, uncertain as to who to turn to, for the union to 
provide that support... So Minimum Wage, working time, recognition, all 
provide us with the opportunity, if we"re prepared to take it, to organize 
workers in this sector. 
The Working Time Directive was implemented through the Working Time 
Regulations (1998), which came into force on I October 1998. These set a working 
time limit of an average of 48 hours per week, which applies to casual and agency staff 
as well as those on more permanent contracts. Many unions have criticised the facility 
for individuals to opt out (in force until 2003) because it may provide a way for 
employers to intimidate less organized staff (TUC, 1998). A report on the effects of 
the Working Time Directive (PWR, 1999) on care home operators found that the 
increase in the wage bill resulting from the directive for the 'average' residential home 
was likely to be about E3,500 per annum, mainly as a result of the entitlement to three 
weeks paid annual leave (rising to four weeks after November 1999), a point also 
made by the GMB's Mike Gresham. The report found that the proportion of 
employees working in excess of the 48 hour limit imposed by the directive was less 
than two per cent, but that staff in 74% of organizations had signed an agreement to 
work more than an average of 48 hours a week. 
One way in which the unions could take advantage of new legislation was to offer help 
to employers, particularly small owners, as a way of promoting organization and better 
conditions. GMB had offered smaller employers help from their legal and research 
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departments. Laura Pole, a Research Officer at GMB, said this was a way of saying to 
employers: 
'Let's work together on this because you're going to have to comply with 
this... you're going to have to acquaint yourself with the law and what they're 
going to do. ' Because for them it's quite a chaflenge to keep abreast of all 
these changes, and we can seH the fact that we will assist you to implement this 
and to make sure that you're compliant. 
Similarly, Stephens said that UNISON had offered some employers help with 
education and training as a way of, 'increasing the skills of members - they will mostly 
be members in practice, or potential members - we can make them more marketable 
and thereby raise the wage level in the sector, as wen as giving us an input into the 
sector and a sort of presence there. ' 
Gresham said that knowledge of the regulations and laws relevant to the sector were 
crucial when attempting to organize: 
One of the things that we have noticed, or we've found imperative, is that our 
officers and recruiters who go into this sector actually need to be well briefed 
and knowledgeable on the sector as a whole, on things such as regulation and 
inspection, funding arrangements, employment law issues - you can't send a 
boilermaker into a private care home, because it's an entirely different sort of 
strategies that are needed. Traditionally with recruitment you've gone and 
organized the workers and then knocked on the employers door. One of the 
things that we've done is organized the owners or establish a relationship with 
the owners. Because these homes are close communities, you know, the 
influence of the home owner or the manager tends to dictate what the... 
Warwick University did some research... a significant number of trade union 
members joined the unions because their bosses tell them to. So if you go in 
like a bull in a china shop, our experience in this sector, if you go in 
aggressively, it tends not to pay dividends. If you can establish the relationship 
it pays dividends. Hence things like the handbooks and things like that that we 
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produce and the quid pro quo is that we'U give this to you, you- give us the 
members. 
The strategy with larger providers had to be different, since they would have their own 
legal and research resources, although Pole still emphasised 'partnership,: 'With some 
bigger ones it might be more a question of we'll have to go to the wire, and "you will 
be forced to do this by the law", and again try and get them to get a partnership 
approach to it rather than an adversarial approach. ' 
It is clear that in this sector there is a greater reliance by the unions on lobbying and 
regulation of working conditions than would otherwise be the case, which results from 
their inability thus far to significantly organize the sector. Stephens acknowledged this: 
'I think we don't generally have strategic policy saying we're going to concentrate on 
lobbying. It's emerged because the weaknesses or the difficulties of organizing in the 
sector mean that we're not in practice organizing the sector, therefore the only thing 
we can put our influence into is lobbying. ' Stephens did say, however, that this may 
change if the returns to the effort that was being put into organizing among private 
contractors of ancillary services declined. Gresham said of GMB's attitude to using the 
law: 'Our policy is that we would rather negotiate than litigate, but we're not 
frightened of doing the litigation route. ' The general approach, therefore, was to use 
the legislation as a bargaining tool. Pole explained this in relation to the NMW in a way 
which also reflected UNISON's approach: '... for any company it must be better to 
have a negotiated, gradual approach to something rather than leave it all 'til April 
[1999] and they have to make the changes overnight... Let's talk about how to deal 
with it prior to the date of it coming, so again it's all about starting those talks. ' 
All the unions belonged to international federations. UNISON was a member of the 
Public Services International (PSI) and the European Public Services Union (EPSU). 
The PSPRU at UNISON worked partly for the PSI and the EPSU. GMB was a 
member of nine international federations in total. Of these, the ones relevant to the 
long-term care sector were PSI, EPSU and FIET, the International Federation of 
Commercial, Clerical, Professional and Technical Employees, which has since merged 
with other federations to form the Union Network International 
(UNI) (www-union- 
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network. org). UNISON also had links with FIET and sometimes participated in events 
organized by them, but was not a member as FIET was primarily a private sector 
organization. Gresham said that FIET had been formed in order to get 'different 
service unions under one umbrella' in response to privatization and the consequent 
increasing involvement of multinationals in public services: '... they realized about six 
or seven years ago that within the service sector , none of the international trade union 
groups had actually got any coordinated strategy, so they embarked on it and they've 
been pretty successful in cleaning, security, care sector. ' Gresham said FIET was 
particularly useful as a means of obtaining information. FIET held regular meetings of 
its affiliates in Merent sectors, including the care sector, the cleaning sector and 
security. The circulation of information was also the main benefit which the RCN 
derived from its international affiliation, the International Council of Nurses, which 
Saber said enabled the sharing of examples of good practice. 
The meetings organized by FIET tended to concentrate on European-wide issues, as 
did those of EPSU. EPSU talked to the European Commission about issues such as the 
Working Time Directive. The most important issue, according to both UNISON and 
GMB, which EPSU dealt with was the European Public Procurement Directive 
(EPPD) (EU, 1992). As discussed in Chapter Five, this stipulates that no 'non- 
commercial' considerations, such as conditions of employment, should be used when 
procuring public services. Gresham said the New Labour government was in the 
process of relaxing this requirement and had indicated, 'that non-commercial activities 
can be taken into consideration, not "should be" taken into consideration, we haven't 
got that far yet... ' According to Stephens, 'the Labour government have argued to us 
that they can't write into either local government contracts or health contracts that 
employment conditions must be protected and quality or health and safety must be 
given due consideration. They can adopt it as a policy but they can't write it into 
contracts. ' EPSU therefore lobbied at the European level to get an 'employment 
dimension' included in public procurement, and both UNISON and GMB were in 
favour of local authorities using such stalffling criteria when making conu-nissioning 
decisions. 
According to Stephens, EPSU's efforts had been 'extremely unsuccessful': 
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Because the European Commission's dialogue with the trade unions is 
conducted by the employment side of the commission who are pro-union... So 
they can control directives like the Working Time Directive and write in union 
influence into those directives, which are then translated into national 
legislation. The Public Procurement Directive is controlled by the other sort of 
wing of the commission, the pro-capitalist, globalization., free market, 
European capital wing, controlled by Leon Brittan... So they just tell the 
employment division to keep well out of trade matters, because this is a matter 
of trade and therefore not appropriate for the employment part of the 
Commission to get involved in. And within the internal politics of the 
Commission the people on it are ... the employment cornmission is much 
weaker than the competition division. And then of course you have the 
shadowy influence of the European round table of industrialists... They're the 
key big European corporations who lobby the competitions side of the 
Commission on things like the Public Procurement Directive, and they're 
determined that there shouldn't be employment considerations written into 
awards of public contracts. I think they could five with changes in policy but 
they don't want it in legislation. 
Stephens also thought that, 'the Americans may occasionally try and put pressure on 
the Commission', in order to keep employment criteria out of contracts. 
In long-term care, it was the example set by the American SEW (discussed in the 
previous section) which impressed both UNISON and GMB the most. Stephens said 
that the organized international federations were less important than concrete links 
with foreign unions such as the SEIU (even though the SEIU was also a member of 
FIET) : 
International links are relevant, those fon-nal bodies in relation to this are not 
particularly relevant. They are relevant for other things, I mean the EPSU 
is 
central in tenns of getting European Directives on public sector issues, but not 
particularly relevant to this. The real relevance of international links here is the 
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links that we've made with the SEW and other unions that are organizing to 
just exchange information and ideas about how to organize. There's not been 
any co-ordinated bargaffiffig approach., we're not at anything like that level. 
Stephens said that UNISON also had links with the American Confederation of State, 
County and Municipal Employees (ACSCME), a primarily public sector union. 
However, Stephens thought it was the SEIU, 'that have made the running in tenns of 
nursing home organizing, and those of us that are pro-organizing as it were always 
quote the SEW ..... As far as I know the SEIU is the only one that's really made any 
impact on the sector. ' 
The GMB was equally impressed with the SEIU, Gresham describing it as, 'The 
American equivalent to the GMB... Very impressive trade union, we're very good 
friends with quite a few of them... ' The SEIU organized all service employees, 
including care staff, cleaners, catering staff, janitorial staff and security staff. Gresham 
described the SEIU's recent history as follows: 
About 10 or 12 years ago they were in the complete doldrums and their general 
secretary, or their president, at that time was a bloke called John Sweeney 
who's now John Monk's equivalent. He took a decision to actually organize 
the non-organized service sector, and their membership went from 400,000 to 
over one million in six to eight years. They're a very, very aggressive trade 
union. I mean they brought out ... they shut 
down New York a couple of 
years ago because they tried to organize and recruit all the janitors and cleaners 
in the apartment blocks and they did, but it meant that some Madison and Park 
Lane garbage wasn't being collected from the stairs. They're very, very 
impressive and their new president, a bloke called Andy Stem, is certainly one 
hell of an organizer, very impressive. They organize, well again in the sector, a 
lot of Puerto Rican, a lot of Mexican, a lot of immigrant and black workers 
who are traditionally non-unionized, no culture of unions, and they've actually 




Andy Stem had been a guest at GMB's conference in the year prior to the interview. 
and Greshwn had been to the SEIU's conferences. Yet despite Gresham's admiration 
for the SEIU, their 'very aggressive' approach could not be more different from the 
GMB's 'partnership approach'. The SEIU's biggest success was in organii g the staff 
of Company 2 (USA), which will be discussed in the next section. 
Although impressed by the activities of the SEIU, it is clear that international links 
were useful primarily for the information and inspiration they yielded, rather than for 
their ability to increase bargaining power. The activities of EPSU, for example, in 
trying to obtain an 'employment dimension' within the European Public Procurement 
Directive had not been successful. None of the unions were able or willing to engage in 
the kind of aggressive organizing within the sector which they admired in the SEIU. As 
discussed above, this left them with a nationally-based strategy reliant to a significant 
extent on using state regulations and laws as the basis of bargaining. Within this 
context, the unions' relations with the case-study firms will be discussed in the next 
section. 
FIRM-SPECIFIC ASPECTS 
As indicated already, union membership across the sector was generally low, and this 
was reflected in the figures for the case-study firms. Stephens said that UNISON 
membership figures for all the case-study firms was 'negligible". Gresham said that 
GMB was in a very similar position, with membership across the case-study firms at 
'two or three per cent, possibly. Very, very low. ' Gresham said that GMB had 'some' 
Company I membership in Yorkshire, but none in the Greater London area. Gresham 
also said that registered nurses in nursing homes would be RCN members, but that 'the 
RCN will not necessarily be their representative body. ' Saber said that the RCN did 
not yet 'have formal agreements' with the case-study firms, but would seek to secure 
these through 'partnership' and the Fairness at Work legislation. 
Stephens said that Company I was conducting talks with UNISON over recognition 
within its residential homes, but not within its nursing homes. Both UNISON and 
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GMB had more members in the case-study firms on the residential side rather than the 
nursing side, mainly because these members originated in local authority homes that 
were transferred to the private sector. Stephens said in relation to Company I that: 
in a sense, what they're doing is recognising that we have a base in the 
[residential] care home sector, in that there are large numbers of people being 
transferred out of local authority... care into privately provided care. I don't 
think they would want to give us a foothold, which we don't have at the 
moment, in their nursing home operations. 
Stephens said that Company I had taken the initiative as a result of impending transfers 
involving UNISON staff- 
... we'd raised some issues at a 
local level in one or two homes and obviously 
our branches had made it clear that when the main transfer took place they'd be 
demanding recognition, but [Company 1] took the initiative to say 'look let's 
not wait until the actual transfers take place, lets talk nationally overall. ' 
However, Stephens said that such negotiations had to be conducted carefuUy, since in 
other sectors: 
we've had one or two contractors that have presented us with recognition 
agreements that we don"t think are worth anything and then gone round 
bidding for contracts and claimed to be in discussion with UNISON, you know, 
and 'we're a union friendly employer'. So people are utilising some form of 
paper recognition as a means of securing market advantage. That hasn't really 
happened yet in our sector, but it could do I suppose... 
Gresham said that in GMB's experience Company I had an anti-union approach, 
although he thought there might be some places where Company I would 
have to 
grant recognition as a result of the Fairness at Work legislation. Although 
he did not 
know the details of this, Company I's Head of Quality Assurance, Bob Jones, 
confirmed that Company I was 'going through the process' of 
dealing with the 
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Fairness at Work legislation. Asked finiher about union organizatior4 Jones said that 
although it was not his area of responsibility, Company I had, 'always had and will 
continue to maintain good links with the Royal College of Nursing, who are a union as 
well. So there's always been that link... I always bring up the Royal College of 
Nursing, because I was once on the council of the RCN. ' 
Stephens said that as a result of its weak organization and the factors discussed in the 
previous section regarding the union's 'cost - benefit analysis', UNISON had decided 
not to attempt to gain recognition from Company 2 or Company 3 at that stage. 
According to Stephens, Company 2 and Company 3 'are known to be the most anti- 
union... ' This statement was informed by experiences, some of which dated back to the 
1980s, 
where people have transferred across [from the NHS], they're the people 
we've had lots of individual disputes with about disciplinary grievance issues, 
no big strikes or anything, but lots of poor treatment of staff and disciplinary 
grievance issues which, in our view, is designed to remove the transferred staff 
as soon as possible after the date of transfer, just basically harass them out or 
make it so uncomfortable that they decide to leave and then they don't need to 
deal with it. 
This related not simply to union members, but to other staff who had rights under 
TUPE, 
and thereby being more expensive than other groups of staff. I think they do 
have a hostile attitude to trade unionism as well,, but I think the main 
motivation for them is that they inherit staff from the health authority or trusts 
who cost them a lot more than the staff that they employ themselves and they 
want to remove them as soon as possible, so they have two tactics. They either 
offer them fairly generous voluntary redundancy, or to the people who don't go 
after that's been put on offer they try and make life as uncomfortable as 
possible so that people just quit. 
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However, some doubt must be cast on these claims as far as Company 2 is concerned, 
since Stephens acknowledged some confusion over which firms had links with each 
other, believing Takare (which was later acquired by Company I- see Chapter Four) 
once to have been 'linked to' Company 2. 
Gresham also displayed some imprecision in his characterization of the attitude of 
some firnis towards the unions. He claimed that: 
we've had a few battles with some of the home owners, particularly the 
Americans, who some of our contacts over there sent us information about 
fraud cases amongst certain of the companies that are trying to get a foothold 
in the UK ..... I mean the Americans as employers are vehemently anti-Union 
in 
the homes and particularly in this sector. 
This information related to information passed by the SEIU, who had succeeded in 
gaining a recognition deal with Company 2 (USA) after a series of strikes. Company 2 
(USA)'s annual report for 1996 (AF, 1996: 28) indicates that the company had 
negotiated new contracts at eight facilities in the US in order to avert a strike by the 
SEIU. However, Gresham said that Company 2 had not had a significantly more 
hostile attitude to the unions since its acquisition by Company 2 (USA). He put this 
down to the fact that, 'a lot of the [Company 2] management is still the old [Company 
21 management that we've had a relationship with, particularly in Scotland. ' This 
relationship stemmed from the time when, according to Gresham, Company 2 had been 
set up by a hotel chain and subsequently bought out by the management, at which time 
GMB had a recognition deal in the hotels. 
Of all the union representatives interviewed, Fenton had the greatest knowledge of 
Company 2's parent company, Company 2 (USA). When Company 2 (USA)first 
began 
to invest in the UK,, UNISON had planned to carry out a joint campaign against 
it with 
the SEIU, involving American residents of Company 2 (USA)'s homes who 
had made 
complaints against the firm relating to allegations, 
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of fraud and corruption in the US. We'd been writing a book at the time on 
fraud and corruption in public services, as a result of privatization, so it fitted 
nicely into the work we were doing. So the idea was that we'd do a joint 
campaign and the Americans were going to bring over a whole team of ex- 
users of [Company 2 (USA)] and shop stewards who were involved in working 
there and we were going to do..... and what it also fitted into at the time was 
that UNISON were running a national public service campaign at the time, 
leading to a big demonstration and concert and aH these sorts of things; it fitted 
in nicely with that as well. But the long and short of it was that the legal team 
here looked over the material that we were going to use and gave it to a 
leading QC who specialized in libel law who said "you cannot be involved in 
the campaign whatsoever because the Company wiH sue you"; so we had to 
pull out. 
The SEIU were more successful in their campaign against Company 2 (USA)in the 
US: 
The SEIU were very successful because they ran a half page ad in the Wall 
Street Journal basically saying '[Company 2 (USA)] are being investigated by 
the FBI, do you know anything and if you do phone this number', and 
[Company 2 (USA)'s] stock fell $2.50 a share and wiped out $100,000 of the 
What's it..... I cant remember the name of the chairman .... off of 
his 
personal fortune. 
Fenton claimed that this action had a major influence on the recognition deal which 
Company 2 (USA)subsequently signed with the SEIU. Fenton thought that British 
unions could learn a lot from American ones like the SEIU, who organized company- 
focused campaigns in which they would, 'go in and find out as much detail as 
possible'. UNISON's goal in attempting to run this campaign against 
Company 2 
(USA)was part of its overall campaign against the private provision of services. 
Company 2's Head of Quality Assurance, Jane Bartlett, confirmed the lack of union 
organization in the company, saying: 'there's not been much union 
involvement at all. 
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The company doesn't currently recognise the union, but it may well change with the 
legislation'. However, she did say that Company 2 had good relations with the RCN, 
which she described as, 'a union of sorts'. Bartlett said that the firm had, 'always used 
RCN guidelines anyway', and that many Company 2 homes had RCN 'resource 
centres'. These were libraries, 'that any nurse from the hospital or any other nurse can 
come in, pick up RCN leaflets, hold seminars and things like that. ' Bartlett said the 
company encouraged nurses that did not work for it to use the resource centres, partly 
as a way of tackling the perception that working in a nursing home was 'second class' 
when compared to working in the NHS- 
Fenton confirmed Stephens' comments that Company 3 had been hostile to the union 
when TUPE transfers had taken place, giving a particular example where staff in a 
Scottish health authority were redeployed within the authority following a transfer 
because Company 3 would not agree to employ unionized staff. Pole said that GMB 
did not have 'much experience of dealing with' Company 3, but was aware that a 
number of public sector homes had been acquired by the company. This meant they 
would have to be carefully monitored: 
we'll have to keep tabs on that because it'll be things like, you know, 'how do 
they apply TUPET, you know we need to keep that kind of information 
coming in because... if, for example, we know that certain companies are not 
going to apply TUPE, or haven't done in the past, we're going to have that 
information to hand when they take over a local authority's workforce, so that 
we can say 'there's a concern here'. So there's a concern, but because of the 
disparate nature of the sector that is quite a challenge. 
When asked in interview whether Company 3 had any union organization, Margaret 
Grant simply said: 'We don't have unions. ' She said it was in the terms and conditions 
of employment that the company did not recognise unions, although staff could 
be 
members on an individual basis. She declined to elaborate on this ffirther, except to say 
that it was, 'just a decision that was taken right from the start. ' However, she said 
Company 3 encouraged staff to be members of 'the professional body', the RCN. 
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Fenton claimed that Company 3 had been harmed by adverse publicity surrounding its 
early US partner, which he said had an, 'appalling record on patient violations and 
accusations of kidnapping. ' Fenton said Company 3 had puffed out of an early PH 
project as a result of, 'the adverse publicity, you know, this is a firm that's owned by 
an American company that's been sued in the States for patient violation, for fraud, for 
corruption, for this that and the other. ' This US company had in turn pulled out of 
Company 3, Fenton thought possibly as a result of Company 3 'saying "look, you're 
making it impossible for us to operate here". ' Fenton said that the US company had 
also 'got driven out of Australia' as a result of a campaign run by a doctor whose son 
had been a resident of one of the company's homes: '... he says his son was subjected 
to quite serious abuse and had a nervous breakdown. So he waged a one-person 
campaign against this firm and drove them out of Australia. ' 
The lack of union organization among the case-study firms meant that they could pay 
wage rates based on what local labour markets would stand. Jones said that this was 
Company I's practice, with pay set on a home by home basis, but that Company I had 
to decide, 'Whether or not it will go the same way as the National Health Service, i. e. 
the same pay across the country or whether or not it remains local. ' Jones said that he 
personally was in favour of it remaining localized: 'I think we should stick with the 
local labour market pay rates... It's not about the rate you're getting, its about where 
you're working, which is very different depending on the cost of living. You know, 
it'd 
be nice to wave a magic wand and have everybody across having the same cost of 
living, but fife ain't like that. ' Bartlett said that in Company 2, also, 'Pay rates are very 
regional, so if we were talking about Bromley, it would be totally 
different if you 
talked maybe about Sheffield or somewhere like that. ' Grant confirmed that the same 
was true for Company 3. 
The low wages paid across the sector meant there was potential for competition on 
pay between firms. Jones said that Company I found it was competing on pay, 
'an the 
time. ' However, he said that the low level of state fimding limited the amount the 
firm 
could afford to pay staff. 'You've also got to bear in mind, I think 
it's 80% of our 
clients, are state funded not private funded. State fimding 
has a limit, so unless that 
limit changes we can't pay more. We might want to, but we can't. 
' Bartlett said 
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Company 2 also had to be mindful of the competition: 'We did a massive survey at the 
end of last year, and sort of rung competitors, got staff to go to other homes and find 
out pay rates before they were set, and we do try and remain competitive. ' However, 
competition on pay was not always in the company's interests: 
Its difficult sometimes, because you can get into almost pay rate wars ..... 
because if we did it the nursing home down the road would do it, and then 
you'd get that all of a sudden you're paying perhaps the qualified nurses three 
pounds an hour more. And its not the be all and end all, I think some of the 
other staff benefits are also important... we try to remain competitive in every 
area. 
Grant said of pay, simply: 'We never expect to be the highest payers. ' 
Grant gave an indication of the flexible nature of Company 3's workforce, describing 
it as 'mobile' and mostly female. The 'nucleus' was full-time, especially the trained 
nurses, but there was 'fluidity'. She said Company 3 had a 'high proportion' of part- 
time female staff, some of whom had two separate posts within the organization. Grant 
accepted that consistency and continuity of staffing was important, but said there were 
6severel recruitment problems, among trained nurses in particular. Both Jones and 
Bartlett made sirnilar comments, with the following from Jones being typical: 
In terms of the qualified staff, there's a national nursing recruitment crisis 
whatever organization you're in, public, private, whatever, and it's only going 
to get worse. The projections demonstrate that there are fewer people coming 
into training and the requirement... its all right for Frank Dobson saying 'there 
are x number more nurses', they just aren't there. And if the public health 
service recruits x number more nurses, that means there's x number less 
available for the independent sector. There is a major problem. Its going to get 
even worse because some bright spark worked out that, I can't remember the 
figures, but something like 60% of the workforce is in its last fifteen years of 
working life. They're predominantly middle aged at the moment but that's... 
what the hell happens when they all retire? Big problem with qualified staff. 
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Company 2 (USA)"s annual report for 1998 (AR form jok, 1998: 21) indicates that: 
6 operating costs in the United Kingdom were impacted by increased temporary staffing 
costs due to a nursing shortage. ' 
These problems were compounded by the status attached to working in a private 
nursing home for older people. Jones explained that : 'We suffer the problem, and this 
is a very honest comment, that the independent sector as opposed to the public sector 
is seen as a second class citizen. Elderly care as opposed to something else you might 
work in is seen as the bottom of the pile. So we don't necessarily get the pick of the 
staff. ' The problems attached to recruitment and retention of less skilled staff were 
somewhat different, and related more directly to pay levels. Jones said: 
There are problems with unqualified staff but they tend to be different. I can 
think of two examples. We've got a home in Manchester where they opened a 
large supermarket down the road and you can get a couple of pence more an 
hour for stacking shelves. Care assistant versus shelf stacking. So they go. 
There's one of the homes down in Kent where they're... building the largest 
shopping centre in Europe... and we've got two homes just adjacent to that. 
Both Jones and Bartlett thought the NMW would have an effect on their respective 
companies, although despite her comment about not being 'the highest payers', Grant 
claimed it would not. Jones said that there were some areas of the country where 
Company I had slowly raised wages over a period of time in order to get them up to 
the required level in time. Bartlett said the impact on Company 2 would also vary 
regionally, but that the size of the company would allow it to absorb these costs: 
... the Minimum 
Wage is going to affect some of the smal-ler individuals [i. e. 
home owners] concerned in a tremendous way. And with the regional spread, 
it's probably not going to affect us at all in the South East... You get up into 
perhaps Newcastle, again probably it'H be East Midlands, there will be an 
effect. But again because of the spread, because the way things are, with also 
having the States [i. e. Company 2 (USA)], the amount of profit we make wil-I 
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go down, but its not going to be Re someone's bread and butter... or anything 
like that. 
Staff relations are obviously important to the smooth functioning of the company and 
the achievement of its goals. Unsurprisingly, all the Heads of Quality Assurance said 
staff relations generally were 'good' or 'quite good'. Both Jones and Bartlett said there 
were factors additional to pay which were important in achieving this. Bartlett, for 
example, said pay was, 'not the be all and end all. I think some of the other staff 
benefits are also important. ' Jones said he believed, the single biggest recruitment 
problem or success, is the quality of the manager of the home. You get the right 
person in charge and your recruitment problems begin to dhiniinish. You get the wrong 
person in charge and they go up. ' 
As discussed in Chapter Four, the merger process was a time of disruption; how this 
was handled was crucial for staff relations. Jones claimed that in Company I this had 
been successful as evidenced by the latest topic of conversation among staff- 
The hot topic at the moment, which perhaps is a good indication of how staff 
are feeling, is what the new dresses are going to look like. As we go through a 
process known as branding where the... a significant number of the homes stil-I 
have their own signs and in order to brand them as [Company I] there are 
certain things they have to go through, and one of them is new frocks. 
At Company 2, however, the merger process had caused considerable difficulties, 
With some of the former Apta staff choosing to leave (see Chapter Four). Bartlett said 
that in 1997, following the merger process, Company 2 had had to look, 
at terms and conditions of employment and how it was going to be all brought 
into one company. It did cause an awful lot of problems, coming up October, 
November last year. In January the new terms and conditions were introduced. 
Most people, I'd say probably 90,95% of people were very happy with the 
outcome, and we've moved forward a lot, but I would say that if you look back 
to the Company 2 Homes as was in 1994-95, last year put us back and I would 
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say now that people are becoming a lot more aware of staff benefits, tramimig .1 
that's available. 
All the Heads of QA said that training was important. Company I had a 'Professional 
Development Centre' (Annual Review, 1997: 23), which provided continuing 
professional education for nurses and National Vocational Qualifications (NVQs). 
Jones said that training would, 'come together more over the next twelve months as 
we head down the road to Investors in People'. As discussed in Chapter Four, 
Company 2 was introducing an intranet which would allow it to, 'effectively train 
eighty units at one time from a central location'. Bartlett said that Company 2 was, 
4pushing staff development and people taking responsibility for their own learning, and 
encouraging that actively. ' She said that the firm's resources allowed it to, 'ensure that 
we've got adequately trained staff and that staff are happy with their terms and 
conditions, and therefore I'm convinced that that is reflected in the care that the 
residents get. ' Grant said that every member of staff at Company 3 had induction and 
4ongoing training', which amounted to a minimum of five days a year, although in 
practice it was more than that. Each home had its own trainer who is responsible to a 
regional trainer, who in turn was responsible at the national level. In addition to this 
there were 'special courses'. 
Training was therefore seen as important to the functioning of all the firms. However, 
as Chapter Four indicated, these firms operated primarily on the basis of 
standardization of the work process rather than standardization of skills through 
professionalization. It is clear from this chapter that wage levels and the overall 'crisis' 
in nurse recruitment were the most important factors when seeking to attract and retain 
enough competent and adequately trained staff. As 'A Better Home Life' points out 
(CPA, 1996: 71), the conditions under which staff work, and the effect of these on 
their morale, are important factors in the quality of care delivered. Large 
firms may 
have an advantage when compared to small owners in being able to provide 
better 
training and marginally higher wage levels, and their QA systems may 
be effective in 
maintaining an acceptable quality of care. However, these observations need 
to be set 
alongside those of Fenn and Smitham in the last chapter 
(see Chapter Six, 'firm 
specific aspects'), which suggest that some large 
firms (although, according to 
243 
Smitharn, not Company 1) may have problems with staff loyalty and retention. It is 
clear that staffing conditions within the private care sector as a whole fall significantly 
below those in the state care sector (L&B, 1997: Al 53), and in most other sectors. 
Whilst the low level of unionization within the firms permitted them to pay according 
to local labour market conditions, two of the three firms acknowledged that the NMW 
would have a significant impact upon them. This reinforces the importance of the state, 
since this would be the case even if the unions did not exist. AU the firms were more 
sympathetic to the RCN than to the other unions, despite the fact that the RCN had 
not managed to secure national agreements with any of them. The evidence from 
UNISON regarding the union's experience of TUPE transfers, and the comments of 
Grant herself, suggest that Company 3 was the most hostile to unionization. Company 
1, on the other hand, had taken the initiative to begin talks with UNISON about 
recognition. Nevertheless, the fact that this was prompted by the TUPE legislation and 
the Fairness at Work provisions (the Employment Relations Act, 1999), and the fact 
that even the RCN felt the need to resort to the latter, again reinforces the relative 
weakness of the unions and their reliance on the state. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
It is clear from the evidence in this chapter that the extent of union organization across 
the sector generally, as well as within the case study fin-ns specifically, is very low. This 
is a valid conclusion, since if anything the incentive of the union officials interviewed 
would have been to overstate the extent of membership. Although there were some 
limited successes in signing or moving towards recognition agreements, such as 
UNISON's talks with Company 1, union membership was negligible. In some cases 
this limited extent of organization was compounded by problems arising from the form 
of organization. This was the case for UNISON in particular, since it was geared to 
organizing employer-based branches within large public bodies. However, in the long 
term care sector, as Stephens put it, 'Because our membership is so weak... it's 
usually not sustainable to have employer-based branches'. Various alternative methods 
of organization had been experimented with in the sector, but these imposed 
higher 
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costs on the union in terms of the resources necessary to make them work. -The union 
thus had to undertake a 'cost-benefit analysis' of whether this sector was the most 
effective place to employ these resources. 
The organizational fon'n of UNISON also impacted on its strategy through the 
medium of the attitudes, perceptions and goals which arose from it being primarily a 
public sector organization. There was a degree of hostility towards and suspicion of 
the private sector, and large and internationalized firms in particular, which was lacking 
in other organizations. Fenton was clearly the most hostile of the respondents. This 
may have stemmed from his position as a researcher in the PSPRU - his function in the 
union was to collect information on multinational firms which could be utilised for 
campaigning activities. Stephens, on the other hand, was primarily responsible for 
organizational matters, and thus took a somewhat more pragmatic approach. All 
agreed, however, that the union's ultimate goal was to retain as much provision within 
the public sector as possible; yet there was a realization that the dominance of private 
provision was unlikely to be reversed. The difficulty the union was having adapting to 
these changed circumstances is demonstrated by the internal debate over how its goals 
should be pursued in this sector, and even whether it should be organizing within it at 
A This debate indicates that the organization was not monolithic. The outcome of afl 
these factors, however, was that the union had effectively 'de-prioritized' the sector. 
Nevertheless, there is some inconsistency in UNISON's decision not to organize within 
the private acute sector, apparently on principle, whilst its decision to de-prioritize 
long term care was more pragmatic. It is possible that the union could take such a 
'principled' stand in the acute sector because that sector is fairly smaH and the 
dominance of the NHS seems assured. In long term care, however, private provision 
has become the norm and this is unlikely to be reversed. 
UNISON's approach Mered from that of the GMB and the RCN, both of which 
took a 'partnership' approach. For the RCN this stemmed from the form of its 
organization as a more 'professional' body, whilst the GMB was not a primarily public 
sector union and had substantial experience of organizing among private employers. 
Gresham's comment that, 'I want [Company 2] to make a profit', contrasts clearly 
with those of Fentor4 for example. Nevertheless, Gresham displayed some imprecision 
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about the activities of multinational firms in the sector, which would seem to refiect 
general perceptions of these type of firms (informed to a large extent by the American 
SEIU) rather than actual experience. It is clear, however, that GMB was more 
pragmatic in its approach to private providers, including large and internationalized 
ones, than was UNISON. However, both the GMB and the RCN were confronted by 
the Miculty in practice of organizing in the sector and faced similar problems to 
UNISON. Despite Gresham's desire to 'hit the big players', GMB's strategy of 
4partnership' was more successful with smaller providers. Large fin-ns have their own 
resources, and therefore no need for the GMB. The unions' weakness meant these 
firms could effectively ignore them, whether their attitude was friendly or hostile. The 
RCN was something of an exception to this in that the case study firms had a positive 
attitude towards it, again because of its professional status. 
The international links which the unions had did not compensate for their weaknesses 
in the domestic arena. Whilst these links provided them with information and 
inspiration, they made no fundamental difference to their bargaining position. As 
Stephens put it: 'There's not been any coordinated bargaining approach. We're not at 
anything like that level'. The one attempt by UNISON to use these international links 
directly, by combining with the American SEIU to influence negatively the entry of 
Company 2 (USA) into the UK market, had to be abandoned due to the danger of legal 
action against the union. 
The unions' weaknesses in the sector deprived them of direct bargaining power, 
forcing them in practice to rely on the intervention of the state to pursue their goals. 
UNISON's dependence on the state, which was clearly also the case for the other 
unions, is demonstrated by Stephens' comment that: 'I think we don't generally have 
strategic policy saying we're going to concentrate on lobbying. It's emerged because 
the weakness or the difficulties of organizing in the sector mean that we're not in 
practice organizing the sector, therefore the only thing we can put our influence into is 
lobbying. ' In terms of directly increasing or retamimig union membership, reliance on 
the state entailed using the Employment Relations Act (1999) and the TUPE 
regulations. In terms of directly improving workers' conditions of employment, this 
entailed ensuring that the National Minimum Wage and the Working Time Directive 
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were applied properly, and lobbying for the NMW to be increased. The NMW and the 
WTD are particularly important, since they will have an impact across the sector as a 
whole, not just in those areas where the unions have a presence such as in homes 
recently transferred from local authorities. Indeed, the weakness of the unions in the 
sector is evidenced by the fact that firms are able to determine wages on the basis of 
local labour markets. The unions are only able to have an impact on this through 
ensuring that the NMW is applied. 
Whilst the NMW and the WTD will affect both large and small providers, they will 
ultimately have the same effect as the state funding policies and new regulatory 
standards discussed in the last chapter, i. e. they will place more pressure on the smaller 
providers and thus accelerate consolidation within the sector. The economies of scale 
which large firms can make use of will give them an advantage over smaller providers 
in being able to accommodate the increased costs associated with these interventions 
by the state. 
Paradoxically, despite the hostility towards large private firms by some in UNISON, 
Stephens indicated that this consolidation may actually make the unions" task easier, 
since it would remove, 'one of the main obstacles in organizing the sector which is the 
multiplicity of small employers'. Where recognition could be obtained, this would 
particularly benefit UNISON because, as discussed above, the form of its organization 
is suited to large employer-based branches. To some extent then, what holds for the 
relationship between the state and large private providers (see Chapter Five) may hold 
for the unions: concentration in the organization of one may be reflected in the other. 
Company I's talks with UNISON are one example of this. However, Company I 
appears to have taken this action because it will in time be compelled to do so by the 
state, not because the union has been in a position independently to compel it to do so. 
it is thus clearly the state which is leading and facilitating this organizational 
concentration within the sector. 
The extent of union organization in the sector has been shown to be minimal. This 
arises partly from the structure of the sector itself, which currently includes a 
multiplicity of small providers and relatively small workplaces. The barriers to union 
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organization thus include the time, effort and money which would be needed to 
organize such a fragmented workforce. The organizational forms of the unions 
themselves, especially in UNISON's case, have compounded these difficulties. The 
unions have therefore had little choice but to pursue their goals through the medium of 
state intervention. These interventions by the state will have a significant effect in 
raising the costs of providers and thus facilitating greater concentration in provision. 
This chapter therefore confirms the findings of Chapter Five, that the state is the 
decisive actor in the sector, but that its actions are likely to disproportionately benefit 
large and internationalized providers in the long term. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: RESIDENTS AND OLDER PEOPLE'S 
ORGANIZATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
Around 400,000 elderly and disabled people live in registered care homes, of whom 
over 300,000 are supported by public funds (CCMN, June 1998). Older people are the 
largest user group in both health and local authority services. As with other areas of 
welfare, there are profound issues of power concerning the relationship between users 
of long term care services and those who provide them (Barnes, M., 1997; Bennett & 
Kingston, 1993). In care services for older people this is a particularly difficult issue, 
since many users have a sense of 'not wanting to be a burden' and 'not wanting to 
cause trouble' (Williams & Keating, 1998). This provides a basis for the easy 
disempowerment of users - they may in fact need to be actively encouraged to have 
their say. In addition, many users of long term care services require a high degree of 
support of various kinds. 
As a result of the lack of autonomous organizations of care home residents, the meso 
level analysis of the relationship between older people and the case study firms centred 
on two foci, as discussed in Chapter Three. The first focus was organizations which 
claim to represent or campaign on behalf of older people. Thus interviews were 
conducted with key people from Help the Aged, Age Concern, Counsel and Care and 
the Relatives' Association (now the Residents' and Relatives' Association). These are 
charities and not directly controlled by older people themselves. It was hoped to 
interview a representative from the National Pensioners' Convention, a campaigning 
organization of older people, but this did not prove possible. The other 
focus around 
which analysis was centred was the ways in which older people resident 
in homes run 
by the case study firms, and their relatives, may have been encouraged to express their 
opinions through meetings at the home level. This provided a focus on actual residents 
which was consistent with the thesis' concern with the organization of relevant actors, 
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rather than individuals. This second focus is discussed primarily in the section on the 
firm specific aspects of the analysis. 
ATTITUDES, PERCEPTIONS AND GOALS 
All of the organizations had similar goals. Both Evelyn Edwards, Director of 
Information and Policy at Age Concern, and Alison Alexander, Advice Coordinator at 
the Relatives' Association, stated improvement in the quality of life for older people as 
their organization's key objective. Age Concern was particularly concerned with 
funding issues in long-term care, with Edwards arguing that nursing and personal 
social care should be free at the point of use. The 'empowerment' of older people was 
seen as important for Edwards, who described Age Concern's goal as enabling older 
people to 'advocate for themselves'. Garton, Head of Planning and Development at 
Help the Aged, emphasised the need for 'independence and inclusion for older people 
and their direct participation in decision making at an individual and collective level'. 
Alexander said the Relatives' Association wanted to involve relatives more in homes, 
and sought to achieve its goals by 'working in a partnership between fwnilies and 
homes'. Les Martin, Deputy General Manager at Counsel and Care, described the 
organization's objective as to provide 'advice and help' for older people, but also 'to 
influence the work of practitioners and the policies of managers and also the key 
opinion-formers who actually come up with legislative change. To try and bridge the 
gap between the experience of individuals and the making of policy. ' 
In terms of the overall shift towards private provision, two of the respondents, 
Edwards and Alexander, thought that standards of care generally had improved, largely 
as a result of the stricter regulation imposed by the Registered Homes Act (1984). 
Edwards, for example, felt that 'we are no longer running with the poor quality care in 
the local authority sector', and that the regulatory changes accompanying the shift to 
private provision had, 'had a tremendous impact on local authorities... of looking at the 
sufficiency of their own homes. So I would think that that has to be good, even if in 
some cases they've had to sell some of them because they can't put them up to 
standard. ' Expectations of the quality of care had been raised, 'even if you don't get 
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it'. Garton also saw 'some very interesting and positive developments within the 
private sector as well as in the public sector and voluntary sector'. However, 
Alexander drew attention to 'the commercial pressures of running a home'; in 
particular falling occupancy rates, falling profits and fee restraint by local authorities. 
According to Alexander, this led to a situation where relatives sometimes complained 
that residents 'only get the basic care and nothing else'. Edwards, Martin and 
Alexander also saw the cross-subsidization between private payers and state funded 
residents which some providers practice as problematic, as, according to Alexander, it 
meant private payers were 'not really getting the care they're paying for'. 
Both Edwards and Alexander also saw staffing issues as important. WIlilst Edwards 
drew attention to the low wage levels in the sector, Alexander was concerned that if 
firms cut their staffing levels as a response to under occupancy this could lead to the 
employment of agency staff, with a corresponding impact on continuity of care. 
According to Alexander, residents rated continuity of care 'as the most important 
thing to them in all of our surveys'. Edwards was also concerned with the level of 
training provided to care staff - Age Concern was providing training materials in 
recognition that 'an awful lot of the teaching willy nilly is going to take place on the 
site anyway', since providers cannot necessarily afford to let staff go on day courses. 
Choice was also seen as a major issue in the shift to private provision. For Garton, 
the 'Modernising Social Services' White Paper (DoH, 1998b) had concentrated too 
much on conu-nissioning rather than the assessment process, which was 
'disappointing'. According to Garton; 
there's an assumption which the White Paper strongly reiterates that if you've 
got a variety of providers, you've got a variety of services, even if the same 
person is setting the terms of the contract with the providers and that just 
seems to me illogical and not the case... I think it's another example of 
government listening to the voices and the strong voices out there are the 
purchasers and the providers and not the users, so the interesting conversation 
for the purchasers and the providers is the one that goes on between them, and 
actually the interesting conversation ought to be the one between the 
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purchasers and the users to find out the user's viewpoint and say 'this is what 
we want, who's going to provide itT 
Martin also saw problems arising from the dominant purchasing position of local 
authorities, which allowed them to hold down or force down fees, perhaps leading to a 
reduction in the number of care homes, thus limiting choice. 
Edwards was also concerned about the shift in the role of local authorities, in that she 
thought it possible that they would lose skills and expertise as a result of losing their 
function as providers: 
I would think that a useful role that local authorities have played has been to 
bring together care providers and to develop training programmes for them and 
I don't know where that's going to sit into the future because really local 
authorities will gradually lose all their expertise in this kind of area and I 
suppose that it's an interesting discussion about whether, just as social workers 
work with persons, whether we need to be thinking more constructively about 
the role of social services in terms of understanding institutional/organisational 
bodies who are significant in social services and running some kind of skills 
based thing around that. 
Alexander said in relation to the changing role of local authorities: 
people are still a bit disturbed about the amount of local authority homes that 
are closing. I think and feel that it reduces their choice because they chose to 
go into a particular home and now it's closing ... 
The issue of local authority home closures was also one identified by Martin, who 
argued that 'there is some evidence that frail and vulnerable people are affected quite 
deeply by the consequences of the home they live in being sold off and then having to 
move, and the mortality rates can increase dramatically in the immediate weeks 
following closures'. 
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Ultimately, it was thought that choice could best be safeguarded by promoting 
alternatives to residential and nursing care. Edwards, for example, advocated 
institutions developing rehabilitative procedures, instead of assuming that people 
would go into a home 'for life'. This could be problematic in practice, she thought, 
because it may involve 'more money for more intensive care', which would lead to fee 
increases which local authorities may not be willing to pay. It may also involve lower 
occupancy rates which private providers would see as threatening their interests. 
Garton said she had 'never actually met anybody who wanted to go into residential 
nursing home care". Some people may need to go into a home for safety reasons or 
because they could not cope in their own homes, 'but its a hell of a loss, that loss of 
one"s home, the loss of one's neighborhood, the loss of one's independence and one's 
former self ' This meant that improvements needed to be made to the nature of support 
provided in people's own hornes,, and that alternatives like sheltered housing needed to 
be investigated. Garton thought that 'what... we ought to do and be promoting very 
strongly is that loss of physically independent living does not mean loss of autonomy'. 
The respondents varied in their awareness of both the size and internationalization of 
the largest firms. Most were aware of these issues at a general level, but as Edwards 
put it, 4not in any detail'. The exception was Ian Davis, whose responses are discussed 
below. In relation to the question of size, Alexander 'seem[ed] to remember its not a 
great deal'. Martin had a greater awareness of size than this, as well as an appreciation 
of the process of acquisition, and gave a fairly accurate estimate of the nwnber of 
homes owned by a firm like Company I as being between 200 and 250. Whilst his 
estimate of 1% of the market for the biggest provider was somewhat low (it being 
closer to 3.5%), he thought the large providers attracted 'much more than 1% of the 
attention from key policy makers because actually they are big enough to have 
somebody in their organization who's, I don't know... called the policy analyst. ' 
Therefore, despite the 'very small proportion of the market' they controlled, they were 
able to play 'a part significantly beyond their size' : 
No, these organisations, are able to devote a fair amount of energy and 
attention to thinking about problems that exist within the market and then to 
actually kind of crack open those kinds of problems by some thoughtful 
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analysis and some careful crafting of words on a bit of paper. And- meanwhile 
the poor bloody infantry, so to speak, the other 90% or whatever who aren't 
part of a big group are affected by the responses of government or local 
authorities to the things that are said to, and the messages coming from the big 
providers. 
Edwards said Age Concern was, 'aware of the bad feelings around Takare 
[subsequently acquired by Company I- see Chapter Four] which was the first of the 
big providers I suppose to have hit the scene and started developing a reputation for 
starting in the North where labour costs were cheap and so on and some people had 
the view that it was minninal care. I don't know enough to comment to you on that. ' 
However, she said that 'we have an awful lot of respect' for Chai Patel, 'and for 
people we know who have gone into some of these large providers as kind of directors 
of training and all the rest of it, that there are things to be said in favour of large scale 
providers'. Similarly to Martin's point about the influence of large providers, however, 
she did wonder 'whether the voice that comes through isn't perhaps not always the 
right voice' from the private sector. Garton was also aware of the 'shift from small 
cottage industry type homes towards the bigger providers. ' Her perception was that 
large providers had 'a large number of the beds', but she did not have detailed figures. 
She thought that this probably meant there had been a shift towards greater 
standardization, but that this did not necessarily equate to improvements in quality. 
However, Help the Aged did have a Business Advisor, Ian Davis, who was on 
secondment from Deutsche Bank. Garton said that Help the Aged did not monitor 
large firms in the private sector 'in any systematic way but we keep an eye on what's 
going on'. Davis did most of this monitoring, and according to Garton most of the 
infon-nation relating to it was 'in Ian's head'. Davis was due to retire in March of 1999, 
and Garton made no mention of a replacement. It is therefore unclear how Davis's 
expertise might feed into Help the Aged's policies or strategies in any systematic or 
long-term way. The interview with Davis was not tape-recorded, but extensive notes 
were taken during it. Davis's understanding of the market in long-terrn care was that 
the largest firms were involved in a 'series of defensive mergers'. This meant that the 
falling occupancy rates and profits associated with local authority funding restraint 
led 
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firms to attempt to 'buy out the competition'. This was dangerous because '50% of 
mergers end in disaster'. Any policy shift away from residential care in the future 
would be welcomed by Help the Aged, but would cause even greater problems for 
firms in the private sector. Davis thought there was a limit to the extent to which 
economies of scale could mitigate the situation for larger providers, since 'beyond a 
certain size, economies of scale disappear'. Firms had shied away from new, purpose 
built, homes because these could become out of date if standards rose. Leaseback was 
therefore a strategy for passing risk onto real estate investment trusts (REITs). Davis 
clearly had an extensive knowledge of the sector and its economics. Howeverg his 
comments failed to acknowledge that small owners would face many more difficulties 
than large ones. These smaller providers are as likely to be acquired by large firms in 
the forthcoming period as are other large providers. 
Awareness of internationalization was lower than that of size generally. Edwards, for 
example, knew only that internationalized firms 'exist but not knowing what they are. 
Only Martin had any awareness beyond this, which was derived from reading the trade 
press, which meant that he could 'only talk in headline cliche type level'. He had seen 
reports in 'Community Care Market News' (CCMN) and in the financial pages of 
newspapers, and recalled reading an article in 'Nursing Times' (Inman & Sone, 1997) 
on US multinationals entering the British market. 
Both positive and negative features were perceived as attaching to large firms. 
Edwards thought that, 'there are arguments which may well show that some of these 
larger providers may actually be - because of the cost-effectiveness of numbers - be 
actually providing better quality in their care homes' (Edwards's emphasis). Garton 
thought that the specialization which large firms may be able to engage in, such as the 
creation of dementia units by Company 3, was 'the sort of pre-emptive thinking which 
can go on if there's that little bit of extra time and space and personnel to develop 
things like that. ' Martin made a similar point: 
I think that the big organizations bring with them some important bits of 
cultural trappings that are missing in small businesses. Which is about ving 
the space, the time and the energy within the organization to think about things 
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rather than simply react to things. To invest time in thinking about devising 
systems and structures that are helpful to busy practitioners, so if you've 
actually got a big company that puts some time and effort into having a quality 
assurance department that devises ways of measuring quality and devises ways 
for people to check the ways that they are performing in relation to those 
measures then it might be fair to say that they are more likely to get close to 
providing a quality service than a small organization that feels up against it 
financially and culturally in terms of how it does business with the local 
authority. 
Alexander also saw potentially positive features in large companies in that, 
4sometimes the large company can work well because you've got someone apart from 
the manager to go to to complain about any service you're not getting or whatever and 
if it's a responsive company then that can be quite effective. ' She also saw large 
companies as offering the potential for partnership: 
working positively you can get in with the company when it's taking over 
homes or whatever and offer to work together and start up groups and that 
kind of thing which they can be more open to. They might feel less threatened 
by them than a small owner/manager. But on the other hand for some people it 
can be a bit faceless, remote and unresponsive and inflexible. I suppose 
generally, I mean my experience of companies has been that it really is still 
down to the individual home and the home manager. Although you do get 
companies with a decent reputation or a not such a good reputation or 
whatever but generally it's a home you know, and you can have two 
different 
homes run by the same company and one's good and one's bad just 
because of 
the manager that happens to be there ..... 
However, some respondents saw cause for concern in the economic advantages that 
large providers may have over smaller ones. Alexander, for example, commented that: 
I know that small providers in my experience, find it difficult in the market 
place in terms of ... partly economies of scale 
but employing staff and you 
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know getting a decent profit margin on the fees that they charge so I assume 
that large companies are doing rather better at it and maybe, you know, 
obviously have a larger voice with local authority contracting and so on. 
In Garton's view, 'one of the problems with the small homes is the financial 
vulnerability, it's very easy for them to go bust and then you haven't got a home any 
more which is a risk and you probably don't get that quite so much with the somewhat 
larger providers. ' Edwards thought that it must be 'very worrying times for small home 
providers'. 
Martin argued that local authority purchasers were making, 
deals with some of the biggest providers which are about depressing costs 
because they are organized in such a way as to be able to cope with driving 
down the cost obviously to a..... I mean I'm not an economist but there's a 
certain point where they can't tolerate that any longer but they have a negative 
effect on the rest of the market place in terms of the smaller providers who 
cannot cope with those costs that are forced down. 
Such deals might come about, Martin thought, because 'some of those big companies 
are actually culturally closer to local authorities than small businesses'. So, even 
though a local authority may be motivated by a public service ethos, in terms of 'how it 
structures itself and runs itself as a bureaucracy' it may be closer to a large firm than a 
smaller one. Large firms, Martin thought, were more likely to have a realistic view of 
economic conditions than small firms, as well as the advantages of economies of scale. 
They were more likely to go for high occupancy, rather than high fees. They could 
then 'negotiate a fee with the local authority that then becomes a bargaining tool / stick 
/ prod that's used with other small providers whose margins are not as... don't permit 
such levels of negotiation. ' It clearly is the case that large providers are able to bear 
lower fees when necessary, at least in the short term, although they will not do this 
where they can find higher fees from private payers, as in Albion (see Chapter Five). 
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Transfers of ownership were seen as a particularly important issue by most of the 
respondents. Some were concerned that, as Garton put it, 'where people five is being 
bought and sold over their heads... and that they have no say, they're often not 
informed of the business decision, they've got no involvement, no preparation or 
reassurance if necessary. It's just happened to people over their heads, which is very 
frightening and unsettling. ' This point was made very clearly by Counsel and Care, 
who, in a letter to the then Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Department 
of Health (discussed later), expressed particular concern 'about residents who have 
experienced changes, often many changes in succession, in the ownership of the home 
in which they reside'. Martin personally was aware of a home, 'which has actually been 
owned by a sole trader who owned a couple of homes and he sold them to Court 
Cavendish and Court Cavendish then got absorbed into Care First, and then Care First 
was bought by [Company I], and that was four different owners in a five year period. ' 
Colin French, the Company I care home manager with whom a supplementary 
interview was conducted (see Chapter Four), indicated that his home had experienced 
multiple transfers of ownership. There were a number of effects which Martin thought 
might result from this: 
... there may be relatively small changes which could appear to be insignificant 
but when taken in the context of the impact on the lives of the people who lived 
there may actually be quite big, you know in ten-ns of the style. It's kind of 
difficult to tie it down, but it has to do with style, perhaps changes in individual 
staff, who don't like the new employer who have changed conditions of service 
who say, 'I don't want to work here anymore'. It may be about things like 
unifon-ns or no unifon-ns. It may be about access to other activities, you know, 
the new provider says 'well one of the extraneous costs here was that we kept 
taking people out in the nuini bus. We ain't going to take them any more. ' You 
know, they will be small things in the context of the bigger policy issues but 
actually, in ten-ns of the fives of the people who live there, which are defined by 
what time they get up in the morning, and what time they go to bed and what 
happens in between and they doWt leave the house perhaps without any 
assistance.... and one of the key things that may well go with the change of 
ownership is actually a change of leadership and management, if only because 
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you actually want to shake things up and you move me from my desk to your 
desk and your desk to my desk and back again in the interests of giving those 
of us as managers the benefit of experience elsewhere. 
Martin elaborated further that: 
we should be careful not to generalize from relatively limited examples, but we 
would say on the basis of anecdotal evidence that, and evidence that comes 
from outside of the care sector certainly supports this, that a change of owner, 
a change of manager, a change of leadership can affect both the style and the 
substance of a service and if I was to go for something that was completely off 
the wall in comparison to this, The Sun newspaper is not the same Sun 
newspaper as I recall somebody having in my office in 1968. It's been owned 
by News International or whatever it was then called in 1968, since then it has 
the same title on the top and a completely Merent quality of infon-nation 
below it. And in a way you can buy a home and keep the same name and it's 
still the same Sunny Side as it's always been but over time, or actually quite 
dramatically, it's changed. 
Alexander was also aware of problems relating to transfers. Although the example 
she gave related to a transfer from a local authority to a charitable trust rather than a 
profit-making firm, it illustrates some of the issues which are relevant to ownership 
transfers generally. The transfer had: 
caused a lot of unhappiness for a couple of reasons but partly because staff 
weren't happy about terms and conditions changing and so a lot of the good 
staff left which made the relatives and the residents unhappy, obviously. The 
relatives were unhappy because the new company didn't want to recognise the 
relatives as a voice in the home and so just refused to do so. 
Edwards, and Martin in particular, had concerns about large firms which related to 
the issue of choice in some way. Edwards thought that 4we have to look very carefully' 
at the issue of lack of provision in areas of scattered population: 'of provision of very 
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small facilities that perhaps the larger providers wouldn't want to do, in order to enable 
people to live near their own homes ..... Now if by going in for more cost effective, 
economic build ups, it meant therefore that in some areas you couldn't get a local 
facility, I think that is retrogressive. ' 
Counsel & Care's letter to the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the 
Department of Health was also concerned with choice. As Martin put it: 
if the industry changes shape and there's either fewer provisions or fewer 
providers then the actual choice you can make about where you go, you know 
it's a bit like shopping on the High Street. I mean you can wake up and not 
know what town you're in because actually there's always a Principles, in this 
kind of configuration in relation to a Burton's and a Top Man, aren't they all 
owned by the same group anyway? It's just a different sort of brand label on the 
outside. Well you know that might be the case in the care market . 
What Martin called 'supply side market domination' was a particular issue: 
although the present position is far from that in which any company will 
achieve anything like monopoly powers, it wouldn't be difficult for local 
dominance to occur either deliberately or by happenstance. We would view 
such developments with alarm... After all not only did the community care 
legislation talk about choice being important, it also talked about being driven 
by user need rather than provider need, and this is a great criticism of the public 
sector was that they had lots of provisions that suited their view of what was 
necessary to meet people's needs, and what was expected was to reverse that 
trend and to actually have a situation where local authorities were building 
services to reflect the assessed and stated needs of the people who have the 
service. If you get one supplier dictating what a home will look like, internally, 
externally and in terms of ethos, in terms of routines, regimes and rules, you've 
got Hobson's choice haven't you? You've got Henry IV's choice. 
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Martin also thought that the near-monopoly purchasing (monopsony) position of some 
local authorities threatened choice, since it allowed them to strike 'deals' with large 
providers who were more able to provide services at lower fee rates. Access to 
alternative services provided by small owners would thus be restricted. 
,. far as internationalization in particular was concerned, as distinct from size, 
Edwards could see both positive and negative features. On the negative side Edwards 
stated: 'I suppose there has to be the economic argument that says if they are crossing 
many continents that they may make decisions to pull out of one in a way that, say, a 
native provider couldift do and that maybe the market is therefore slightly more 
volatile. ' On the other hand she thought that: 'we may be bringing in some much better 
practices. It gives you the opportunity to look and get the best from elsewhere, so 
clearly there are some homes in America which have been designed in a way and with 
facilities that are possibly giving us new thinking. Or some of the other countries on 
the continent. ' 
In commenting on the issue of internationalization, Martin highlighted the fact that his 
op1nions as 'an individual with a set of political views' might be distinct from those 
associated with his professional role, although he 'suspect[ed] that there'd actually be 
a degree of resonance one to the other' and that his statements were driven by his 
'professional concern about how big organizations make decisions'. With that 
qualification he stated: 
I've got no doubt at all that it's not a good thing that people should be making 
decisions in Philadelphia about the health and vitality of their corporation... I'm 
worried about the ways in which managers of an establishment in middle 
England may have to change the policy in relation to the purchase of shall we 
say incontinence pads for elderly dependent people based on the company 
saying, from its corporate headquarters in Philadelphia, 'we need to 
find a 1% 
saving in our nursing home operations in the UK'. And I can actually think 
about that not on a global level, but I know it's happened nationally 
in ten-ns of 
what happens is that Health Authorities change their policies on 
how they'll 
relate to the private sector and the private sector then actually 
issues an edict 
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which leads to somebody being wet and uncomfortable in bed. And- if that can 
happen in terms of how big organizations interact with their users within one 
country then the scope for the decision making being detached from the 
consequences grow much more marked when you cross the ocean to the States 
or whether you cross the Channel to Generale des Eaux or whoever else might 
own the railway line that I travel to work on. 
Martin also remembered an encounter with a representative from Stakis Hotels from 
when he worked in a Social Services Department, at the time when Stakis were 
considering moving into the long term care market. The nature of Stakis' main 
business interests seemed to have caused Martin some discomfort: 'the fact that [Stakis 
are] known for swanky leisure focused hotels, perhaps close to casinos, that made it 
feel more incongruous really. ' 
Quality was obviously an important issue for all of the respondents in this group. All 
thought that there needed to be regular inspection of homes. Edwards specifically 
mentioned an adequate complaints procedure as important, whilst Alexander identified 
training and staffing as a particular problem, claiming that continuity of care was rated 
by residents as 'the most important thing' in all of the Relatives' Association's surveys. 
However, all the respondents thought that the way to approach quality issues was to 
find out what residents wanted. As Alexander put it: 'are they listening to their 
residents, do they have systems for listening to what the residents feel about the care 
and feeding back from thereT. According to Garton: 
the place to start is with the services or is with the needs assessment, actually 
the initial personal assessment of what they want, what that person actually 
requires and their order or priority and then to construct ways of getting as 
near as possible to achieving that and then going back and checking out again 
how far that's happened. Whether the outcomes that person is seeking have 
changed and the Oferent factors that have come up. 
Garton had some reservations about what she saw as the drive 'on the professional 
side' to standardize assessment. This had positive features, but was: 
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an incredibly medical model and its very different from starting with what the 
user might want for themselves in their life, how they might want their life to 
be, and I think we probably need both but I don't see how they marry at the 
moment because especially that whole sort of medical/social assessment 
process is tremendously powerful .... and it has a momentum all of its own and 
it really does seem to me that when the big guys get hold of something and 
start galloping along it's the little guys, the users, who get trampled underfoot 
and you lose the counterweight .... 
According to Garton: 
the most important thing, as people tell us all the time, is the quality of the 
relationship between the individual providing the service and the individual 
receiving the service - how people are treated, whether they like the person 
who's supporting them, whether that person treats them like a whole human 
being with appropriate respect, being listened to and all the rest of it. 
One way of ensuring that users were listened to was for them to be involved directly 
in the quality process. Edwards was in favour of the idea of lay inspectors, and in some 
areas older people themselves had carried out this role. Edwards was also in favour of 
residents' committees in homes. Age Concern had published a book 'some years back' 
'to encourage user participation in the home', which focused on practical issues such 
as being able to choose what time to eat breakfast. The issue of residents' conunittees 
will be discussed further below, in relation to firm-specific aspects. 
In relation to the current regulatory arrangements, Edwards thought that the level of 
funding was too low, and that this was preventing some authorities from carrying out 
their statutory two inspections of each home per year. She thought that this problem 
was exacerbated by the fact that inspection units were also responsible for complaints, 
which stretched them further. In general Edwards was in favour of strengthening 
regulation. Garton, however, was 'a bit fed up' with the argument that inspectors 
tended to concentrate on ensuring basic minimum standards as a result of limited 
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resources: 'because you can do good things or bad things with the same reSourc&. 
Garton thought that regulation didn't have to be 'a kind of here's my grid, tick, tickq 
tick. ' It could instead be 'more proactive and positive", involving the spread of new 
ideas perhaps gained from interviewing residents. Garton thought the American 
regulatory system compared favourably with the British one because, 'they have so 
much more of a tradition of rights' and had a 'separate ombudsman/advocacy culture' 
alongside the regulatory function. VVhilst Edwards saw a role for 'written returns to 
inform the process' of inspection, Alexander thought more help for staff on how to do 
paperwork might be needed: 'It's difficult because a lot of people who go into care 
don't do it because they like paperwork'. 
Counsel and Care stood out from the other organizations, in that it had begun to 
publicly campaign for an industry regulator similar to those which regulate the 
privatized utilities. As Martin explained, this was: 
born out of a concern that, really, in lots of other spheres of life there are 
regulators, you know, where previously publicly provided services have moved 
into the market place. In a Oferent way one of the integral parts of that 
transfer process was the creation of Offivat, Offgas, Offiel and so on and I felt 
that what we'd seen was a ma or retreat, bit by bit, by local authorities from the 
provision of welfare services without anybody thinking about what that meant 
in terms of regulating services overall, as distinct from coming in and 
registering and then subsequently inspecting individual services. There was a 
big issue about the collective needs of older people who lived in homes, and we 
are talking about V2million older people living in residential care or nursing 
homes across the UK - it's a not inconsiderable amount of people. 
Counsel and Care had sent a letter (which the interviewer was not permitted to see, 
but which Martin quoted from) to the then Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at 
the Department of Health, explaffimig the reasons why it thought such a regulator was 
necessary. Seven issues (most of which have already been discussed in this section) 
were highlighted which the organization saw as relating to trends which could 
develop 
'which could be quite hostile to the interests of those [the market] is intended to 
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serve'. These were: firstly, 'local authority (near) monopolies', which were holding 
down fees and thus leading to a reduction in the number of homes; secondly, 'ultimate 
financial responsibility', which related to local authorities' resources being controlled 
by central government, leading to 'a lack of clear accountability for situations where 
there is insufficient money to buy good services'; thirdly, 'discriniation against self- 
funders', relating to cross-subsidization; fQurtWy, transfers and sales; fifthly, homes 
closures; sixthly, 'narrowing of choice'; and seventhly, 'Supply side market 
domination', leading possibly to local dominance. 
Martin was the most informed about the quality assurance systems used by large 
firms, and thought that, 'many of them bring with them an infrastructure of support 
that will actually contribute to quality in terms of their having in-house quality 
assurance systems, in-house training, and internal audit'. He had seen the internal 
quality assurance manual of 'one of the component parts of what is now [Company I] 
Care Homes' on a visit to one of their homes some years ago, and had been: 
extremely impressed by the make up of that manual, the degree of detail and 
what I'd been told during the course of the conversation with a couple of 
managers of the home that I'd been at, about the processes that they use to 
comply with that manual. The sort of internal procedures were impressive at 
least on paper, but it was interesting how I got them described to me on a 
number of occasions form Merent sources within the organization as a great 
deal of harmony in those presentations. 
However, like all the other respondents, Martin did not think there was a case for 
homes belonging to larger organizations being inspected less regularly or in a 
fundamentally different way: 'I mean frankly I think there's absolutely no substitute for 
going into homes and talking to the residents and talking to the staff and observing 
practice and observing the interaction between people. ' He did, however, think that 
inspection should involve more of an, 'educational kind of perspective', rather than 
simply, 'identifýýing bad practice and listing it and telling people to do something about 
it'. The other respondents had similar views. Edwards, for example, thought that: 
'there clearly is an argument for saying that you don't necessarily need to do exactly 
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the same inspection, nor in practice do you, of every facility,. Some homes may, 
therefore, need inspecting more often than others, but all were seen as needing some 
minimum inspection. This was true even where finns had their own QA systems 
because, 'they have to be seen to be equally treated with other bodies'. 
Martin had some sympathy with the complaint made by large firms concerning the 
lack of uniformity of demands made by different inspection units. However, he thought 
that firms had often expressed this 'by a degree of bully boy tactics'. In particular, 
Takare (now incorporated within Company 1) had been accused of behaviour, 'where 
they would actually say listen we're not having your requirements on us, we've got it 
through elsewhere, we're not interested in listening to you telling us what you want, 
this is what we're doing and we'll fight you every inch of the way. ' Martin felt that this 
put Health Authorities, 'under incredible amounts of pressure, which members of the 
public can't do in relation to their planning applications'. Counsel and Care thus: 
came round to the view that there was a need for a national inspection service 
because of the, not just the fact that there was variability between one 
inspection unit and another, but that there was scope for providers to Play one 
off against another and perhaps to drive down standards through that process. 
Whereas actually if you've got a centrally driven system with sufficient rigour 
within it, and power to enforce then actually you dorft any longer have any of 
this... 
As discussed in Chapter Five, the government ultimately opted for a National Care 
Standards Commission for England through the Care Standards Bill (2000). However, 
the interviews for this thesis were conducted prior to the publication of the Bin, when 
the expectation was that regional commissions would be set up, as proposed in the 
'Modernising Social Services' White Paper (DoH, 1998b). Martin saw the possibility 
that similar problems could occur as a result of this regionalization, involving 
disparity 
between the dffferent regional commissions: 'we want one approach across the eight 
commission areas, and we want that one approach to be the right one that can 
be 
demonstrated and held accountable and can be clearly understood by all those whom 
it 
affects; the enforcement agents and the people against whom the enforcement action's 
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taken. ' Despite Counsel and Care's preference for nationally organized regulation, 
Martin thought the idea of regional commissions was not a bad one, since it involved 
an attempt to create, 'a sort of sense of ownership, stakeholding within a kind of 
perceptible area'. He thought this should build on the experience of the locally 
organized inspection units that currently exist. Edwards said that Age Concern was 
also in favour of the proposals for regional commissions, and of regulation 'becoming 
independent of local authorities'. Garton was also in favour of this, but was concerned 
that the conm-nissions, and the standards they work to, should have enough flexibility to 
accommodate regional differences in users' preferences. 
Alexander could also see the argument for regional conunissions, but was concerned 
that they may not be as accountable as locally controlled regulation. However, she 
argued that: 
the regional thing is going to go ahead, I suppose what I'm saying is that if 
you're going to have regional inspectorates then can we make sure we've got 
the user voice in there somewhere, however they're going to do that, and that's 
what we'll be stressing rather than saying 'oh no, you must be doing it at local 
level'. I think our policy position would be, 'o. k. we're having regional boards 
but where's the user inpuff 
Garton took a similar view of the proposed commissions, stating: 
I wish they had a stronger advocacy role and that they had real user 
involvement in the homes and I don't think there's much of a sign of that. I 
thought that it was a pity that the idea of having a children's rights officer and... 
somebody at the sort of commission level who had a children's rights brief 
wasn't replicated for older people. That would be good to have seen. 
Martin thought that existing accountability at local level was somewhat illusory, and 
that actual practice, 'was more to do with the culture of the local authority or perhaps 
the lead people within the authority'. He was of the view, therefore, that other 
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mechanisms based on stakeholding notions could be used to create accountability at 
regional level. 
All the respondents were in favour of abolishing the distinction between nursing and 
residential care. Edwards, for example,, argued that: 'Clearly it's an absurdity to have 
the two separate, so we favour integration. ' Both Alexander and Martin highlighted 
the anomalies and problems associated with two dffferent types of registration, which 
sometimes led to residents having to move from one home to another because their 
needs had changed slightly. Martin, for example, criticised, 
the idea that older people, who as a result of becoming a bit more unwell, 
should actually have to move to another place because it's registered to look 
after their nursing needs as against them being nursed in a place that they've 
made home. Why have to make two critical decisions after you've left the place 
you've lived in perhaps all your adult life, and you've made this critical decision 
to go into a home because you can no longer cope and then two years later 
somebody says 'well actually you'll have to go into another home now because 
you've become a bit more incapable'. We'd like to see a single care home 
emerge and that's more likely to emerge from a merging together of registration 
of nursing and residential care. 
This section has shown that all the respondents had some awareness of the size and 
internationalization of the leading firms in this sector, although this often lacked detail, 
and awareness of internationalization was lower than of size generally. All the 
respondents saw both positive and negative features as attaching to the shift to private 
provision in the sector, and to the role of large and internationalized providers within 
it. There was no outright hostility to such providers, as there was with UNISON for 
example (see Chapter Six); indeed, the perception was that the overall effect of these 
changes had been to raise the quality of care. The respondents were generally in favour 
of some centralization of regulation, as in the 'Modernising Social Services' proposals, 
but had reservations regarding accountability and user input. Counsel and Care was 
most concerned with issues relating to the overall structure of the market, and had 
begun to campaign for an industry-wide regulator. 
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FORM AND EXTENT OF ORGANIZATION 
As indicated above, all the organizations considered in this section are charities, and 
that is reflected in the form and extent of their organizations. The nature of these 
organizations was most explicitly described by Garton who, when asked whether Help 
the Aged was an older people's organization, responded that it was instead a 
'traditional charity' which was not organized on a 'democratic and accountable basis'. 
It was, she said, 'incredibly top down, central office, all the things it shouldn't be type 
organization'. It nevertheless was, 'doing some of the right things in channelling the 
money directly to older people at the local level'. Help the Aged and Age Concern, the 
two largest organizations considered here, which aim to promote the interests of older 
people in general, had the largest scope in tenns of having a network of local groups 
which they supported and which fed into their activities at national level. Age Concern 
had about 1400 local groups throughout the UK, I 100 of which were in England. 
These were direct providers of services, mainly day care services such as day centres, 
luncheon clubs and visiting. The provision of information was also a key activity of 
these groups. They did not provide any significant level of residential services, but 
Edwards said they were 'increasingly becoming involved in domiciliary care'. Help the 
Aged, on the other hand, ran 'ten or so' residential homes. 
Help the Aged tended to work with older people's or pensioners' forums around the 
country, most of which were linked to the National Pensioners' Convention (NPC). 
The NPC officer with responsibility for long-term care was approached for an 
interview for this study, but it did not prove possible to arrange one. Garton described 
the NPC as being 'largely composed or led by people who have been very active in the 
trade union field or in labour politics'. Garton saw this type of organization as being 
4effective in some ways', but saw a problem in that, whilst many members of local 
pensioners' forums were women, few women were leaders of the movement nationally. 
Help the Aged also had a program called 'Speaking Up For Our Age', whereby it gave 
grants to local groups. Such support to local groups represented a third of Help the 
Aged's overall grant giving. Help the Aged also acted in a "proactive' manner, for 
Iý --- 
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ii local groups around a campaign involving example, organizing transport issues. Age i 
Concern also worked with older people's forums, with Edwards, for example, 
mentioning the role of Lewisham Older People's Forum in organ=ii g lay inspectors. 
The Relatives' Association also played a role in facilitating relatives to become lay 
inspectors. 
However, this kind of collective local organization did not appear to have much 
impact on the delivery of long-term care. One exception to this was Age Concern's 
local group in Naresborough, which was 'fighting against' the closure of a home by 
North Yorkshire council because it was the primary facility in the town. On the whole, 
however, other kinds of nationally organized activities were more relevant to this 
sector. These included advice and advocacy, research and its dissemination, and 
various campaigning activities. All the organizations carried out these kinds of 
activities. Alexander, for example, managed the help line which the Relatives' 
Association ran, and infon-nation gained from this was then fed into the organization's 
policy work. The majority of the Relatives' Association's advice was dispensed, either 
to would-be residents or their relatives, when people were initially looking for a home 
to move into. They saw it as important to encourage people to look at more than one 
home before they took a decision. 
Counsel and Care provided a very similar advice and information service, although 
Martin said they increasingly had to, 'engage in advocacy - determined advocacy - to 
assist people to secure their rights and we do that, not around the whole gamut of 
older people's needs, but I think we're very focused on community care issues and 
we're particularly adept at, and knowledgeable about, issues around residential care, 
nursing care'. Counsel and Care also issued press releases in response to letters 
received from residents or relatives, and a series of fact sheets which responded to 
questions frequently asked on the advice line. Help the Aged and Age Concern carried 
out very similar activities, with Age Concern, for example, animi g to cover about 
250,000 calls a year, and Help the Aged covering 70,000. Edwards described Age 
Concern's fact sheets as, 'the centre of all that we do'. 
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This advice work, and the information which was gathered from it, was bolstered in 
all of the organizations by various research projects, the findings of which were then 
disseminated via books, articles, conferences, the press and other news media. Age 
Concern, for example, had 'about 22' books 'coming on stream' in the coming year, a 
significant number of which were for care providers, and in particular 'lower level care 
workers'. Garton indicated that an increasing amount of the research carried out by 
Help the Aged was, 'user focused and increasingly including older people directly... 
which are starting from older people's own experience'. Help the Aged was also 
carrying out research within three of its own residential homes around 'changing the 
culture of homes and making them more like people's homes, ordinary individual 
choice and so on and so forth'. Alexander pointed out that the Relatives' Association 
was a small organization with limited resources, but it had carried out a small research 
project 'looking at the relationships' between home staff, residents and relatives, 'and 
working out a training program that would encourage involvement'. Counsel and Care 
also carried out a number of research projects relating to, 'everyday life in homes - 
abuse, health care, incontinence, meals and meal times and so on'. At the time of the 
interview Martin was developing a research project concerned with issues of choice, in 
relation to the problems associated with ownership transfers discussed above. As 
indicated above, Help the Aged had a Business Advisor, Ian Davis, part of whose job 
was to monitor private providers of long-term care. 
The research conducted by the organizations could be used to finiher their aims in 
two main ways. Firstly it could be disseminated in ways designed to influence 
providers and practitioners in the delivery of care, what Martin called practice and 
policy at a 'lower' level. Organizations thus organized conferences and workshops 
for 
various kinds of practitioners, as well as issuing literature aimed at them. Secondly, 
research fed into the various campaigning activities carried out by the organizations. 
Although some of this was directed at the public through the use of various media, 
whilst some of it involved direct lobbying, the goal was always to 
influence 
government policy. Martin, for example, described part of his responsibility at 
Counsel 
and Care as: 
271 
driving along our own kind of position on certain things and attracting 
attention to it, which you do in a variety of ways, you know you intervene in 
public policy by writing learned pieces which you send in when you're asked 
to... The health select committee are actually researching something we've got, 
we say well comment. We also try to influence public policy by press release 
and the things you say in the national press which is difficult to get into, the 
trade press which is much more easy for us to get access to... and by the radio 
circuits be they the national network or the locals. 
Ways in which the organizations could try to influence government policy more 
directly included the use of a team to brief parliamentary groups in both Houses of 
Parliament, mentioned by Edwards, and written responses to various government 
initiatives. As Garton put it: 'I mean the range of work going on on the policy front is 
the sort of standard stuff of responding to government documents, white papers, green 
papers you name it, announcements of various kinds from the point of view of the 
interests of older people as we see thern. ' This involved, for example, responses to the 
report of the Royal Commission on Long Tenn Care, mentioned in particular by 
Edwards (see Age Concern Policy Unit, 1998), and responses to the 'Modernising 
Social Services' White Paper (DoH, 1998b), views on which were discussed above. 
The organizations also took their own initiatives when attempting to influence 
government policy, trying to set the agenda according to the needs of older people as 
they perceived them, rather than simply responding to government initiatives. One 
example of this was Counsel and Care's attempt to promote the idea of an industry 
regulator. As discussed above, this had involved sending a letter to the then 
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Department of Health, detailing the 
arguments for such a body. Martin described the response to this letter, which was 
prior to the publication of 'Modernising Social Services', as 'sort of a non-response... 
a bit of waffle'. However, Martin stated that: 'we ain't going to drop 
it now just 
because we bunged it out once and not quite attracted the attention we'd 
hoped for. 
We'll have another go. ' Ideas on this issue were 4still evolving', but 
it was being 
followed up through the use of various forums, for example, a presentation to the 
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Annual Conference of the Scottish National Association of Inspection and Registration 
Officers. 
Two of the four organizations were affiliated to international organizations of various 
kinds. Age Concern was affiliated to the International Federation on Ageing (IFA) and 
Eurolink Age, and Help the Aged was affiliated to Help Age International (HAI) and 
Eurolink Age. Counsel and Care did not belong to any international associations, but 
had contacts with the International Ageing Network. The IFA described itself as, 
'bringing together academics, practitioners, activists and leaders of organizations of the 
aged across national boundaries and encompassing all the continents of the world' 
(http: //www. ifa-fiv. org/pOl. htm). Its main activity was to, 'provide a forum for the 
sharing of ideas, experiences and research'. The IFA had 'consultative status' as an 
International Non-Goverm-nental Organization (INGO) with a number of supranational 
bodies such as the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC) and 
the International Labour Organization (ILO). 
HAI, 'advocate[d] at the international, national and regional levels based on the 
needs, views and experiences of the older people we work with' (Annual Review, 
1998/1999: 1). It aimed to, 'increase the impact of conununity based organizations by 
sharing expertise and supporting the growth of new agencies'(ibid). The work of HAI 
was primarily oriented towards developing countries, and produced an influential 
'Ageing & Development Report' in 1999 (HAIý 1999). Eurolink Age aimed to 
influence the European Union in the interests of older people through a variety of 
campaigning, research and consultative activities (AP, 1998-1999). These international 
organizations, therefore, pursued the same kinds of strategies of research and 
attempting to influence policy at the supranational. level as the national organizations 
considered in this chapter did at that level. None of them did any substantial work in 
relation to long-term care, and they made no direct impact on the nature of long-term 
care in the UK, or on the activities of the case-study firms. 
The organizations considered in this chapter therefore may have an impact on the 
long-term care market in the UK through a variety of means. Advice and advocacy is 
offered to users of long-term care services, whilst research and advice are offered to 
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practitioners, from managers to 'low-level' workers. Finally, the attempt to influence 
provision of care indirectly by influencing government policy is a central part of their 
activity. Their international links made no direct impact on their work on long terin 
care. Direct relationships between older people's organizations and the case study 
firms, where they exist, will be discussed below, as will the use of residents' meetings 
within homes owned by the three firms. 
FIRM-SPECIFIC ASPECTS 
The organizations considered here had very few direct dealings with any of the case 
study firms analysed in Chapter Four. All of them, however, participated in the 
Continuing Care Conference (CCC), as did Company I and Company 3 as well as 
other large providers and national care home associations. The CCC was formed in 
1992, and described itself as 'a coalition of commercial, charitable and public service 
organizations with a mutual interest in providing better care for current and future 
generations of elderly people' (CCC, 1998). The CCC was chaired by Chai Patel, 
Company 3's current chief executive and the former chief executive of Care First. 
Alexander said in relation to the CCC that the Relative's Association aimed to work in 
'partnership' with providers. Edwards described the Conference as being 'started by 
the insurance industry at a time when there was all this talk about long term care 
insurance schemes'. She said it had a sub-group which was chaired by Chai Patel, 
'which was looking at care standards and contracts and so on for the industry... so one 
has a feeling that, at that level, with the big ones [private providers] that they are doing 
quite a lot of work to try and ensure good quality in their homes. ' Alexander also 
mentioned work done on standards in this forum, as well as the development of a 
'framework contract together for use for people who are paying privately in residential 
care' (CCC, 1998). Alexander commented in relation to this type of work: 'we try to 
get agreement on what's possible and what the user would like and what they feel is 
feasible, and get some sort of balance in there and keep each other informed'. 
However, the motives of fin-ns in working within the CCC should not simply be seen 
as altruistic - it is likely that their own strategic interests played a part. 
One of the 
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CCC's principal aims was, to persuade Government to provide incentives for 
individuals to make self-provision for long term care to complement state provision' 
(CCC, 1998). Although not directly concerned with the CCC, Bob Jones's comments 
regarding Company I's membership of provider associations and links with other 
organizations may have some relevance here: '[W]e believe in maintaining links with 
outside organizations and because we've suddenly become the biggest a number of 
outside organizations are, I won't say beating a path to our door, but are dead chuffed 
that we're involved. ' The particular advantages of this were twofold: 'One is keeping 
abreast of what's going on, and secondarily is being able to drive the central agenda. 
The more we can get involved with central organizations, the more we can drive the 
agenda. A bit selfish perhaps, but there you go. ' In response to the question of which 
direction that might be in, Jones stated: 'Whichever is the strategic direction [Company 
I] think it should be in. " 
Other than links through the CCC, Martin indicated that Counsel & Care had 
approached the chief executive of Company I Care Homes for 'some money", and that 
he had 'responded positively' by providing 'a couple of grand'. However, he had seen 
a piece in 'Nursing Times' about Counsel & Care's promotion of the idea of an 
industry regulator, and had written to Martin asking if it was him who was quoted. 
Martin said he had not 'come back to us negatively since then', but Martin was unsure 
'whether he'll give us a couple of grand when I ask him next time'. This raises an 
isnportant issue about the funding of voluntary organizations and their independence. 
Martin was clear that: 'We certainly wouldn't modify our views on the need for a 
regulator on the basis of whether or not they'll give us some money. ' 
The direct relationships between older people's organizations and large firms 
therefore appear to be minimal. However, the case study firms did have varying 
degrees of support for, and implementation of, residents' and relatives' meetings in 
their homes. Such meetings were broadly favoured by the older people's organizations 
considered here. Edwards, for example, thought that there was 'a great deal to 
be said' 
for residents' conmittees. 
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Alexander said that in homes where the residents were 'more fit and able' the 
Relatives' Association was, 'trying to encourage residents' committees where residents 
would have a direct influence on how the home was structured and even to how 
employment or recruitment was done and that kind of thing - they would have an input 
in all the running of the home. ' In nursing homes, where residents may be in need of 
higher degrees of support, they favoured relatives becoming involved, although not 
necessarily in the form of a relatives' committee. Alexander gave the example of a 
home in Berkshire (the owners of which she did not identify) where relatives' 
involvement in solving problems had led to them becoming 'permanent board 
members'. Alexander was in favour of meetings which included residents, relatives and 
staff, but said she thought it was up to the residents how these were organized: 
because I mean we've found in some cases where relatives want to run a group 
and they need... They want to run it themselves and they find that the 
management are there all the time and that restricts the amount of discussion 
they can get, or for some relatives they find that too impeding to have the 
management there all the time or it's chaired and controlled by the members of 
the management rather than relatives themselves. So, you know, you have to 
be careful of that .... 
The most important thing, Alexander thought, was that 'the interests of the residents 
must come first'. The Relatives' Association also encouraged 'locality groups' or 'area 
groups': 'we have about 30 area groups where people from different homes meet 
together - often at a carers centre or somewhere like that - so that they can compare 
experiences of homes or pass on good practice from their homes, that type of thing. ' 
Garton did have some reservations about residents' meetings, arguing that 'it depends 
how it's done... if it's done well and those things work well and they actually have an 
influence and an impact then yes I think it's a good idea. As a sort of add on "we're 
doing it because either because we have to or because it makes us look like good guys" 
then I think that's very different. ' As a positive example, she described a scheme in 
Wolverharnpton, run by a company called Extracare, where a residential home had 
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been replaced by 'extra-sheltered housing', and where the residents had an established 
'decision making process'. 
All three case study firms had some form of residents' meetings in their homes. Jones 
said that Company I were 'stimulating all the homes to have residents' / relativ& 
forums'. These tended to be 'dominated more by relatives than residents' because 'the 
dependency levels in the homes is such that realistically you're lucky to have a handful 
of clients that can walk, let alone actively participate in a meeting. ' However, there 
were other ways in which Company I tried to involve residents. One was that, as part 
of the quality review, 'staff are charged with actually asking the residents - "go and 
talk to them7V Jones said that this 'doesn't happen as well as I would like it to at the 
moment, but I haven't quite got my head round how I can get that happening better. ' 
However, although Jones felt Company I had 'a little way to go', all the clients or their 
relatives were intended to be involved in part of their own care planning process: 
So they should be having input to the care they're getting. The traditional 
model though, the nurse told you what you were getting. The new model is 
4you're part of this decision making process - how do you want us to help 
you? ' Because part of the review checks the care records, we can pick up if 
that's happening, so residents will be involved as part of that process. 
Company I also intended 'to send a questionnaire to every client in East Anglia so 
they have an opportunity to comment on the service'. It was not clear why this was 
being carried out in East Anglia in particular, although it is possible that this was 
intended as a pilot. It was thought that most clients would need help filling this form in 
because, 'probably 60 - 70% of our clients can't fill it in themselves anyway. 
' This 
raised a number of issues which Company I had a group looking at: 
because if its a carer filling it in will they bias the answers to them as opposed 
to the client? And we had some examples of that in the past. If its the relatives 
filling it ir4 that in itself is not a problem because the relatives usually come up 
with good information anyway, but do we run the risk of simply tailoring the 
search to the relatives' needs rather than the clients needs, which sometimes are 
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very different. One would hope they were the same, but life ain't like that in a 
care home. Relatives have their own agenda. 
Jones said he was in favour of a shift towards concentrating on what users wanted: 
I mean at the end of the day we are a service to the users. Its been, I think, 
harder for professionals than lay people to get their head round moving from 
'I'm the professional, I know best' to 'You're the user, what do you wantT, 
and the professional aspect is then helping them do something, not telling them 
how they should do it. Obviously there are times when one has to make people 
aware of the risk of the choice they're making ..... But I think as long as you 
document it and you go about it in an appropriate way it's all right. 
He thought that there was some 'way to go' in terms of staff within Company I 
accepting this focus on users' preferences, but asserted that: 'Definitely that is the new 
[Company I] culture. It isn't necessarily the culture of some of the [corporate] pasts. ' 
Jane Bartlett also asserted that what she called the 'user perspective' was 'of the 
utmost importance' to Company 2. This meant listening to the views and perceptions 
of residents and relatives, both through meetings and through listening on an individual 
level to residents. Bartlett was in favour of this because, 'you can actually get so much 
information by doing that, and it's then a true reflection on the real quality. ' Bartlett 
said that Company 2 had 'just started along that road', and that it was something 
which she personally was 'very, very aware of and want to push even more than we're 
doing now'. Listening to residents on an individual level was built into the QA 
mechanism described in Chapter Four: 'We spend a lot of time talking to the residents 
again about any issues or comments that come up. Anything that's affected them 
within the last month within the unit, and they're picked quite at random by the 
regional managers. ' There were three types of meetings which took place in homes - 
'regular residents meetings'; 'relatives groups'; and 'staff groups to obviously pass 
messages round'. The company had had trials 4in a couple of areas' bringing all three 
groups together, which had: 
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worked very successfully because the relatives can say 'I don't think you're 
doing this right for my mum' and mum will turn round and say 'oh yes they are, 
I see so and so everyday', and its actually airmig and ironing out quite a few 
things, so that's possibly something we're going to look at more in the future 
to bring all three groups together for a meeting rather than having individual 
ones. We're trying to get the team work from everybody. 
These kinds of arrangements had been inspired by a research project which Company 
2 had been participating in since January 1998 with a team from the University of 
Northumbria at Newcastle. This research was focused on Company 2's Northern 
region, which encompassed 13 homes from Lancashire to Newcastle, involving a 
spread of 'different types of unit'. The research involved each of the homes trying out 
a quality system called Qualasses, which had been 'developed by an outside 
consultancy'. The researchers were, 'interested in seeing the difference in 
organizational change with the introduction of Qualassess". The Qualassess systen-4 
works by having a coordinator within the home but is not with the manager of 
the home, and that coordinator will then get together residents, relatives and 
other members of staff to discuss quality issues. And although there's an 
agenda - so they may be looking at personnel... they may be looking at resident 
activities, they may be looking at the decour of the home or whatever - they 
will actuafly discuss it, and then they would feed back their findings to the 
general manager, with an action plan for the home, and things are actually 
acted on, so it's total, really, user involvement throughout. 
Bartlett's experience of this project had been positive: 
I mean if it carries on I'd like to see it introduced into more homes, 
because it 
certainly seems to be working ..... the 
feedback coming from [the university] 
and coming from the consultancy that actually developed the system 
has been 
invaluable, and has helped me make decisions about things to improve. 
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, La indicated in Chapter Four, the interview with Margaret Grant was of shorter 
duration than that with the other QA managers, and was not tape-recorded. However, 
Grant did say that Company 3 homes had meetings of residents and relatives, which 
both the home manager and the chef attended. It was seen as important for the chef to 
attend because most complaints related to food, laundry or activities, rather than to the 
quality of the building. These meetings took place four times a year in each home. The 
attendance of relatives was important because they were often needed to 'represent' 
the 'Patients', who may not be able to articulate their own needs or opinions. The 
potential problems of this form of 'representation', in tenns of the possibility of a 
conflict of views or interests between resident and relative, were not discussed in this 
interview as they were with Jones and Bartlett. Nor were similar issues relating to the 
presence of home managers at such meetings. When asked about the 'user 
perspective', Lloyd Hughes said that she thought this was a positive thing because, 
'the company depends on its patients'. However, the use of the ten-n 'patient', rather 
than 'resident' or 'user, may indicate a more paternalistic or medical approach 
towards users, although it may also simply be an indication of a long experience in 
nursing. 
In sum, it can be seen that all three fin-ns have some form of residents' meetings, 
usually with relatives present. The QA managers interviewed had different assessments 
concerning the presence of relatives at these meetings. Wlilst Jones saw it as 
necessary, but identified the problems inherent in it, Grant saw it as a positive thing 
because it provided residents with 'representation'. Bartlett indicated that relatives 
meetings were usually separate from those of the residents, but that this was being 
reassessed as a result of the research which Company 2 was participating in. Bartlett 
saw the presence of relatives as mainly positive, not because they could represent 
residents, but because residents' opinions could be aired alongside those of relatives 
and staff, leading to more clarity. Company 2 was distinct in allowing outside agencies 
(in this case a university and a consultancy) to carry out evaluations in its homes, and 
being prepared to change practice as a result of this. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
As discussed in Chapter Three, the application of the meso level of analysis to the 
relationships between the fin-ns and residents themselves involved some Oficulties, 
arising primarily from the lack of any autonomous organizations of residents. The 
organizations considered here are charities, acting in the interests of older people as 
they understand them. Some of these, such as Help the Aged and Age Concern, are 
large organizations involving some hundreds of local groups and have well organized 
national offices with a number of professional staff working for them. However, the 
form of these organizations predisposes them towards activities which are aimed 
primarily at influencing government policy. They did provide valuable services to 
residents and potential residents, through advice, advocacy and information. However, 
their direct contact with the case study (or other) firms was limited. Furthermore, 
although they had links with various international organizations, these made little 
difference to their work on long term care. Rather, these international organizations 
tended to replicate the policy work carried out by the nationally based organizations, 
but with the focus on influencing the work of supranational bodies rather than of 
national governments. 
This does not necessarily mean that the organizations considered in this chapter had 
no influence over providers. Rather, that influence tended to be indirect. To the extent 
that these organizations are successful in influencing government policy, over 
regulatory issues for example, this will have a significant impact on providers. As well 
as direct campaigning work, research and its dissemination may also play an important 
role in influencing the 'climate of ideas' within which firms operate. This, of course, is 
difficult to measure, but it may be significant. For example, all of the organizations 
favoured residents' participation in their care through means such as residents' and 
relatives' committees, and it is possible that they have played a significant role 
in 
facilitating the adoption of such forums by the case study firms. 
All of the case study firms had some form of such meetings. Meetings 
in homes 
belonging to all three firms were, however, initiated and facilitated by staff - meetings 
did not represent autonomous organization by either residents or relatives, and 
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nowhere was there the level of involvement in the overall running of the home 
favoured by Alexander in particular. The use of residents' meetings therefore seems to 
indicate that the firms have a consulting and responsive attitude towards their 
residents, rather than the existence of any fully fledged user control. This may be 
thought to be an appropriate balance, given the sometimes very high degrees of 
support required by some residents in nursing homes, which are the majority type of 
homes run by these firms. Residents will not necessarily wish to be involved in direct 
or intensive fon-ns of participation, and there may be other mechanisms for seeking 
residents views. However, the standardization which is characteristic of these firms' 
delivery does not seem to permit much, or even any, variation in the way meetings are 
organized based on the preferences of residents. 
There are other potential problems related to this form of involvement. As Garton 
pointed out, it may be done to make providers 'look like good guys'. Most problems, 
however, relate to residents' capacity to participate fully; they are there in the first 
place because they require care. This is well illustrated by the case of Company 1. As 
Jones put it: 'the dependency levels in the homes is such that realistically you're lucky 
to have a handful of clients that can walk, let alone actively participate in a meeting. ' 
This comment is significant in more than one way, since it is true that some residents 
may have difficulty participating, but being able to walk is not a precondition for such 
participation. Jones did in fact demonstrate his awareness of the issues at stake here, 
through his identification of the problems attaching to a member of staff or a relative 
assisting a resident to articulate her or his views - relatives for example may have their 
own agenda. With regard to staff, Jones indicated that there was 'some way to goý in 
bringing about a new Company I culture based on users' preferences. These issues 
apply equally to all the fim-is, although as noted above Company 2 was distinct in 
pen, nitting outside agencies such as a university and a consultancy to carry out 
evaluation in its homes and to change practice accordingly. This is significant, since it 
indicates that ownership by a foreign-based firm does not necessarily prevent it from 
exercising some flexibility and experimentation in these matters. This is also consistent 
With Bartlett's claim in Chapter Four that Company 2 (USA) permitted some degree of 
autonomy in the way care was delivered in its UK division. 
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The organizations considered in this chapter did have some direct contact with the 
case study firms through such forums as the Continuing Care Conference. However, as 
discussed above, it is likely that the motives for firms' involvement in such forums is 
motivated as much by their particular agendas as by a desire to improve care in 
general. As Jones said of Company I's membership of provider associations: 'the more 
we can get involved with central organizations, the more we can drive the agenda'. 
Private firms have an interest in influencing such forums, not necessarily in a narrow or 
manipulative way, but in terms of influencing the overall debate about care and how it 
is delivered. As Papadakis, & Taylor-Gooby (1987: 67) point out in relation to private 
health providers, firms have an interest in sustaining, 'an atmosphere of discussion over 
public and private welfare with a view both to cooperation with the NHS and to 
redrawing or blurring the boundaries between the two'. 
There appeared, however, to be no antipathy to private providers on the part of the 
respondents from older people's organizations. Rather, there was an acceptance that 
standards and expectations may have been raised as a result of the shift to private 
provision, and some respect for figures such as Chai Patel. This is clearly an important 
outcome for the case study firms in terms of how other potentially influential 
organizations respond to them, and is perhaps one of the goals of their participation in 
forums such as the CCC. However, there was significant concern among the 
respondents from older people's organizations about questions of choice and about the 
impacts of ownership transfers. These impacts may involve changes of regime and, in 
the worst cases, closures of homes and the moving of residents. The latter can 
be 
extremely serious, as Martin indicated in relation to local authority home closures: 
'there is evidence that frail and vulnerable people are affected quite deeply 
by the 
consequences of the home they live in being sold off and then having to move, and the 
mortality rates can increase dramatically in the immediate weeks 
following closures. ' 
These issues will be returned to in the final chapter. 
Whilst the respondents had some awareness of the size and internationalization of 
the 
case study firms, this was generally less than might 
have been expected. The 
exceptions were Ian Davis, Help the Aged's business advisor, and 
Les Martin of 
Counsel & Care, who had some awareness derived mainly from the trade press. 
There 
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was some recognition that there might be some gains from internationalization, such as 
foreign expertise, but there was also concern that internationalization might allow 
scope for greater economic 'volatility' (as Edwards put it). Chapter Four indicated that 
the case study firms did see being part of an internationalized organization as useful in 
allowing them to learn from abroad, although the information given by Company 2's 
Bartlett suggests that American practices (such as restraint) may not always be the 
most appropriate for use in the UK. In addition, the potentially negative effects of 
Company 2 (USA)'s financial problems on Company 2 do bear out Edwards's 
comments about the possibility of greater volatility in the market. Martin was also 
concerned that, 'the scope for the decision making being detached from the 
consequences grows much more marked when you cross the ocean to the States', a 
comment which again underlines the importance of firms such as Company 2 
(USA)allowing some degree of autonomy among their national divisions. 
All the respondents were adamant that large providers must be treated equally with 
other providers by regulators, although there was some acceptance that regulators 
should be able to be more flexible in recognising the differences between different 
types of providers. All the respondents were broadly in favour of the regulatory 
changes recommended in the 'Modernising Social Services' %ite Paper (DoH, 
1998b), although Counsel & Care had begun to campaign for an industry regulator 
with powers affecting market structure rather than only quality narrowly defined. 
These are important issues, since this thesis demonstrates that the organization of large 
firms and the overall structure of the market may have an influence on the quality and 
type of care delivered. These issues will be returned to in the final chapter. 
In sum, whilst the organizations considered here may have significant influence on the 
'climate' within which care is delivered by private providers, their primary activity is 
geared towards influencing government policy. This orientation towards government 
policy confirms the centrality of state institutions and of government policy in shaping 
the environment in which firms operate, and is therefore consistent with the findings of 
Chapters Five and Six. It is the form and extent of state activity in the sector which 
determines the basis upon, and the constraints within which, private providers may 
operate. Indeed, the lack of any autonomous organization of users of long term care, 
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due to the very nature of that care in providing support for vulnerable people, 
underlines the importance of the state, through its regulatory activities, in protecting 
the interests of residents. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter Three stated two aims of this thesis: firstly to build on what was known about 
large and internationalized welfare fin-ns through an empirical and exploratory study of 
large and internationalized fin-ns within the UK market for long term care; secondly to 
make a contribution to the debate within Social Policy (and other disciplines) 
concerning the deterministic claims relating to globalization discussed in Chapter One. 
The results of the research have been presented and discussed in previous chapters. 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss further these results and analyse their 
implications. These implications can accordingly also be split into two: firstly the 
implications for long term care of the process of consolidation and internationalization 
which the thesis argues is proceeding within the market; secondly the implications for 
the globalization debate of what is happening within the long term care market. The 
discussion of these two sets of implications overlaps considerably. This chapter deals 
with them in reverse order, looking first at the implications of the previous chapters' 
findings for the globalization debate. The rationale for this is that, as is argued below, 
developments within the market are largely the outcome of state policies - an argument 
of considerable importance for the globalization debate. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE GLOBALIZATION DEBATE 
Chapter Three pointed out the difficulty of a direct quantitative comparison of 
internationalization in the case study firms. Chapter Four, however, showed that all 
three of the case study firms have experienced some degree of internationalization, 
although in different forms. Although at the time the research was conducted the UK 
was the only country in which Company I provided long term care homes, the firm had 
foreign operations in insurance, hospitals, primary care and dentistry, and its Spanish 
arm was considering moving into care homes. Company 2 (USA) was the most 
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mternationalized in terms of long term care provision, with care home operations in 
five countries (of which Company 2 was the largest outside the USA) as well some 
overseas provision of pharmacy and medical supply services. Company 3 was the least 
internationalized in terms of provision, but had been majority owned by a US company 
at one point, and had significant alliances with US firms, particularly in real estate and 
retirement home management, as well as US based financing arrangements. 
Furthermore, there is considerable evidence that such internationalization is 
increasing. Company I's strategy was influenced to a considerable degree by the near 
monopoly of the NHS over hospital provision, which led it to expand into long terrn 
care provision in the UK, but to expand its other services abroad. In 1997, the only 
year for which an annual report could be obtained for the company, its foreign 
operations were its fastest growing business and it had announced an, 'objective of 
opening for business in at least one new country a year. '(Annual Review, 1997: 17) 
Company 2 (USA)'s strategy was clearly based on international expansion, although it 
was unclear what impact its 'Chapter 11 reorganization' would have on this. The 
impact on Company 3 of its acquisition by new owners could not be fully determined 
at the time of writing, but preliminary indications were that it was considering 
expansion into the rest of Europe (CCMN, May 1999). Concentration within the 
market has therefore been accompanied by internationalization, and this is likely to 
continue to be the case. This is consistent with the perspective adopted in Chapter One 
that there is a process of globalization which can be observed within the world 
economy, and with the discussion of increasing internationalization among service 
firms in Chapter Two. The strategy of internationalization pursued by the case study 
firms may be characterised as 'market seeking' rather than 'client following'. 
Chapters Five to Seven presented the results of the meso level analysis of the 
relationships between these internationalized firms and other key domestic actors. Two 
of these actors, the unions and older people's organizations, were found to be 
generally weak in terms of their ability to exert any direct influence over such firms. 
Furthen-nore, the international links which these organizations have make very little 
Merence to this lack of influence. In contrast to this, the state (and its agencies) has 
decisive power over such firms and the environment within which they operate. This 
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power is reinforced by the actions of the other two non-firm actors in -seeking to 
compensate for their lack of direct power in relation to the firrns by attempting to 
influence the policies of the state. However, this situation involves a number of 
complexities. There are complexities which relate firstly to the diffuse or indirect 
influence which may be exercised by older people's organizations and unions. 
Secondly, there are complexities that relate to the longer term outcomes of the state's 
actions in relation to the interests of the firms. The rest of this section explores these 
arguments and their associated complexities. 
The overall evidence is that the state is the decisive actor in influencing the actions of 
the firms, primarily through its capacity to shape the environment in which they 
operate. This relates to the 'second aspect' of the meso level of analysis, i. e. the 
'structural' aspects relating to the form and extent of organization of the various 
actors. Chapter Five shows that state policies relating to both funding and regulation 
are placing all private providers under considerable economic stress. 
Evidence published by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (Laing, 1998) discussed in 
Chapter Five indicates that the fees paid by state agencies frequently fall below the true 
costs of care, and that restrictions placed upon the funding of state purchasers by 
central government result in the effective demand for care falling significantly below 
what would be expected from demographic pressure. The effect this has on the 
industry as a whole can be gauged from occupancy rates. In March 1999 these were 
85.7% for private nursing homes and 87.1% for private residential homes, well below 
the levels recorded prior to the 1993 Community Care reforms (L&B, 1999-2000: 
182). This means that relative to effective demand there is considerable over-capacity 
in the industry, which wiH only be reduced through either a substantial increase in 
available funds for purchasing or in significant closures. The government's response to 
the RCLTC (NHS Plan, 2000) may alleviate this to some degree, but its decision to 
make only nursing care (strictly defined not to include personal care) free at the point 
of use will continue to hold down effective demand and will disproportionately favour 
large providers, which are concentrated in nursing care. 
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These economic pressures are clearly against the short term interests of all private 
providers. The evidence relating to Company 2 (USA) in Chapter Four shows that 
changes in state policies (in this case by the US state as well as the UK state) can lead 
to problems which threaten the very existence of even the largest and most 
internationalized of firms. However, Chapter Four also shows that the largest firms are 
better placed to withstand such pressures through econon-fies of scale and greater 
access to borrowed funds. Thus whilst large firms may be significantly damaged (to a 
greater or lesser extent) by state funding policies, the overall effect of such policies is 
to produce an imperative for 'rationalization' within the for-profit sector which can 
only facilitate the process of concentration, and therefore by implication that of 
internationalization. 
Chapter Five also shows that there is considerable evidence that state policies on 
regulation will soon impose heavy burdens on all providers, but that again these will be 
more easily borne by large firms. Chapter Five showed that the existing regulatory 
arrangements are widely regarded as inadequate. In particular, the QA managers of the 
fin-ns themselves all articulated their frustration with the inconsistency which they 
regarded these arrangements as producing. The government is addressing this problem 
through its proposals for a National Commission for Care Standards for England, 
which would implement a new set of National Required Standards (NRS) for long 
term care. The consistency which it is thought this reorganization will bring has 
widespread support. However, the costs associated with the NRS will 
disproportionately affect small providers, who generally operate from smaller, 
converted, premises and who have less funds with which to make the required changes 
to such premises. Whilst the timetable for the phasing in of the NRS will determine to 
some extent the precise impact on the industry, there are fears of a 'mass desertion' of 
the industry, especially in the South East where small owners may attempt to take 
advantage of the current boom in property prices by selling up. As CCMN (August/ 
September, 1999) pointed out, if this happens it may well lead to short term under 
capacity, thus increasing the bargaining power of providers in their relations with state 
purchasers. There is little doubt, however, as to the long term impact of the NRS on 
the structure of the industry. It almost certainly will provide another impetus towards 
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concentration., as large firms make the necessary adjustments and buy up some of the 
smaller firms which cannot cope. 
In contrast to this decisive shaping of the industry by the state, the unions were 
generally weak in the sector. The RCN appeared fairly successful in recruiting qualified 
nurses, but this was primarily on the basis of offering professional services rather than 
collective organization. Among the less skilled workers who form the majority of 
workers in the sector, neither UNISON nor GMB had had any great deal of success. 
This was despite fairly Merent approaches. UNISON officials displayed considerable 
hostility to the private sector, and to foreign owned firms in particular, and took a 
'traditional' bargaining approach to organizing. GMB was far more pragmatic towards 
private provision in general, and adopted a 'partnership' approach towards employers 
in the sector. However, both had very small numbers of members, both across the 
sector as a whole and within the case study firms. The difficulties of organizing in the 
sector had led UNISON to effectively abandon any major effort to do so in the 
foreseeable future, despite holding talks with Company I on the residential side. 
This weakness of autonomous organization had lead the unions in practice to pursue 
their goals in the sector through the provisions of recent acts of parliament. The 
National Minimum Wage (NMW), the Working Time Directive (WTD), the 
Employment Relations Act (1999) and the TUPE regulations (198 1) were all means of 
using the state to enforce better conditions for care workers and to extend or maintain 
union organization. Thus in terms of union - fnn relationships, it was the state, rather 
than the two actors directly concerned, which had the decisive power. Both large and 
small firms generally oppose such measures. However, the effects of them upon 
providers generally was, and will continue to be, much the same as that of state 
funding and regulatory policies, i. e., it will facilitate still greater concentration because 
of the greater ability of large firms to withstand the economic costs of such policies. 
All of the unions had international links. However, in practice these made very 
fittle 
difference to their bargainmig position, other than as a source of information and 
inspiration (mainly in the guise of the American SEIU). This is a significant finding for 
the globalization debate, since the formal membership of international 
federations 
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proved to be less important than their lack of organization at the national level, and 
they therefore had to turn to the nationally organized state. On the one occasion that 
UNISON had sought to utilise its international contacts to make a direct impact on one 
of the case study firms, i. e., its planned campaign against the entry of Company 2 
(USA)into the UK market, this had to be abandoned because of the likelihood of legal 
action. In this case, the company would have been the actor in a position to use the 
state against another actor. The unions were clearly much less organized at the 
international level, in terms of mobilizing resources and engaging in coordinated 
activity, than were the firms. 
Older people's organizations were generally in a similar position to the unions in 
ten-ns of having little direct influence over, or even contact with, the firms. There are, 
however, significant Merences. It was not among the goals of these organizations to 
engage in direct bargaining with firms. The form of their organization predisposes them 
towards seeking influence through ideas rather than direct bargaining. They do this 
primarily through research, the provision of information and advice, and campaigning 
to influence government policy. Their international links are an extension of this way of 
organizing, seeking influence at an international level among, for example, 
supranational. bodies. Once again, therefore, there is an emphasis on achieving goals 
through the medium of state policy and action. 
The evidence from the meso level of analysis, therefore, overwheh-ningly supports the 
conclusion that the state is the most powerful actor in this sector. This has important 
implications for the globalization debate surveyed in Chapter One, since it clearly 
contradicts the deterministic argument that the state is weak in comparison to 
internationalized firms. This conclusion cannot be overgeneralized from. There are 
clearly significant specificities related to this sector - what happens within it does not 
tell us all we need to know about the overall impact of the world market on the state, 
or about what happens in other sectors. However, all sectors have their specificities - 
the more evidence is accumulated about different sectors the more we are in a position 
to make an informed judgement about the overall role of the state. 
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Furthermore, the findings of the thesis contradict determiinistic arguments in 
important ways. The deterministic thesis relies heavily on the notion of the possibility 
of 'exit' by internationalized firms (Weiss, 1998: 184). This is made clear by the 
quotation of Mishra (1999: 6) cited in Chapter One: 'Put simply, by providing capital 
with an 'exit' option, globalization has strengthened the bargaining power of capital 
very considerably against government as well as labour... Thus money and investment 
capital can vote with their feet if they do not like government policies... ' Applied to 
this thesis, Mishra's argument would assume that both British fin-ns like Company I 
and Company 3 and US firms like Company 2 (USA) would seek to shift their 
investment out of the UK in response to the imposition of stricter regulatory criteria by 
the state, especially as the new regulations will raise costs whilst state funding 
continues to be restricted. Yet there is no evidence of this. On the contrary all of the 
case study firms were broadly in favour of the regulatory changes, largely because they 
will increase consistency. 
It may be argued that these particular firms are less mobile in the sense of being able 
to take advantage of 'exit', since as service firms they must invest where the service is 
consumed (as discussed in Chapter Two). It is therefore not possible for them to 
produce in low cost countries and then export to developed countries. This is certainly 
the case, and yet it in no way undermines the conclusion that the thesis challenges the 
deterministic argument. This is because, as Chapter Two demonstrated, services are 
not an irrelevant part of the world economy, but account for the majority of output in 
advanced countries, and form a large and growing proportion of international trade 
and FDL Thus research such as this thesis, which investigates the internationalization 
of services in relation to the globalization debate, will become increasingly important 
as services make up a growing section of the world economy. The relative lack of 
mobility of service firms is an important argument against the deterministic thesis. 
These findings have particular relevance for the debate on globalization within Social 
Policy, since there is a widespread assumption that the state is withdrawing from 
welfare, and that this is at least partly the result of globalization. However, this thesis 
confirms the view that, in this sector at least, the state has not withdrawn but rather 
that the form of state intervention has changed, in this case from direct provision to 
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funding and regulation. Regulation is particularly important here, since the evidence is 
that the impetus is towards more rigorous and more extensive regulation than has 
hitherto been the case. That the state may be changing the form of its intervention 
confirms the arguments of those like Weiss (1998,1997), who have emphasized the 
adaptivity of the state within changing economic conditions. The growing regulatory 
powers of the British state are particularly important since many writers (Weiss, 1998; 
Ruigrok & van Tulder, 1995) regard Britain as a weak state when compared to others 
such as Japan or Germany, yet in this sector at least it is increasing its power. 
As noted above, there are important complexities to this picture of the predominance 
of state power. Firstly, older people's organizations and unions may have ways of 
exerting influence which are alternatives to either direct bargaining with the fin-ns or to 
influencing state policy. The GMB and RCN, for example, both took a 'partnership' 
approach to organizing in the sector, which involved offering employers resources and 
advice with a view to exerting some influence over them. However, where this was 
successful, it was likely to be with smaller employers who had limited resources, rather 
than with large firms. Part of the strategy of older people's organizations, however, 
was to change broad attitudes towards older people and the way services should be 
delivered to them. The effects of this are diffuse and difficult to measure, and this 
thesis does not attempt to do so. Nevertheless, it is likely that recent changes in the 
overall 'climate of opffii0n', fostered in part by the organizations considered in the 
thesis, have influenced the decisions of all the case study firms to organize regular 
residents' and relatives' meetings within their homes. The older people's organizations 
also provided valuable services to older people relating to long term care, such as 
information and advice. 
There are also significant complexities to the relationship between the state and the 
firms, and to the outcomes of this. As noted above, state policies towards funding and 
regulation, as well as those which affect the labour market in the long term care sector, 
are against the immediate, narrowly conceived, interests of all firms, and may even 
lead to some large firms going out of business. It will almost certainly lead to some 
large firms being acquired by, or merging with, others. Yet these policies tend to have 
a more dramatic impact on small fin-ns, thus leading to still greater concentration 
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within the market. This greater concentration can only be in the long term interests of 
large firms in general, and increase their structural bargaining power in relation to 
other actors, including state agencies. 
It has also been argued that any new process of concentration is likely to be 
accompanied by the parallel process of internationalization which has been observed 
among these firms. This process of internationalization has also been facilitated by the 
state, since the New Labour goverm-nent has continued to pursue the liberal policies of 
its predecessors on international trade and investment. Thus, rather than having 
regulatory regimes which discriminate against foreign firms, as is the case in some 
countries (see Chapter Two), the government has supported supranational agreements 
and institutions which tend to reinforce liberal trade and investment policies. This is the 
case with both the WTO's General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the 
EU's public procurement rules. These might be considered institutional constraints on 
the actions of the government, as opposed to constraints imposed by the market itself 
However, as discussed in Chapter Five, they reflect rather than conflict with the 
government's worldview, and are voluntarily entered into. 
Despite the overwhelming power which the state has to shape the environment within 
which the firms operate, it may be the case that the firms are able to exert some 
influence over the state and its agencies. This can best be demonstrated in relation to 
regulation. There has been a broad consensus in favour of changes which remove 
inconsistencies in regulation. The firms themselves have played an active part in the 
development of this consensus, through forums such as the Continuing Care 
Conference and through direct lobbying. In addition, key figures such as the current 
chief executive of Company 3 (and former chief executive of Care First), 
Chai Patel, 
have headed influential bodies such as the Better Regulation Task Force and the 
Continuing Care Conference, and have won the respect of some of those working 
for 
older people's organizations. Firms, therefore, have made active efforts to 
influence 
the policy process. Rather than simply opposing regulation, as authors such as 
Levitt 
(1968) argue they are likely to do (see Chapter Two), they have sought to 
influence its 
shape. Once again, it is difficult to measure how successful they 
have been, but it is 
clear from Chapter Five that, in contrast to small 
firms, they broadly welcome the 
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forthcoming regulatory changes because they are likely to lead to more consistency. It 
is also clear from Chapter Five that the relationship between the firms and state 
regulatory agencies is marked by constant bargainmig, and this is unlikely to change 
after the implementation of the forthcoming reforms. 
It has been argued, therefore, that the primary outcome of state policies in the long 
term care sector has been, and is likely to continue to be, a process of concentration in 
the supply of privately provided services, an outcome which is in the long term 
interests of those large and internationalized firms which remain in business. The 
introduction by the state of more rigorous regulatory criteria has generally been 
accepted by these firms. Indeed, they have played an important role in exposing the 
inconsistencies of the current regulatory system. In part, this is because such firms 
were already nationally (and, of course, internationally) organized entities seeking to 
standardize their own services across a large geographical area. They therefore are 
acutely aware of inconsistencies between regulatory authorities, whilst having both the 
resources and the organizational capabilities necessary to meet more rigorous criteria 
where they are imposed. Indeed, Chapter Four showed that their internal QA systems 
mirror the requirements of the regulatory system, and sometimes exceed them. 
This has significant implications for the globalization debate, since whilst the state is 
the dominant partner, and its actions may be contrary to the immediate interests of 
even large and internationalized firms, they do not appear to be contrary to the long 
term interests of such firms. Rather the actions of the state appear to be fostering the 
development of such fin-ns. This tends to confirm the arguments of those like Weiss 
(1998,1997), who have argued that the state has been a facilitator of 
internationalization. It also appears to confirm the observation made in Chapter Two, 
that rather than there being a simple antinomy of interests between states and firms, as 
often assumed in the globalization debate, there may be a 'symbiotic' relationship 
between the two (see Mintzberg, 1979: 288). There is thus a symmetry between the 
4new managerialism' within the welfare state, and the organizational form of large and 
internationalized firms. This is unsurprising, since the ideas which inform this new 
managerialism originate within the private sector. However, they have been utilised by 
state agencies in the external regulation of private welfare providers. As suggested in 
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Chapter Two, therefore, the relationship between state and firms does indeed appear to 
be marked by a process in which the actions of each encourage a concentration and 
fon-nalization of the power of the other. 
The implications for long term care services in the UK of the processes of 
consolidation and internationalization discussed in this section will be discussed in the 
next section. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR LONG TERM CARE IN THE UK 
it has been argued above that state policies on long term care are likely to facilitate 
greater concentration and internationalization in the sector. However, this is not the 
stated aim of such policies, and therefore may be regarded as an unintended 
consequence of them. However, it cannot simply be regarded as a 'side effect', since 
there is a distinct economic logic to the process. The government is seeking the highest 
possible quality of care for the lowest possible cost, whilst also providing minitnum 
standards of protection for workers in sectors such as long term care which tend to 
employ 'flexible' labour on low wages. This combination of the highest possible quality 
of care and the lowest possible cost can best be provided by large firms due to the 
economies of scale which they can utilise, and for the same reason such firms are best 
able to meet the costs associated with higher labour market standards. Thus 
government policies in diverse areas affecting the sector push increasingly in the 
direction of provision by large firms, which are also increasingly internationalized. 
However, previous chapters show that there was a high degree of consensus attached 
to the proposed regulatory changes, with both the unions and older people's 
organizations broadly supporting them. Such support was based on the overt merits of 
these policies - i. e., they are seen as raising standards for the users of services - not on 
their consequences in increasing concentration and internationalization among firms in 
the sector. This is significant, since there was little detailed awareness of the 
internationalization of such firms among older people's organizations, and some 
reservations about provision by large fin-ns. The unions, and UNISON in particular. 
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were often sceptical about, or hostile towards, large and internationalized firms, 
although there was a perception that their size may make them easier to organize 
(despite their perceived anti-unionism). This section explores the implications for long 
term care in the UK of the dual processes of concentration and internationalization. 
This thesis has been centrally concerned with the issue of quality. Whilst the thesis 
has not attempted to evaluate directly the quality of care provided by the case study 
firms., previous chapters show that there are powerful incentives for large finns to 
maintain high standards of care. Chapter Four showed the importance to these firms of 
branding, which is dependent upon demonstrating high and consistent levels of care. 
Such consistency is achieved through strict control over the labour process through 
internal QA systems. In addition, all of the firn-is appeared committed to organizing 
residents' and relatives' meetings. The evidence from Chapter Four also indicates that 
the firn-is obtained significant benefits from their internationalization which may help to 
raise quality. Such benefits included access to more advanced information and 
communications technology, a wider pool of experience and expertise to draw upon, 
increased training resources and greater economies of scale. This was despite the use 
of practices in the US by Company 2's parent company, Company 2 (USA), which are 
widely regarded as unacceptable in the UK (issues relating to US practices are 
discussed below). 
Chapter Five showed that state regulators, even when organized on a local basis, 
have significant power in their relationships with such firms, since if lack of 'fitness' 
can be traced back to the owner this could potentially endanger the existence of the 
entire firm (or at least its care home operations within the UK). In practice this is 
highly unlikely to happen, both because of the pragmatic way in which inspectors go 
about their job, and because the firm would not allow this situation to be reached. In 
addition., any negative publicity arising from poor standards uncovered 
during 
inspection would do considerable damage to the firm. In practice, therefore, care 
homes run by these organizations are involved in a two way process concerning the 
quality of the care they deliver: one involving an internal relationship 
between the 
home and the fin-n's central QA personnel, the other involving a relationship 
between 
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the care home (backed up where necessary by the firm's central resources) and 
external regulators. 
The evidence therefore suggests that at present these fin-ns are likely to provide a 
standard of care which exceeds minimum official requirements. However, if the 
process of concentration continues as expected, three areas of concern can be 
identified. These are: firstly, the effects of increased ownership transfers; secondly, 
issues relating to standardization; and thirdly, the possibility of a decline in the quality 
of care resulting from the interaction of the regulatory system with large providers. 
These will be discussed in turn. 
Chapter Four showed that the process of merger and acquisition (M&A), which last 
peaked in 1997, involved significant problems for the two case study fin-ns which had 
predominantly grown in this way, in terms of cohering the various acquisitions into a 
single organization. These generally related to the issue of 'cultural fit' identified in 
Chapter Two. Company I's Bob Jones identified three main 'corporate pasts' and 
'about 20 different sets of policies and procedures' which needed to be cohered into a 
single whole. Furthermore, these problems went beyond simple organizational 
problems, involving also 'political' problems of rivalry between the three pasts which 
impacted upon the very shape of the QA system eventually adopted. This rivalry 
existed at 'every level', from the regions down to the homes. In part these problems 
were caused by the inability of one of the 'corporate pasts', Care First, to integrate 
successfully the two firms from which it itself had been formed. Company 2 had 
experienced sh-nilar problems in integrating its three constituent parts into a single 
whole, with Bartlett describing the process as causing, 4a lot of unrest and a lot of 
upheaval'. In addition to these organizational problems, the financial problems 
affecting Company 2's parent, Company 2 (USA), examined in Chapter Four, 
illustrate 
the increased uncertainty that may arise when the acquiring firm is based overseas. 
Both QA managers said these problems relating to the M&A process grew less over 
time, with Jones describing Company I as being in a, 'transitional phase of 
bringing it 
together'. Any new phase of M&A resulting from the pressures for rationalization 
discussed above is likely to disrupt these firms before they have fully settled 
into a new 
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way of working. Such transfers of ownership can have a significant effect on both 
residents and staff. This is the case for individual homes acquired by large 
organizations, as much as it is for existing firms acquired by larger ones, as is 
evidenced by Grant's comment that it was 'never easy' to integrate a pre-existing 
business once acquired. The potential effects on staff are evidenced by Company 2's 
loss of significant numbers of staff as a result of changed working practices after the 
merger (see Chapter Four). The process of ownership transfer also causes significant 
insecurity among staff. According to Bartlett, at the time of Company 2's merger, 
people were 'coming to terms with who, if you like, was going to end up in charge of 
[Company 2] or [Company 2 (USA)] or whatever it was going to be called... I think it 
was mostly being unaware of what was physically going to happen, and because they 
felt insecure it obviously affected some routines. ' 
The comments of Dianne Fenn in Chapter Five also indicate that changes of 
management at both the home and regional levels, which may result from ownership 
transfer or from internal reorganization or promotion, can also have a disruptive effect 
on the relationship with regulatory agencies: 
I'll just get one sort of case sorted out and the care manager understands the 
relationship ... you know how to ensure a good working relationship with staff 
and with GPs, when they're whisked off or they leave or somebody else comes 
in and you go through the whole thing again and then you find that the next 
one, above the local manager, has also changed and they haven't got any idea... 
Fenn's experience was that much hard work in raising standards within a particular 
home could be damaged when changes in management took place. Partly this was 
because the manager's relationship with his or her own staff had to be formed anew, 
and staff may in the meantime,, 'go back to their old ways. Frequent changes in 
management could also have an important impact on the attitude of staff- 
It's very sad to say, but in a big company where they feel they've got no 
conurýitrnent to anybody you know, and a lot of them think, 
A yes this is a 
very rich company they're always changing and they don't care about their 
299 
staff, there is absolutely... no commitment, they're not proud to be working for 
a particular firm or business. 
As Fenn made clear, both the continuity and the morale of staff have a profound 
impact on the wellbeing of residents. There are also additional reasons why the impact 
upon residents of ownership transfer may be potentially far more serious than it is for 
staff. It is well known that physically moving residents is severely disruptive of their 
lives and wellbeing, for emotional and psychological reasons as well as physical ones, 
in the worst cases resulting in fatalities. Ownership transfers are likely to increase these 
physical transfers, as the new owner rationalizes its internal provision and closes some 
homes. Chapter Four shows that this was the case with Company I's acquisition of 
Care First; as CCMN (November 1997) put it, the integration of Care First required 
'considerable reconfiguration'. The supplementary interview with Company I home 
manager Colin French, quoted in Chapter Four, also tends to indicate that following 
acquisition there is internal bargaining over which homes will close; in this case the 
home in question narrowly avoided being closed, instead receiving extra investment. 
However, even where homes are not closed, Chapter Four demonstrates that there 
will be considerable reorganization resulting in a change of regime for many homes. 
Such changes of regime brought about by ownership transfer may be just as disruptive 
of the lives and expectations of residents as physically moving them. How this is 
managed by the new owners is therefore crucial for the wellbeing of the residents. 
Three out of four of the respondents from older people's organizations were 
concerned about the potential impact on residents of what Garton called, 'where 
people live... being bought and sold over their heads' (see Chapter Seven). Les Martin 
of Counsel & Care gave some examples of the kinds of ways in which such changes 
could be disruptive for residents: 
... they will 
be small things in terms of the bigger policy issues but actually, in 
terms of the fives of the people who five there, which are defined by what time 
they get up in the morning, and what time they go to bed and what happens in 
between and they don't leave the house perhaps without any assistance ..... a 
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change of owner, a change of manager, a change of leadership can affect both 
the style and the substance of a service... 
This was one of the points Counsel & Care had made in their letter to the then 
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Department of Health, expressing 
particular concern, 'about residents who have experienced changes, often many 
changes in succession, in the ownership of the home in which they reside. ' Garton had 
been concerned that residents had no say in such changes: 'they're often not informed 
of the business decision, they've got no involvement, no preparation or reassurance if 
necessary. ' Issues associated with ownership transfer should thus be a key area of 
consideration in future policy decisions. 
The second area of concern relates to issues of standardization. As noted above, there 
is considerable evidence that large and internationalized firms maintain a generally high 
standard of care. They do this through the operation of the QA systems discussed in 
Chapter Four. This involves standardising their 'product' across all outlets (i. e. 
homes), and such standardization is an important feature of its marketing (i. e. 
branding). This is the 'McDonald's' approach discussed in Chapter Two. Concerns 
arising from this process of standardization relate primarily to the possibility of 
effective local monopolies or oligopolies emerging. As discussed above, if forthcoming 
regulatory changes lead to a significant reduction in the numbers of small owners 
operating in the market, this will significantly alter the 'balance of power' between the 
remaining large firms and purchasing authorities in some areas. Les Martin claimed 
in 
Chapter Seven that some local authorities were already colluding with large firms, in 
order to reduce costs, in a way which damages choice. VVhilst Martin 
did not provide 
any concrete evidence of this, it is certainly the case that any 
future shift in the 
direction of local monopolies will have important implications 
for choice. 
This question of choice was a particularly important 
issue for older people's 
organizations. As Martin pointed out, the Community 
Care refonns aimed at 
increasing choice. Opening up provision to private providers was seen as a 
key way of 
accomplishing this, since state services were often considered 
to be monopolistic and 
provider driven (Grfffiths, 1988: 7). It would thus 
be an irony if the outcome of the 
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government's attempts to raise the quality of care, whilst restricting the avdflabiHty of 
funding, were to lead to 'community' care being delivered primarily by large and 
internationalized firms offering standardized services. Whilst the process of 
concentration may not go that far in the near future, there is a very real possibility of 
localized monopolies coming to undermine choice. Thus the relative reduction of small 
providers may lead some areas to lose the perceived advantages associated with them. 
As Company I's Bob Jones put it, 'Usually what's special about [small providers] are 
there are a lot of people where the owner is the manager and lives and runs it... It's like 
going to a real cosy seaside bed and breakfast where you feel real homely, real 
comfortable, versus going into a Trusthouse Forte... ' 
This issue of standardization is also related to the issue of bureaucratization which 
large organizations are prone to. According to Jones: 'the only way to run large 
organizations [is] with a bureaucracy... So inevitably we've ended up with perhaps 
more of a bureaucratic structure than any of the pasts had... We have to have a level of 
central control because if we didn't we would lose it, because it is that big. ' Company 
I had tried to mitigate the negative aspects of standardization and bureaucratization by 
allowing home managers some level of autonomy, but it is clear that the larger the 
organization is, the more it will be prone to bureaucratization. Such bureaucratization 
sits uncomfortably with the concept of 'community care'. 
The evidence from the QA managers quoted in Chapter Five also shows that where 
homes run by large firms do manage to retain some individuality, this may be 
undem-lined by regulators demanding changes which undermine the attempt to create a 
'homely' environment. Bartlett, for example, spoke of regulators being dissatisfied 
with a home in Newcastle which did not meet physical standards, such as those 
concerning single rooms and en suite facilities, but provided residents with the 'cosy' 
environment they favoured. This may, of course, be an argument which ain-is to 
justify 
inadequate provision. However, this question of the effect of regulation on the quality 
of care provided, especially where the company being regulated 
is a large one, relates 
to the third area of concern, i. e. the possibility of a decline in quality resulting 
from the 
interaction of regulation with large providers. 
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This third area of concern relates to research done on the nature of the regulatory 
system in the US in the early 1990s, referred to in Chapter Two. Braithwaite (1993) 
showed that the introduction of strict structural input standards in the US in the 1970s 
hastened concentration within the industry, as is likely to be the case in the UK. Large 
companies could most effectively meet the standards by building large homes which 
made use of economies of scale in provision. However, as discussed in Chapter Two, 
according to Braithwaite (1993) the combination of large homes (where management 
is separated from actual care provision) and input regulation resulted in 'ritualism' (i. e. 
fuMing formal requirements regardless of the outcomes for residents), and the 
adoption of a 'disciplinary' approach to residents based on control and risk avoidance. 
Large homes came to embody the worst aspects of instutionalization. As discussed in 
Chapter Five, the new NRS in the UK concentrate on both process and structural input 
measures (both of which tend to favour large providers), although there is explicit 
reference to the outcomes which these are expected to result in and designated means 
for checking this. This is in contrast to the Australian regulatory system, which is based 
on a radical orientation towards outcomes (Braithwaite et al, 1993). 
As is shown in Chapter Four, the case study finns' internal QA systems are based 
primarily on process considerations. As has already been argued, these tend to go 
beyond the minimurn requirements of the current regulatory system. This is in contrast 
to Braithwaite's observations of care in US homes at the time of his research (1993: 
40), where 'most corporate quality assurance programs demand no more than 
is 
required by government regulation. ' If government policy ultimately facilitates 
concentration in the UK market to the extent whereby local monopolies 
do emerge, 
and if this is matched by a trend towards larger homes, it is possible that the 
standardized care within such homes may also move in a 'disciplinary' 
direction. 
Where large firms face less competition, the market-based incentives to Provide high 
quality care will be reduced. This shifts more responsibility onto the regulatory system 
to facilitate and sustain high quality. If regulators pay inadequate attention to actual 
outcomes, they may provide an incentive for ritualistic behaviour. 
None of this is inevitable, of course. Even with a greater degree of concentration 
than 
is currently the case, there may be cultural and historical reasons why care 
in the UK 
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does not develop in this way, especially considering the role older people's 
organizations and others have played in raising awareness of such issues. The 
prevalence of litigation in American society, for example, is an important factor in 
encouraging restraint as a way of avoiding the risk of accident and injury (Braithwaite, 
1993: 43), which does not exist in the UK to the same extent. In fact, physical restraint 
is widely regarded as unacceptable in the UK. In addition, the NRS place some 
importance on 'discussion with residents' as a means of providing evidence that 
standards have been properly implemented. This is likely to provide some protection 
against ritualism, although the reluctance of some older people to complain must be 
acknowledged (see William & Keating, 1998), as well as the difficulty some residents 
may have in articulating themselves (see Chapter Seven). 
However, as Braithwaite et al (1993: 52) suggest, there may be a need for 'constant 
reinvigoration' of the regulatory system (see Chapter Two). The US experience 
demonstrates the importance of continually monitoring the interaction between the 
regulatory system, the structure of the industry, and quality outcomes for residents. A 
number of respondents interviewed for this thesis had some sympathy with the idea 
that regulation should move beyond a concern with the quality of care delivered in 
homes, to encompass also companies as whole organizations, or with the idea that the 
market structure of the sector as a whole should be monitored and regulated. There is 
some evidence that forthcoming government reforms are moving in this direction, but 
the issue needs to be given more, and clearer, attention. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has shown that the thesis has important implications for the globalization 
debate, as wel-I as for long term care in the UK. There is a process of concentration 
within the UK market for long term care, which is being accompanied by a parallel 
process of internationalization. Far from being powerless, the state has been shown to 
be the dominant actor in shaping this process of concentration. The implications for 
long term care involve concerns about the effects of ownership transfers, 
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standardization, and the quality of care arising from the interaction of the regulatory 
system with large providers. 
The thesis has demonstrated the applicability of micro and meso levels of analysis to 
the debate about globalization and social policy, where a macro level of analysis 
usually dominates. Micro and meso levels of analysis are particularly appropriate when 
studying privately provided services. The meso level of analysis allows for relationships 
between actors to be examined in their true complexity, and the determinism which 
characterizes some other approaches to be avoided. The thesis has also demonstrated 
the fruitfulness, if not necessity, of an interdisciplinary approach to the study of 
globalization and social policy. 
APPENDIX ONE 
THE BARGAINING ARENA IN RUIGROK & VAN TULDER'S MODEL 
--- 
Bargaining 
Source* Ruigrok &van Tulder (1995 -. 68) 
APPENDIX TWO 
INTERVIEW RESPONDENTS 
Primary Interviews (Respondent, Position, Date and Place of Interview) 
Bob Jones: Head of Quality Assurance, Company I Care Services. 
(13.11.98, Company I Care Services Headquarters, Leeds) 
Jane Bartlett: Quality Assurance Manager, Company 2. 
(30.10.98, Company 2 Care Home, Bromley) 
Margaret Grant: Professional Services Manager & member of Board of Directors, 
Company 3. 
(20.11.98, Company 3 Offices, North Wales) 
Maria Smitham: Nursing Homes Registration & Inspection Manager, East Albion 
Health Authority. 
(14.5.99, East Albion Health Authority Head Office) 
Dianne Fenn: Nursing Homes Registration & Inspection Manager, West Albion 
Health Authority. 
(18.6.99, West Albion Health Authority Head Office) 
Adam Warden: Local Services & Community Care Manager, Albion County Council 
Social Services Department. 
(19.8.99, Albion Social Services Head Office) 
Gordon Saydon: Strategic Commissioning Manager, Albion County Council Social 
Services Department. 
(29.9.99, Albion Social Services Head Office) 
Julia Owen: Senior Project Manager (Americas), Invest in Britain Bureau. 
(11.5.99, IBB Headquarters, Department of Trade & Industry, London) 
Kevin Fenton: Research Officer, UNISON / Public Sector Privatization Research 
Unit. 
(30.7.98, UNISON Headquarters, London) 
Steve Morton: Director of Policy & Research, UNISON. 
(21.10.98, UNISON Headquarters, London) 
Peter Stephens: National Officer (Healthcare), UNISON. 
(4.3.99, UNISON Headquarters, London) 
Mike Gresham: National Secretary Public Services Sector, GMB / APEX 
and Laura Pole, Research Officer, GMB / APEX. 
(8.3.99, GMB Headquarters, London) 
Louise Saber: Independent Sector Advisor, Royal College of Nursing. 
(22.3.99, RCN Headquarters, London) 
Tom Douras: Trade Group Secretary (Health), TGWU. 
(Telephone interview, 18.3.99) 
Tessa Garton: Director of Policy, Help The Aged. 
(18.12.98, Help The Aged Headquarters, London) 
Ian Davis: Business Advisor, Help The Aged. 
(18.12.98, Help The Aged Headquarters, London) 
Evelyn Edwards: Director of Information & Policy, Age Concern England. 
(12.1.99, Age Concern Headquarters, London) 
Alison Alexander: Advice Coordinator, The Relatives Association. 
(3.2.99, Relatives Association Head Office, London) 
Les Martin: Deputy General Manager, Counsel & Care. 
(5.2.99, Counsel & Care Head Office, London) 
Supplementary Interview 
Colin French: Care Home Manager, Company 1. 
(25.5.99, Company I Care Home, Hastings) 
Positions of those not responding to interview reguest 
National Organizing Officer (Long Term Care), National Pensioners' Convention. 
Nursing Homes Registration and Inspection Manager, Birmingham Health Authority. 
Nursing Homes Registration and Inspection Manager, North Essex Health Authority. 
Nursing Homes Registration and Inspection Manager, West kent Health Authority. 
Nursing Homes Registration and Inspection Manager, North Nottinghamshire Health 
Authority. 
APPENDIX THREE 
EXAMPLES OF INTERVIEW GUIDES 
Example 1: Company OA ManaRers 
Note: Interview questions were derived from the research questions detailed in Chapter Three, which were themselves informed by the discussion in Chapters One and Two. Interviews with company QA managers involved questions relating to both the 
micro level of analysis and the meso level of analysis ('firm specific' aspects). 
Interview schedules were also constructed to take into consideration the 'flow' of the 
conversation from one topic to another. Interview questions do not, therefore, 
necessarily follow the same chronological order as the research questions from which 
they were derived. 
1: Could you tell me what your job involves? 
Q. 2: Could you explain how your QA systems work? 
Q. 3: Do residents have any input into, or involvement with, quality assurance? 
Do you have residents' / relatives' meetings? 
How effective are these? 
QA How do you think your QA arrangements are different to those of other firms? 
Q. 5: I understand the company has recently gone through a process of merger and 
acquisition. What has been your experience of this ? 
Has it had any impact on your QA systems? 
Q. 6: Your company is a large organization. Do you think this gives it any particular 
advantages or problems? 
Are econon-ýes of scale an advantage? 
Q. 7: I understand the company has international links. What advantages or problems 
are associated with this? 
Q. 8: What is the relationship of the UK division / care division to the company's 
headquarters? 
Are financial targets set from the centre? 
Q. 9: In your experience, is there any tension between the profit making goals of the 
company and the quality of service goals? 
10: Are state purchasers the main source of funding for the company? 
1: What is your assessment of the current regulatory arrangements? 
Are these adequate in your experience? 
What changes would you like to see? 
12: Does the company belong to a provider association? 
What benefits does this provide? 
Are these associations a means for political lobbying? 
13: How would you describe staff relations within the organization? 
What mechanisms do you use to motivate the staff? 
14: How are pay rates deterrnined (localized or national rates)? 
Do you think the introduction of the National Minimum Wage will affect the 
company? 
15: How easy do you find it to attract enough adequately trained staM 
What internal training arrangements do you have? 
16: Is their any union organization within the company? 
What is the company's attitude to this? 
17: Are there any changes you would like to see to the provision of long term care? 
18: Is there anything else you would like to add? 
Example 2: RMondents from Non-Firm Organizations 
Note: Interviews with respondents from non-firm organizations relate to the meso level 
of analysis. The interview guide given here represents the basic template for questions 
put to these respondents. As explained in Chapter Three, differences between the non- 
firm actors, and sometimes between individual roles within the same organization, 
meant that the actual questions put to particular respondents may have varied from this 
template to some extent. 
1: Could you tell me what your job involves? 
Q. 2: What are the goals of your organization? 
Q. 3: What is your assessment of the overall shift to private provision in long term 
care? 
How has this affected users of these services? 
Q. 4: How aware are you of the size of the leading fin-ns in the sector? 
Q. 5: How aware are you of the level of internationalization of these? 
Q. 6: What is the attitude of your organization to these firms? 
Q. 7 Do you know much about large fin-ns' internal QA mechanisms? 
Q. 8: How do you think quality can best be monitored ? 
Q. 9: How effective do you think the current regulatory arrangements are? 
Do you think there is a case for large firnis to be treated differently from 
smaller providers in any way? 
10: What is your assessment of the 'Modernising Social Services' White Paper? 
1: How do You organize in this sector? 
12: What is the extent of your organization in this sector? 
Q. 13: Has your organization encountered any problems in pursuing its goals in this 
sector? 
Q. 14: Does your organization belong to any international associations, or have any 
international links? 
What benefits has it gained from this? 
15: Do you have any experience with the case study firms? 
Can you give examples? 
Q. 16: In your experience, in what ways are the case study firms different to each 
other? 
17: In your experience, how are these large fin-ns different to smaller providers? 
18: Are there any changes you would like to see to the provision of long term care? 
19: Is there anything else you would like to add? 
Q. 20: Is there anyone else you think I should talk to? 
APPENDIX FOUR 
UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTS 
Company Annual ReDorts (AR) and Reviews 
TC Group / Care First Annual Report 1996 
Company I Annual Report 1997 
Company 1 Annual Review 1997 
Company 2 (USA) Annual Report 1996 
Company 2 (USA) Annual Report 1997 
Company 2 (USA) Annual Report 1998 
Company 3 Annual Report 1997 
ANS Annual Report 1998 
Other Annual Reports and Reviews 
Age Concern Annual Review 1998-1999 
Age Concern Annual Report 1998-1999 
Counsel and Care Annual Report and Review 1998/99 
Eurolink Age Annual Report 1998-1999 
Help Age International Annual Review 1998/1999 
Other Documents 
Company I Care Homes 'Quality Review for Nursing and Residential Homes' 
West Albion Health Authority Application Forin for Registration of a Nursing Home 
(& Guidelines) 
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